Home Blog Page 53

Iran’s Regime Shifted Drug and Weapons Smuggling Operations to Yemen After Assad’s Fall

Yemen’s Interior Minister Ibrahim Haidan stated that after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, Iran’s regime transferred its narcotics and weapons smuggling operations to Yemen.

He said in an interview with Al Hadath TV on Sunday, October 26, 2025, that the Syrians arrested in Yemen were drug-manufacturing experts who had entered the country under the guise of tourists.

Haidan reported close security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s legitimate government, adding that relations between the two sides “are at their best level.”

Strong Ties Between Houthis and Iranian Regime Arms Supply Network Remain Intact

According to him, the discovery of a drug production factory in Yemen’s Al Mahrah Governorate was carried out in full coordination with Riyadh, and the coast guard forces of both countries have conducted joint exercises and training sessions.

On September 5, Haidan had also announced the seizure of a captagon production plant linked to Iran’s regime in Yemen, stating that the country’s security forces had arrested a Syrian national and a Lebanese national in connection with the facility.

He said the purpose of these activities was “to expand smuggling networks and destabilize the region.”

The Houthis are considered one of Iran’s regime’s proxy groups in the region.

The Israeli news outlet Ynet reported on September 26, 2025, that the Houthis, with Tehran’s support, continue to produce weapons and train proxy forces.

Continuing his interview with Al Hadath, Yemen’s interior minister referred to the country’s internal situation, stating that the Houthi coup had weakened the structure of the state and created a security vacuum.

Haidan added that some of the arrested Houthi members had links with the Somali militant group al-Shabaab.

The Houthis have controlled the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, since 2014. However, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union do not recognize the group’s rule.

The United States and Israel have designated the Houthis as a terrorist organization.

The Middle East Monitor Research Foundation, a Dubai-based political think tank, wrote in an October 16, 2025, analysis that with the Gaza ceasefire agreement, Yemen has become a new front of confrontation between Iran’s regime and Israel.

On September 6, Moammar al-Eryani, Yemen’s minister of information, announced that the Houthis, in cooperation with Iran’s regime, had established a factory for producing chemical weapons in areas under their control.

Iran’s Regime Executes 18 Prisoners, Including One Woman

Eighteen prisoners, including one woman, were executed in prisons across Iran between Tuesday, October 21, and Sunday, October 26, 2025. The executions took place in the prisons of Shiraz, Zahedan, Aligudarz, Arak, Esfarayen, Khorramabad, Dezful, Qom, Shahroud, Rasht, Tabriz, Ghezel Hesar (Karaj), Yazd, and Borujerd.

Execution of 3 prisoners in Adel Abad Prison of Shiraz

At dawn on Sunday, October 26, three prisoners were executed in Adel Abad Prison in Shiraz. Their identities are as follows:
– Mousa Mohammadi, a native of Tabriz and resident of Saadi Town in Shiraz, previously arrested and sentenced to death on murder charges.
– Mohammad Reza Nazari, from Shiraz.
– A prisoner identified by the surname Dehghani, who had been charged with murder.

UN Fact-Finding Mission Expresses Concern over Unprecedented Rise in Executions in Iran

Execution of Mohammad Omar Zardkouhi in Zahedan Prison

On the morning of Sunday, October 26, 28-year-old Mohammad Omar Zardkouhi was executed in Zahedan Prison. He had been arrested two years earlier on murder charges and sentenced to death.

Execution of Manouchehr Mehki in Aligudarz Prison

At dawn on Sunday, October 26, Manouchehr Mehki was executed in Aligudarz Prison. He had previously been arrested and sentenced to death on murder charges.

Execution of Mehrdad Moradi in Arak Prison

At dawn on Sunday, October 26, Mehrdad Moradi was executed in Arak Prison. His charges were related to narcotics offenses.

Execution of Ali Saedpanah in Esfarayen Prison

On the morning of Sunday, October 26, Ali Saedpanah was executed in Esfarayen Prison. He had been arrested two years earlier and sentenced to death on murder charges.

Execution of Yar Hossein Bahri in Khorramabad Prison

At dawn on Saturday, October 25, Yar Hossein Bahri was executed in Khorramabad Prison. His charge was murder.

Execution of Mohammad Osmani in Dezful Prison

At dawn on Saturday, October 25, Mohammad Osmani was executed in Dezful Prison on murder charges.

