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House Renting in Tehran Up By 50%

Davood Beigi-Nejad, the vice president of the Real Estate Union, says that the average rent in Tehran has increased by more than 50 percent, and due to the rise in housing prices, tenants are no longer considering buying homes.  

On Sunday, August 18, Beigi-Nejad added that currently, the rental market and the buying and selling of housing are in a state of stagflation.  

According to him, “There are generally no buyers in the housing market.”  

Previously, the Central Bank of Iran had reported that the rental rates in Tehran and urban areas of the province had increased by 47 percent and 51.6 percent, respectively, in June compared to June 2023.  

The Central Bank’s statistical archive shows that while nearly 15,000 homes were sold in Tehran in June 2018, before the US sanctions against Iran were implemented, this figure dropped to less than 4,000 units in June this year.  

Since the start of Ebrahim Raisi’s administration, the average price per square meter of housing in Tehran has soared from under 32 million tomans (approximately 534 dollars) to nearly 85 million tomans (approximately 1,417 dollars).  

At the beginning of his term, Ebrahim Raisi’s government promised to build one million housing units annually; however, on April 13, Mohammadreza Rezaei Kochi, the regime’s head of the Parliamentary Commission on Construction, announced that the progress of the “National Housing Movement” plan had stalled at 25 percent, and only a “very small portion” of the government housing projects had been completed.  

He added that what has been delivered is related to the “National Housing Action” project of the previous government.  

The vice president of the Real Estate Union also mentioned the approval of a 25 percent cap on rent increases this year, stating that currently, there is no suitable pricing model.  

Last year, the government also banned rent increases of more than 25 percent in Tehran, but in practice, rents rose by twice that amount.  

Beigi-Nejad says that, as in previous years, no steps have been taken in the housing market to help tenants become homeowners because the pricing is beyond the financial capability of tenants; in other words, the purchasing power of the average tenant has declined, and for this reason, the housing market is in recession, as there are no buyers.  

He added that tenants, due to their reduced financial power, are moving from the areas they live in to lower-income neighborhoods.

The Iranian Regime’s Debt to the Central Bank Increased by 72% in June

New statistics from the Central Bank indicate a 72% jump in the government’s debt to the Central Bank this June compared to the same month last year.

Furthermore, the total debt of the government and state-owned companies to the Central Bank and other banks in the country surpassed 1.5 quadrillion tomans (approximately $25 billion) this June, which is 37% more than last June.

Of this amount, more than 1.3 quadrillion tomans (approximately $21.6 billion) is related to the government’s debt, while the rest pertains to the debt of state-owned companies to the banking system.

The government’s debt to the banking system is equivalent to six months of the national budget, and it is unclear how the government intends to repay this massive debt.

Moreover, the government’s bank debt is only a small part of its total debt; the National Development Fund also claims more than $100 billion from the government, an amount equivalent to 2.5 years of the national budget.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its spring report stated that the total debt of the Iranian government last year amounted to 28.5% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

This significant increase in the government’s debt to the banking system comes despite the fact that the 13th government, under the presidency of Ebrahim Raisi, had promised at the beginning of its term to stop borrowing from the banking sector to control liquidity and inflation. However, over the past three years, the government’s debt to domestic banks has doubled.

Central Bank statistics show that liquidity in the country surged by 27% in June this year compared to June 2023, reaching an astronomical 8.5 quadrillion tomans (approximately $141.6 billion).

Economic experts have identified uncontrolled liquidity as the main factor behind inflation in Iran.

In recent years, the Iranian government has forced the Central Bank to print unbacked currency to cover budget deficits, enabling it to borrow directly from the Central Bank and other banks. As a result, inflation in Iran has consistently remained above 40% over the past three years, and the value of the national currency has more than halved.

Iran is Entering a Cycle of “Mass Migration,” Government Agency Warns

The Strategic Research Center of the Iranian Presidency, in a report based on the results of a survey, has highlighted serious issues in utilizing human capital and warned that Iranian society is entering a phase of “mass migration.”

