The New York Times
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THE PREAMBLE
Notes recent examples of Iran’s ignoring the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Security Council, including building the uranium enrichment plant near Qum and enriching uranium up to 20 percent. Also notes serious concerns over the role of the Revolutionary Guard Corps in proliferation activities.
Recalls the need for countries to exercise vigilance over Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, to prevent transactions that contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
Also notes the potential connection between revenue from Iran’s energy sector and the financing of possible nuclear proliferation activities.
Notes some technology in the energy sector can echo technology used in some sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.
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MAIN TEXT
Repeats the long-standing demand that Iran suspend enrichment and other proscribed nuclear activities.
Repeats need for Iran to cooperate fully with the I.A.E.A.
–Obligated Iran to comply with its safeguards agreement with the I.A.E.A. that allows for surprise inspections of suspected nuclear activity.
Obliges Iran not to construct new enrichment facilities.
Bans Iran from investing in sensitive activities including uranium mining, enrichment or ballistic missile related activities. Countries would be obligated to prohibit such investment.
Adds new conventional arms restrictions. Countries would be prohibited from making sales to Iran from eight categories of heavy weapons: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems. They would also be prohibited from providing any assistance, training for these items.
Countries are called upon to exercise vigilance and restraint in supplying any arms to Iran.
Prohibits Iran from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Other countries would be prohibited from providing any technology or assistance related to ballistic missiles.
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Other provisions
Subjects some companies and individuals connected to the Revolutionary Guard an asset freeze and possible travel bans. Calls upon countries to exercise vigilance over transactions involving the Revolutionary that could contribute to proliferation activities.
Establishes a comprehensive new framework for voluntary cargo inspections both in ports and on the high seas if there is reasonable information to suspect that the vessel is carrying prohibited cargo like conventional arms, sensitive nuclear or missile items.
Obligates countries to seize and dispose of any prohibited items found and bars them from providing critical support services like bunkering to ships suspected of carrying such prohibited cargo.
To limit Iran’s ability to evade sanctions, countries are asked to provide information related to steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Iran’s air cargo division to evade sanctions, including the renaming of vessels (a technique that has been employed in the past).
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Financial, commercial and banking measures
These measures apply when a state has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to Iran’s nuclear proliferation or sanctions evasion.
States would be called upon to block any financial transaction, including those related to insurance or reinsurance tied to proliferation.
States would be obligated to require their nationals to exercise vigilance when doing business with Iranian entities including the Revolutionary Guard and Iran Shipping Lines if such business could contribute to proliferation.
States would be called upon not to allow licensing of Iranian banks on their territory if there is a connection to proliferation, as well as correspondent banking relationship.
States would be called upon not to allow their banks to open branches in Iran if there is a connection to proliferation.
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Provisions to enhance implementation sanctions (including prior rounds)
Establishes a United Nations panel of experts to monitor implementation of sanctions and recommend ways to improve enforcement.
Restates a commitment to dialogue.
Notes that an incentive package from June 2008 remains on the table.
As in previous resolutions, says that the measures would be suspended or terminated if Iran cooperates fully with the I.A.E.A.
