With the introduction of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new leader of Iran’s regime and the release of his first official message, Iran’s political atmosphere has entered a new phase. The message, issued under extremely critical circumstances amid ongoing war and mounting internal and external pressures, has been viewed by many observers as an attempt to consolidate the position of the new leadership.

The message included a range of political and military positions—from emphasizing the continuation of the war and threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz to speaking about opening new fronts and stressing the presence of Basij forces in the streets. However, a closer examination of the message suggests that behind the aggressive rhetoric and authoritarian slogans, signs of concern and crisis within the power structure can also be observed.

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The first key point in the message is the attempt to establish the legitimacy of the new leadership. Following the death of Ali Khamenei and the discussion surrounding succession, a major question has been whether transferring power to his son could gain consensus within the regime’s power structure.

One of the main objectives of Mojtaba Khamenei’s message appears to be conveying that the transfer of power occurred within a legal framework and with the support of official institutions. His reference to being chosen by the Assembly of Experts—the body constitutionally responsible for selecting the supreme leader—and emphasizing the support of government officials appears to be an effort to respond to criticisms that view the new leadership as an example of hereditary power transfer within the system of clerical rule.

Mojtaba Khamenei Surrounded by Crises

However, the way the message was released has itself raised questions. The statement was published without any image or video, which some analysts interpret as a sign of caution—or even concern—at the highest levels of power. At moments like this, political leaders typically attempt to demonstrate their authority through public and symbolic appearances. The release of a non-visual message could therefore indicate the sensitivity and complexity of the political situation within the ruling establishment.

Another major theme in the message is the emphasis on continuing the war. The new leader has attempted to portray the ongoing conflict as a necessity for defending the country and even as the will of the people.

However, this claim does not align well with social realities in Iran. Numerous reports of protests and public dissatisfaction suggest that a significant portion of society is unhappy with the continuation of the conflict and its economic and human consequences.

In such circumstances, insisting that the war reflects the people’s decision appears less like a reflection of social reality and more like an attempt to legitimize the continuation of the regime’s military policies.

Another key element of the message is the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz. This threat has long appeared in the political and military rhetoric of Iran’s regime and is usually highlighted during periods of heightened tension with global powers or regional countries. However, the implementation of such a threat would have far-reaching consequences for the global economy as well as Iran’s own economy.

Closing the Strait of Hormuz would not only disrupt the main route for transporting a large portion of the world’s oil but would also severely affect Iran’s own oil exports. For this reason, many experts view the threat more as a tool of political and psychological pressure rather than a realistic operational option.

Opening New Fronts in the War

At the regional level, Mojtaba Khamenei’s message also reflects an effort to demonstrate Iran’s power and influence. The reference to opening new fronts and using allied forces in the region is part of a strategy that Iran’s regime has pursued for years to expand its influence across the Middle East. However, the current regional situation and international pressures may increase the costs of such an approach for the ruling establishment.

Perhaps the most important part of the message is the emphasis on domestic issues and the role of Basij forces in “maintaining the scene.” This section indicates that concerns about protests and internal unrest remain one of the regime’s main worries.

Emphasizing the presence of Basij forces and loyal elements in the streets is essentially an attempt to maintain social control and prevent the expansion of potential protests. In recent years, the government has repeatedly faced large waves of protests, and this experience has made the control of the streets one of its top priorities.

Overall, Mojtaba Khamenei’s first message represents a mixture of displays of authority and signs of concern. On one hand, the aggressive tone and emphasis on continuing the war and issuing regional threats are attempts to portray strength and stability under the new leadership.

On the other hand, the repeated focus on domestic issues and the role of repressive forces suggests that concern about the internal situation remains one of the regime’s most significant challenges. For this reason, the message not only reflects the future direction of the ruling establishment but also reveals the depth of the political and social crises it faces.

Amid escalating military tensions in the Middle East, officials in the British government have warned about widespread attacks by Iran’s regime. The UK Defense Secretary presented a report to the House of Commons, the lower chamber of the British Parliament, outlining the scope of these attacks. He described the actions as dangerous, reckless, and indiscriminate. His report included statistics on missile and drone attacks as well as the military response by the United Kingdom and its allies.