Execution of Narges Ahmadi in Qom Prison

On the morning of Saturday, October 25, Narges Ahmadi was executed in Qom Prison. She had previously been arrested on murder charges and sentenced to death.

Execution of Reza Sabzi in Shahroud Prison

At dawn on Saturday, October 25, Reza Sabzi was executed in Shahroud Prison. His charges were related to narcotics offenses.

Execution of 3 prisoners in Lakan Prison of Rasht

At dawn on Saturday, October 25, three prisoners were executed in Lakan Prison in Rasht. Their identities are as follows:
– Farhad Hatami, from Kangavar.
– Meysam Bagheri, 34 years old, from Karaj, who had been imprisoned for six years.
– Amir Nazari.
All three were executed on charges related to narcotics offenses.

Execution of Marouf Fattahi in Tabriz Prison

At dawn on Wednesday, October 22, Marouf Fattahi, 30, from Tabriz, was executed in Tabriz Prison. He had been arrested five years ago following a street altercation and sentenced to death for murder.

Execution of a prisoner in Ghezel Hesar Prison

According to the state-run IRNA news agency, at dawn on Wednesday, October 22, a prisoner identified only by the initials M.A. was executed in Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj. His charge was murder.

Execution of Eslam Mirsaydeh in Yazd Prison

At dawn on Tuesday, October 21, Eslam Mirsaydeh, a 59-year-old Afghan national from Pul-e Alam city in Afghanistan, was executed in Yazd Prison. His charges were related to narcotics offenses.

Execution of Fardin Vafaipour in Borujerd Prison

At dawn on Tuesday, October 21, Fardin Vafaipour, 43, from Borujerd and father of two children, was executed in Borujerd Prison. He had been arrested four years earlier on drug-related charges and sentenced to death.

Iranian Political Prisoner Sentenced to Death

The Revolutionary Court of Rasht has sentenced Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, a 67-year-old political prisoner, to death.

Branch One of the Revolutionary Court of Rasht sentenced political prisoner Zahra Shahbaz Tabari to death on charges of “collaboration with groups opposing the regime.”

The ruling was issued despite “very limited and unreliable evidence.”

Judge Ahmad Darvish-Goftar issued the death sentence last week during a video-conference hearing for Shahbaz Tabari.

The political prisoner from Rasht has been accused of “collaboration with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).” The PMOI/MEK is the largest organized opposition group to Iran’s regime.

Iran’s regime has turned executions into a tool of control and repression. The regime’s policy of executions serves not justice, but the continuation of institutionalized violence and an admission of its inability to enact social reform.

Trial lasted less than 10 minutes

Shahbaz Tabari’s family described the entire court process as “symbolic and illegal.”

In an interview with the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), Shahbaz Tabari’s child said: “The trial lasted less than 10 minutes. My mother did not have effective access to an independent lawyer. The lawyer appointed by the judiciary endorsed and relayed the verdict without offering any real defense. The entire trial was a show.”

He added: “The judge announced the death sentence with a smile during a 10-minute session. The appointed lawyer also smiled when he heard the verdict.”

He called the charges against the 67-year-old political prisoner “fabricated” and stressed that his mother “had no connection whatsoever with any political group or opposition movement.”

Earlier, on July 27, Iran’s regime executed two political prisoners, Mehdi Hassani and Behrouz Ehsani Eslamloo, on charges of membership in the PMOI/MEK.

Global Condemnation of the Execution of Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani

Another political prisoner, Manouchehr Fallah, imprisoned in Rasht, has also received a death sentence on the same charge.

These actions by the Iranian regime reflect its fear of the growing activities of the resistance movement. Through such measures, the regime seeks to intimidate and influence public opinion.

Limited and unreliable evidence

According to Zahra’s relatives, the case evidence consists solely of “a piece of cloth bearing the slogan ‘Woman, Resistance, and Freedom'” and “an unpublished voice message,” with no indication of organizational or military activity.

Her child added that Iranian regime security officials even attempted to add more serious charges, including “possession of weapons,” to the case—an allegation that, considering her age and professional background, is “baseless and absurd.”

Shahbaz Tabari is a graduate of Isfahan University of Technology, an electrical engineer, and a member of the Iranian Engineering Organization. She holds a master’s degree in Sustainable Energy from the University of Borås in Sweden.

She had previously been arrested for posting peaceful content on social media and was released after three months under electronic monitoring.

