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The Value of the Rial on a Downward Slope: Direct Consequences of Pre-Crisis Policy Failures

Economic experts always emphasize the key role of smart governance in maintaining financial stability and preserving the value of Iran’s rial. A look at official statistics reveals that incompetence in economic policymaking is the primary driver of the current crisis. The Iranian regime’s officials failed to make the country’s financial structures resilient against internal and external shocks. The absence of a comprehensive support program has doubled the negative impacts of this situation on public livelihoods. In recent years, imbalances in the public budget led to increasing borrowing from the Central Bank. This trend caused an uncontrolled surge in liquidity and expanded the monetary base.

Many analysts believe that the root causes of this turmoil date back to the years preceding the military conflicts. Structural mismanagement wasted the country’s foreign exchange resources and severely weakened the economy’s buffering capacity. Consequently, the first sparks of tension ignited the currency crisis. A report by the Central Bank of Iran in June 2026 revealed that the country’s total liquidity crossed the threshold of 14.9 trillion tomans. This liquidity growth was the direct result of the government’s hidden budget deficit.

Disregarding the severity of the crisis, the Iranian regime continued to print unbacked money. The latest data published on the Central Bank of Iran website reported the monetary base growth rate at over 61.5%. This large figure represents a ticking time bomb at the heart of the country’s half-dead economy. Independent experts repeatedly warned officials about the consequences of these destructive policies. Nonetheless, the approach to economic management remained unchanged, making the path toward collapse smoother.

The Role of Executive Incompetence During Conflicts on the Foreign Exchange Market

A detailed examination shows that the recent war merely accelerated the collapse of the value of the rial. The ailing structure of the economy lacked the capacity to withstand new pressures even before the conflict. Through its incorrect decisions, the Iranian regime worsened the livelihood struggles of citizens during the crisis. Amid the military conflicts, the price of the dollar in the open market climbed daily without interruption.

Meanwhile, government officials made contradictory statements regarding the country’s foreign exchange reserves. The Central Bank announced in late June 2026 that 4.5 billion dollars had been added to the foreign exchange reserves in recent months. It is worth noting that due to the dire state of foreign exchange reserves, the regime’s officials have avoided disclosing the absolute total figure of reserves for years, reporting only positive or negative changes. In its latest report, the International Monetary Fund estimated the Iranian regime’s “readily available” foreign exchange reserves for 2025 at 22.9 billion dollars. According to field reports from credible economic news agencies, the dollar rate experienced an unprecedented jump at the height of the conflicts. The capital market also suffered heavy and historic drops due to these insecurities, as evidenced by daily data from the Securities and Exchange Organization. Retail investors withdrew their money from the stock market to protect the value of their assets.

The public rush to speculatively buy gold and foreign currency multiplied the pressure on the value of the rial. According to official currency transaction data on the Central Bank of Iran website, the supply of foreign exchange for importing essential goods was severely disrupted during the war. The acute shortage of foreign currency resources abruptly raised the prices of consumer goods. Mismanagement in the distribution of preferential currency created an environment for macro-rent-seeking by well-connected brokers.

 What Do Official Statistics Say About Inflation Rates and the Post-War Collapse?

In its latest official report in June 2026 on the national portal of the Statistical Centre of Iran, the institution revealed new dimensions of the crisis. The Consumer Price Index shows an unprecedented upward trend on an annual basis. Based on this data, the country’s annual inflation rate has reached a staggering 62%. This statistic indicates that the public’s living costs have increased by more than half compared to last year. Point-to-point inflation even surpassed the 88.6% threshold.

The Central Bank’s analytical reports fully confirm these bitter economic realities. The freefall of the value of the rial effectively stripped private sector actors of any long-term planning capabilities. According to the periodic assessment by The Economist in April 2026, the country’s economic growth rate, excluding oil, dropped to negative 9.2%. This figure reflects a deep recession across the country’s industrial and manufacturing sectors. Domestic producers cannot afford raw materials due to the severe fluctuations in the exchange rate.

The statistical database of the International Monetary Fund evaluated Iran’s financial outlook as highly bleak in its recent analysis. In its report for the first half of 2026, the IMF forecast Iran’s economic growth at negative 6.1 percent due to infrastructural and trade crises. This international institution considers structural budget deficits to be the main root of high inflation. The combination of these factors with the ruling establishment’s executive incompetence has shrunk the public’s dining tables to the smallest possible size. The plunge in the value of the national currency completely destroyed the purchasing power of workers and employees.

The Drastic Drop in the Value of the Rial and the Shrinking Livelihoods of the People

The continuous drop in the value of the rial has directly targeted the financial capabilities of families across all provinces. Securing basic needs such as housing, healthcare, and food has become a daily struggle for a large segment of society. Statistical evidence cited by labor representative Hamid Haj-Esmaeili on portals linked to the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labour, and Social Welfare places the poverty line in the capital at an astonishing 60 million tomans. According to this data, a family of four needs an income above 60 million tomans just to survive. The minimum wage approved by the Supreme Labor Council does not cover even one-sixth of this amount.

