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Tehran Faces the Most Severe Water Crisis in a Century

As Iran’s energy crisis intensifies, officials of the Iranian regime are shifting responsibility onto the public, urging citizens to “conserve” and warning of the critical state of dam water reserves.

On Sunday, July 20, the Tehran Water and Wastewater Company announced that the droughts of the past five years, combined with the sharp decline in rainfall this water year, represent an unprecedented situation in the past 60 years and have severely affected Tehran’s water resources.

According to the company, the current reserves in the dams that supply water to Tehran are at their lowest level in the past 100 years.

Severe Water Crisis Sweeps Across Various Iranian Cities

The utility advised residents living in multi-story residential complexes to install a storage tank and then a pump on the ground floor or basement level to “compensate for pressure drops.”

A video circulating on social media dated July 20 shows water being delivered by tanker trucks to residents of Shahriar County in Tehran Province.

Dozens of residents from various cities report that they experience at least two power outages per day, each lasting at least two hours, and water is cut off for at least four hours daily.

Regime-affiliated media, citing a “500 million cubic meter deficit” in Tehran’s dams, reported that the total reserves currently stand at around 414 million cubic meters. Under normal conditions, this figure should be 925 million cubic meters at this time of year.

Lar Dam is only 7% full and, with a 34% decrease compared to last year, is in a severely deteriorated state.

Latyan and Mamloo Dams at 20% Capacity, Amir Kabir at 38%

Tehran City Council Chief Urges Conservation Despite 24-Hour Water Cuts

Reports from several Iranian cities indicate water outages lasting for many hours—and in some cases, up to a full day or longer.

On July 20, Mehdi Chamran, the chairman of Tehran City Council, referenced the water shortage crisis in the capital and said: “The Ministry of Energy is trying to supply water.”

He continued: “We are still facing water pressure drops and occasional outages, and people must help manage the situation through conservation.”

Iranian citizens are being forced to install water tanks and pumps in their homes.

Energy Mafia Is the Main Driver of Iran’s Water and Power Crises

Banafsheh Zahraei, a professor of water resources management at the University of Tehran, stated that the four main dams supplying water to the capital will dry up by mid-September.

According to EcoIran, citing official statistics as of July 12, 54% of the country’s dam reservoirs are empty, and 17 dams have less than 20% of their capacity filled.

The filling level of 10 dams is under 10%, putting them dangerously close to complete dryness.

This list includes Lar and Latyan dams in Tehran, as well as Shamil and Niyan in Hormozgan Province.

The Water Industry publication reported that from the beginning of the current water year (starting September 22, 2024) until July 12, total inflow to the country’s dams has dropped to approximately 22.4 billion cubic meters.

A multilayered mafia involved in policymaking, resource exploitation, and project implementation is the main cause of the water and energy crises in Iran.

In addition to water shortages, electricity and internet services have also been cut for several hours each day in numerous Iranian cities in recent weeks.

Following power outages in the Tabriz marketplace, some shopkeepers have been forced to use electric generators to continue their operations.

This situation is similar in other Iranian cities and has affected all types of businesses.

Iran’s Regime Threatens to Cause Insecurity in the Region If Snapback Sanctions Are Enacted

With the confirmation of the upcoming talks between the European Troika and the Iranian regime in Istanbul, the state-run daily Farhikhtegan wrote that Europe intends to suspend the snapback mechanism in exchange for the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. The deputy chairman of the Iranian regime’s parliament’s National Security Commission also referred to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open as Tehran’s bargaining chip in the negotiations.

Abbas Moqtadaei, deputy chairman of the regime’s parliamentary commission on national security and foreign policy, told the state-run Borna News Agency that if Europe activates the snapback mechanism, Tehran’s response would be to target the “security of a vast network of waterways.”

Iran’s Nuclear Power Dream: From Fantasy to Reality

He added that this would not be limited to the region, the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz, but would also include other maritime areas, given the Iranian regime’s naval capabilities and developments.

Ismail Baqaei, spokesperson for the Iranian regime’s Foreign Ministry, announced early Monday, July 21, that nuclear negotiations with the three countries—Britain, France, and Germany—will resume on Friday, July 25, 2025, in Istanbul at the deputy foreign minister level.

