The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed on Wednesday that Iran had followed through on recent threats to produce uranium metal, a key component of nuclear warheads. The report comes just days after Iranian Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi delivered remarks via state media which indicated that the Islamic Republic might actively pursue nuclear weapons capability if “pushed” by pressure from the US and its allies. 

Alavi’s statement flew in the face of the regime’s longstanding official position that the Iranian nuclear program is intended only for the “peaceful” purposes of power generation and scientific research. In fact, the Intelligence Minister directly cited one of the main sources of support for that argument, a fatwa issued by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on December 12, 2010, which suggested that nuclear weapons were contrary to Islam. But in downplaying the fatwa’s potential impact on future Iranian decision-making, Alavi seemed to corroborate prior rebuttals by the likes of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which argued that the fatwa was neither binding nor permanent, and was most likely intended only to mitigate Western opposition while the regime inched closer to a short “breakout time” for a nuclear weapon. 

Western attitudes toward the notion of a peaceful Iranian nuclear program have been varied, as evidenced by the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and the backlash against it. While the Obama White House and fellow negotiating powers permitted Iran to retain scaled-back nuclear enrichment operations, those who were most skeptical of Iran’s intentions were also keen to protest that these activities should have been ended altogether. That sentiment was a driving force behind the Trump administration’s decision, in 2018, to pull out of the deal that its predecessor had spearheaded. 

When President Trump was seeking reelection last year, he argued that the Iranian regime was looking to his opponent, who had been Obama’s vice president, as a possible lifeline in the wake of the economic hardship inflicted by the Trump administration’s re-imposition and expansion of US sanctions. Indeed, Joe Biden hard signaled during the presidential campaign that he would be willing to return the US to the agreement, even as Trump insisted that Iran was on the verge of economic collapse and would swiftly concede to more comprehensive demands if maximum pressure persisted into 2021. 

Read More:

We May Produce Nuclear Weapons if We Are Forced To

Whether or not Trump was correct about this, Tehran was evidently frustrated by Biden’s refusal to immediately reverse his predecessor’s policies after taking office. While the new administration is still leaving the door open for a return to the nuclear deal, it has also insisted that Iran has to act first by reversing the various steps that it has taken in violation of the agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 

The US withdrawal from that agreement was followed by a grace period after which sanctions began to be phased back in starting November 2018. Shortly thereafter, Iran acquired stockpiles of nuclear material in excess of what is allowed under the JCPOA. Further violations proceeded in a series of strategic steps until early 2020 when the regime announced that it no longer intended to comply with any of the imposed restrictions. 

This prompted the deal’s European signatories – Britain, France, and Germany – to trigger a dispute resolution mechanism. But the leadership of the European Union expressed willingness to draw that process out indefinitely, thus leaving the US as the only party exerting serious pressure on the Islamic Republic while the deal remained on life support. However, this still did not stop Iranian officials from complaining about Europe’s role in the dispute or insisting that the EU take measures to explicitly undermine US sanctions. This desire to divide Europe against America was reiterated by Hossein Deghan, currently the only candidate for Iran’s forthcoming presidential election, in a recent interview with The Guardian. 

“To be crystal clear, the Europeans have absolutely no independent stance from America any longer,” Deghan declared in the context of rejecting the notion the EU or its member states might act as mediators in discussions aimed at resolving the dispute between Iran and the US. He also gave voice to Tehran’s early frustration with the Biden administration by suggesting that its foreign policy showed no sign of substantive differences from that which was put in place by President Trump. 

Deghan, a military adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and former officers in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, seemed to make it clear that if he were to assume the Iranian presidency the regime would continue to insist upon the immediate removal of all US sanctions, as a prerequisite for any steps toward renewed Iranian compliance with the nuclear deal. However, representatives of the current administration, that of Hassan Rouhani, have attempted to portray the prospective election of a “hardliner” like Deghan as the closure of existing opportunities for peaceful reconciliation. 

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said on Wednesday that the Biden administration should be wary of missing a “fleeting” window for mutual restoration of the JCPOA. But his comments came in the context of a video that celebrated the Islamic Republic’s 41st anniversary by disparaging its so-called “enemies” and mocking the supposed failure of US-led pressure tactics. 

