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Conflict And Disputes Over the Agreement with Rafael Grossi in Iran Regime’s Parliament

Following the announcement of the agreement between Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister of Iran’s regime, some members of Majlis (parliament) reacted harshly to the deal.

This behavior raises questions about the hidden objectives behind these actions and their contradiction with the foreign policy of Iran’s regime.

Even though any international agreement is made in full coordination with Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran’s regime, and higher security institutions, why do Majlis members take such positions?

U.S. State Department Warns to Hold Tehran Accountable if No Nuclear Deal Is Reached

One day after the announcement of the agreement between Iran’s regime and the IAEA, Javad Hosseini-Kia, a member of Majlis, stated: “We know for sure that the Agency has given information about nuclear sites to Mossad.” He also added: “Grossi himself is a Mossad agent, and we demand his prosecution.”

Before him, Fatemeh Mohammadi-Beigi, a representative from Qazvin, had made the same claim. She said: “Grossi will not be allowed to enter our country.” She further added: “If he enters, he must be arrested and tried as an accused for his crimes.” She continued: “The Iranian people will never forget the betrayals of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Grossi.”

In the same line, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of the state-run Kayhan newspaper and a close confidant of Khamenei, had called for the execution of Rafael Grossi.

These statements come at a time when Iran’s regime foreign policy is working to prevent the implementation of the “trigger mechanism” or snapback sanctions, which are being pursued by the three European countries at the United Nations Security Council.

Its implementation would lead to the re-imposition of crippling and broad UN sanctions against Iran’s regime.

This situation clearly highlights the contradiction between the statements of some Majlis members and the regime’s diplomatic approach.

On June 9, Mojtaba Zarei, a Majlis representative from Tehran, made claims in a Twitter post. He alleged: “We now know which bombs of the Israeli gang are located at which point and in which shelter.” He also referred to technical details and calculations regarding these bombs.

He also stated: “We brought more than 10 million pages of documents.” According to Zarei, the publication of parts of these documents would cause crises in Asia, Europe, and the United States. These remarks were followed, four days later, by an Israeli attack against Iran’s regime and the assassination of its military commanders and scientists.

Such behaviors from some Majlis members are not unprecedented. On May 9, 2018, in reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal (JCPOA), Majlis members burned the U.S. flag and a copy of the JCPOA during a public session.

This action increased the level of tension between Iran’s regime and the United States. Ultimately, following the deadlock in negotiations and escalating tensions, including an attack by Khamenei’s proxy forces on the U.S. embassy in Iraq, Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the IRGC, was assassinated on the orders of U.S. President Donald Trump.

Then, the Ukrainian passenger plane was shot down by the IRGC’s air defense on orders. This incident triggered widespread protests within Iran’s regime.

The accusations against Rafael Grossi and demands for his prosecution by some parliament members faced a reaction from another representative.

Mojtaba Tavangar, a representative from Tehran, on September 9, 2025, objected to these behaviors during a parliament session. He said: “The cost of the words and actions of some individuals should not be paid by the entire parliament.” Tavangar added: “They make such a mess that they overshadow the parliament’s historic action.”

He further said: “This is happening in a parliament that proudly carries the sign of being revolutionary.” Then he posed a critical question: “Does revolutionary behavior have any meaning without ethics and rationality?”

Question regarding parliament members’ behavior and explanation of their conduct

Now the question is, why do parliament members, despite knowing about the coordination of the foreign ministry with Khamenei and higher authorities, take such positions?

A former parliament member said in this regard: “The troublemakers in the parliament are Khamenei’s proxy representatives.”

He believes that just as Khamenei authorizes the signing of international agreements, he also orders the application of pressure and disorder. He added: “They do not accuse the IAEA Director General of espionage on their own.”

According to this former parliament member, if one looks at the backgrounds of these representatives, they are generally long-standing figures. These individuals are not reprimanded for their crisis-provoking remarks. He added: “On the contrary, they are even encouraged, and their eligibility is approved in every election.”

