Shahram Kalantari, head of the Iranian Pharmacists Association, pointed to the heavy debts of insurance companies and the Subsidy Targeting Organization to pharmacies and announced that 80% of the country’s pharmacies are on the verge of bankruptcy.

On Sunday, August 17, in an interview with the state-run Fars News Agency, Kalantari said: “The Subsidy Targeting Organization has not made any payments since February, and the debts of this organization along with the debts of insurance companies to pharmacists have exceeded 300 trillion rials (approximately 322.58 million dollars).”

Medicine Shortages In Iranian Pharmacies And Online Sales

He added that many private pharmacies, due to bounced checks, have practically been pushed out of the drug supply cycle, and distribution companies no longer cooperate with them.

These remarks come at a time when the rising prices of medicine and medical services in recent months have placed increasing pressure on citizens, especially low-income groups.

Meanwhile, a number of sick citizens, under the current circumstances, have given up on buying medicine and pursuing their treatment.

50% of the pharmaceutical market is monopolized by state-owned pharmacies

The head of the Pharmacists Association further stated in his interview that there are more than 17,000 pharmacies in Iran, of which about 16,000 are private.

Kalantari added that nevertheless, 50% of the pharmaceutical market is controlled by 1,700 state-owned pharmacies.

He continued: “Pharmaceutical companies, because they cannot collect payments from state-owned pharmacies and medical universities, put pressure on private pharmacies and significantly reduce their settlement deadlines.”

He put the amount of bounced checks of pharmacists at 40 trillion rials (approximately 43 million dollars) and added: “Any pharmacist whose check bounces can no longer practically obtain a checkbook, and in effect, distribution companies no longer work with such pharmacists, do not sell them products, and these pharmacies head toward bankruptcy.”

Criticism of “online drug interventions”

The head of Iran’s Pharmacists Association also criticized “online drug interventions” in Iran and warned about its consequences.

Kalantari said: “No matter how much we explain that medicine is not a commodity that we should allow patients to obtain through platforms, no one listens. Or they buy from centers whose origins are completely unknown.”

He stressed: “The sale of medicine must be under strict supervision, and the related data and information should be monitored on servers located in the Ministry of Health.”

According to Kalantari, the issue of online drug sales currently has supporters in the Article 90 Commission of Iran’s parliament, and even the head of this commission supports it.

Masoud Pezeshkian, the president of the Iranian regime, has ordered the implementation of the “Speculation and Arbitrage Tax Law.” The legislative process for this law began in 2020, and it aims to tax half of the increase in the value of citizens’ assets caused by inflation during its first two years of enforcement.

The “Speculation and Arbitrage Tax Law,” which was approved by the regime’s Majlis (parliament) on June 29, was formally enacted by Pezeshkian on Friday, August 15.

Since the 1980s, the Iranian regime has sought to impose taxes on citizens’ capital gains from assets such as property, cars, gold, and foreign currency, but these attempts had never been put into practice.

Only $1.5 Million Paid Out of $70 Million in Taxes Owed by Luxury Homeowners in Iran

The law covers real estate, vehicles, gold, jewelry, silver, platinum, foreign currency, and cryptocurrencies. To enforce it, the Ministry of Economy is required to create an intelligent system that links to the registries of deeds, the stock exchange, customs, and the Central Bank in order to track transactions subject to taxation.

First two years: taxing citizens on inflation

Although the regime’s state-run media welcomed this law with headlines such as “Considering the effect of inflation for the first time,” evidence shows that the government also intends to tax the burden of inflation itself. In practice, during the first two years, citizens will be taxed not only on profits but also on 50% of the increase in asset prices caused by inflation.

For example, if a citizen purchased an apartment in 2024 for 50 billion rials (about $54,000), and due to 40% inflation, its value rises to 80 billion rials (about $86,000) in 2025, the 30 billion rial price difference would be considered profit.

Out of this 30 billion rials, 20 billion comes from inflation. According to the law, 10 billion rials (half of the inflation effect) plus 10 billion rials of actual profit would be subject to taxation. In this way, during the first two years of enforcement, the government will also be taxing inflation itself.

