Reza Pahlavi, who is commonly referred to in Iranian political discourse as the “shah’s son,” claimed in remarks delivered at the Swedish parliament on April 13 that what has happened in Iran is a revolution against the 1979 revolution. In other words, Reza Pahlavi claims that in their recent uprisings from 2022 to 2025, the people of Iran are pursuing demands and ideals that stand in direct opposition to those of 1979. From a scientific and sociological standpoint, can such a claim even be valid? What does a revolution actually mean? Has sociology ever identified such a phenomenon in its historical record?
A revolution is always an action formed against the existing order and political system, and in reaction to current crises—not a reaction to a historical revolution that occurred in the past and has already concluded.
From this perspective, the phrase revolution against a revolution is conceptually contradictory. A revolution is a historical event and cannot itself become the direct subject of political action; what can become the target of protest or revolution is the political system that emerged from that revolution. This distinction is of central importance in analyzing many historical transformations. For example, in the French Revolution, developments after 1789—including the Reign of Terror or even the restoration of the monarchy—are never interpreted as a revolution against the revolution, but rather as different phases of the revolution’s consolidation or deviation from its course. The same pattern can be seen in the Russian Revolution, where developments after 1917, from the civil war to Stalinism, are understood not as a negation of the revolution but as its reinterpretation and at times its deviation.
Historical Analysis of the 1979 Revolution
If we extend this theoretical framework to Iran, it becomes clear that the 1979 revolution must also be understood as a historical process involving a set of demands and social coalitions, not as a closed and static point that can be treated as the object of absolute negation or affirmation.
However, one of the important characteristics of revolutions is the gap between their original ideals and their institutional outcomes. Many theorists of revolution have pointed out that revolutions often face a return to concentrated power or a restriction of freedoms during the process of consolidating authority. This phenomenon is not exceptional but part of the internal logic of revolutions, because under unstable conditions political forces turn to centralization to preserve order. Under such circumstances, the gap between society’s expectations and the political system’s performance widens, creating the basis for new protests. As was seen in Iran’s revolution, Khomeini exploited a historic opportunity created by the shah’s repression of radical and revolutionary social forces, stole the people’s revolution and the democratic forces’ movement, and imposed a medieval dictatorship over Iran’s people—a dictatorship that had no relation whatsoever to the people’s revolution.
Within this framework, the uprisings and social transformations in contemporary Iran can be analyzed as a reaction to this very historical betrayal by Khomeini and the surviving elements of his political system. The demands raised in Iranian society today—from civil liberties and citizenship rights to democracy and women’s liberation—not only are not in conflict with the initial slogans of the 1979 revolution, but in many cases reflect those same demands under new conditions.
From the perspective of historical sociology, social transformations occur cumulatively and in layers. No revolution takes shape in a vacuum, and no movement is ever completely severed from its past. Even movements that define themselves in opposition to the past are, in practice, nourished by previous concepts, experiences, and discourses.
Why Does a Revolution Against a Revolution Never Occur?
Another important point is that revolutions usually form against perceived injustice and the loss of legitimacy in the existing political system. These concepts relate to the present condition, not to the historical past. When the gap between society’s expectations and the government’s performance widens, the capacity for social mobilization rises, making protest movements or even revolutionary movements possible. Here too, the main issue is the existing order. Even if that order has roots in a revolution, what is challenged is the current structure and performance of a fascistic dictatorship, not the revolution itself as a historical event.
Therefore, it can be said that Reza Pahlavi’s description of a revolution against the 1979 revolution is a form of simplification and even conceptual distortion that ignores the complexity of social transformations. He either fundamentally lacks any understanding of social change or is deliberately feigning ignorance. By ignoring the distinction between a revolution and the post-revolutionary system, this expression tries to imply a complete rupture, while theoretical and historical evidence points instead to a form of continuity and reinterpretation between the people’s current demands and the demands of 1979.
From the perspective of political science and sociology, revolutions are understood not as endpoints but as the beginning of long-term processes of social transformation. These processes may include periods of progress, regression, deviation, or reconstruction, but they always remain connected to one another. On this basis, the current developments in Iran should also be understood as part of this historical process—a process that began in 1979 and is still evolving.