Later that day, Baqaei described Iran’s talks with the European countries as being at the level of deputy ministers and added: “Wherever we feel diplomacy can be used to achieve the rights of the Iranian nation, we will not hesitate.”

Recently, the three European countries had warned the Iranian regime to immediately resume diplomatic talks and take concrete steps to resolve the nuclear issue. Otherwise, the snapback mechanism would be triggered on August 31.

Referring to these threats, Moqtadaei stressed: “If the Europeans exert pressure, we also have our own tools… We can create trouble for them in the region, especially in West Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Sea of Oman.”

Over the past years, the Iranian regime has repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz but has never carried out the threat.

On June 22, Esmail Kowsari, a member of the regime’s parliamentary commission on national security, stated that the Majlis (parliament) has approved a plan to close the Strait of Hormuz. However, this resolution is not binding, and the final decision lies with the Supreme National Security Council.

The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic passage between the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman and is one of the most vital shipping lanes in the world, with more than 21 million barrels of oil and about one-third of global liquefied natural gas exports passing through it daily.

The Iranian regime also relies on this strait for exporting its oil and importing goods.

Leverage: Return of IAEA Inspectors

In a report referring to the July 25 talks, the state-run daily Farhikhtegan wrote that none of the officials have yet made any statements about the mechanism or agenda of the negotiations, but the likely topic will be the activation of the snapback mechanism.

The paper wrote that Europe wants the International Atomic Energy Agency’s monitoring in Iran to resume and for the inspectors to return.

According to this outlet, the European side has conditioned the postponement of the snapback mechanism on the IAEA Director General presenting a satisfactory report to the European Troika and the UN Security Council.

Following the U.S. attack on Iranian regime nuclear facilities, Tehran’s pressure tactics and bargaining chips in negotiations with both the U.S. and Europe appear to revolve around threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, withdrawal from the NPT, increased uranium enrichment, allowing IAEA inspectors back into Iran, and even the release of European hostages, including French nationals imprisoned in Iran.

On July 20, Iranian regime foreign minister Abbas Araghchi sent a letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres warning against the possible activation of the snapback mechanism against the Iranian regime and wrote:

“…E3 lacks any legal, political, and moral standing to invoke the mechanisms of the JCPOA and UN Resolution 2231 (2015).”

Following the end of the 12-day war with Israel, Araghchi equated Europe’s activation of the snapback mechanism with a military attack on the Iranian regime and made the start of negotiations conditional on guarantees of no further military assaults.

EU Sanctions Hossein Shamkhani: A Blow to the Oil and Weapons Network of Iran’s Regime and Russia

On Monday, July 21, the European Union issued an official statement sanctioning Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani—senior advisor to the traitorous Ali Khamenei—for his key role in circumventing oil sanctions on Russia and participating in the so-called “shadow fleet” oil network.

The statement describes Hossein Shamkhani as a key player in exporting Russian oil to China and India, generating substantial revenue for the Kremlin through companies based in Dubai and a network of financial institutions in Geneva, Singapore, and London.

The EU also accuses Shamkhani of using companies such as Admiral Group, Milavos Group, and the Ocean Leonid Fund to manage tankers that operate without flags, insurance, or GPS trackers, thereby providing critical infrastructure to bypass sanctions.

From Oil to Weapons: Shamkhani at the Frontline of Iran-Russia Cooperation

Western media investigations, including by Bloomberg, had previously revealed that Shamkhani’s financial network is involved not only in oil trade but also in transferring Iranian weapons to Russia. He is accused of overseeing the pipeline for shipping missiles, drones, and military components from Tehran to Moscow via the Caspian Sea.

Bloomberg: Shamkhani’s Son’s Influence in the International Banking System

In Bloomberg’s January report, Shamkhani was identified as a “shadow billionaire” and a covert operative of the regime embedded in Western financial systems. According to the report, twelve Western intelligence officials and informed sources confirmed that Shamkhani operated under cryptic aliases such as “Hector” or simply “H.”