The deep chasm between incomes and expenditures accelerated the unfortunate slide of the middle class below the poverty line. Field reports indicate that the consumption of meat and dairy products among lower deciles fell by up to 45%. Malnutrition, particularly among children in underprivileged areas, has turned into a severe crisis. The phenomena of shared rentals and suburban slum expansion have risen sharply based on housing sector data from the Statistical Centre of Iran.

Instead of solving the root causes of the problems, regime officials have resorted to distributing meager and ineffective cash subsidies. The real value of these subsidies vanishes within a few weeks due to high inflation. Independent economic experts believe that these temporary palliative measures only increase the volume of liquidity in the market. The ultimate result of this vicious cycle will be a new wave of price hikes in the coming months.

The Collapse of the Value of the Rial and the Paralysis of Production and Foreign Trade

The drop in the value of the rial has completely paralyzed the supply chain of domestic manufacturing industries. A major share of factories relies heavily on imported raw materials to manufacture their products. The surge in the dollar’s price caused production costs in certain industries to skyrocket by up to 120%. In its quarterly report published on the Iran Chamber of Commerce website, the chamber announced that more than 40% of small manufacturing units have shut down. The remaining units operate at less than half of their actual capacity.

Instability in government currency regulations also confronted non-oil exporters with severe challenges. Sudden directives from the Central Bank regarding the repatriation of export earnings completely destroyed export incentives. Due to extreme price volatility, Iranian merchants cannot sign long-term contracts with foreign partners. Consequently, Iran’s export markets in neighboring countries like Iraq and Afghanistan are gradually being lost to competitors.

The Research Center of the Chamber of Commerce announced in July 2026 that the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) dropped sharply. This index, whose data is accessible on the Iran Chamber of Commerce portal, clearly demonstrates a severe recession in the industrial, service, and construction sectors. Capital flight from production toward non-productive markets has endangered the future of employment in the country. According to official data, the unemployment rate among university graduates has climbed above 39%. 

Crisis in the Banking System and Financial Imbalances of Government Organs

Under the impact of the collapsing value of the rial, the country’s banking system faces a hidden threat of bankruptcy. Severe banking imbalances are the direct result of government mandates forcing banks to extend loans to specific state-backed entities. An official report by the Majlis Research Center in May 2026 showed that commercial banks’ debt to the Central Bank increased. This debt grew by 48% compared to the previous year, turning into a massive crisis. The accumulated losses of state-owned and private banks have severely diminished their capacity to offer loans.

Many of the country’s large financial institutions survive solely on direct, daily injections of money from the Central Bank. This situation translates into the second-by-second generation of inflation and a further erosion of public purchasing power. The country’s pension funds are also in a state of extreme financial imbalance. Due to its budget deficit, the government is unable to pay its financial shares to these supportive funds.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance pointed out this issue in a confidential report, aspects of which were leaked. According to this text, analyzed on the platform of the Majlis Research Center, more than 80% of the pension funds’ budget is supplied directly from the general public budget. This heavy reliance places a massive financial burden on the country’s administrative structure. The continuation of this trend poses a serious threat to the financial sustainability of the entire economic system.

 Social and Psychological Repercussions of Economic Collapse in Society

Sociologists warn about the dire consequences of expanding absolute poverty across various layers of society. Severe economic insecurity completely eradicates the motivation for entrepreneurship, innovation, and productive activities. When the value of the rial depreciates daily, the inclination toward speculative activities accelerates. Rather than entering the production sector, public capital is directed toward speculative markets for gold, foreign currency, and automobiles. This economic behavior is a direct result of psychological insecurity and a lack of trust in the country’s future.

The migration rate of specialized professionals and physicians experienced a dramatic increase according to data released on the portal of the Iranian regime Medical Council. In just the first eight months of the Iranian year 2024, more than 4,500 doctors and medical staff left the country for developed nations. The sudden exit of this volume of human capital confronts the healthcare system with a crisis. The brain drain in engineering and information technology has also inflicted irreversible damage on the manufacturing infrastructure.

Diminishing hope for the future among the younger generation has severely reduced marriage rates. Official statistics on the National Organization for Civil Registration website show that the marriage rate dropped by nearly 40% over the past five years. Conversely, divorce rates have increased due to livelihood problems and recurring psychological pressures. The regime’s mismanagement has severely weakened social foundations and family structures in Iran.

End of New Year Holidays Marked by Continued Decline in the Value of the Iranian Rial

Future Outlook of Iran’s Economy and the Paths Ahead

International analysts believe that without fundamental changes in foreign policy, improving the situation remains impossible. The financial isolation of the Iranian regime and its inclusion on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist have blocked trade channels. Financial transaction costs for Iranian merchants have increased by 15% to 20% due to the reliance on intermediaries. These extra costs are ultimately extracted from the pockets of end consumers and ordinary citizens.