In his view, a representative who makes unconventional statements does not act independently but carries out an assigned mission. He named Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel and Hossein Fadaei as intermediaries between Khamenei’s office and the parliament. The former member said: “In the past, Khamenei’s messages were conveyed to the parliament troublemakers through them.”

These remarks clearly show that this policy, like Khamenei’s “hardliner vs. reformist” scenario, is used domestically to influence the shaky base of loyal regime forces, giving them the impression that part of the regime opposes such negotiations.

Ultimately, if things go wrong, these same figures place the blame on the defeated faction of the regime, just as they did with the failure of the nuclear deal (JCPOA). In this way, Khamenei and his faction are always whitewashed.

This policy, however, seems to have lost its previous effectiveness in the current context of Khamenei’s deepening weakness across foreign, regional, proxy, and especially domestic fronts.

Iran’s Regime Unveils the ‘Winter Drill’ Plan While the Energy Crisis Continues

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Even before the summer has ended, the CEO of Tavanir (Iran’s Power Generation, Distribution, and Transmission Company) announced that the electricity crisis in Iran will not end anytime soon. Along with unveiling a plan called “Winter Drill,” he said preparations are underway for the cold season. The chain of the energy crisis—from gas to water and electricity—has also affected other sectors such as communications.

Mostafa Rajabi-Mashhadi, on Sunday, September 14, in a meeting on “Managing the Passage of Summer Peak Load,” said that the “serious imbalance in electricity” will not be resolved soon and preparations must be made for the winter season.

He announced the preparation of a plan named “Winter Drill” and said that this year’s fuel situation is better compared to last year, but this does not mean neglecting continuous tasks of consumption management.

Iran’s Electricity Crisis Pits Industry Against Energy Ministry

These remarks in the last week of summer 2025 come as in recent years, the frequency and duration of blackouts have been reported to increase year after year.

The continued power outages this summer, accompanied by water cuts, sparked widespread protests in many cities across the country. The protests even reached small towns such as Khoshk-e Bijar in Gilan province. As in many other protests, Iran’s regime carried out mass arrests of demonstrators.

The blackouts were not only problematic for citizens. According to Ebrahim Sheikh, deputy minister of Industry, Mine, and Trade, despite a sixfold increase in electricity costs for industrialists this summer, the “imbalances” in this sector were not reduced. This has led to disputes between the Ministry of Industry, Mine, and Trade (known as “SAMT”) and the Ministry of Energy within the government.

The widespread blackouts in the summer of 2025 also claimed lives. Reports published in Iranian media about the consequences of repeated outages show that the continuation of blackouts and fluctuations became a deadly threat to patients dependent on electrical equipment, and at least five citizens lost their lives in recent months due to these outages.

At the same time as the Tavanir CEO’s remarks, Mostafa Pourdehghan, a member of the presidium of the parliament’s Industry Commission, referred to disruptions in Iran’s mobile phone network—recently reported to have increased—and attributed the cause to frequent power outages.

Pourdehghan explained: “When we ask the Minister of Communications and Information Technology about it, he responds that on one hand electricity is cut off, and on the other hand, our batteries are worn out and acidic.”

The frequent blackouts, along with the regime’s inability to provide drinking water for citizens, have created a multifaceted crisis. A crisis that officials of Iran’s regime themselves warn is intensifying.

Border Residents of Sistan and Baluchestan Prevent IRGC Fuel Smuggling

Border residents of Sistan and Baluchestan province in Iran blocked the Mirjaveh-to-Rutak route by burning tires in protest against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) fuel smuggling schemes. Locals said that while independent fuel carriers are barred from transporting fuel, regime forces, in collaboration with tribal leaders, smuggle fuel into Pakistan.

On Saturday, September 13, the Baluch Activists Campaign reported that after border residents blocked the transport routes, fuel carriers connected to tribal leaders were forced to turn back.

Increasing Gasoline Price in Iran: Social Experiment or Preparation for Fuel Price Hikes?