On April 17, security forces raided Shahbaz Tabari’s home, arrested her, and transferred her to Lakan Prison in Rasht.

During the operation, agents searched her residence and confiscated her mobile phone, laptop, and those of one of her family members.

According to Shahbaz Tabari’s family, she has only seven days to appeal the death sentence issued against her.

With The Debt of a Single Bank in Iran, 120 Specialized Hospitals Could Be Built

Hossein Raghfar, a pro-regime economist, reacted to the recent crisis involving Iran’s Ayandeh Bank, saying that with its tens of trillions of tomans of debt to the Central Bank, at least 120 specialized hospitals could be built in Iran.

On Saturday, October 25, Raghfar said in an interview that Ayandeh Bank has losses of 4.5 quadrillion rials (approximately 4 billion dollars) and owes 3 quadrillion rials (approximately 2.7 billion dollars) to the Central Bank.

According to him, the bank also loaned 1.3 quadrillion rials (approximately 1.13 billion dollars) to 61 individuals without collateral and has not recovered the money.

U.S. Treasury Identifies $9 Billion in ‘Iranian Shadow Banking’ Activity

The economist added that this amount of debt is 25 times the cost of constructing the Persian Gulf refinery and could be used to build 120 specialized hospitals or a railway network connecting Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tabriz.

On October 23, Mohammad Reza Farzin, the governor of the Central Bank of Iran’s regime, announced the dissolution of Ayandeh Bank and its merger into Bank Melli (the National Bank of Iran).

In a statement, the Central Bank also said that due to accumulated losses of 5.5 quadrillion rials (approximately 4.78 billion dollars), overdrafts of 3.13 quadrillion rials (approximately 2.7 billion dollars), a negative capital adequacy ratio of 600%, severe liquidity imbalance, and the non-repayment of 80% of granted loans, it was necessary for Ayandeh Bank to enter the “resolution process.”

Ali Ansari, the founder of Ayandeh Bank and owner of the Iran Mall (one of the largest shopping centers in the Middle East), reacted to the bank’s dissolution without mentioning its massive debts, calling Ayandeh’s activities a symbol of “effort and intelligence” and saying his “conscience is clear.”

Raghfar continued, describing Ayandeh Bank as one of the symbols of structural corruption in Iran’s banking system. He said that while such enormous resources have been destroyed, the bank’s CEO mocks public opinion and speaks of rationality in economic management.

Criticizing oversight institutions, Raghfar added: “The question is, where was the government during all this time, and why did it delay the dissolution of Ayandeh Bank? The excuse of lacking proper laws for this delay is irrelevant and unrealistic.”

The economist referred to the backing of unbalanced banks as “power institutions” and emphasized that as long as major bank debtors are not identified and the judiciary and parliament fail to act against them, the banking crisis will persist.

In recent days, many social media users, referring to Ali Ansari’s close relationship with Mojtaba Khamenei (the son of regime supreme leader Ali Khamenei), described the structure of Iran’s regime as the main driver of widespread financial corruption.

Financial reports of Ayandeh Bank show that by mid-June, about 98% of its major loans—amounting to 1.2 quadrillion tomans (approximately 1.043 billion dollars)—were classified as non-performing, effectively meaning that the bank’s repayment cycle had collapsed.

Raghfar also commented on Bank Sepah, saying that “before merging with the five military and security banks, it was not unbalanced,” but the merger introduced “corrupted assets and massive debts” into its balance sheet.

The economist warned: “With Ayandeh Bank’s massive debt, the country’s economy has become extremely fragile, and in the future, Bank Melli may also join the list of unbalanced banks.”

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of Iran’s regime parliament (Majlis), on October 25, called the decision to dissolve Ayandeh Bank “a serious starting point for reforming the banking system and thereby reducing the country’s inflation,” adding that similar actions should be taken against other loss-making banks and financial institutions.

He urged the Central Bank to offset Ayandeh Bank’s accumulated losses through “the assets of its main shareholder.”

Fatemeh Mohajerani, the government’s spokesperson, also cited “banks’ imbalance and excessive withdrawals” as one of the causes of inflation, assuring the public that depositors “should not worry” because their accounts will be transferred to Bank Melli.

Ayandeh Bank was established in 2012 following the merger of Tat Bank, Salehin Credit Institution, and Ati Credit Institution.

