The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 32 individuals and entities based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine for operating procurement networks supporting the Iranian regime’s ballistic missile and drone production.
John K. Hurley, U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, announced the sanctions on Wednesday, November 12, saying that the Iranian regime abuses global financial systems to launder money, purchase components for its nuclear and weapons programs, and support its proxy groups worldwide.He said: “At the direction of President Trump, we are putting maximum pressure on Iran to end its nuclear threat.”
The Trump administration official added: “The United States also expects the international community to fully implement UN snapback sanctions on Iran to cut off its access to the global financial system.”
Washington Sanctions 26 Companies Linked To Tehran, Including U.S. Chipmaker Subsidiaries
According to the Treasury Department’s statement, the newly sanctioned individuals and companies pose a threat to commercial shipping in the Red Sea and to U.S. forces and their allies in the Middle East.
Purchase of missile fuel raw materials
In its latest action, OFAC sanctioned a multinational network known as “MVM Partnership” for supplying chemical materials to the Iranian regime’s missile program.
Since 2023, this network, in coordination with Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI)—a subsidiary of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization—has been purchasing sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid from China.
These materials are used to produce solid-fuel propellants and resins used in ballistic missiles.
Since its establishment, the MVM network has purchased and transferred hundreds of tons of these materials from China to Iran.
The U.S. Treasury also sanctioned Marco Klinge, based in the United Arab Emirates, and Majid Dolatkhah and Vahid Qayumi, based in Iran and Turkey, respectively, for their roles in this network.
Klinge conducted purchases from China and India and collaborated with the Chinese company China Chlorate Tech; Dolatkhah acted as the liaison between Parchin and Klinge, while Qayumi managed domestic chemical operations and communications with Iranian companies.
Additionally, the companies EVA, Framlane, MVM Amici, Zagros Shimi Far, Furqan Novin Pars, and VGGW were added to the sanctions list for being owned by or cooperating with these individuals.
In a February report, the Financial Times revealed that two Iranian vessels carrying over 1,000 tons of solid rocket fuel materials were en route from China to Iran, with the shipment destined for delivery to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Bandar Abbas.
Supplying critical drone components for the IRGC Quds Force
OFAC also sanctioned several individuals and companies linked to the Iranian firm Kimia Part Sivan (KIPAS), which has cooperated with the IRGC Quds Force in its drone program.
The Iranian company Bespar Pouya (Pardo), a subsidiary of KIPAS, has produced and repaired drone components through early 2025 and maintained contact with personnel affiliated with KIPAS and the Quds Force.
Pars Novandishan (ARIAPA), another KIPAS front company, provided technical support for drone production, including the development of electronic systems.
Both Bespar Pouya and Pars Novandishan were sanctioned.