In a report titled “Managing Migration Abroad,” the center wrote: “We are currently at the peak of the ‘desire and decision’ to migrate, especially among skilled and capital-rich labor.”

The report from the Strategic Research Center is dated August 3, but it gained attention from domestic media on Thursday, August 15.

According to this report, Iranian society is in a unique migratory situation, with a heavy psychological atmosphere surrounding the desire to emigrate, significantly affecting people’s lives.

The report adds that the desire and decision to migrate have “intensified” among various groups, including workers, athletes, doctors, researchers, entrepreneurs, and investors.

In this study, two groups—”doctors and nurses” and “students and graduates”—have identified the economic effects of inflation as a major factor influencing their desire to migrate.

Seventy-three percent of doctors and nurses and 59% of students stated that the effects of inflation had a “very significant” impact on their desire to migrate. Additionally, 63% of doctors and nurses and 51% of students assessed the impact of sanctions on their migration desires as “very significant.”

Doctors and nurses cited dissatisfaction with job income, lack of future security, imbalance between income and expenses, and the commercialization of their field as the main reasons for their migration.

Previously, the head of the Iranian Medical Council had warned, “The exodus of doctors from the country is a serious issue.”

In June 2023, the head of the Health and Treatment Commission of the Iranian regime’s Majlis (Parliament) reported that about ten thousand specialists and sub-specialists had obtained the necessary certification for work migration over two years, stating that Arab countries have become the primary destination for Iranian doctors.

According to the report by the Strategic Research Center, on the other hand, entrepreneurs and startups have cited reasons related to economic uncertainty and insecurity, including economic sanctions, severe inflation, currency fluctuations, economic instability and unpredictability, the unprofitability of production, complex bureaucracy, and instability in domestic and foreign policies. They have mentioned the attractiveness of the investment environment and the stability of the destination country as reasons for their migration.

IRGC-Linked Hackers Targeted the Trump and Biden Campaigns

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Iran-linked hackers targeted the campaign headquarters of both current President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump, Google has confirmed.

On Wednesday, August 14, Google’s Threat Analysis Group reported that the APT42 hacker group targeted the personal email accounts of about a dozen individuals associated with Biden and Trump, the Republican Party’s nominee in this November’s election.

Google’s report also stated that APT42 “successfully accessed the personal Gmail account of a veteran political advisor,” but the name of the advisor was not disclosed.

On Tuesday, it was reported that the personal email account of Roger Stone, a supporter of Donald Trump, was possibly accessed by hackers linked to the Iranian government.

According to Google, the APT42 hacker group is linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and consistently targets high-profile users in Israel and the United States.

Based on a chart included in Google’s report, this hacking group has even targeted users inside Iran to gain access to their computer systems.

Current and former government officials, political campaigns, diplomats, think tank members, as well as NGOs and academic institutions involved in foreign policy discussions, have all been targeted by this IRGC-linked group.

According to Google, in the past six months, about 60% of APT42’s known geographic targets were focused on the U.S. and Israel, indicating this group’s aggressive and multifaceted efforts to rapidly shift its operational focus in support of the Iranian regime’s political and military priorities.

According to the report, the APT42 hacker group had also previously attempted to interfere in the 2020 U.S. presidential election.

According to Politico, early Wednesday, Trump, in his first public comment on the incident, accused the Iranian regime of hacking his campaign and praised the FBI’s investigation into the hack.

On the same day, The Washington Post reported that the FBI stated it is also investigating suspicious attempts attributed to the Iranian regime to hack the Biden-Harris campaign and a Trump aide.

The Washington Post, citing several informed sources, reported that FBI agents investigating the efforts of Tehran-linked hackers to target the Trump, Biden, and Harris campaigns have found evidence indicating that one of the targets of these hackers was Susie Wiles, a senior advisor to Trump.