According to unofficial estimates, the bank currently employs around 4,000 staff members and provides services to nearly three million customers through 270 branches across Iran.

Critical Air Pollution in Iran’s Major Cities

0

The air in several cities of Khuzestan Province has reached the red alert level, meaning it is unhealthy for all groups. In Isfahan and Mashhad, air quality is reported to be at an orange level, unhealthy for sensitive groups.

According to air quality monitoring data on Friday, October 24, the city of Hoveyzeh, with an air quality index (AQI) of 158, is classified as “unhealthy for all groups” and is currently the most polluted location in Khuzestan Province.

The Air Quality Index (AQI) is divided into five main categories: 0–50 represents clean air, 51–100 indicates moderate air quality, 101–150 is unhealthy for sensitive groups, 151–200 is unhealthy for everyone, 201–300 is very unhealthy, and 301–500 represents hazardous air conditions.

Air Pollution Emergency in Three Iranian Provinces

The cities of Behbahan and Khorramshahr recorded AQI levels of 152 and 151, respectively, placing them in the red alert zone.

Experts have warned that fine particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns—about one-thirtieth the diameter of a human hair—can penetrate deep into the lungs and cause cardiovascular, respiratory, and neurological problems.

Warning in Khuzestan, Rising Pollution in Tehran

While Khuzestan is under an air pollution alert, Tehran’s air quality index is also on the rise.

Reports indicate that on the first Friday of November, Tehran’s air quality index reached 108, placing it in the orange zone—unhealthy for sensitive groups.

Over the past 24 hours, the average AQI in Tehran was 99, which is considered acceptable.

According to data from the Tehran Air Quality Control Company, the capital had only 10 days of acceptable air quality in October, while 19 days were unhealthy for sensitive groups and one day was unhealthy for all groups.

The most polluted day of the month was October 2, when the AQI reached 181 due to particulate matter smaller than 10 microns.

For most polluted days in October, Tehran’s main pollutant was fine particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns, which was responsible for reduced air quality on 20 out of 30 days that month.

Situation in Other Cities

Based on data from 13 active monitoring stations, Isfahan’s 24-hour average AQI stood at 121, indicating orange alert conditions—unhealthy for sensitive groups.

In Mashhad, the 24-hour average AQI was 124, also reflecting unhealthy conditions for sensitive groups.

In recent weeks, multiple cities across various Iranian provinces have been struggling with air pollution and dust storms, disrupting residents’ daily lives.

Over the past years, air pollution levels have repeatedly reached critical points, and the spread of dust particles has worsened Iran’s environmental crises and public health threats.

Despite the worsening situation, Iran’s regime has failed to present a coherent or sustainable plan to control and manage this crisis.

Water Inflow into Dams in 21 Iranian Provinces Down 39% Compared to Last Year

0

According to the latest data on Iran’s dam reservoirs, the volume of water inflow into dams from September 23 (the start of the current water year) to October 18 has decreased by 39%, and rainfall in 21 provinces has been recorded as zero. Currently, Iran’s dams are on average only 34% full.

The state-run ILNA news agency reported on Friday, October 24, that the total volume of water entering Iran’s dams from September 23 to October 18 was 780 million cubic meters — a 39% drop compared to 1.29 billion cubic meters during the same period last year.

Water discharge has also decreased by 29% due to management restrictions.

Three Dams in Iran Dried Up, Eight More Near Collapse

According to official statistics, the total water storage in the country’s dams has now reached 17.66 billion cubic meters, compared to 23.31 billion cubic meters during the same period last year — showing a 24% decline this year.

The average filling rate of Iran’s dams is estimated to be only 34%.

On September 22, Mohammad Reza Kavianpour, head of the Water Research Institute, warned that rainfall this fall would be “below normal” and that the water crisis in the country would persist.

That same day, the state-run IRNA news agency reported that only 36% of Iran’s total dam capacity had been filled.

Reports indicate that 22 dams across the country are in a critical condition, with less than 15% capacity. Among the dams supplying water to Tehran, Amir Kabir Dam is at 11%, Lar at 2%, Taleghan at 38%, and Latyan-Mamlu at 9% capacity.

In other regions of the country, the severe decline in water reserves continues. Dams in the Lake Urmia basin have fallen by 40% compared to last year, while in Khuzestan Province, the Karkheh, Marun, and Jarreh dams have experienced declines of 49%, 70%, and 26%, respectively.