The UK Defense Secretary’s report on attacks by Iran’s regime

During a session of the UK House of Commons, John Healey, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence, presented a report on recent developments in the region. He said Britain’s policy toward the actions of Iran’s regime is based on three principles. The first principle is defending British forces and interests in the region. The second is full coordination with NATO allies and regional partners. The third is adherence to legal foundations in military decision-making.

IRGC and Basij Checkpoints Targeted in Drone Attacks in Various Cities

According to him, the United Kingdom has been deploying military equipment to the region since January. Typhoon fighter jets, F-35 fighter aircraft, radar systems, and counter-drone teams were stationed at various bases. These measures were taken before the start of the recent clashes involving Iran’s regime.

The UK Defense Secretary stated that the recent attacks by Iran’s regime have been very extensive. He said that on the first day of these attacks alone, targets in 10 countries were struck. Some of these targets were military, but civilian facilities were also damaged. Among the targets were hotels in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and in Bahrain, as well as Kuwait International Airport in Kuwait.

According to the report, British forces stationed at a US military base in Bahrain were only a few hundred meters away from the impact site of one of the missiles fired by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran’s regime. In addition, a drone that was likely launched from Lebanon or Iraq struck a British base in Cyprus.

Statistics of missile and drone attacks by Iran’s regime

The UK Defense Secretary announced that Iran’s regime has so far launched more than 500 ballistic and cruise missiles. In addition, more than 2,000 drones have been used in these attacks. These strikes have targeted several countries across the region.

He also said that even after Masoud Pezeshkian, the president of Iran’s regime, apologized to Persian Gulf countries, the attacks continued. In one of these attacks, Bahrain was targeted and 32 civilians were injured. In another attack, a water desalination facility was damaged.

The UK Defense Secretary emphasized that the British government fully condemns the attacks by Iran’s regime. He said these actions have endangered the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. Among those at risk are British citizens and members of the country’s armed forces.

The United Kingdom’s military response to threats from Iran’s regime

Continuing the report, the UK Defense Secretary described Britain’s military actions to counter threats from Iran’s regime. He announced that British F-35 fighter jets shot down several Iranian drones over Jordan. Typhoon fighter aircraft also destroyed targets that were heading toward Qatar.

British counter-drone units also repelled several additional attacks against coalition bases in Iraq. These actions were carried out in the framework of defending British forces and regional allies.

Concerns about the expansion of the regional crisis

The UK Defense Secretary also expressed concern about rising tensions in Lebanon. He stated that Hezbollah is an organization affiliated with Iran’s regime. According to him, the group represents a serious threat to regional security.

In the report presented to Parliament, the defense secretary emphasized that the current crisis in the Middle East could have far-reaching consequences. He said Britain’s adversaries are closely monitoring developments in the region. Under such circumstances, the British government is seeking to protect its forces and its interests.

Amid escalating clashes, reports indicate that checkpoints belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia were targeted in drone attacks in several cities across Iran; attacks that, according to regime sources and field reports, have left significant casualties among security forces.

Fars News Agency, which is affiliated with the IRGC, reported that preliminary investigations indicate Israeli drones were launched to target checkpoints in Tehran. According to the report, in attacks on the evening of Wednesday, March 11, in several parts of the capital, at least 10 security and Basij forces stationed at checkpoints were killed. According to the outlet, checkpoints in District 14 (Mahallati Highway), District 15 (in front of Hashemabad gas station), District 16 (Fadaiyan Eslam Street), and District one (the end of Artesh Boulevard) were among the locations directly targeted.

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Field reports also indicate continued attacks on checkpoints in Karaj. According to one witness, several checkpoints in the city were targeted and the sound of drones flying overhead was heard in the sky. Reports have also emerged about checkpoints being targeted in Fardis, a city in Karaj County.

In Tehran as well, residents reported drones flying over the areas of Velenjak, Niavaran, and Dorous. Witnesses say air defense systems and security patrols were activated to counter the drones but were unable to shoot them down. At the same time, reports indicate that in some locations, including near Tajrish Square, forces stationed at checkpoints temporarily removed the barriers and left the area.

Similar attacks have also been reported in other cities. According to local sources, a Basij checkpoint on Amir Kabir Boulevard in Shiraz was targeted in an attack early Thursday morning. Videos published from the city of Qorveh in Kurdistan Province also show that Basij and IRGC bases in that city were targeted in aerial attacks.

