Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Iranian regime, appointed Mohsen Rezaei as his representative to the Supreme National Security Council on August 9, 2026. Hours later, Iranian regime president Masoud Pezeshkian appointed him secretary of the council.
Seventy-one-year-old Mohsen Rezaei was one of the founders of the IRGC Intelligence Unit before becoming commander of the Iran-Iraq War. In 1981, at the age of 27, he became commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a position he held for 16 years—the longest tenure as commander of the force.
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During his tenure, the IRGC’s ground, naval, and air forces were established, the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters was founded, and the IRGC evolved from a paramilitary force into military, security, and economic power. Rezaei’s name, however, is most closely associated with the Iran-Iraq War, from major operations to decisions whose human cost is still debated.
Karbala-4: Defeat Under the Name of Deception
The main example is Operation Karbala-4, an operation that was compromised in January 1987 and halted after heavy Iranian casualties. According to figures cited by Hossein Alaei, former commander of the IRGC Navy, a total of 17,000 Iranian forces were killed or went missing and 26,000 were wounded in Operations Karbala-4 and Karbala-5. Years later, Rezaei wrote: “Operation Karbala-4 was carried out to deceive the enemy.”
From Uniform to Ballot Box
In 1997, Rezaei put aside his military uniform and served for 24 years as secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. He also ran in four presidential elections.
In 2015, Rezaei said that if the United States attacked, Iran would capture “at least 1,000 Americans” in the first week and receive “several billion dollars” for the release of each one: “Our economic problem would also be solved.” The idea that Iran could solve its economic problems by taking American soldiers hostage was for a long time a subject of ridicule and criticism.
Boasts That Have Become Relevant Again
But in recent months, Rezaei’s rhetoric has been more than a reminder of his old boasts; it has become closely tied to the ongoing dispute over war and negotiations. Following the 12-day Iran-Israel war in 2025, he claimed that Iran had used only “30%” of its capabilities and had been prepared for a two-month battle: “If the war had lasted more than two months, there would be no Israel today.” He then warned that if Israel attacked again, Iran would respond “with all its might” and change its “red lines.”
The Strait of Hormuz also occupies a central place in his recent positions. He has said that Donald Trump wants to become the “police of the Strait of Hormuz” and that the costs of security, insurance, and the environmental consequences of the waterway should be charged to its users. In the days leading up to his appointment as secretary of the council, he also warned: “If the blockade continues, American ships and forces will face serious dangers and casualties,” adding: “We will never allow a second corridor to be opened in the Strait of Hormuz.” In his view, the strait is “under Iran’s management,” and the patience of the armed forces also has limits.
Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, too, said only one day before leaving office that the Strait of Hormuz would not be reopened until the United States changed its behavior. Therefore, the disagreement cannot be reduced to the simple dichotomy of “Zolghadr the moderate, Rezaei the warmonger.”
The Regime’s Leadership After Ali Khamenei
This reshuffle comes amid a larger vacuum left by the death of Ali Khamenei. Iran’s regime is still at war, and the political and security formation of the new leadership has not been finalized yet. To date, no new image of Mojtaba Khamenei has been released, nor has his voice been heard. If the war ends, it is unclear where internal power struggles will go and how the balance among the new supreme leader, the IRGC, the government, and parliament will change.
In such circumstances, Mohsen Rezaei is an understandable choice for the regime. He is a veteran commander with a network within the IRGC, understands the language of war, and can move between the regime’s supreme leader, the government, and various factions of the hardliners.
Following the killing of Ali Khamenei, Iran’s regime has entered an endless cycle of internal conflicts and infighting, and it is unclear how far this will go. But one thing is beyond dispute: the Iranian regime’s weakness in managing crises and war. It appears that the regime has no choice but to continue the war and send signals of strength, while at the same time lacking the ability to resolve its internal problems, and economic difficulties have limited the capacity and resilience of the Iranian people.