A Blow to the Iranian Regime’s Covert Financial Core

The sanction against Hossein Shamkhani, alongside the EU’s simultaneous move to lower the oil price cap for Russia, is part of a targeted package aimed at undermining the financial resources of both Russia and Iran’s regime in the Ukraine war.

With this action, the European Union has sent a clear message: Iran’s regime is no longer merely supplying drones for the war in Ukraine—businessmen tied to Ali Khamenei, the regime’s supreme leader, are bolstering the war’s economic backbone.

These sanctions not only expand the scope of measures against Russia, but also explicitly place Iran’s regime among the official backers of the Kremlin’s war machine.

By sanctioning Hossein Shamkhani, the European Union has effectively acknowledged and targeted a global network of financial corruption, arms trafficking, and money laundering operated by the Iranian regime.

IRGC Calls for ‘Psychological Preparation’ Amid Growing Fears of Snapback Sanctions

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), fearing the possible activation of the snapback mechanism, has called for “psychological preparation of society” instead of “hope-building.”

As speculation increases over the potential activation of the snapback mechanism by the three European signatories to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran’s state-run media have simultaneously warned of a severe reaction to this possible Western move and also pointed to its internal consequences.

Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the IRGC, on Sunday, July 20, recalled the position of Iran’s regime Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, expressed in an interview with a French publication conducted on July 10.

IRGC Spy’s Secret Trip to Iran After Spying on Jewish Targets in Germany Exposed

Tasnim wrote: “In response to the European officials’ threats regarding the activation of the snapback mechanism, the foreign minister considered it equivalent to a military attack and warned that this action would mean the end of Europe’s role in Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.”

The 10-year JCPOA agreement is set to expire in October 2025. If Iran’s regime had complied with its commitments under the deal by that date, the snapback mechanism would have become void. However, based on UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (adopted in 2015 to implement the JCPOA), any party to the agreement may trigger the snapback mechanism at any point during the 10-year period before October 2025.

Currently, most of the economic pressure on Iran’s regime comes from U.S. sanctions. However, if the snapback mechanism is activated, all previous UN sanctions will automatically be reinstated without the need for a vote at the UN Security Council. In a scenario where new sanctions were proposed for voting, allies of the Iranian regime such as China and Russia might veto them. But with the snapback mechanism, this is not possible because it is structured in a way that allows Security Council members to veto “non-reimposition” of sanctions, but not to veto their “reimposition.”

Now, the JCPOA members—Germany, the United Kingdom, and France—who are currently at odds with the Iranian regime, each have the authority to request the reimposition of international sanctions before October.

Consequences of the Reimposition of International Sanctions

In Tehran, widespread concerns have emerged over the activation of the snapback mechanism—concerns that officials of Iran’s regime equate with a “military attack.”

The daily publication of the IRGC’s Political Department wrote about the severe shock of the snapback mechanism—even before it is implemented—and stated: “It is clear that in the absence of a rational and swift response, public distrust will intensify and second and third waves of inflation will emerge with greater intensity.”

The publication proposed several measures for managing society in the event the snapback mechanism is activated, including imposing new taxes, restricting foreign transactions to control capital flight from the country, and limiting dollar-based transactions.

In the political section, the IRGC publication suggested that the “tone of policymaking” should shift from “absolute hope-building” toward “psychological preparation of society and economic actors.”

It is rare for a publication affiliated with the IRGC’s Political Department to make such a proposal.

The state-run daily Donya-e-Eqtesad wrote: “The words of that complex legal document [the JCPOA] still shape the fate of Iran’s policy. The snapback mechanism now stands at the center of regional geopolitical developments.”

The newspaper emphasized: “For Iran, the reimposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism is not merely a legal or diplomatic development. This change directly affects the country’s economy and impacts currency exchange, trade, and financial dynamics.”

The paper warned that, under a pessimistic scenario, even China and Russia might go along with the reimposed sanctions and predicted: “The economic pressure will be such that its primary goal will be to alter Iran’s political calculations and force it to accept new conditions at the negotiating table. In other words, the snapback mechanism will become a tool for engineering Iran’s political behavior—at a very heavy cost to the country’s economy.”