“Soon, my government will be compelled to take further remedial action in response to the American and European dismal failure to live up to their commitments under the nuclear deal,” Zarif said, referring to previously announced plans to restrict access for inspectors from the IAEA on February 21, unless US sanctions have been removed by that time. In the event that Tehran moves forward with that plan, the regime’s uranium metal production may be the last major development to be reported by the UN nuclear agency. 

That production, along with Mahmoud Alavi’s threat regarding future nuclear weapons capability, raises questions about how Deghan or any other hardline leader might alter Iran’s strategy to be more threatening in this regard. While the current president has been variously embraced as a “moderate” or “reformist” by certain Western authorities, he has actively participated in communicating the ultimatums associated with the prospective return to JCPOA compliance. And this is only of many public behaviors that have allowed the regime’s critics to all his moderate credentials into question. 

 “We have still not seen any goodwill from the new government,” Rouhani told Iranian state television on Thursday, apparently ignoring reports from days earlier which indicated that the Biden administration was weighing various options for Iran and the US to trade intermediary steps leading to restoration of the status quo as it existed before maximum pressure went into effect. Rouhani made no apparent effort to demonstrate goodwill on the Iranian side, but merely reiterated the regime’s demand that Biden reverse his predecessor’s policies without regard for the explicit progress that Tehran has made toward nuclear weapons capability. 

For many critics of the Iranian regime, that progress is only further confirmation that the Trump administration’s strategy was more or less correct, and that the JCPOA’s restraints on the Iranian nuclear program were too loose to prevent Iran from sprinting toward acquisition of a nuclear bomb at some point in the future. In fact, even though Biden’s diplomatic overtures to the Islamic Republic have been tentative and conditional, they have still been enough to raise alarms among those who believe that Tehran is more likely to respond to coordinated pressure tactics. 

On Wednesday, an editorial in Newsweek accused Biden of pretending to “play hardball” with Iran but actually moving in the direction of policies that let the regime off the hook for malign activities, potentially empowering not only Iran but also Russia and China. The piece argued that the administration wants “to help Iran economically despite the fact that its intensive uranium enrichment and other nuclear activities make clear that Iran’s nuclear efforts are entirely military-related.” 

It remains to be seen how Biden will react to the increased transparency of those military intentions following Alavi’s comments and the start of uranium metal production in Iranian facilities. On one hand, the White House is sure to face pressure from allies that believe the best course of action is to return to the nuclear deal and dis-incentivize Iran’s continued pursuit of nuclear provocations. But on the other hand, prominent figures within US intelligence and policy circles can be expected to advise the administration that such concessions would only embolden more of the same action. 

Along these lines, former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe recently stated that there is “no intelligence to support” the lifting of sanctions on Iran. In fact, Ratcliffe argues that the Iranian regime’s latest efforts to pressure Biden toward more conciliatory policies are a sign of desperation in the face of a situation that has made Iran “weaker, poorer, and less influential in the Middle East than they’ve been in decades.” 

“In his Fatwa, the Supreme Leader [Ali Khamenei] announced that the production of nuclear weapons is Haram [forbidden] and contrary to Sharia, and the Islamic Republic would not pursue them. However, if [foreigners] caught a cat in an awkward corner, it may behave unlikely to a free cat. If they pushed Iran to that path, then [the production of nuclear weapons] is not Iran’s fault,” said Iran’s Minister of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) Mahmoud Alavi in an interview with the state-run TV Channel Two on February 8. 

Cornered Cat 

In his unprecedented remarks, the Intelligence Minister described the establishment as a cat to show the country’s dire conditions. Given recent developments and the Iranian government’s concerns about the next events, Iranian authorities are seemingly right. 

Alavi raised these remarks while Tehran suffers from economic pressure and isolation as a result of the ayatollahs’ aggressive and outlaw behavior. Only four days earlier, MOIS agent Assadollah Assadi, who had disguised himself as a senior diplomat in Vienna, was sentenced to 20 years in prison in Belgium for masterminding a bomb plot against the opposition gathering in June 2018.

Window of JCPOA Closing, But in Which Direction?