According to this report, on the evening of September 12, border residents burned tires and blocked roads in protest against the IRGC’s “Fuel Tanker” and “Cooperation” projects.

The campaign stated that the IRGC’s goal in implementing these projects is to bypass sanctions and transfer fuel to Pakistan. It added that residents have said they will not allow traffic for the implementation of these schemes.

Fuel carrying has existed for decades in Sistan and Baluchestan as a livelihood for border residents. At times, the government sold fuel at higher rates to some carriers so they could deliver it across the border in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

With sanctions tightening, the IRGC has sought to “fully control this cycle and centralize the profits,” and within this framework, it has advanced projects such as “Razagh,” “Fuel Tanker,” and now “Cooperation,” in collaboration with certain tribal leaders.

In this system, “no one is allowed to carry fuel independently.” Tanker and vehicle owners must act as “renters,” transporting fuel to designated border points, handing it over to IRGC agents, and only receiving transport fees.

Protesters announced that they will not allow tankers and vehicles linked to this scheme to pass. Reports indicated that these vehicles have “retreated,” and at present, the situation on the ground is under the people’s control.

Iran’s Gasoline Smuggling Crisis Exposes Systemic Corruption and Military Involvement

The Baluch Activists Campaign further reported that the “Cooperation” project is being carried out under the leadership of an IRGC commander in collaboration with several Baluch tribal leaders.

According to the report, fuel carriers in this project are required—despite all risks—to deliver fuel to points designated by the IRGC and tribal leaders with “minimal profit,” while the transfer to Pakistan and final sales remain under the IRGC’s control.

In the past seven years, military forces have killed or injured more than one thousand Baluch fuel carriers.

Iran’s Regime Majlis Research Center: Snapback Mechanism Manageable Through Sanctions Evasion

The Research Center of Iran’s regime Majlis (parliament) announced that according to its assessments, the activation of the snapback mechanism does not have a “serious economic impact” on Iran and is mostly related to restrictions on dual-use technology exports. It added that Iran’s regime, with its experience in circumventing sanctions and the opposition of China and Russia, can manage this restriction.

In its report titled “Review of the Snapback Mechanism and the Economic Consequences of UN Security Council Resolutions Against Iran,” the center wrote: “Sanctions by the Security Council, unlike US secondary sanctions (which are economy-based and target vital sectors such as oil and banking), are proliferation-based and focused on limiting nuclear and missile programs.”

Reward For Disrupting Iran’s Oil Sanctions Evasion Network

The center added: “The important point is that activating the snapback mechanism does not create a sanctions regime harsher than the current pressures.”

On August 28, the three European signatories to the JCPOA—France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—triggered the 30-day snapback process in a letter to the UN Security Council to reinstate UN sanctions. This move was welcomed by the United States and Israel, while officials of Iran’s regime called it “null and illegal” and vowed an appropriate response.

The parliamentary research center also wrote in its report: “The economic effect of the snapback mechanism is mainly limited to the implementation of an export control regime on dual-use technologies, which, given Iran’s experience in bypassing restrictions and the lack of full alignment by China and Russia, is manageable.”

It added: “The cargo inspection mechanism, due to certain conditions such as requiring the flag state’s consent and the risk of reciprocal actions by Iran, rules out the possibility of a naval blockade or seizure of Iranian ships.”

In recent weeks, officials of Iran’s regime have insisted that the implementation of the snapback mechanism is mostly “psychological.”

The likelihood of international consensus against Iran’s regime is “low.”

While some Iranian media outlets had earlier warned about an international consensus against Iran’s regime, the parliamentary research center put forth a different claim.

On August 4, the state-run newspaper Farhikhtegan, affiliated with Islamic Azad University, warned about rising tensions, the possibility of military confrontation, and the formation of a global consensus against Iran’s regime after the potential activation of the snapback mechanism by European countries.