An Institute of International Finance (IIF) report, key points of which were shared on the International Monetary Fund website, focused on the fact that the Iranian regime requires deep structural reforms—a prospect that seems like a mirage. These reforms include full independence for the Central Bank, removing mandatory price-fixing, and a genuine fight against systemic corruption. However, the current governance structure shows no willingness to execute these painful economic surgeries. The interests of powerful quasi-governmental entities, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Mostazafan Foundation, and the “Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order” (EIKO), rely heavily on the continuation of this chaotic status quo and lack of financial transparency.

Experts believe that continuing current policies will drive the country toward three-digit hyperinflation. Should this occur, the value of the rial will completely lose its functionality as a national currency. The experience of countries undergoing economic collapse shows that without political will from the Iranian regime, the downfall of public livelihoods will continue at a faster pace than before.

 Crisis Upon Crisis: A Chronic Breakdown

An analysis of economic trends demonstrates that the current crisis did not emerge overnight. The collapse of the value of the rial, runaway inflation, and the severe erosion of purchasing power are clear indicators of chronic mismanagement and the Iranian regime’s incompetence in handling crises. Recent military tensions merely acted as a catalyst, exposing the depth of structural damages. The Iranian regime shaped this reality by adopting flawed financial policies before the war, exhibiting a total lack of planning during the war, and abandoning market controls afterward.

Official statistics from the Central Bank and the Statistical Centre of Iran bear witness to the fact that the public’s dining tables have fallen victim to the political decisions of the Iranian regime. The reality is that the livelihoods of society have been sacrificed for the regime’s deliberate policy failures, which have driven national resources to ruin.

Continued Labor Protests: Telecommunications Retirees Rally in Various Iranian Cities

As labor protests continued across different parts of Iran, on Monday, August 3, telecommunications retirees in Bijar County and dismissed workers from the maintenance unit of Salman Farsi Petrochemical Company in Mahshahr held protest gatherings, demanding that their grievances be addressed.

In Bijar, a group of telecommunications retirees staged a protest over their living conditions, the management of the Telecommunication Company of Iran, and the performance of the company’s major shareholders. The protesters identified the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, and Mobin Trust Consortium as the principal shareholders of the telecommunications company and called for their livelihood and labor-related demands to be addressed.

Protests Expand Across Iranian Cities, From Retirees and Workers to Students and Bakers

At the same time in Mahshahr, 52 dismissed workers from the maintenance unit of Salman Farsi Petrochemical Company gathered outside the governor’s office and the office of the local member of Majlis (parliament), demanding reinstatement and an end to their employment uncertainty.

According to the workers, all of whom have more than five years of work experience, they have been out of work since March 2026, following the suspension of operations at the unit. They said that although other employees have returned to work, their contracts have not been renewed, and they have not been allowed to return to their jobs.

The protesting workers also said that despite repeated follow-ups and several protest gatherings over recent months, they have received no response from the authorities. They are demanding immediate reinstatement, renewal of their contracts, and an end to job insecurity.

Monday’s protests took place as labor demonstrations by retirees, workers, and other occupational groups have continued in recent weeks across various parts of the country, focusing on livelihood demands, job security, and protest to management practices.

Iran’s Economy in Critical Condition, Insider Warns

Hossein Raghfar, an economist close to the Iranian regime, described Iran’s economic situation as “very unfavorable” and warned that the continued policy of increasing the exchange rate could push the country’s economy toward hyperinflation.

Speaking on Saturday in an interview with the state-run ILNA news agency, Raghfar responded to recent remarks by Masoud Nili, an economist close to the Iranian regime, who said Iran is at the “station before hyperinflation.” Raghfar said the country’s economy has not yet entered the hyperinflation stage, but there are worrying signs that the crisis is intensifying.

Triple-Digit Inflation Pushes Iran’s Lower and Middle Classes to Breaking Point

Referring to the sharp rise in market prices, he said many goods have become more than 100% more expensive over the past few months. However, from a scientific perspective, hyperinflation occurs when the monthly inflation rate reaches about 40% to 50%, a situation that, according to him, Iran’s economy has not yet reached.

The university professor identified the government’s exchange-rate policies as one of the main factors worsening the economic crisis and stressed that if the continuous increase in the exchange rate persists, it could pave the way for Iran’s economy to enter the hyperinflation stage.

Raghfar’s remarks come as the continuous increase in the prices of goods and services has placed growing pressure on citizens’ livelihoods and sharply reduced the purchasing power of a large share of households. At the same time, officials of the Iranian regime, instead of presenting an effective plan to curb inflation and stabilize the market, have primarily emphasized the need for the public to show “resilience” in the face of economic hardships.

It should be recalled that Masoud Nili, a regime-affiliated economist and faculty member at the Sharif University of Technology’s School of Management and Economics, previously warned that Iran’s economy has entered what he described as the “station before hyperinflation.” He said the country’s economy has moved beyond chronic inflation and is now facing extremely high and severe inflation, a situation that, if left unchecked, could lead to hyperinflation.