On the other hand, “the threshold of society’s tolerance is going to end,” according to state-run media, which poses serious risk at the Islamic Republic’s survival. In December 2017 – January 2018 and November 2019, economic grievances sparked nationwide protests. Currently, citizens face far worse financial conditions in comparison to the past years and government-linked sociologists warn about the “erosion of the state’s social acceptance.” 

Furthermore, members and supporters of the Iranian opposition Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK/PMOI) have recently intensified their anti-establishment activities, inciting the people to voice their protests against the government. Following the MEK domestic network’s activities, there has been no day without protests, rallies, and strikes on behalf of impoverished citizens. 

In such circumstances, Tehran is deeply concerned about international developments. Before January 20, when Joe Biden took office as the 46th U.S. President, Iranian officials were hopeful that they could immediately receive financial reliefs and resume their bankrupt economy. However, Biden and his nominees declared that they would not grant privileges to the Iranian government for free, particularly while Tehran has breached many restrictions and limitations under the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 

Tehran’s Propaganda for Coercing the U.S. to Rejoin the JCPOA 

Notably, following the revelations by the Iranian opposition coalition National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) about Tehran’s attempts for achieving nuclear weapons, Khamenei claimed, “We believe that the production of nuclear is Haram.” 

“We do not believe in Atomic bombs and nuclear weapons, and we would not pursue them. According to our ideological beliefs, our religious basics, using these mass destructive devices are forbidden and Haram. They would lead to destroying earth and human generations,” Khamenei said in February 2009. 

However, the Supreme Leader currently tries to terrify the international community to make his government’s advantages. This is another flipside of the Iranian government’s hostage-taking method to gain its required privileges. In other words, Tehran follows its renowned blackmailing policy by jeopardizing global peace and security. 

On the other hand, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif warned his counterparts about the Islamic Republic’s decisions. “Time is running out for the Americans, both because of the parliament bill and the election atmosphere that will follow the Iranian New Year,” Zarif said on February 6, pointing to the Parliament (Majlis) recently passed legislation that ordered the government to leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on February 21. 

In response, the U.S. State Department Spokesperson Ned Price described Alavi’s remarks as very concerning. “I would say that we, of course, took note of those remarks. They are very concerning. Would also note – and I referenced this yesterday as well – that Iran has an obligation under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – the NPT – never – never, never, never – permanent prohibition to acquire nuclear weapons, and it reaffirmed that commitment under the JCPOA. I think that’s where we’d leave our reaction,” Price said during the February 9 press conference. 

Also, in his first visit to the Department of Defense on February 10, Biden announced, “I would never hesitate to use force to defend the vital interests of the American people and our allies around the world when necessary.” 

In this respect, Iranian state-run media slammed Alavi for his recent remarks, displaying the government’s fragile conditions and baseless claims. “It should be asked of the Intelligence Minister… were [his remarks] a personal opinion or a part of the state’s strategy to confront the democrats?” wrote Mashreq daily, affiliated with the Khamenei’s faction. 

“The Intelligence Minister’s remarks prepared the atmosphere for a massive wave of propaganda against Iran’s nuclear program. The Islamic Republic’s foes immediately exploited Mahmoud Alavi’s unconsidered comments—which were contrary to the Supreme Leader’s orders— and claimed that [Khamenei’s] fatwa is flexible, and Iran will strive to produce nuclear weapons under special circumstances,” Jahan News daily wrote. 

Iran watchers believe that the Intelligence Minister’s recent comments and Zarif’s concerns reveal the Iranian government’s need for negotiations. Furthermore, they indicate that both the Iranian government and the international community are in a new balance of power. It seems that the world has realized that Tehran’s blackmailing and hostage-taking techniques are a sign of its weakness, which should be confronted by firmness and power. 

The Islamic Republic of Iran keeps doubling down on its demands for unearned relief from US sanctions, but so far the Biden administration has responded appropriately by saying that Tehran must be the one to make the first move. It is vitally important that the administration remains firm in that position, lest it end up providing the mullahs with further incentive to threaten the international community and expand upon its various malign behaviors. 