U.S. Sanctions 13 Shipping Companies and 8 Tankers to Counter Iran’s Regime

But the research center wrote: “The hopeful point is that in the multipolar world of 2025, due to the opposition of powers such as China and Russia—as reflected in the very important letter of the foreign ministers of the three countries Iran, China, and Russia—the possibility of forming an international consensus against Iran will be greatly reduced.”

This refers to the September 1 joint statement by the foreign ministers of Iran’s regime, China, and Russia, in which they declared that the European Union’s attempt to activate the snapback mechanism against Iran is “legally baseless and politically destructive.”

The parliamentary research center wrote: “Adding new names to the sanctions list or reestablishing an expert panel is difficult because it requires consensus in the Security Council and can be vetoed by China and Russia. While US political pressure on Iran’s trade partners, such as China, is possible, it is independent of the use or non-use of the snapback mechanism.”

The center predicted that after the reinstatement of UN sanctions against Iran’s regime, “Iran’s large-scale transactions in oil exports, petrochemicals, and financial settlements will continue without serious challenges, although short-term psychological shocks may occur in asset markets.”

This claim comes at a time when Iran’s economic situation has worsened in recent weeks. Even the Ministry of Intelligence, warned ministries and major companies that the consequences of activating the snapback mechanism could lead to a halt in Iran’s oil sales, trigger major economic and security crises, increase unemployment, and intensify social discontent in the country.

While regime media and institutions are attempting to downplay the impact of the snapback mechanism and the return of UN sanctions by publishing aligned reports, earlier reports revealed that the Supreme National Security Council had ordered media outlets to normalize the atmosphere in the country through such reports and portray the possible return of sanctions as having no effect on people’s lives.

The directive stated that media outlets must, by “maintaining the psychological calm of society,” refrain from publishing any “emotional,” “crisis-inducing,” or “provocative” headlines or analyses in their coverage of the snapback mechanism.

Iranian Middle-Class Youth Suffer from Chronic Anxiety Due to Economic Concerns

The state-run newspaper Shargh reported that young people from Iran’s middle class are suffering from chronic anxiety caused by economic concerns about their future.

On Saturday, September 13, Shargh published a report titled “Fall into the Field of Poverty,” stating that despite earning monthly salaries between 20 million and 30 million tomans (200 to 300 dollars), these young people can no longer afford routine purchases they used to make in previous years.

According to the report, many young people no longer have money for small leisure activities such as going to restaurants, attending gyms, or buying routine skincare products.

Iran’s Economy in Crisis: Investment Collapse and Soaring Inflation

A young woman, noting in her interview with Shargh that her income had risen from 5 million tomans to 30 million tomans over the past four years, said: “Clearly, I am struggling to make ends meet each month. My friends are in the same situation. Our only entertainment now is to meet at each other’s houses a few times a month, and we have completely given up going to cafes and restaurants.”

Eliminating some goods from the shopping basket

A young couple, both employed, told Shargh that they had cut their monthly purchases from chain stores, adding that they could no longer even afford a certain type of coffee they used to buy every month.

Another young woman working in the human resources department of a well-known dairy company told the newspaper: “I haven’t signed up for any classes, nor do I go out with my friends like I did last year, yet life has become harder.”

She added: “What bothers me more than financial pressure is the fear of running out of money at the end of the month. That’s why I watch my spending from the beginning of the month, so I don’t end up broke.”

Multiple reports on the rise of poverty in Iran

In recent years, various media outlets and institutions have published multiple reports on the rise of poverty in Iran.

In June 2023, the Research Center of Iran’s regime parliament confirmed in a report the “increase and deepening” of poverty in the past decade, stating that about one-third of the population has been living below the “absolute poverty line” in the past five years.

According to the report’s data, over the past decade, the number of poor people in Iran has increased by about 11 million.

Hopelessness among the educated class has also been on the rise, with growing concerns about the migration of students and academics.

Meanwhile, Massoud Pezeshkian, the president of Iran’s regime, in response to this crisis, has pointed the finger at the educated class and, using gendered language, accused them of “cowardice.”