IRGC Officer Killed in Drone Strike in Syria

The Iranian regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that one of its Aerospace Force officers has died due to injuries sustained in an airstrike in Syria. Tehran claims that this attack was carried out by the U.S.-led coalition.

In a statement published by Iranian regime news agencies on Thursday, August 15, Hossein Salami, the commander of the IRGC, identified Ahmadreza Afshari as one of the “Aerospace industry specialists of the IRGC in Syria” who died from injuries caused by the airstrike.

Government officials and Iranian regime media refer to members of the IRGC operating in Syria as “advisors,” but most of them are members of the Quds Force, the IRGC’s extraterritorial branch, playing a crucial role in maintaining Iran’s proxy groups.

In his “condolence message,” Hossein Salami stated that Ahmadreza Afshari was injured during an attack by “coalition forces” in Syria that took place a few days ago. He was transferred to Iran for medical treatment but succumbed to his injuries on Thursday.

The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had previously reported that five Iran-backed militiamen were killed in Syria due to a drone strike in Deir ez-Zor province.

On August 11, Agence France-Presse (AFP), citing this report, announced that a vehicle carrying militia groups near the Iraq-Syria border was targeted in this strike. Reuters, in a separate report, also confirmed the deaths of five individuals in the attack, quoting two security sources.

The location of this incident was reported to be in eastern Deir ez-Zor province, where Iran’s proxy forces have a significant presence and have frequently been targeted by the U.S. or Israel. However, neither of these countries has claimed responsibility for this attack.

Israel rarely acknowledges its attacks on Iran-backed militias.

The August 11 drone strike on Iran-backed forces followed a drone attack on the International Coalition base in “Kharab al-Jir” near Hasakah in northeastern Syria, during which several U.S. and coalition soldiers were injured.

Since the start of the Syrian civil war over a decade ago, Iran’s proxy forces and Hezbollah have been fighting in support of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Israel has also conducted hundreds of strikes against these forces.

An Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1 is an example of these attacks, which resulted in the deaths of several Iranian military personnel, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force.

In retaliation for this attack, Iran launched unprecedented drone and missile strikes on Israeli territory in the early hours of April 13.

Regional tensions, which had previously escalated with the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza, entered a new phase after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, during his visit to Tehran on July 31.

Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.

Since then, the Iranian regime has repeatedly threatened retaliatory action against Israel, while the U.S. has expressed its expectation that Iran will refrain from any potential military strike against Israel in response to Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination.

It appears that the Iranian regime is caught between the dilemma of whether to attack or not. If it attacks, it may face a severe response from Israel, and if it refrains, its claims of power will be questioned.

What is certain is that the Iranian regime is much weaker than it appears.

The regime’s primary fear is of an uprising by the Iranian people and potential overthrow, similar to what nearly happened in 2022 when the regime was brought to the brink of collapse. This fear makes the Iranian regime increasingly cautious of further causing tension in the region and weakening its stance.

Halt in Iran’s Oil Production Growth Since Early Spring, Per OPEC, IEA 

New statistics from the International Energy Agency and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) show that Iran’s oil production experienced significant growth last year, but this growth has stalled since the beginning of this spring.

The International Energy Agency estimated Iran’s daily oil production in July at around 3.35 million barrels, while OPEC’s assessment placed it at about 3.27 million barrels.

Before U.S. sanctions, Iran’s daily crude oil production was 3.8 million barrels, but this figure dropped to less than 2 million barrels towards the end of Donald Trump’s administration. However, production started to rise again after Joe Biden took office.

Data from Vortexa, a tanker tracking company, indicates that Iran’s daily exports of oil and gas condensates have remained steady at around 1.7 million barrels over the past few months.

Before the U.S. sanctions, Iran’s regime exported about 2.5 million barrels of crude oil and gas condensates (a type of ultra-light crude oil produced from gas fields) daily, but this figure dropped to 330,000 barrels towards the end of Trump’s presidency.

China is currently the buyer of over 95% of Iran’s oil exports, with the remaining oil being sent to Syria.