The Exile of Political Prisoner Saeed Masouri to Zahedan Prison in Southeastern Iran

The latest news from Ghezel Hesar Prison indicates that around noon on Saturday, July 19, prison authorities informed political prisoners that Saeed Masouri, the longest-held political prisoner in Iran, is to be exiled to Zahedan Prison.

According to Ghobadi, the deputy director of Ghezel Hesar Prison, this decision was made by the Sentences Enforcement Office of the so-called Moqaddas Prosecutor’s Office.

The purpose of transferring Saeed Masouri—who has been imprisoned for 25 years without any furlough—to Zahedan Prison is to impose maximum pressure and harass him.

In recent days, various United Nations bodies, as well as international lawyers and human rights experts who were made aware of Saeed Masouri’s situation and the threats against him, have been continuously following up on his case.

Iran’s regime continues its pressure on longtime prisoners affiliated with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and other political prisoners. The regime aims to crush the “No to Executions Wednesdays” campaign, which is being sustained through strikes in 48 prisons.

Reactions from Political Prisoners in Greater Tehran and Qarchak Varamin Prisons

A group of political prisoners in Greater Tehran Prison supporting the PMOI issued a statement condemning the threat of forcibly exiling political prisoner Saeed Masouri.

The statement reads: “The regime’s attempt to abduct political prisoner Saeed Masouri on Wednesday and exile him to an unknown location was thwarted by the resistance of other inmates. This action reminds us prisoners of the vile abductions of Mehdi Hassani, Behrouz Ehsani, Mir Youssef Younesi, and later Ali Younesi.”

“Now it is the turn of one of the longest-held political prisoners, and by abducting him, they are paving the way for the ‘commission of a crime’!”

PMOI Supporters Given Double Death Sentences by Iran’s Regime

The statement from PMOI-supporting political prisoners in Fashafouyeh Prison continues: “Just as after each abduction, we filled Evin Prison with chants of ‘Dictatorship, crime, death to this rule’ with our bare hands and clenched fists, we now see ourselves alongside our captive comrades in Ghezel Hesar. We also preemptively condemn any transfer of Saeed Masouri to any unknown location and consider these actions to be the desperate and repressive regime’s revenge against the people of Iran, especially its political prisoners.”

They concluded: “While condemning the possible exile of Saeed Masouri to an unknown location and calling on human rights organizations, we remind the regime: the vast resistance, rooted in the blood of martyrs and the suffering and struggle of prisoners across the homeland and its prisons, cannot be ‘exiled’!”

Severe Water Crisis Sweeps Across Various Iranian Cities

As Iran enters its fifth consecutive year of drought, the water crisis has intensified on a broad scale. From rural areas and underprivileged towns to the capital Tehran, communities are experiencing water shortages, pressure drops, and even frequent water outages.

Sajjad Jafarzadeh, the director of water and wastewater in Khalkhal, confirmed on Friday, July 18, that the region is facing severe water stress and part of the water supply project remains unfinished due to lack of funding.

Iran’s Regime Negotiates with Four Countries to Import Water as Crisis Deepens

Unprecedented decline in rainfall, severe drops in dam and groundwater levels, and the absence of effective consumption policies have painted an alarming outlook for the country’s water future.

Iran’s soil is parched

Alireza Abbasi, member of the regime’s parliament representing Karaj, said on Thursday, July 17, 2025, in a meeting with the managers of Alborz Regional Water Company: “Given the high rate of population influx and the implementation of projects like the National Housing Movement, pressure on the province’s water resources will increase. Every water project must be accompanied by demographic and development assessments.”

According to Abbasi, “Although drinking water supply is a priority, we must not sacrifice food security. No country ignores its food security, even if it has abundant water resources.”

Silent rationing in the capital

The state-run daily Ham-Mihan reported on July 17 that in the capital, a form of “silent rationing” has emerged through pressure drops, repeated nighttime water cuts, and recommendations to purchase water tanks and pumps.

According to the report, although the water and wastewater company has claimed that there are no official plans for cutoffs, the CEO of the Tehran Water and Wastewater Company stated that residents should consider purchasing water tanks and reservoirs.