Meanwhile, the Israeli military announced that dozens of its fighter jets, based on precise intelligence, targeted a series of IRGC command centers, internal security bases, Ministry of Intelligence facilities, and military infrastructure in Tehran and other parts of Iran. According to the Israeli military, during these attacks individuals operating in an IRGC command center in Tehran were identified and targeted within seconds after being detected.

According to the statement, the targets included command centers of the IRGC Aerospace Force, a complex at Imam Hossein Military University (an IRGC-affiliated military academy in Tehran), Basij and IRGC bases, and facilities used for the storage and production of ballistic missiles. The Israeli military stated that this operation is part of the current phase of attacks aimed at damaging the operational infrastructure and key capabilities of Iran’s regime.

At the same time, some figures close to the government have also referred to casualties at the checkpoints. For instance, Meysam Motiee, a pro-regime cleric and political figure, announced that in an attack on a checkpoint at the end of Artesh Boulevard in Tehran, four people were killed and about 10 others were wounded.

In response to these developments, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of the Majlis (parliament) of Iran’s regime, published a message calling on people to remain present in the streets. Addressing the people of Iran, he wrote: “Your presence in the streets has confused and angered the enemy. This small soldier of yours has three requests from you: the streets, the streets, the streets. Your children in the armed forces are risking their lives to defend Iran—strengthen their position by holding the streets.”

Scattered reports from various cities across Iran indicate that checkpoints, which in recent weeks had been widely deployed in neighborhoods and streets, have become one of the main targets of aerial and drone attacks; a development that regime sources say is intended to reduce the presence of security forces in the streets.

On Wednesday, March 11, as clashes in the region continued, new developments occurred in the military and security sphere. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) warned in its latest statement that Iran’s regime is using civilian ports along the Strait of Hormuz for military activities, a move that the command says could place civilian lives at serious risk.

According to a statement released by the United States Central Command, known as CENTCOM, the naval forces of Iran’s regime have stationed their ships and military equipment inside ports that are normally used for commercial shipping traffic. The command emphasized that such actions could expose civilians and port workers to the risk of military attacks.

Khamenei’s Five-Kilometer Underground Shelter in the Heart of Tehran

In this context, CENTCOM urged Iranian civilians to immediately distance themselves from all port facilities where the regime’s naval forces are present.

At the same time as this warning, reports emerged of airstrikes inside Iran. Images released on Wednesday show that several locations in northern Tehran were targeted by air attacks. Reports accompanying these images refer to areas including Pasdaran, Dowlat, and Qolhak neighborhoods. Precise details about the extent of damage or possible casualties have not yet been released, but the strikes indicate the continuation of military operations against targets linked to the regime’s security and military structures in Iran’s capital.

In another development, U.S. President Donald Trump said in a brief interview with the news website Axios that the war with Iran’s regime may soon come to an end. In the five-minute interview, he said that almost nothing remains to be targeted and added that whenever he decides, the war could end. Trump also emphasized that some smaller targets remain in different locations, but according to him the course of military operations is approaching its final stage.

According to U.S. officials, in recent days several targets linked to the presence of foreigners in Iraq—including hotels, foreign businesses, and diplomatic facilities—have come under attack. It has also been reported that the U.S. Embassy building in Baghdad was targeted by a rocket attack in recent days.

At the same time, the U.S. government has increased political pressure on the Iraqi government to curb the activities of militias affiliated with Iran in that country and to push Baghdad to distance itself further from Tehran’s policies.

Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Sinking of 16 IRGC Mine-Laying Vessels

As airstrikes against the regime’s military targets continued, serious threats and warnings about the possibility of minelaying in the Strait of Hormuz—one of the world’s most strategic waterways—became one of the main focuses of recent developments.

In the most significant development, Donald Trump issued a warning to Iran’s regime in a message on Truth Social, stating that any mines placed in the Strait of Hormuz must be removed immediately. He emphasized that if such actions have been carried out and the mines are not removed, Tehran will face unprecedented military consequences.

This warning came as the United States Central Command, known as CENTCOM, announced that its forces had destroyed several vessels belonging to the naval forces of Iran’s regime, including 16 mine-laying boats near the Strait of Hormuz.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense of the United Arab Emirates announced that the country’s air defense systems intercepted and destroyed missiles and drones launched from Iran. These developments indicate that the scope of tensions has extended to other countries in the region.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced the continuation of its missile operation called “True Promise 4” and said that new waves of attacks had been carried out. However, U.S. military officials say the intensity of Iran’s missile attacks has decreased in recent days. A senior Pentagon spokesperson stated that about 140 American soldiers have been wounded since the start of the war.