Speaking on Monday, July 20, 2026, at the conference titled “Iran Economy Outlook 2026,” Nili stressed that Iran’s economy now stands between chronic inflation and hyperinflation. According to him, the inflation the Iranian people are struggling with today is no longer ordinary or merely chronic inflation, but has entered a phase of extremely high inflation.

Trump: New round of talks with the Iranian regime to begin on Monday

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U.S. President Donald Trump announced that a new round of negotiations between Tehran and Washington will begin on Monday. His remarks came hours after he announced the cancellation of planned military strikes against Iran.

Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One on Sunday evening, Trump said that they don’t want to be attacked, and they were aware of the scope of the attack. We are now in talks, and negotiations begin Monday afternoon.

He also claimed that an agreement had been reached regarding the Strait of Hormuz and expressed hope that a deal on Iran’s nuclear program would also be achieved.

At the same time, reports indicate intensive consultations among the foreign ministers of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, and Jordan. The discussions appear to be centered on the negotiation process between Tehran and Washington.

Oil Market Reaction

Trump’s remarks about canceling the strikes and resuming negotiations triggered an immediate reaction in global markets. U.S. crude oil prices fell 5% to $80.79 per barrel, while Brent crude also declined 5% to trade at $83.87 per barrel.

Araghchi: Negotiations with Oman are in the final stages

Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian regime’s foreign minister, announced that negotiations between Tehran and Muscat regarding the Strait of Hormuz are nearing completion and are in their final stages.

At the beginning of the cabinet meeting, he presented a report on the latest status of the negotiations and said the talks had made significant progress.

Meanwhile, Esmaeil Baghaei, spokesperson for the Iranian regime’s Foreign Ministry, explained that the negotiations between Iran and Oman are focused on establishing a designated corridor and route for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

According to Baghaei, Tehran believes the southern route through the Strait of Hormuz, which lies in Omani waters, has contributed to regional insecurity and harmed Iran’s national interests, making it unacceptable to the Iranian regime. He added that the agreed route would be neither the current northern route nor the existing southern route, but rather a new route to be agreed upon by the two countries.

Baghaei also stressed that this understanding is unrelated to whether the Strait of Hormuz remains open or closed. He said any potential closure of the waterway would result from what he called “America’s violation of its commitments and the imposition of a blockade,” and emphasized that the agreement with Oman is only one of the prerequisites for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, not a sufficient condition.

According to the report, under the proposed agreement between Iran and Oman, ships would enter the Strait of Hormuz through a route controlled by Iran and exit through Omani waters.

Trump had previously stated that, following requests from Iran and several countries in the region, he agreed to cancel the attack on Iran on the condition that the parties reach an agreement as quickly as possible. He also wrote on his social media platform that an initial agreement had been reached on a general framework, including the immediate, full, and complete reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Three Political Prisoners Subjected to Enforced Disappearance in Evin Prison

Reports from Evin Prison indicate that on the morning of Saturday, August 1, prison guard forces raided Ward 7, assaulted three political prisoners—Amirhossein Moradi, Ehsan Rostami, and Afshin Heyratian—and forcibly removed them from the ward before transferring them to an undisclosed location. No information has yet been released regarding their physical condition or whereabouts.

According to informed sources, the operation took place at around 11:30 a.m. in the section housing political prisoners in Ward 7 of Evin Prison, located in Tehran. Prison guard officers entered the ward without providing any explanation or presenting a warrant and used force to separate the three political prisoners from the others.

Iran’s Regime Uses War to Legitimize the Gallows

According to witnesses, the officers severely beat the three prisoners. During the assault, their clothes were torn, and visible injuries were observed on their bodies. Witnesses also reported that the atmosphere inside the ward was extremely tense throughout the operation.

Transfer to an Undisclosed Location

According to the report, Amirhossein Moradi, Ehsan Rostami, and Afshin Heyratian were forcibly removed from the ward after being beaten and transferred to an undisclosed location.

As of the time of publication, prison authorities had provided no explanation regarding the reason for the transfer or the location where the three prisoners are being held. Their families and lawyers also remain unaware of their physical condition or fate, raising concerns about their safety and the possibility of further abuse.

Who Are the Three Transferred Prisoners?

Amirhossein Moradi is a student at Sharif University of Technology, one of Iran’s leading universities. Ehsan Rostami is a political prisoner, and Afshin Heyratian is a children’s rights activist who has previously faced judicial cases because of his civil and human rights activities.

The simultaneous transfer of the three prisoners without any official explanation has raised questions about the motive behind the action and their current situation.

Prison Officials Present During the Operation

Knowledgeable sources say the transfer operation was carried out in the presence of several Evin Prison officials. According to the report, Yousefi, the prison’s deputy for health affairs; Fathollahi, the head of the prison guard; Sadeghi, deputy for protection; Rostami, deputy head of the prison guard; Haghjoo, head of inspections; and Mahmoudi, head of Ward 7, were present along with a number of prison guard personnel.