Numerous reports have emerged of nighttime water outages, failure to supply water to lower floors of buildings, and residents’ protests. Southern and peripheral districts of Tehran—from Salehiyeh and Pishva to Nematabad and Shariati Town—have been the hardest hit.

In contrast, northern Tehran has so far experienced the least disruption, which has increased the “sense of discrimination among southern residents” of the capital. Northern Tehran is an affluent area.

Ham-Mihan, quoting water sector experts, emphasized that if current consumption trends continue and infrastructure remains inadequate, the likelihood of implementing official rationing in the coming weeks is high.

Low rainfall, empty dams, and extreme heat

Issa Bozorgzadeh, spokesperson for Iran’s water sector, stated that rainfall in the current water year has decreased by more than 40% compared to the long-term average, with only about 153 millimeters recorded.

The state-run newspaper Ettelaat reported that rising temperatures have caused 75% of rainfall to evaporate, effectively eliminating the possibility of utilizing a significant portion of surface water.

According to the report, out of approximately 260 billion cubic meters of annual precipitation in the country, only 85 billion cubic meters are usable.

The volume of the country’s surface runoff has dropped to under 45 billion cubic meters, and groundwater recharge has fallen below 40 billion cubic meters.

Ettelaat wrote that 55% of the country’s water consumption is supplied from underground sources—sources that now face a cumulative deficit of about 145 billion cubic meters, leading to land subsidence, desertification, and environmental crises.

The country’s dams are also in dire condition. Only 14% of the reservoir capacity of Tehran’s dams is filled, and Latian Dam, with a capacity of 95 million cubic meters, currently holds only 41 million cubic meters of water.

Abbas Aliabadi, Iran’s regime energy minister, warned on July 14 that dams such as Mamloo, Latian, and Lar may soon go offline.

What are the consequences of this crisis?

Water outages, in addition to putting pressure on household consumers, could force production units to shut down, exacerbating unemployment.

The water crisis will have serious social and economic impacts. Large-scale migration from rural areas, rising local tensions over access to limited water resources, and a decline in agricultural and industrial production are among the consequences Iran will face.

Experts have long warned that if this trend continues, Iran will reach a point where not only will habitation in many regions become difficult, but social and economic security will also be endangered.

The Drying Up of Lake Urmia Will Destroy Millions of Lives and Hectares of Land

The drying of water bodies—from Lake Urmia to Zayandeh-Rood and Hoor al-Azim—is an example of the environmental threats posed by the water crisis.

The decline in surface runoff has endangered plant and animal species and put fragile ecosystems at risk of collapse. If this trend continues, desertification, land subsidence, and the expansion of dust storm hotspots will accelerate.

Bijan Kazemi Transferred to an Intelligence Ministry Safe House in Qom

On Wednesday, July 16, Bijan Kazemi, a political prisoner detained since January 2025, informed his mother during a brief phone call—his first in 12 days of total silence—that he had been transferred to one of the Intelligence Ministry’s safe houses in the city of Qom. This was his first communication since his suspicious transfer from Greater Tehran Prison and he has heightened concerns over his physical and mental well-being, including the risk of torture and enforced disappearance.

His mother, Ms. Khosravi, said in a statement: “Bijan called tonight and said he is imprisoned in one of the Intelligence Ministry’s safe houses in Qom. I don’t know if he is alive or not.”

“A Crime is in Progress”: A Letter from Political Prisoner Saeed Masouri Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Plans

Safe houses are secret facilities operated by intelligence agencies, beyond the reach of judicial oversight. These locations are consistently associated with torture, psychological abuse, and coerced confessions. Human rights activists have repeatedly warned about the systematic use of such illegal spaces and described them as a clear symbol of widespread human rights violations by Iran’s regime.

From arrest in Khorramabad to enforced disappearance in Qom

Bijan Kazemi was arrested on January 19 and was initially held and interrogated at the Intelligence Ministry’s detention center in Khorramabad. He was then transferred to Ward 241 of Evin Prison (under the control of the judiciary’s Intelligence Protection Unit), and later to Ward 209 (directly overseen by the Intelligence Ministry). Following the bombing of Evin Prison, he was moved to Fashafouyeh Prison. Finally, on July 1, he and a group of other detainees were transferred to an undisclosed location, now revealed to be one of the Intelligence Ministry’s safe houses in Qom.