Inside Iran, the security atmosphere has also intensified. The regime’s prosecutor general warned that “any cooperation with the enemy” abroad would be met with confiscation of property and heavy punishments and called on citizens to report suspicious cases to the prosecutor’s reporting system. At the same time, the commander of the regime’s Law Enforcement Force threatened that any protest gathering during wartime conditions would face severe crackdowns.

On the other hand, the World Health Organization warned that attacks on oil facilities could cause a phenomenon known as “black rain,” which could create serious respiratory problems for residents of affected areas.

Meanwhile, some diplomatic sources at the United Nations reported that the representative of Iran’s regime has claimed that in the recent bombings about ten thousand civilian locations were destroyed and more than 1,300 civilians were killed figures that have not yet been confirmed by independent sources.

After images were released by the Israeli army showing underground tunnels linked to Ali Khamenei, the former supreme leader of Iran’s regime, rumors that had circulated for years about the existence of such a shelter once again drew attention. The images show a network of tunnels stretching several kilometers and passing beneath various areas, including medical centers, schools, and residential buildings.

On March 6, shortly after heavy strikes on central areas near the Pasteur government complex in Tehran—where key offices of the Iranian regime, including the presidential office, are located—the Israeli army released a video of this underground shelter. In the video, a structure resembling an underground city can be seen; a shelter that is reportedly intended to remain in use by remaining regime officials even after Khamenei’s death.

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Analysis of the released images using online tools suggests the length of these tunnels is about five kilometers. According to Alireza Zakani, the mayor of Tehran, and members of the Tehran City Council, the cost of constructing each kilometer of metro tunnel in Tehran at current prices is estimated on average between 50 to 60 thousand billion rials (about 31 to 36 million dollars). However, this amount only covers basic construction work and does not include interior finishing, equipment, internal landscaping, or underground facilities.

Based on these figures, the cost of excavating five kilometers of underground tunnels is estimated at roughly 250 to 300 thousand billion rials (approximately 150 to 188 million dollars). Given the classified nature of the project and its security requirements, the real cost may have been several times higher than that of building a normal tunnel.

Under normal conditions, tunneling contractors in Tehran are able to excavate about 10 meters of tunnel per day. Therefore, constructing such a complex would require at least about 500 days, which is roughly equivalent to 17 months. Considering the project’s level of secrecy and additional equipment requirements, the actual construction time was likely longer.

Estimates indicate that the central facilities of this tunnel network are located at a depth of 40 to 50 meters, and this section lies directly beneath the Shahid Shorideh Medical Center.

The central core; beneath a medical center

In the released video, the central section of this shelter complex appears southwest of the presidential building. The location lies directly beneath the “Shahid Shurideh” Medical Center, a facility affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture Jihad of the Iranian regime that began operating in 1985. In practice, this medical center is considered part of the Pasteur government complex.

From the northwest, this section connects to another entrance of the complex at the end of Rajabi Street, a point located about 200 meters from Shahid Shurideh Hospital.

One of the entrances is also located beneath a building opposite the Karimeh Ahl al-Bayt Clinic, near Hor Square in central Tehran.

The easternmost entrance; beside a girls’ elementary school

The easternmost entrance of this tunnel network is located in the Sheikh Hadi neighborhood on Valiasr Street beneath the Jami multi-story parking structure. This parking facility is built next to the Hejrat Girls’ Elementary School, and about 100 meters away is the Saheb-al-Zaman Boys’ Elementary School.

At the northernmost point of the network is the 12 Farvardin multi-story parking structure, located on Jomhouri Street at the corner of 12 Farvardin Street and Danesh Street.

An entrance beneath a mosque beside a school

Another entrance to these tunnels is located west of Pasteur Square, between the Hor Metro Station and Pasteur Square. This entrance is situated beneath a mosque called Tawhid Mosque. Next to the mosque there is a building, and behind it stands the Kadkhodaei Boys’ Elementary School.