On June 10, Bahram Salavati, a researcher and former director of the Iranian Migration Observatory, announced that only 1% of Iranian students who migrate abroad return to the country.

In March, Mohammad Jalili, head of the faculty recruitment center at the Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education, also warned that the exodus of faculty members has reached Iran’s top universities.

U.S. State Department Warns to Hold Tehran Accountable if No Nuclear Deal Is Reached

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The U.S. State Department, expressing doubts about the recent agreement between Iran’s regime and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), warned that if no nuclear deal is ultimately reached, Washington will “hold Tehran accountable.”

An unnamed U.S. State Department spokesperson said in an interview with Al Arabiya news channel on Friday, September 12, that the United States is waiting for details of the agreement between Tehran and the IAEA to be clarified.

The official added that it is essential to reach an agreement under which Iran’s regime abandons its ambition to build nuclear weapons and halts uranium enrichment—an action that would benefit the people of Iran, the region, and the world.

Is The Iranian Regime Ready to Reduce Uranium Enrichment Levels To 3.67%?

The official emphasized that if this goal is not achieved, the United States will continue to hold Iran accountable for its actions.

On September 9 in Cairo, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian regime’s foreign minister, reached a new arrangement for continued cooperation between the two sides.

Grossi said this agreement concerns “practical measures for resuming inspections in Iran” and outlines the inspection procedures for the regime’s targeted nuclear facilities.

In a contradictory account, Araghchi declared on September 10 that under this agreement, “no access will be given to IAEA inspectors, except regarding the Bushehr power plant.”

We want concrete steps from Tehran, not symbolic moves

The U.S. State Department official further stressed in the Al Arabiya interview that what is expected from Tehran regarding the nuclear file are “practical and tangible actions,” not “symbolic moves.”

Al Arabiya reported that although it was initially thought the recent Cairo agreement would put Iran’s nuclear case on a path to resolution, the deal left many issues between Tehran and the IAEA unresolved, and Washington is dissatisfied with the outcome.

Citing the remarks of this U.S. official and the recent positions of Donald Trump’s administration, Al Arabiya reported that the coming weeks will play a decisive role in the trajectory of relations between Iran’s regime and the West.

According to this report, this period will either lead to a new agreement between Tehran and Western powers or mark the beginning of a phase of severe economic pressure against Iran—during which the U.S., with Europe’s support, will use broad sanctions to curb the regime’s nuclear program.

On September 10, at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, the European Union and the U.S. warned that Tehran must immediately resume cooperation with the agency.

On August 27, France, the UK, and Germany—the three European members of the JCPOA—announced in a letter to the UN Security Council their decision to begin the process of activating the snapback mechanism and reimposing UN sanctions against Iran’s regime.

Thus, Iran’s regime has only until the end of September to reach an agreement with the West and prevent the return of sanctions.

Polish Company Sold Shahed Drone Parts to Iran

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According to the local Polish daily Glos Wielkopolski, the Polish company WSK Poznań sold parts to Iran that were used in the production of Shahed-136 suicide drones—drones that were recently employed in Russian attacks against Poland.

The case was first exposed by an investigative journalist from Radio Zet, who reported that fuel pumps directly exported from the Polish factory eventually ended up on Iranian drone production lines.

According to him, WSK Poznań sold the parts to Iran Motorsazan, a manufacturer of agricultural tractors, which then delivered them to drone factories. The completed drones were later transferred to Russia and used in the war in Ukraine.

After uncovering the matter, Poland’s Internal Security Agency prosecuted the company’s director. In April 2025, following his voluntary acceptance of punishment, the court sentenced him to a one-year suspended prison term with a two-year probation, a fine, and mandatory regular reporting to the court.

Crashed drone in Lublin likely an Iranian Shahed

This scandal coincided with a September 10 attack in which 19 Russian drones struck Polish territory, several of them crossing from Belarus. Four drones were shot down, but one hit a residential building in Lublin province.