The International Energy Agency states that global oil demand growth in the second quarter of this year has slowed to nearly the same level as in the spring. It is expected that global oil consumption will increase by only 1 million barrels per day this year, with a similar increase anticipated for next year.

This is in contrast to last year when global oil consumption increased by 2.5 million barrels per day.

The slowdown in global oil demand growth is primarily due to the Chinese market, where electric vehicle purchases have surged. In the first half of this year, more than half of the cars sold in China were electric.

Oil consumption in Europe is expected to decline this year, and the Americas will see only a slight increase in oil consumption.

The Tehran Stock Exchange Index Has Dropped Twenty Times in the Last 24 Days  

Reports indicate that the Tehran Stock Exchange index once again fell on Tuesday, August 13, dropping to 1,991,000 points.

Over the past 24 days, the overall index has been negatived for 20 days, with the total index declining by 210,000 points, equivalent to more than a 10% drop.

The National Development Fund recently injected 6 trillion rials (approximately 10 million dollars) into the stock market in two separate rounds, but this action failed to prevent the index from declining.

On Tuesday, following a 7,568-point drop in the overall index, Mohammad Reza Farzin, the Governor of the Central Bank, announced that in today’s Supreme Council of the Stock Exchange meeting, it was agreed that support from the banking system for the capital market would begin on Wednesday.

He did not explain exactly what measures the banking system would take to “support” the stock market or why the recent financial interventions by the National Development Fund have not helped the stock market’s situation.

Earlier, the Stock Exchange Organization had requested the creation of a credit line or the deposit of at least 500 trillion rials (approximately 833.33 million dollars) into the stock market.

Estimates show that nearly 50 trillion rials (approximately 83.33 million dollars) of real money has exited the stock market in just the past two weeks. The largest capital flight from this market occurred on July 31, following the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the subsequent threats of retaliation by the Iranian regime the following day.

With reports circulating about the possible “definitive decision” by the Iranian regime to attack Israel, nearly 12 trillion rials (approximately 20 million dollars) exited the stock market again on August 12.

The drop in the stock index and the outflow of real money from the market means significant losses for individuals who, for whatever reason, have been unwilling to sell the shares they purchased.

The fluctuations in the stock index over the past few years have followed an unusual pattern. For example, during the economic crisis and the decline in Iran’s GDP, the stock index rose from 500,000 points in mid-March 2020 to 2.5 million points in the spring of last year.

Some experts have reported deliberate manipulation of the stock market by the government, a claim that both the twelfth and thirteenth administrations have denied.

5 Iranian Female Activists Sentenced to Over 20 Years in Prison

The human rights organization Hengaw announced on Monday, August 12, that five female activists from Gilan (northern Iran), who were active in media and environmental issues, have been sentenced by the Iranian regime’s judiciary to a total of more than 20 years and seven months of imprisonment.
According to this report, Anahita Dustdar, Nina Golestani, Rezita Rajai, Anahita Hejazi, and Negin Edalatkhah were each sentenced to three years, six months, and one day in prison on charges of “collusion and assembly,” and to seven months and sixteen days for “propaganda against the regime.”

The sentences were given by Judge Mehdi Rasekhi, and officially communicated to the activists.
Rezita Rajai, a writer, Anahita Hejazi, the director of Anna Animal Shelter in Rasht, along with three others, were arrested by the Iranian regime’s security forces on November 11, 2023, and were temporarily released from Lakan Prison in Rasht after posting bail.

Previously, on July 13, 2024, six civil and women’s rights activists from Gilan, named Forough Samii-Nia, Jelveh Javaheri, Shiva Shah-Sia, Negin Rezaei, Matin Yazdani, and Azadeh Chavooshian, had been transferred to Lakan Prison in Rasht to serve their prison sentences.

According to reports from human rights organizations, Iranian regime officials, following the nationwide protests triggered by the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the Morality Police in 2022, have intensified their crackdown on women’s rights activists and human rights defenders, resorting to harsher methods and issuing heavy sentences to silence dissenting voices.