About 200 meters from this location, another entrance lies on the southwest side of Pasteur Square along Daneshgah-e-Jang Street. Nearby are the Karimeh Ahl al-Bayt dental clinic and the Karimeh Ahl al-Bayt medical clinic across from it. The “2 Farvardin” pharmacy belonging to the Iranian regime’s army is also located close to this point.

Entrance beside a football school

The westernmost entrance of this tunnel network is located beneath a small building next to the office responsible for issuing hunting firearm permits. On the eastern side of this building, a football training school has been constructed directly adjacent to it, and the surrounding area contains densely packed residential complexes.

This area is located near the intersection of Sepah and Kamali streets, on Kashan Street at the end of Fourth Street. These tunnels are also located close to the Yas and Namjoo residential complexes, which are affiliated with the Iranian regime’s army.

Amid growing public discontent and the looming threat of nationwide protests, the Iranian regime has intensified its security measures, combining a near-total internet blackout with heavy militarization of the streets in a desperate bid to prevent a new uprising.

According to NetBlocks, a global internet monitor, Iran is currently experiencing one of the most severe internet disruptions recorded globally. The organization reported that the country has been largely offline for nearly a third of 2026. Since the onset of the recent conflict on March 9th, ordinary citizens’ access to the global internet has plummeted to roughly 1%, with over 240 hours of continuous blackout.

⚠️ Update: At 240 hours, #Iran's internet blackout is now among the most severe government-imposed nationwide internet shutdowns on record globally, and the second longest registered in Iran after the January protests, with the country having spent a third of 2026 offline. pic.twitter.com/LPoVkOI9MM

— NetBlocks (@netblocks) March 10, 2026

Highlighting this deliberate digital isolation, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani admitted that internet access is being selectively provided only to those who can “deliver the voice to the world”—a clear indication that the regime is monopolizing the narrative through its state-approved propaganda channels while keeping the public in an information blackout.

To further suppress any organizing efforts, state security forces have launched a sweeping wave of arrests. Ahmad-Reza Radan, the commander of the regime’s police force, announced on the evening of March 10th the arrest of 82 citizens accused of “sending materials to and communicating with foreign media.” Simultaneously, the notorious Ministry of Intelligence claimed the arrest of 30 others on fabricated charges of “espionage and collaborating with the enemy.”

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Acknowledging the heavy militarization of urban areas, Radan confirmed that security forces are deployed around the clock. He issued a direct, lethal warning to deter citizens from protesting, stating explicitly: “If anyone wants to come to the streets, all our forces are ready with their fingers on the trigger.”

These threats coincide with widespread reports of heavy security presence, multiple checkpoints, and a suffocating atmosphere across major cities. Activists and the Coordinating Council of Iranian Teachers’ Trade Associations have described the atmosphere in Tehran as that of a “military barracks” filled with intimidation and fear.

International observers note that this dual strategy—imposing total digital isolation coupled with the explicit threat of lethal force—exposes the Iranian regime’s deep-seated panic and vulnerability over the prospect of a popular revolution aimed at ending the dictatorship.

Mojtaba Khamenei, the second son of Ali Khamenei, was introduced on Sunday evening, March 8, as the third leader of the Iranian regime. A figure who for years had been one of the most influential unofficial actors within Iran’s ruling system and played an important role in the regime’s hardline power core has now officially succeeded his father.

Although he rarely appeared in public and for years tried to remain a mysterious behind-the-scenes figure, he was the key person in a network structure that connected security institutions and the project of transferring power. He operated “in the shadows” for many years, but his influence could be traced during moments of crisis, from the disputed 2009 presidential election to periods of war.

The Succession Crisis of Ali Khamenei and the Prospect of Overthrow

From Mashhad to the Supreme Leader’s Office

Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei was born in 1969 in Mashhad and is the second son of Ali Khamenei. His family belonged to the Shiite clerical establishment and rose from the margins of religious seminaries and politics to the center of power in the Iranian regime after the 1979 revolution.

Ali Khamenei’s elevation to the position of leader of the Iranian regime in 1989 marked a turning point in Mojtaba’s life. He went from being the son of a president and well-known cleric to the son of the regime’s supreme leader. During those years he continued his seminary studies in Tehran and Qom, the main centers of the regime’s religious education, and became known as a cleric.