However, the text of the law includes numerous exemptions from paying taxes.

Details of the new law

According to the law, the sale of taxable assets within one year will be subject to a tax rate of 20% to 40%. Sales between one and two years will be taxed at 10% to 15%, and sales after more than two years will be taxed at lower rates.

The first residential property and one vehicle per family are exempt, as are agricultural, livestock, industrial, and mining properties used for production. Family transfers, inheritances, and legally registered settlements are also exempt.

In some sections of this 28-article law, penalties are foreseen, including preventing deed transfers, bans on commercial activity, and fines of up to twice the owed tax.

Through this law, the Iranian regime seeks to offset the effects of its recent regional setbacks and international sanctions by imposing heavy taxes on the people. In Iran, however, the largest financial transactions and assets are controlled by regime institutions, all of which remain tax-exempt.

In recent days, Mohsen Paknejad, the Iranian regime’s oil minister, announced the introduction of a type of “special super gasoline” to be imported by the private sector and sold at specific stations for more than 50,000 tomans (500,000 rials / $0.50) per liter. He simultaneously stressed that this has no connection to rationed gasoline or the existing prices of 1,500 and 3,000 tomans (15,000 and 30,000 rials, roughly 1.5 to 3 cents) and that the 60-liter monthly quota for vehicles will remain unchanged.

On the surface, the government seems to be targeting specific consumers—particularly luxury car owners and those demanding higher-quality fuel. In reality, however, this decision raises serious questions about the future of Iran’s subsidy policies and the likelihood of a broader increase in gasoline prices.

The continuous devaluation of the rial and lack of investment in refining capacity have forced the Iranian regime, despite its claims of self-sufficiency, to rely on gasoline imports. According to regime officials, about $8 billion was spent on fuel imports last year alone.

The social experiment model

In political economy, one method governments use to gauge public reaction to price reforms is through limited trial projects. The sale of imported gasoline at 50,000 tomans fits this framework. Oil officials insist that this fuel is only for specific consumers and unrelated to subsidized quotas. However, this move can be interpreted as a form of “social conditioning,” gradually nudging people to accept that the real price of fuel is far higher than current subsidized rates.

From a behavioral perspective, the aim of creating a “dual pricing” system between subsidized and free-market gasoline could push society toward accepting gradual price increases. The November 2019 protests showed the regime that any sudden, across-the-board price hikes can trigger severe and costly social backlash. For this reason, establishing incremental price tiers starting with specific groups is likely the strategy the government is pursuing. In the 2019 nationwide protests, the Iranian regime killed 1,500 people.

The Anniversary of Iran’s Bloody November 2019 Protests

Budgetary pressure and political signals

Iranian regime president Masoud Pezeshkian and members of his cabinet have repeatedly stated that they do not intend to raise fuel prices for the “underprivileged.” At the same time, however, Pezeshkian and other officials have often criticized the “disproportionate consumption of wealthier groups,” questioning why these groups should receive subsidized gasoline. This contradiction shows that while the government fears the social consequences of price hikes, it also fully recognizes that the current policy is financially and economically unsustainable.

Given the regime’s chronic budget deficit, recurring energy crises in both winter and summer, and the heavy costs of fuel imports, the pressure to raise gasoline prices is greater than ever. The introduction of 50,000-toman gasoline by the private sector may be the first step in this process—a step presented as “liberalization for luxury vehicles” but one whose consequences will inevitably spread to society as a whole.

Although regime officials currently insist that subsidized gasoline prices will remain unchanged, economic evidence and political signals indicate that sooner or later, the debate on raising prices will extend to the general level. Pezeshkian’s government faces a choice: either continue bearing the financial burden of fuel subsidies and cover deficits by printing money and fueling inflation or take the difficult path of price reforms.

The increase in gasoline prices is less about providing a luxury fuel for certain cars and more a sign of a potential shift in the Iranian regime’s energy policies in the near future—a shift that could bring broad economic and social consequences.