Iranian Political Prisoners Face Escalating Wave of Executions Amid Nationwide Protests

Since Tuesday of last week, August 6, the Iranian regime has executed more than 45 people, with 29 of them in a single day and 26 executed collectively at Ghezel Hesar Prison, setting a new record for state-sanctioned killings and executions in recent years.

In recent weeks, a large number of political prisoners have been sentenced to death under vague judicial processes on charges fabricated by the regime, such as “baghi” (rebellion against the Islamic government) and “efsad fil-arz” (spreading corruption on earth).

Meanwhile, six Sunni political prisoners face imminent execution by the Revolutionary Court in Mashhad.

The rise in executions followed the inauguration of the new president of the Iranian regime, who has claimed that “Iran is the safest country in the Middle East.”

Political prisoners across Iran are engaging in a hunger strike as part of a campaign called “No to Executions Tuesdays,” protesting the execution sentences of fellow inmates.

Activists in this campaign, many of whom are well-known prisoners participating in the hunger strike, have pointed out that following the death of Ebrahim Raisi, a member of the “Death Committee” responsible for the 1988 massacre (where the majority of the 30,000 executed political prisoners were members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, the largest opposition group to the regime), and in the lead-up to the regime’s staged “presidential elections,” the Iranian regime’s repressive apparatus temporarily reduced the number of executions. However, we, the prisoners of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign, warned at that time that this reduction was temporary and that a widespread wave of executions was likely to follow.

Last week, female prisoners in Evin Prison protested the execution of Reza Rasaei and were met with beatings by security forces.

Poverty In Iran Causing an Increase in Child Marriage

The state-run donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper reported that economic challenges such as high inflation and income inequality are key factors contributing to child marriage in Iran and claimed that the shrinking middle class has also exacerbated this issue.

On Tuesday, August 13, Donya-e-Eqtesad published the results of a study on “child marriage,” stating, “In Iran, factors such as low per capita income, high inflation, and income inequality are among the main causes of early child marriages.”

Donya-e-Eqtesad claimed that contrary to popular belief, the “prevailing religious view in the country” has not had a “significant” impact on early child marriages. Instead, factors such as economic sanctions and the shrinking middle class in Iran have played a larger role in child marriage.

The newspaper wrote that “studies” show that in Iran, early marriage is more often related to girls getting married before reaching puberty.

The report notes that there are many obstacles to stopping early child marriages in Iran. For example, the government opposes enacting strict laws on marriage due to concerns about a decline in birth rates.

According to the latest official statistics released in Iran by the government’s Statistical Center, at least 27,448 marriages involving girls under 15 years old occurred across various parts of Iran from winter 2021 to the end of autumn 2022.

Academic research shows that early marriage is a significant factor in domestic violence, school dropout rates among girls, and is considered a form of child sexual abuse in the context of marital relationships.

According to previous reports, some instances of child marriage have occurred due to poverty and the availability of marriage loans. Additionally, a 2021 report from Iran’s Ministry of Welfare stated that one in three Iranians lives below the poverty line and cannot meet their basic needs, leading some families to prefer reducing the number of dependents by forcing children, who lack understanding of sexual matters, into sexual relationships without their consent or awareness.

The promotion of “childbearing” by order of Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran’s regime, and the provision of banking facilities for marriage and childbearing in recent years have led some families in parts of Iran to marry off their under-18 children due to poverty to benefit from these incentives.

For years, the United Nations and its oversight mechanisms have called on the Iranian regime to change its laws to prevent child marriage and criminalize domestic violence. However, in practice, the regime has not only failed to take structural action in response to these requests but has also manipulated statistical categories to distort official data related to marriage and motherhood ages.

It is worth noting that official reports only include marriages that have been “officially registered,” while two years ago, the state-run ISNA news agency quoted experts stating that most child marriages are unregistered, and no accurate statistics are available on them.