A leaked “confidential” document from the Iranian regime Presidential Institution reveals that Tehran has spent an estimated $50 billion on supporting the Assad regime during the Syrian war. Only the repayment of approximately $18 billion has been determined, not in cash, but in the form of projects and plans that lack both technical and economic justification and executive guarantees.
Reports emerged on May 29 revealing that the Iranian presidency’s website and internal servers were targeted by a group of Iranian dissidents codenamed “GhyamSarnegouni” (meaning “Rise to Overthrow” in Farsi).
Confidential documents released earlier by the group indicated that the Iranian regime’s budget spent during the ten-year Syrian war goes beyond $50 billion. Now, this group has released another document indicating that the Iranian regime is having a hard time reclaiming its debts from the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
The new document is a report titled “Determining the Fate of Iran’s Investments in Syria and Repayment of Debts,” prepared by the Deputy for Economic and Infrastructure Coordination and Monitoring of the Vice President in February. Its examination shows no certainty regarding the implementation of certain defined projects.
According to this document, Tehran’s claims against Damascus are divided into two categories: military and non-military claims.
In the non-military claims section, it is stated that the Iranian regime, in addition to oil exports to Syria, has also provided cash to the government of Bashar al-Assad during the ten years of the Syrian war.
The report specifies that as a result of a document signed by the Syrian Minister of Economy and Trade and the former Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development (Rostam Qassemi) in October 2022, it is planned that approximately $18 billions of non-military debts of Syria to Iran will be repaid over a 50-year timeline, according to a schedule.
- Out of the eight projects listed in this “confidential” report from the Iranian regime’s presidency, the timing of three projects is not specified, and two projects are still uncertain. For the other four projects, Iran is expected to spend $947 million to collect its dues from the Syrian government after 50 years.
- For example, the list includes a phosphate mine with a capacity of 1.05 billion tons, which was agreed upon in 2015.
- Iran needs 530,000 tons of phosphate rock annually in the agricultural sector, some of which is supplied through imports. According to the agreement, Iran is supposed to receive part of its dues over 50 years by investing $125 million in this mine, which will be completed over a period of three years.
- Apparently, this contract was implemented in 2018, and by the end of February, 2.05 million tons of phosphate have been extracted from this mine.
- Another “definite” contract is related to Block 21 oil field with a reserve of 100 million barrels of oil in the city of Homs. Iran is supposed to invest $300 million over a 30-year contract starting from 2020 to receive $3.4 billion of its debts from Syria over 30 years.
- Another definite contract is Block 12 in Bukamal, which is a 30-year contract with the Syrian government. According to this report, no action has been taken regarding this contract yet, but it is predicted that with a $300 million investment over five years, it will bring a total income of $3 billion to Iran over 30 years.
- The other project is the launch and operation of the third mobile operator in Syria, a project for which the execution time is not even specified. It is only announced that Iran is supposed to spend $222 million to launch the third mobile operator in Syria so that this project can be operational after three years. On paper, the duration of Iran’s operation in this project is stated as 20 years, and a projected revenue of $1.5 billion is also announced.
- The fifth listed project is the “payment of a five-year share of Lattakia Port’s revenue.” According to this document and the agreement reached with the Syrian government, Iran’s share has been received in 2019 and 2020, and apparently, the process of these payments should continue for 20 years.
- The sixth project is related to the port of Hamidieh, the fate of which is not specified, and it is only mentioned in this report that the project is under negotiation.
- “Five thousand hectares of agricultural land” is the title of the seventh project agreed upon by the governments of Iran and Syria. The report states that the draft contract for this project has not yet been signed. This project apparently intends to repay $25 million of Syria’s debt to Iran over 25 years.
- Finally, the seventh project is called “Zahed Livestock Farm.” The start date of the operation of this project is unknown; however, it is stated that through this project, $7 millions of Iran’s claims from Syria will be repaid over a period of 25 years.
The total required investment by Iran for these projects is stated as $947 million, and according to the estimates in this report, this investment is expected to eventually settle $17.932 billions of Syria’s debts to Iran.
The most noteworthy aspect of this report is the “predicted” duration of debt repayment, which is stated as ten 5-year periods. This means that it is projected that $18 billions of Syria’s debts will be paid to Iran over a period of 50 years through Iran’s investment in these projects at 3- and 5-year intervals.
To provide a general understanding of these amounts, it should be noted that $50 billion is equivalent to 15% of Iran’s total gross domestic product (GDP) and is comparable to one and a half years of the government’s general budget.
Risky and ambiguous negotiations
In the continuation of the analysis of this document, there are other interesting points. According to the report from the Deputy for Economic Coordination and Supervision of the Office of the Vice President, these projects have been selected from a list of 130 projects presented by the Syrian government, and the other projects are currently under review and site visits.
However, the report emphasizes that these “main projects” are the ones mentioned, indicating that despite Iran’s $50 billion expenditure in support of Bashar al-Assad during the 10-year war in Syria, only a few secondary projects have been allocated to Iran. Moreover, these projects require significant investment and time for their operation, and according to the same confidential report, they do not have significant capacity for the reimbursement of Iran’s claims.
The most important point in this report is the uncertainty regarding the guarantee status for these projects. The report explicitly states that the Syrian government’s guarantees are not valid and approved, and Syrian banks do not have the ability to issue guarantees.
According to this document, Iranian banks also cannot provide guarantees to private sector for their activities in Syria due to the lack of banking relations and the high risk associated with guarantees issued by the Syrian side. This means that the risk for private sector activities in Syria, to which promises of investment were made, is high, and only the government and the Khatam-al Anbiya Central Headquarters can accept such project risks.
This document also states that the “Khatam-al Anbiya central Headquarters,” the economic arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is expected to pursue the receipt of economic claims from Syria.
Unquantifiable Military Claims
Part two of Iran’s demands from Syria in the “confidential” report from the Vice President’s office pertains to military claims. The report explicitly states that there is no information available regarding the specific amount of Syria’s military debts to Iran.
The report emphasizes that military claims, in addition to being subject to significant considerations on the part of the Syrian government, have not yet been finalized by domestic entities, and there is no definitive figure to rely on.
The report does not provide further explanation regarding the “considerations,” which could potentially involve disagreements between the two parties. Additionally, the responsibility for pursuing military claims has been assigned to the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
An examination of Iran’s budget laws over the past ten years reveals that a portion of the resources required for the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards’ military section has been defined under a category called “Noor Rabi” (Light of Spring) in the annual budgets.
This budget category is only identifiable in the annual budgets of Iran between the years 2019 and 2021, while in the budgets preceding and following this period, it has been consolidated under other sections of the Revolutionary Guards’ budget.
According to reports by the United Nations, during the first ten years of the Syrian civil war, in which the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards also participated, over 307,000 civilians were killed. This war also resulted in 12 million displaced individuals, leading to the destruction of cities and the economic foundations of the country. According to some reports, approximately 80 percent of the population of Syria fell below the poverty line.
Nevertheless, Assad’s military performance did not yield the desired outcome for the Iranian regime. It is now evident that it will take 50 years for a portion of Iran’s $50 billion in public wealth, which could have been the foundation for Iran’s development, to be repatriated to the country. Furthermore, even this amount is not certain and is subject to the conditions and contingencies outlined in the same document.
The presence of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards in the Syrian civil war and its support for Bashar al-Assad were carried out on the orders of the regime’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei, under the command of Qasem Soleimani.