Political Influence Without an Official Position

Mojtaba Khamenei never held an official position in the government or the formal power structure of the Iranian regime. He was neither a minister, nor a member of parliament, nor a publicly recognized commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Nevertheless, Western media have described him as a behind-the-scenes power broker and one of the most influential figures within the ruling clerical establishment. Despite his very limited public presence, he influenced decision-making processes through the inner circles of the office of the supreme leader.

In analytical discussions, he has been portrayed as a figure without an official signature but a gateway to the regime’s leader, the coordinator between the leader and security institutions, and transmitting messages at critical moments.

Who could meet Ali Khamenei, at what time, and with what agenda often affected the outcome of many decisions. Reports indicate that Mojtaba Khamenei played a significant role in managing this access and the behind-the-scenes coordination.

Alongside figures such as Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, the chief of staff of the leader’s office, and Vahid Haghanian, a senior executive figure in that office, he was considered part of the shadow network surrounding the leadership. This network of clerics and security-administrative managers served as a channel through which many of the regime’s main domestic and foreign policy lines passed.

This position led many accounts to compare him with the role played by Ahmad Khomeini, the son of regime founder Ruhollah Khomeini, during the early years of the government. Ahmad Khomeini was also known for acting as a liaison between the leader’s household and political and security institutions, although the network Mojtaba Khamenei built over the years has been described as broader in its connections with military and economic institutions.

Ties With the IRGC and Security Institutions

Almost all credible reports about Mojtaba Khamenei share one common point: his close, deep, and long-term relationship with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly its security branches. Over two decades, he developed strong relationships with IRGC commanders—from the Quds Force, responsible for foreign operations, to the Basij militia and the IRGC Intelligence Organization—and these ties increased his influence within the country’s political and security structure.

When the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned him in 2019, it stated that Ali Khamenei had delegated part of his responsibilities to Mojtaba and that he acted on behalf of the leader. The official statement referred to his cooperation with commanders of the IRGC Quds Force and the Basij in advancing the regime’s regional objectives and its domestic repressive goals.

Elections and Internal Power Struggles

Mojtaba Khamenei’s name became linked to presidential elections and internal power struggles within the ruling system from the mid-2000s.

He was widely seen as one of the behind-the-scenes actors involved in the unexpected rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential election. Mehdi Karroubi, one of the candidates, wrote an official letter to Ali Khamenei complaining about Mojtaba’s role in supporting Ahmadinejad—an allegation the leader rejected but one that remained in the political memory of critics.

During the disputed 2009 election and the subsequent crackdown on protests, some media reports claimed that Mojtaba coordinated with the IRGC and the Basij militia and played an active role in managing the response against protesters.

During the 2022 protests following the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini in the custody of the regime’s morality police, his name again appeared in slogans and analyses by critics and became a symbol of the role of the IRGC and the security apparatus in suppressing demonstrations.

U.S. Sanctions and the Formal Recognition of an Unelected Role

In the fall of 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned a network of individuals close to Ali Khamenei. In its official statement, the group was described as a shadow network of the leader’s military and foreign policy advisers.

Regarding Mojtaba, it was clearly stated that although he had never held any government position and had no elected or appointed office, he acted on behalf of the leader and had been entrusted with some of Ali Khamenei’s responsibilities.

Succession and the Problem of “Crown-Prince Rule”

Years before Ali Khamenei’s death, the scenario of his succession had become a central focus for analysts, and Mojtaba’s name repeatedly appeared at the top of the list of possible successors—especially after the death of Iranian regime president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024, which changed the balance among potential contenders.

However, these same factors highlighted another problem: the accusation of establishing a hereditary succession in a system that was founded with anti-monarchy slogans.

The issue of his clerical rank also stood alongside this political sensitivity. He was mostly known by the clerical title “Hojjat-ol-Eslam,” and although some seminary-affiliated media in recent years began referring to him as “Ayatollah,” this title remained controversial among parts of the clergy and the public. Similar debates had also existed regarding Ali Khamenei’s religious authority in 1989.

A similar claim is also contested regarding the former Shah of Iran and his son. The son of the former Shah, like the son of the former leader of Iran, claims the right to reclaim the throne and has highlighted this issue in the political arena while supporting foreign war.

Some compare Mojtaba Khamenei and his rise to leadership after his father with the son of the Shah.

However, all of this will only have meaning if he and the government he now heads survive attacks by the United States and Israel, manage to emerge from shelters, and appear in practice as the leader of the Iranian regime.