As the legal deadline for the expiration of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 approaches, and with the growing possibility that the three European countries might trigger the “Snapback” mechanism, Tehran and Moscow have stepped up their legal consultations to counter this scenario.
On the morning of Saturday, August 23, Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian regime’s foreign minister, and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, held a joint phone conversation to review developments related to the nuclear file, recent moves by European countries, as well as the regime’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In this conversation, both sides emphasized that the three European countries—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—due to their repeated violations of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) commitments and their alignment with the United States in attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, lack both legal and moral standing to use the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism. According to Araghchi, the idea of extending Resolution 2231 is a decision that must only be made by the Security Council with the agreement of all its members. He stressed that the Iranian regime does not recognize any right for the three European countries in this matter.
Previously, Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna, had warned that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany intend to activate Snapback against Iran before the end of August. This mechanism, included in Resolution 2231, allows for the reimposition of all previous UN Security Council sanctions against the Iranian regime without the need for a new vote.
Ulyanov stated on X (formerly Twitter) that the three European countries themselves have violated Resolution 2231 and JCPOA commitments, and therefore, under international law, lack the authority to activate Snapback. He referred to the principle of “good faith” in international law and to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1970 regarding South Africa and Namibia, stressing that one cannot benefit from rights under an agreement while simultaneously violating its obligations.
Meanwhile, Araghchi also told the state-run IRNA news agency that the activation of Snapback would bring significant economic damage to Iran, but he did not consider it “the end of everything.” He said: “For several years, we have been in talks with China and Russia about preventive solutions, although their success is not guaranteed.”
At the same time, China has also lodged a note at the Security Council strongly opposing the activation of this mechanism. Beijing declared that the current deadlock stems from the obstruction of the United States and the three European countries in implementing the JCPOA, not from Tehran’s behavior. The Chinese government warned that the return of sanctions would be an illegal move, violating the spirit of diplomacy, and could bring “catastrophic and unpredictable consequences.”
What is the snapback mechanism?
Snapback is a mechanism outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which allows participants of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) to restore previous UN sanctions against Iran if the country is found in “significant non-compliance” with its commitments. This can be done without requiring a new vote—only through the submission of a formal notification.
According to paragraph 11 of Annex B of Resolution 2231, once such a notification is submitted, sanctions automatically return after a 30-day period unless the Security Council adopts a new resolution to extend the suspension. In practice, due to the veto power of the permanent members, passing such a resolution is extremely difficult and nearly impossible.
Which sanctions would return?
If Snapback is activated, Iran’s nuclear file would once again fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This chapter authorizes the Security Council to impose both military and non-military measures against states in order to maintain global peace and security.
The first consequence of triggering this mechanism would be the full reinstatement of the arms embargo. Iran would be banned from exporting or importing all types of weapons, military equipment, missile systems, ammunition, and even related technologies. This ban would cover both formal and informal military cooperation.
In the missile field, all activities related to ballistic missiles—including production, testing, research and development, or the provision of components—would be strictly prohibited. Any cooperation with other countries or international bodies in this area would also be subject to penalties.
In the financial and banking sectors, sanctions would freeze the assets of key Iranian institutions such as the Central Bank, state-owned banks, the National Development Fund, and other affiliated entities worldwide. These sanctions would almost completely sever Iran’s ties with the global financial system.
A Decade After the Signing of the JCPOA, Will the Snapback Mechanism Be Triggered?
In the energy sector, Iran’s exports of crude oil, natural gas, petrochemical products, and other energy resources would once again be sanctioned. Foreign investment in Iran’s energy industry would stop, and international companies would be prohibited from participating in oil and gas projects in the country.
Additionally, the UN sanctions list targeting Iranian individuals and entities would be reinstated. This includes senior officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ministry of Defense, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, companies tied to Ali Khamenei (the regime’s supreme leader), and other key institutions that had previously been removed under the JCPOA framework.