According to these sources, the simultaneous presence of several senior prison officials indicates that the operation had been planned in advance.

Growing Concerns Over the Prisoners’ Fate

Several hours after the transfer of the three prisoners, no official information has been released regarding their whereabouts or condition. The lack of information available to their families and lawyers has further intensified concerns about their fate.

The incident comes as Ward 7 of Evin Prison has previously been criticized repeatedly by human rights organizations over poor detention conditions, inadequate hygiene, lack of facilities, and the treatment of political prisoners.

Triple-Digit Inflation Pushes Iran’s Lower and Middle Classes to Breaking Point

The state-run Economy24 website, citing the latest inflation data from the Statistical Center of Iran for July 2026, wrote: “The nearly 25% increase in the cost of the household livelihood basket during just the first four months of the Iranian year (beginning March 22), together with soaring inflation in essential food items, shows that economic pressure on the lower and middle-income groups has reached a critical breaking point.”

Rising Inflation in Iran and Uncertainty Over Workers’ Livelihoods

Economy24 added, citing analytical data: “Among 53 selected food items, 41 recorded price increases higher than the urban point-to-point inflation rate of 85.2%. A review of annual price trends shows that products such as solid and liquid cooking oil, mayonnaise, imported rice, chicken, and eggs have experienced record-breaking price surges.”

According to the report, the average prices of Iranian rice, lamb, beef, and various nuts have reached levels that have effectively turned them into luxury goods or unattainable items for a large segment of society.

The website said that the Iranian regime’s economy is burdened not only by monetary factors and structural imbalances in the banking system, but also by “the heavy shadow of geopolitical uncertainty and the country’s prolonged and exhausting state of neither war nor peace.”

The state-run Rouydad24 website, citing the latest data from the Statistical Center of Iran, reported that point-to-point inflation reached triple digits in eight provinces during the Iranian month of Tir (June 22–July 22, 2026).

The report said that while Iran’s nationwide point-to-point inflation rate was reported at 87.9%, it reached 112.4% in Ilam Province and stood at 73.9% in Tehran Province—”a gap of 38.5 percentage points that shows households across different provinces have not experienced price increases equally.”

Rouydad24 also noted that disparities in annual inflation are significant, with Ilam Province recording the highest rate at 80.6%, while Tehran Province recorded the lowest at 55.2%.

The report added that the most severe inflationary pressures are evident in the food category.

Rouydad24 reported that point-to-point inflation for food, beverages, and tobacco reached triple digits in all 31 provinces, climbing as high as 149.9% in West Azerbaijan Province.

According to the report, even provinces where overall inflation remains below 100% have experienced food basket price increases of more than double compared with the previous year.

How Iran’s Clerical Regime Divided, Conquered, and Kept Breathing

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The clerical regime in Iran is politically, economically, and morally bankrupt. It commands no social capital. Its legitimacy, to the extent it ever had any, was liquidated long ago — in the torture chambers of Evin, in the mass graves of the 1988 massacre, in the blood of teenage protesters shot on rooftops during the 2019 uprising. What it has, instead of a mandate, is a rotating gallery of mirages designed to keep Iranians chasing shadows.

For two decades, the regime’s most profitable illusion was “reform.” Khatami, Rouhani, the promise that the theocracy could soften from within — millions of Iranians were told to wait, to vote, to trust the process. The 2017 uprising in Mashhad, Shiraz, and a hundred other cities incinerated that myth. “Reformist, hardliner — the game is over,” the crowds Enter the monarchy fantasy — the notion that a son of the deposed Shah, living comfortably in a Maryland suburb on wealth stolen under his father’s rule, might somehow constitute a credible alternative. For the regime, Reza Pahlavi has been a political gift: a figure who absorbs opposition energy, fragments it, and returns nothing. His record is not one of leadership but of serial contradiction.

Reuters Reveals the Credibility Crisis at the Heart of Reza Pahlavi’s Campaign

On the IRGC: in 2017, he publicly rejected designating the Guard as a terrorist organization. In November 2018, he boasted on television of “two-way contacts with the Army, the IRGC, and the Basij.” By December 2018, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he claimed “direct communication” with military and paramilitary forces. In 2020: “My support will come from these very IRGC members.” Then, on July 14, 2026 — one day after Britain designated the IRGC — he reversed everything in a Reuters interview, denying he had ever communicated with senior Guard commanders and recasting years of boasts as anonymous social media messages. The Washington Examiner noted the technical impossibility: his X account restricts direct messaging to 66 approved contacts.

On foreign intervention: for years, he insisted the regime would fall from within, telling POLITICO throughout 2025 he “didn’t want the United States or Israel to get involved directly.” By February 2026, he told ABC News that U.S. military strikes were “critical.” By July, he called the U.S.-led war “a necessary step.”

