Since the start of the war on February 28, 2026, the Iranian regime has clearly sought to turn the conflict into a tool for its own survival. Rather than being devoted primarily to confronting an external enemy, the wartime atmosphere has been used to suppress society and control the regime’s internal crises.
Under the cover of the war, thousands of young protesters were arrested, large numbers of participants in the Dey uprising were executed, along with 10 members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK). At the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij forces have remained deployed in the streets for months to prevent new protests, while the regime has taken a series of measures—including keeping the Majlis (parliament) suspended—to prevent its internal divisions from escalating.
However, since the ceasefire took effect, the regime’s instability has become increasingly evident. One of the clearest manifestations of this instability is the growing infighting within the ruling establishment. The signing of the memorandum of understanding with the United States created a deep rift at the top of the government—a division that was visible even during the funeral ceremony of former Iranian regime supreme leader Ali Khamenei. At a ceremony that would normally be expected to symbolize unity, a group of regime supporters chanted “Death to the compromisers” against Masoud Pezeshkian and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and threw stones at the Iranian regime’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
Rift at the Top of the Government Following the Agreement
Only a few hours after the memorandum was signed, the Iranian regime’s supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, officially declared that he had “fundamentally held a different view.” This position effectively split the Assembly of Experts—the body responsible for selecting the regime’s supreme leader—into two camps. Dozens of its members issued a statement opposing the memorandum, and the divisions spread into the IRGC, the Basij, and their commanders.
Meanwhile, the regime’s Friday prayer leaders have one after another spoken out against the terms of the memorandum, while state-run media outlets have become platforms for attacking the government. Death threats against the president, threats to destroy the Foreign Ministry building, and repeated verbal attacks all point to a crisis that can no longer be dismissed as an ordinary political dispute.
These divisions are not a new phenomenon but the result of a long-term process of erosion that has affected the entire structure of the regime for years. For this reason, the current crisis is neither a temporary disagreement nor a problem that can easily be repaired; rather, it is rooted in the nature, strategy, and system of governance of the Iranian regime.
From this perspective, the war is not merely a military confrontation for the Iranian regime; it is a tool for postponing the eruption of internal crises, suppressing society, and delaying a reckoning with divisions that have now become visible even at the highest levels of power. However, the experience of recent months shows that as the wartime atmosphere subsides, those accumulated crises re-emerge and manifest themselves with even greater intensity.