Although no casualties were reported, NATO invoked Article 4 and held a consultative meeting. However, the alliance declared that the Russian drones’ incursion into Polish airspace was “deliberate” but did not constitute a “direct attack.”

The foreign ministers of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine condemned the incident and called for strengthening Ukraine’s air defense system and NATO’s eastern flank.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also warned that the attack could be a test by Moscow to gauge Western allies’ readiness, likening it to the psychological atmosphere of the Crimea crisis.

U.S. lawsuit filed to seize $584,000 from Iranian linked to IRGC drone program

In another development, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a lawsuit to seize $584,000 in Tether cryptocurrency linked to Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi, 39, CEO of Sanat Danesh Rahpooyan Aflak.

According to the Massachusetts Attorney’s Office, the company produced “Sepehr” navigation systems for drones and missiles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with 99% of its sales in 2021 and 2022 going to the IRGC Aerospace Force.

This technology was used in a Shahed drone during the January 2024 attack on the “Tower 22” base in Jordan, which killed three U.S. soldiers.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office declared that all assets linked to terrorist activities against the U.S. will be confiscated. Abedini, who had previously been indicted in the U.S. for materially supporting the IRGC, was arrested in Milan in December 2024 but freed in January 2025 in exchange for the release of an Italian journalist detained in Iran—an incident described as an example of the Iranian regime’s hostage-taking policy.

U.S. Lawsuit Filed to Seize $584,000 From Iranian Linked to IRGC Drone Program

The U.S. Department of Justice announced a lawsuit to seize about $584,000 in Tether cryptocurrency linked to 39-year-old Iranian national Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi, CEO of Sanat Danesh Rahpooyan Aflak, due to his role in the IRGC drone program.

On Thursday, September 12, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Massachusetts announced that this Iranian company had been producing Sepehr navigation systems for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which were used in drones and guided missiles.

The Attorney’s Office stated that between 2021 and 2022, about 99% of the sales of this navigation system went to the IRGC Aerospace Force, where it was used in one-way suicide drones.

Earlier, on May 6, a U.S. federal judge denied bail to Mehdi Mohammadsadeghi, who is awaiting trial for his alleged involvement in a deadly drone attack on a U.S. military base in Jordan.

Prosecutors also linked the technologies produced by Sanat Danesh Rahpooyan Aflak to the January 2024 drone attack on the U.S. military base in northern Jordan, known as “Tower 22.”

Three U.S. soldiers were killed and more than 40 injured in that attack.

Investigations revealed that the drone used was an Iranian Shahed model, and its navigation system had been produced by this company.

Under U.S. law, all assets belonging to individuals or entities involved in planning or carrying out terrorist acts against the United States or its citizens are subject to confiscation.

According to the Massachusetts Attorney’s Office, the asset forfeiture case is being pursued by Carol E. Head, chief of the Asset Recovery Unit, while the criminal case is being handled in coordination with Justice Department prosecutors and the counterterrorism and counterintelligence divisions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

The statement emphasized that all allegations in this case remain at the accusation stage, and the defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in court.

Italian Journalist Cecilia Sala Arrested in Tehran: Mystery Surrounds Detention

On July 9, the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported that Abedini had worked in a drone research laboratory at a Swiss university that had been funded by the European Union and Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Innovation.

The German-language daily wrote that his activities helped Tehran gain access to advanced Western technology for its drone program.

The Abedini–Sala swap

Abedini, 39, a Tehran resident, is the founder and CEO of Sanat Danesh Rahpooyan Aflak, which builds navigation modules for the IRGC drone program.

He had previously been charged in the United States with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, namely the IRGC Aerospace Force.

He was arrested in Milan, Italy, in December 2024 at the request of the U.S., but was released in January 2025 after Iran’s regime detained Cecilia Sala, an Italian journalist, just three days after Abedini’s arrest.

Many have described the arrest of Cecilia Sala and her exchange for Mohammad Abedini as the latest example of the Iranian regime’s policy of hostage-taking and blackmail.