During this entire period, no official charges have been brought against him, he has been denied access to legal counsel and has only been permitted extremely brief calls to inform his family that he is still alive.

Legal rights conditioned on cooperation with Intelligence

MinistryAccording to his family, security agents have explicitly stated that access to a lawyer, family visits, or any legal process is conditional on “cooperating with the Intelligence Ministry.” This pattern is one of the regime’s common methods for fabricating cases and forcing false confessions.

When a prisoner is removed from the view of oversight bodies, their family, and even the judicial system, the stage is fully set for physical torture, psychological pressure, threats against family members, and forced televised confessions. Human rights organizations have warned that under the current conditions—especially in the context of the recent war crisis and heightened security atmosphere—these circumstances may lead to grave human rights abuses against political prisoners.

Three Civilians Shot and Killed by Iranian Security Forces in Khomein

The state-run IRIB news agency published a vague report stating that following a shooting near a “military center,” three “compatriots were martyred.” The dimensions of the incident remain unclear. About two weeks earlier, two young nature tourists were also killed by security forces in the city of Hamedan.

According to the report, on the evening of Thursday, July 17, individuals described by IRIB as “security guards of a military center” in Khomein, located in Iran’s Markazi province, became suspicious of two passing vehicles and opened fire, resulting in the “martyrdom of three compatriots.”

The same report quoted the Khomein county prosecutor as confirming the incident, stating: “A judicial case has been opened, and the details of the incident are under investigation.”

IRIB emphasized that “those responsible for this incident” are currently in custody. In the terminology of Iran’s regime-controlled media, the phrase “martyrdom of compatriots” typically refers to civilian casualties. Given that this incident involved gunfire from “military center guards” toward passing vehicles, it is likely that the victims were ordinary citizens. In contrast, regime media openly refer to military casualties using terms such as “security martyrs.”

The Iranian regime has a long history of its agents shooting ordinary citizens. In August 2024, Arezou Badri, a 31-year-old woman, was shot and severely injured by police for not observing mandatory hijab laws while in her personal vehicle. In May 2022, Maria Arefi and Reza Moradkhani were shot by the regime’s so-called “morality patrol” officers.

Since the 12-day war, the Iranian regime’s military forces have altered the nature of their attacks on civilian populations. On July 2, the Fars News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), confirmed reports of the killing of two young men in Hamedan by the regime’s security forces, stating the incident was the result of fire from “security operations forces” targeting a vehicle carrying three passengers.

The Shooting of Arezoo Badri: A Tragic Case of Violence and Repression in Iran

The two young men were Mehdi Abaei and Alireza Karbasi, who had gone to the outskirts of Hamedan for a nature trip. At their funeral, mourners chanted the slogan: “I will kill, I will kill / the one who killed my brother.”

Although regime officials repeatedly claim they will “deal with those responsible” for such incidents, in previous cases, no reports have been released to the public regarding any actual disciplinary actions, investigation processes, or punishments for the offending regime agents.

Europe Threatens to Reinstate UN Sanctions Against Iran’s Regime

Germany, France, and the United Kingdom warned Iran’s regime that it must immediately resume diplomatic talks regarding its nuclear program and declared that if no concrete steps are taken within the next six weeks, they will reinstate United Nations sanctions against Tehran.

Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister of Iran’s regime, stated on Friday, July 18, referring to his joint discussion with the foreign ministers of the three European countries and the EU foreign policy chief on Thursday evening, that the start of negotiations is conditional upon the United States’ readiness for a deal that is “fair, balanced, and beneficial for both parties.”

Iran’s Regime Dismisses IAEA Report About its Nuclear Program as “Biased and Baseless.”

Araghchi said that during the discussion, he emphasized that Europe must act “responsibly” to play a positive role and abandon “outdated policies of threats and pressure, including the snapback mechanism.”