On organizations: the Iran Future Association (2007, stalled). The National Council of Iran for Free Elections (Paris, 2013; by 2017, the Congressional Research Service noted “defections” and “minimal” activity). The Phoenix Project (2019, vanished). The Alliance for Democracy and Freedom in Iran (Georgetown, 2023) — torpedoed by his own tweet on April 4, 2023, demanding hand-picked additions, until coalition partners walked out citing his “undemocratic methods.” The Atlantic Council documented how his online supporters drove actress Nazanin Boniadi off Twitter entirely.

None of this is incidental. Every peaceful protest in Iran —every worker who struck, every student who marched — has been met by the regime with bullets, torture, and mass arrests. In that context, Pahlavi’s four decades of pacifist rhetoric did not protect a single protester. It disillusioned dissent by promising a transition that never materialized, and it divided dissent by fracturing the opposition. His overnight pivot on January 10, 2026 — suddenly calling on Iranians to “seize city centres and hold them” — only confirmed what his own would-be patrons already knew. Rudy Giuliani called him “a fraud” who “never risked his life.”

Here, then, is the blunt truth. Foreign military intervention has not altered the regime’s behavior. Sanctions have not. Appeasement — the nuclear deals, the frozen-asset swaps, the diplomatic handshakes — has not. The mirage of reform has not. And the illusion of a monarchist restoration has not. Every one of these paths has been tried, and every one has delivered the same result: the regime still stands, and Iranians still die.

The only path to freedom in Iran, to peace in the Middle East, and to stability beyond it is regime change — achieved not by foreign saviours or exiled pretenders, but by recognizing the Iranian people’s sovereign right to overthrow this regime by whatever means they deem necessary. That right is not granted by Washington, London, or Brussels. It exists because forty-seven years of tyranny have left no other option.

Iran’s Regime Uses War to Legitimize the Gallows

As the world’s attention remains fixed on the drums of war echoing across the Middle East, the Iranian regime has found, in the shadow of war and escalating external conflicts, a strategic opportunity and a key pillar for its survival to reinforce its weakened and fragile domestic front.

Under the cover of escalating regional tensions, Iran’s prisons have become open arenas for systematic purges and organized intimidation aimed at deterring a protesting society. This continues as urgent warnings from international human rights organizations, along with increasingly alarmed calls—even from state-run newspapers—for a temporary halt to executions out of fear of an imminent social explosion, continue to grow.

Iranian Regime Backs Down on Executions Over Ghezel Hesar Prison Hunger Strike

Pezeshkian’s deception and state media’s admission of structural failure

While the regime’s primary domestic security priority is expanding the use of the gallows and deepening the atmosphere of fear, Iranian regime president Masoud Pezeshkian has been tasked with implementing a policy of deception and deflecting responsibility in an effort to contain society.

On July 20, 2026, the state-run Mehr News Agency published remarks by Pezeshkian in which he claimed: “The most important battlefield today is the economy and people’s livelihoods!”

However, what Iranian citizens are experiencing in practice is entirely contrary to these slogans, as the regime has completely ignored labor and professional protests while expanding the wave of executions through the use of the gallows.

As part of this effort to mislead public opinion, the state-run newspaper Donya-e-Eqtesad published an article on July 20 titled “Why Doesn’t Change Happen?” Without naming individuals directly, it pointed blame toward the regime’s supreme leader and the heads of the three branches of government, acknowledging the deadlock of structural reforms. It stated: “Beliefs that have taken shape over the years in the form of security and ideological priorities have now become a major obstacle to any reform… The path that has been followed has not been the right one, and a fundamental change in approaches and objectives is unavoidable.”

Iran’s prisons are witnessing the widespread transfer of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience to solitary confinement; a step widely regarded as a precursor to execution by hanging.

Within this context, human rights reports have documented the following major developments in July 2026:

Execution of political prisoner Mehdi Khanaki: In the early hours of Wednesday, July 22, the Iranian regime’s judiciary executed 26-year-old political prisoner Mehdi Khanaki, a law graduate, by hanging in Karaj. Khanaki had been wanted since the January 2026 uprising and was arrested on February 10. He was subjected to severe torture during detention, a matter that had been reported to the UN Special Rapporteur and international organizations.

‘No to Executions Tuesdays’ Campaign Marks 131st Week Across Iran

Fourteen prisoners were suddenly transferred to solitary confinement in Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan, with 12 facing the imminent risk of execution within hours. So far, four of them have been executed. Under the cover of war, the regime is using the gallows in an attempt to contain the country’s deepening and explosive social crisis.

State-run newspaper’s alarmed appeal: “Temporarily halt the executions!”

The extent of the regime’s fear of widespread public anger became evident in the unusual and unexpected position adopted by the state-run Ettelaat newspaper in its July 20 edition. The newspaper issued a direct and alarmed appeal to the head of the judiciary under the headline: “Temporarily halt the executions!”