Death Sentence Issued for a Political Prisoner in Iran

On Monday, September 8, the Iranian regime’s judiciary informed political prisoner Pejman Toubere Rizi, who is held in Evin Prison, of his death sentence on charges of membership in the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and “corruption on earth.” The verdict had already been typed in advance and was ready to be read out by Judge Amouzad.

Pejman’s trial was held on September 1 in Branch 28 of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Amouzad. Earlier, on July 27, Pejman was taken to court in handcuffs and shackles, where the judge asked him to confess to the charges and cooperate with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence in exchange for exile to Saravan instead of execution, but Pejman refused. Again, on August 16, he was summoned to court without a lawyer, and the judge, citing the charge of “corruption on earth,” demanded that he sign under the death sentence, which Pejman did not accept.

The 85th week of the ‘No to Execution Tuesdays’ campaign in 52 prisons across the country

Pejman Toubere Rizi, a 31-year-old from Kermanshah, was arrested in Tehran on January 28. He was held for more than two and a half months in Evin Prison’s wards 209 and 240, where agents of the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence subjected him to interrogation and torture.

On July 23, regime agents raided Pejman’s father’s home again, and due to their violent behavior, his stepmother, Fariba Vahedi, who was suffering from cancer, went into shock and later passed away.

In this regard, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) called on the United Nations and the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran to take urgent action to save the lives of prisoners sentenced to execution and to secure the release of political prisoners.

Reward For Disrupting Iran’s Oil Sanctions Evasion Network

The U.S. State Department, under the “Rewards for Justice” program, has offered up to $15 million for information that leads to the disruption of Iran’s oil sanctions evasion network and the financial mechanisms of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The State Department, through the “Rewards for Justice” program, announced that it will pay up to $15 million for information that disrupts the financial mechanisms of the IRGC, including its Quds Force, or the network linked to “Wang Shaoyun.”

According to official announcements, the reward covers two categories of information: first, any leads that disrupt the IRGC and Quds Force financial systems; second, information that undermines the illegal financial activities of Wang Shaoyun. U.S. officials say Wang and his associates, through shell companies in China, Oman, and Turkey, sold Iranian sanctioned oil to Chinese state-owned refineries and channeled the proceeds for the benefit of the Quds Force. The FBI stated that this network conducted over $100 million in transactions using the U.S. financial system illegally.

How did the sanctions evasion scheme work?

The official account describes a cross-border network scheme involving ship-to-ship transfers to conceal the Iranian origin of cargoes, issuing falsified or misleading documents about destination and ownership, and routing payments through U.S. banks.

Nine Iranian individuals and entities added to the European Union’s new sanctions list

Among the key figures was “Mahmood Al Hasbi,” an Omani citizen, who in June 2020 purchased the tanker M/T Pride of Oman using a $16.5 million loan from U.S. financial institutions. From July that year, he began transferring Iranian oil cargoes to third-party vessels for shipment to Chinese buyers. U.S. officials say some Turkish, Omani, and American individuals and entities also facilitated the process.

Legal status and charges

On January 25, 2024, a federal court in Washington, D.C. issued an arrest warrant for Wang. The charges include violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), conspiracy to commit money laundering, and laundering of monetary instruments. An arrest warrant was also issued for Al Hasbi around the same time.

According to the FBI, Wang was in contact with senior IRGC officials to coordinate purchases, and millions of dollars of related transactions were processed through U.S. banks. As a legal reminder, all individuals named remain under indictment until a final ruling is issued.

Why is this important now?

According to Washington’s assessment, China is the main buyer of Iranian oil, and most of Iran’s shipments head there. Therefore, shutting down sanction evasion routes, particularly those linked to Chinese state-owned refineries, is a key pillar of sanctions pressure. The U.S. State Department has called on anyone with information about Wang Shaoyun, Mahmood Al Hasbi, their associates, and related financial networks to contact the designated channels for review under the “Rewards for Justice” program.