The general framework of the proposal titled “Countering the Infiltration of Intelligence Services and Foreign Governments or Institutions” was approved on Sunday, August 17, with 183 votes in favor in the Iranian regime’s Majlis (parliament). Beyond being a legal measure against espionage, the proposal carries a clear political message: expanding the securitization of society and increasing the cost of communication, information-sharing, and citizen organizing. However, only the general framework has been approved so far, and its articles and details have not yet received final approval.
In the proposed text, the scope of restrictions extends far beyond countering intelligence operations. Article 5, for example, would prohibit scientific cooperation with certain foreign universities and institutions and even the transfer of medical, research, and archaeological samples under certain circumstances, with prison sentences envisaged as punishment. Other sections of the proposal also impose restrictions and criminal penalties on communication and cooperation with foreign media outlets and certain non-Iranian organizations.
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If such a law is passed in its current form, it would not only target spies or intelligence agents; it could also transform the public sphere into an environment of suspicion and fear. Students, journalists, researchers, social activists, and ordinary citizens may find themselves worrying, before any contact with people outside the country, about how their actions could be interpreted by the regime’s security agencies.
At a time when the gap between society and the ruling establishment has widened and Iran’s younger generation relies more than ever on independent media, social networks, and cross-border communications, proposals like this could become tools for intimidating society and preventing the formation of communication networks and social organization.
The Iranian regime seeks to present “countering infiltration” as the official purpose of this proposal, but the practical result of expanding such regulations would be to restrict the very communications that allow people to receive news, share their experiences, make their voices heard internationally, and coordinate around common demands.
For example, if the family of a prisoner sentenced to death informs international media about their loved one’s sentence, the government could, under this law, prosecute them for communicating with what it considers hostile media outlets or suspicious organizations.
If a prisoner or their family tries to make their voice heard around the world, they could face the intimidating measures envisioned in this repressive proposal.
For this reason, the danger of this proposal is not limited to possible imprisonment or punishment for certain individuals; the greater danger is the creation of a society in which fear of being accused of infiltration replaces trust, dialogue, and social participation.
It appears that the regime’s purpose in introducing such a proposal under these circumstances is to send a message of strength both to foreign counterparts and to people who, in the normal course of life, business, and work, interact with foreign individuals or organizations.