Part of the appeal, reflecting deep concern within the regime’s decision-making circles over the possibility of a domestic uprising, stated:

“There will be time to carry out corporal punishments and executions, but the rapid increase in reports of executions and their growing number cannot be regarded as a positive sign or evidence of the government’s strength and control.”

These admissions show that despite media attention being dominated by external conflict, the Iranian regime’s greatest concern remains its fear of the majority of the population seeking its overthrow. The judiciary is attempting to intimidate them through the expansion of executions under the cover of escalating regional military tensions.

The failure of appeasement strategies and the need for a democratic alternative

Strategic assessments following recent developments indicate that international policies toward Tehran have failed, and this failure can be summarized in two key areas:

First: The failure of appeasement and military strikes

Experience has shown that neither negotiations and international policies based on appeasement nor foreign military strikes are capable of producing a lasting political solution or containing the regime because they ignore the principal driver of change.

Second: The need for a domestic democratic alternative

The fundamental flaw in international policies lies in ignoring the capacity of the Iranian people and the potential of a domestic democratic alternative—the only force capable of dismantling the system of Velayat-e Faqih from its roots, ending the destruction of Iran’s resources and wealth, and establishing lasting stability and freedom.

Current realities show that the external conflict fueled by the Iranian regime serves as nothing more than a tool to legitimize the gallows at home and to conceal the structural failure of the country’s economy.

No matter how much regional tensions escalate or how extensively the regime exploits them for propaganda purposes, they will never eliminate the fundamental realities confronting the overwhelming majority of Iranians: economic collapse, the growing number of executions, and the people’s determination to overthrow the system of Velayat-e Faqih and replace it with a national and democratic alternative.

Rising Inflation in Iran and Uncertainty Over Workers’ Livelihoods

The livelihoods of workers and retirees have faced unprecedented challenges in recent months. Point-to-point inflation has reached 96%, and it is projected to approach three digits for the first time in the country’s history. In this environment, implementing a wage increase for workers during the second half of the Iranian year faces serious obstacles. At the same time, employers are struggling with what is described as an economic war, including damage to production units and workforce reductions, while delays by the Social Security Organization in paying retirees’ pensions have added to the pressure. The value of the 10 million-rial government shopping voucher has also fallen to one-third of its original purchasing power because of runaway inflation, and its proposed increase has not yet been implemented. Meanwhile, the latest estimate of the workers’ minimum livelihood basket stands at 429 million rials (approximately $227), while the base monthly wage for a worker with two children is around 250 million rials (approximately $132).

Iran’s Statistical Center: Point-To-Point Inflation in July Reached Nearly 88%

Hamid Haj Esmaili, a labor market expert, told the state-run Jahan-e Sanat newspaper that implementing the wage increase for workers during the second half of the Iranian year (September 23, 2026, to March 22, 2027) would be a very difficult and complex issue. Although the measure had been approved by the Supreme Labor Council at the end of the previous Iranian year, he said that the implementation of wage increases at the end of the year on March 21, 2026, had already encountered numerous problems. On one hand, employers had been affected by the war, with some production units damaged and others forced to lay off workers. Therefore, in order to prevent further layoffs, employers were permitted to implement wage increases only through mutual agreement between workers and employers.

He added: “On the other hand, the Social Security Organization delayed pension payments to retirees. Under such circumstances, implementing wage increases during the second half of the year will face many challenges, and it may not be feasible under the current conditions.”

Three-Digit Inflation Is Approaching

Responding to a question about inflation over the past four months and its impact on workers’ living standards, the labor market expert said: “Inflation is approaching three digits, and this will have negative consequences for workers and retirees. By the end of the previous Iranian year on March 22, 2026, inflation had reached 60%. It has now risen to 96% on a point-to-point basis and is approaching three digits.”

It is noteworthy that, according to the Statistical Center of Iran, the Iranian regime’s official statistics agency, inflation in rural areas reached 100% in July.

Calculated Livelihood Basket Reaches 429 Million Rials

According to the state-run ILNA news agency, Mohsen Bagheri, a workers’ representative on the Supreme Labor Council and head of the Wage Committee of the High Council of Islamic Labor Councils, discussed the latest calculation of the workers’ livelihood basket. Bagheri said that preliminary estimates indicate that food and beverage costs within the livelihood basket have increased significantly compared to the past and may have risen by approximately two to three times. However, he said that precise calculations will be completed after the Statistical Center of Iran publishes its official data. He added that if the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor and Social Welfare establishes the Wage Committee, the livelihood basket calculations will be reviewed and finalized through tripartite negotiations involving representatives of the government, workers, and employers.

He emphasized that if the Labor Ministry does not hold these meetings, the workers’ group will independently calculate the livelihood basket based on the official statistics of the Statistical Center of Iran and announce its findings.

Regarding the latest estimated value of the livelihood basket, Bagheri said that the workers’ group’s most recent estimate, based on January 2026 inflation, stood at 429 million rials.

