Last week, the United States sanctioned a transnational network for its involvement in a multi-year scheme aimed at supplying spare helicopter parts—and even a complete U.S.-made helicopter—to the armed forces of Iran’s regime.
In 2024, the U.S. government had also targeted several individuals involved in the same scheme through a civil forfeiture case.
Since then, the Haroon Research Institute began investigating the helicopter parts supply network serving Iran’s regime.
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The complaint associated with the forfeiture case shows that this network used intermediaries in Western Europe, a coordinator in Dubai, and a series of international transactions to conceal its ultimate destination—the Iranian regime’s armed forces.
The new U.S. sanctions list does not directly name one of the main suppliers based in New Jersey; however, Haroon’s investigation indicates that some helicopter components produced by this company were sent not only to Iran’s military-industrial sector but also to firms tied to Russia’s military structure.
The new U.S. sanctions, announced on October 1 following the reactivation of UN sanctions, represent Washington’s latest step to restrict Iran’s regime military supply chains.
Links Between “Pasargad Parvaz Kish” and Two Companies Based in Uruguay and Portugal
The U.S. Department of the Treasury identified the Iranian company Pasargad Parvaz Kish and its CEO, Mehdi Shirazi Shayesteh—active in Iran and Germany—as key figures in this network.
The state-owned Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA) repeatedly requested helicopters and spare parts from Pasargad Parvaz Kish, which fulfilled these orders through a transnational procurement network.
The ownership structure of Pasargad Parvaz Kish is directly linked to Iran’s regime sanctioned financial networks. Among its shareholders is Arzesh Afarinan Pasargad, the investment arm of Bank Pasargad, which has already been blacklisted by Washington.
In addition to Iran, the supply network included several intermediaries and facilitators in Turkey, Portugal, and Germany—all of whom have now been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury.
One of the key figures in this network is Amir Hossein Salimi, an Iranian partner of Shirazi Shayesteh and the CEO of “Perfect D” based in Uruguay.
According to the civil forfeiture case, Shirazi Shayesteh and Salimi agreed in May 2021 to launch a joint project in Portugal using their companies. They identified an existing business owned by a Portuguese citizen, Antonio Mira, and renamed it “Business United Unipessoal LDA.”
According to the complaint, their first move was to purchase a U.S.-made helicopter. Business United initially bought the helicopter, then transferred it to Perfect D, which ultimately delivered it to Pasargad Parvaz Kish.
Role of a U.S. Company in Supplying Helicopter Parts to Iran’s Regime
Cobra International, based in Union City, New Jersey, describes itself on its official website as a supplier and exporter of spare parts and services for both military and civilian sectors.
According to the civil forfeiture case, between 2021 and 2023, Business United conducted about seven transactions with Cobra International on behalf of Pasargad Parvaz Kish and, in late 2023, wired $209,000 to Cobra to purchase a second-hand helicopter engine.
Court documents also reveal that Cobra purchased this engine from a Chinese company.
According to the Haroon Institute, in 2022, Cobra sold helicopter parts worth $54,500 to Business United, but the latter requested that the shipment be sent to Nordic Air and Heli Invest in Sweden.
After the shipment arrived in Sweden, a company called Aviation Network transferred the parts to Pasargad Parvaz Kish in Iran.
Western Efforts to Target Sanctions-Evasion Networks
The helicopter parts supply network, relying on multilayered intermediaries, brokers in third countries, and seemingly legitimate front companies in Western Europe, illustrates the growing complexity of illicit chains that support sanctioned military programs.
Washington’s new measures reveal a shifting trend: Western authorities are now focusing not only on end users but also on the facilitators who enable such transactions.