The latest Iranian statements suggest that the conflict over this issue may be drawn out for some time to come. But it can only last as long as the Iranian economy can avoid succumbing to the pressure that was ramped up by Biden’s predecessor. And regardless of how long that may be, the effects of that pressure include a substantial increase in leverage on the US side, which must not be given away without cause. 

Window of JCPOA Closing, But in Which Direction?

On Sunday, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered remarks to military leaders which were carried by state media. After outlining the regime’s expectation of full and immediate relief from US sanctions, Khamenei said that only afterward would Iran return to full compliance with the restrictions on nuclear activity that were put into place by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. “It is the irreversible and final decision and all Iranian officials have consensus over it,” he added. 

President Joe Biden did not immediately respond to those remarks, but in a separate media interview on the same day, he reiterated that the US takes the opposite position: Iran must resume compliance with all the formal terms of the JCPOA, and only then will sanctions relief be phased back in. 

Iran has been violating those terms since early 2019, at in January 2020 the regime announced that it would comply with none of them. This led to the deal’s European signatories – Britain, France, and Germany – triggering a dispute resolution mechanism, but the European Union’s head of foreign policy soon expressed willingness to draw that process out indefinitely. Josep Borrell’s remarks reinforced perceptions of the US as standing alone in its hardline approach to Iran policy, and the longevity of that situation was promptly called into question by the American presidential election. 

In the run-up to Biden’s election, then-President Donald Trump argued that that outcome would be a boon for Iran, given that Biden had expressed an interest in returning to the JCPOA as written. Before pulling out of the nuclear deal in 2018, Trump described it as one of the worst ever negotiated, on account of its arguably weak restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program and its failure to address adjacent issues like the regime’s ballistic missile development and its regional imperialism. 

To justify a strategy that he described as “maximum pressure,” Trump suggested that a faltering Iranian economy would force the Iranian regime to come back to the negotiating table and accept stricter limits on its nuclear activity as well as restrictions on other categories of malign behavior. The administration maintained its commitment to that strategy even after Trump’s electoral debate, putting new sanctions into place even in the few weeks immediately prior to Biden’s January 20 inauguration. 

To date, Biden has not removed any of those sanctions. On some level, this can potentially be regarded as tacit acknowledgement of their value. Trump believed that Iran’s economy was on the verge of collapse prior to the election, and that Tehran was looking to a Biden presidency as a possible source of last-minute reprieve. It is not entirely clear whether the new administration’s shares the previous one’s assessment of how dire the situation is for Iran, but during his first three weeks in office, Biden has made it clear that he is in no rush to provide the expected lifeline. 

This is as it should be, and it’s how things should remain for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether or not Iran’s economy is indeed teetering on the brink of collapse. While there may be some uncertainty on that matter, there is no doubt whatsoever about the provocative steps Iran has taken in its attempt to shift things back toward the status quo as it existed prior to Trump. These include the resumption of uranium enrichment to 20 percent fissile purity, the full resupply of nuclear stockpiles, and the start of work on uranium metal that would be a core component of a nuclear warhead. 

But Iran’s provocations also extend beyond the nuclear sphere and include last month’s seizure of a South Korea-flagged vessel and threats against the lives of various dual nationals and falsely accused spies like the Iranian-Swedish medical researcher Ahmadreza Djalali. Some of these gestures are aimed at extracting concessions from the US specifically, while some are aimed at US allies, often in the interest of encouraging them to act as proxies for Tehran and to ramp up their own pressure in favor of American concessions. 

The Biden administration must stand fast against both these forms of pressure, on the understanding that it is the right thing to do not only for US interests but also for those of other Western nations and for the Iranian people themselves. Giving into Iran’s demands would be foolish under almost any circumstances, and it would be especially foolish at a time when those demands are being issued ineffectually in response to a massive increase in American leverage. 

By acquiring sanctions relief while sacrificing nothing on its end, the Iranian regime would come away from this situation believing that threats of nuclear weapons development and politically motivated execution are both successful strategies, which it can fall back on the next time it comes under international pressure. 

Regardless of what one thinks about the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, there is no giving up on it now unless we want Iran’s provocations to grow worse and more frequent. The time may still come when that campaign can be ended safely, but it will only come after the Iranian regime has changed its behavior following the conclusion that tit-for-tat threats cannot work against the United States of America.