According to Reuters, the foreign ministers of these three European countries, known as the E3 (European Troika), along with the EU foreign policy chief, held a phone call with Iran’s foreign minister for the first time since the mid-June U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

A French diplomatic source told Reuters that during the call, Iran’s regime was urged to immediately resume diplomatic efforts toward a “verifiable and sustainable” nuclear agreement.

These three countries, along with China and Russia, are the remaining signatories to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (JCPOA), a deal that lifted sanctions against the country in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear program.

The UN Security Council resolution recognizes the agreement is set to expire on October 18, but under its provisions, sanctions can be reinstated even before that date. The implementation of this process takes approximately 30 days.

European countries have repeatedly warned that if a new agreement is not reached, they will trigger the “snapback” mechanism, a process through which all previous UN sanctions against Iran would be reimposed.

Since the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran during the 12-day war, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have left the country.

Although officials of Iran’s regime have indicated a willingness to return to diplomacy, there are no signs of an imminent resumption of the sixth round of nuclear negotiations between Tehran and Washington.

U.S. President Donald Trump has said that Iran’s regime is very eager to negotiate, but he is in no hurry to talk with Tehran.

Diplomats say that even if talks resume, reaching a comprehensive agreement before the end of August — the final deadline set by the Europeans — does not seem realistic, especially given the absence of inspectors who can assess the remaining state of Iran’s nuclear program.

Two European diplomats have stated that they hope to reach a joint strategy with the United States in the coming days, in order to enable negotiations with Iran’s regime in the near future.

Approval of Accelerated Implementation of Class-Based Internet in Iran

The Supreme Council of Cyberspace, attended by the heads of the three branches of power and senior military and security commanders of the Iranian regime, held a meeting and passed a resolution that paves the way for further internet restrictions on citizens. At the same time, Mohammad Reza Aref, the regime’s first vice president, called for the rapid launch of a national internet and the strengthening of domestic messaging platforms.

On the evening of Tuesday, July 15, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace approved the executive regulations of the Committee for Facilitating Digital Businesses.

Internet Censorship in Iran Has Turned Into a Billion-Dollar Business For State Actors

This committee was established in February 2025 under the administration of Masoud Pezeshkian, president of the Iranian regime, and now its regulations have been formally approved. Amir Sayyah, acting head of the Economic and Regulatory Affairs Department at the National Cyberspace Center, announced that the committee intends to unblock IP access for “certain businesses”—a move seen as a step toward implementing class-based internet.

The term “class-based internet” refers to the regime granting specific groups privileged access to the internet, while the general public is denied that level of connectivity.

This practice began during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani when Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, a former Minister of Communications, granted unfiltered internet access to some journalists aligned with the government.

During the November 2019 protests, while internet access was cut off for the general public, some journalists and political figures remained online from within Iran, using social media—especially Twitter/X—to amplify the regime’s narrative of the unrest. These included labeling the protesters as “store looters” or calling the demonstrations a “hunger revolt.” A similar pattern emerged during the IRGC’s downing of a Ukrainian airliner in January 2020.

In this context, Fatemeh Mohajerani, spokesperson for the Pezeshkian administration, announced that the government intends to allocate “freer internet” to journalists. However, even before this, some journalists within the regime were already granted such access upon request and with government approval.

According to the tech website Digiato, “It appears that under the fourteenth government, the class-based internet plan… is being implemented on a broader scale.”

On the other hand, Aref called for the swift launch of the national internet and emphasized the need to strengthen domestic messaging apps. He said: “We must reassure domestic users that the National Information Network meets their needs in a secure environment.”

Mohajerani also stated: “The reason for the multi-day internet outage during the war with Israel was the launch of the national internet.” Referring to the 12-day war with Israel, Aref said: “This was a war of technologies and soft power, and we must seriously assess our performance in this area.”

The “national intranet” project has long been a key goal of the Iranian regime, with Ali Khamenei, the regime’s supreme leader, emphasizing its implementation since the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the first term of Hassan Rouhani.

Its serious implementation began under Azari Jahromi’s tenure as communications minister and advanced considerably during Rouhani’s second term. Now, following the end of the 12-day war, the Pezeshkian administration is pushing forward with a project that was aggressively initiated under Rouhani.