He further referred to discussions about the impact of exchange rate changes on living costs and said that during wage negotiations, the workers’ representatives believed the effects of the currency’s depreciation would gradually appear in consumer expenses. For that reason, they proposed postponing the final review of the livelihood basket until those effects became clear so that additional wage benefits could also be increased. Bagheri added that the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance had argued that its exchange rate policies would reduce inflation beginning in February. However, according to him, that prediction did not materialize, and by the end of June the effects of the exchange rate increase had become fully visible in the market, pushing inflation for food and beverages to around 140%.

Regarding a new estimate for the livelihood basket, Bagheri said that no precise calculations have yet been completed. He added that although a significant increase in food costs is expected, announcing any exact figure without expert calculations would not be accurate.

The Statistical Center of Iran announced that point-to-point inflation reached 87.9% in July 2026, while annual inflation stood at 66%.

The annual inflation rate also indicates that the average prices of goods and services during the 12 months ending in July 2026 were 66% higher than during the corresponding previous period.

In July 2026, rural households experienced the highest inflationary pressure compared with the national average. Point-to-point inflation in rural areas reached 106.9%, while monthly inflation was recorded at 3.4%.

Reuters Exposes $4 Billion Iran-Linked Gambling Network  

A Reuters special investigation shows that one of the world’s largest illegal gambling networks has become part of the Iranian regime’s multi-billion-dollar sanctions evasion operation through an unlicensed cryptocurrency exchange in Dubai.

The exchange, called “Shelbit,” has processed at least $4 billion in cryptocurrency since May 2024. According to blockchain data analysis, it has been linked to the Central Bank of Iran, sanctioned entities, and cryptocurrency wallets attributed to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Shelbit’s official address is an office on the upper floor of a budget hotel in Dubai’s Deira district. The exchange is run by Siavash Keyvanpour, an Iranian living abroad, but Shelbit has no active website or clear means of providing services to the public.

US Sanctions Global Network Supporting Mahan Air and IRGC

Employees whom the Reuters reporter found at the address claimed they had never heard of Shelbit or Keyvanpour. The office was registered under the name of a watch sales company, and inside there were only a few worn watches, a cash-counting machine, and a desk.

One of Shelbit’s main clients is a Persian-language network comprising more than 2,000 gambling websites. The network’s two main promotional figures are Iranian influencers Sasha Sobhani and Pouyan Mokhtari, who showcase their lavish lifestyles on social media, including multi-million-dollar cars, luxury villas, private jets, and yacht parties.

Reuters identified more than 60 Iranian influencers promoting these gambling websites, with about half of them having more than one million followers.

A technical analysis by cybersecurity company Infoblox found that websites registered under seemingly different names and brands use common software and technical features, indicating they are part of a single network. One of these websites alone has processed more than $130 million through Shelbit since May 2024.

Gambling is prohibited under the Iranian regime and is punishable by imprisonment and flogging. However, this network has access to Iran’s electronic payment system, which is subject to strict government oversight.

Former regime officials and individuals with ties to the IRGC told Reuters that the IRGC took control of the largest online gambling networks about a decade ago, as online gambling expanded.

Blockchain data show that Shelbit has processed at least $125 million for the Central Bank of Iran.

The exchange has also received at least $20 million from an operation that experts identify as a cryptocurrency mining network in Iran.

Cryptocurrency mining, which the Iranian regime legalized in 2019, has become an important tool for circumventing sanctions. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies mined in Iran can be sold on international markets without relying on the global banking system.

Since May 2024, at least $676 million has been transferred from addresses linked to Shelbit to Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange.

Sobhani, Mokhtari, and Keyvanpour were prosecuted in Iran in connection with the abt90 and Hazarat gambling websites. In 2023, Sobhani and Mokhtari were each sentenced in absentia to two years in prison, while Keyvanpour received a three-month prison sentence. Iran’s regime issued Interpol Red Notices for Sobhani and Mokhtari, and both were arrested in Spain. However, the notices were later withdrawn, and the Spanish case was closed.

Sobhani denied any involvement in money laundering, sanctions evasion, terrorism financing, or transferring funds on behalf of the Iranian regime, the Central Bank of Iran, or the IRGC. He said he had only been paid to advertise certain gambling websites and was neither their owner nor manager.

Mokhtari also said he is not a member of the IRGC or any military group affiliated with the Iranian regime and rejected the allegations made by Dubai authorities. Both men said they do not know Shelbit or Keyvanpour and have no knowledge of any possible connection between their activities and the Iranian regime.

Mokhtari was arrested in Dubai in late March on suspicion of financing Iranian regime groups accused of carrying out attacks against the United Arab Emirates.

This case illustrates how the combination of illegal gambling, social media influencers, Iran’s domestic banking infrastructure, cryptocurrency mining, and international cryptocurrency exchanges has helped the Iranian regime circumvent Western financial and banking restrictions.