In Hormozgan Province, the Esteghlal and Shamil-Niyan dams have experienced up to 100% depletion of their reserves, while in Golestan Province, the Voshmgir, Boostan, and Golestan dams have virtually dried up.

Zero Rainfall in 21 Provinces

According to official data, the total rainfall from September 23 to October 17 was only 1.9 millimeters, while the long-term average is 56 millimeters and last year’s figure was 3.9 millimeters.

Based on these figures, 21 provinces in Iran recorded no rainfall in October, raising serious concerns about water supplies for agriculture and drinking in the coming months.

The provinces without rainfall include Tehran, Markazi, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Fars, Kerman, Khorasan Razavi, Isfahan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Kurdistan, Hamedan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Lorestan, Ilam, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, Bushehr, Zanjan, Yazd, Hormozgan, Qom, and South Khorasan.

Experts warn that continued rainfall decline and falling dam reserves could make this one of Iran’s driest autumns in the past decade.

Meanwhile, despite repeated warnings about water resource management, no sustainable solutions have been implemented, and in some cases, officials of Iran’s regime have resorted to temporarily shutting down activities in certain provinces as a measure to prevent further deterioration.

Amnesty International Reports Over 1,300 Executions in Iran in 2025

Amnesty International announced that more than 1,300 people have been executed in Iran during 2025 and called on the international community to take immediate action to “stop this horror.”

In a statement on Friday, October 24, the organization described the execution of over 1,300 people in the current year as “the highest figure recorded in decades.”

Amnesty International: More Than One Thousand People Executed in Iran in 2025

The human rights organization warned that thousands of others are at risk, as Iranian authorities continue to use the death penalty as a “weapon.”

On Thursday, October 23, Amnesty International had also reported that more than 1,000 executions had taken place in Iran since the beginning of 2025 and called for an immediate halt to the killings.

The organization stressed that executions in Iran are carried out “after unfair trials and with the aim of suppressing protests and minorities.”

In response, political prisoners in various prisons have protested the wave of executions through sit-ins, issuing statements, and participating in “No to Execution” campaigns.

At Least 236 Prisoners Executed in October

On Thursday, October 23, the human rights website HRANA reported in its latest monthly update on human rights violations in Iran that the Iranian regime’s judiciary executed at least 236 people between September 23 and October 22 in prisons across the country.

These figures show that in the past month, an average of eight people were executed every day—equivalent to one execution every three hours.

According to HRANA, in addition to the executions carried out, at least 12 new death sentences and seven confirmations of execution verdicts were issued for prisoners in Iran.

Among those executed were two individuals, Ali Aghajeri and Mohammadreza Shiheki, who were under 18 years old at the time of arrest and alleged offense.

Currently, in addition to inmates convicted of general crimes who are executed daily in Iran’s prisons, about 70 prisoners nationwide with political charges are at risk of having their death sentences confirmed or carried out, while over 100 others face the possibility of receiving death sentences on similar charges.

In this context, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, in his latest report to the General Assembly published on Tuesday, October 21, expressed concern over the surge in executions, torture of detainees, suppression of minorities, and increasing restrictions on civil liberties.

According to the report, in the first half of 2025, at least 612 people were executed in Iran—a 119% increase compared to the same period last year.

Guterres expressed regret over the Iranian regime’s disregard for international recommendations to halt executions and to limit death-eligible crimes, describing public executions as “contrary to the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment.”

Iranian Worker at Risk of Execution

Milad Panahipour, an attorney, announced that his client, 42-year-old laborer and political prisoner Manouchehr Fallah from Gilan Province, currently held in Lakan Prison in Rasht, has been sentenced to death on the charge of “destruction with intent to confront the government.” According to the lawyer, the charge is based on the explosion of a small firecracker outside the Gilan courthouse.

On Thursday, October 23, Panahipour told the state-run news website Emtedad that Fallah lost his father in childhood and that the incident leading to his death sentence caused only about 150 million rials (approximately $130) in damages. Despite this, the court issued a death sentence.

Iran: 88 Public Executions In 12 Years

The lawyer explained that since childhood, after his father’s death, Fallah had made a living as a laborer and constantly struggled with poverty and hardship. During more than two and a half years of imprisonment, he was allowed only a few visits and, due to his mental state, preferred not to see his young daughter in the prison environment.

Referring to his client’s mental and economic condition, Panahipour said issuing such a sentence for a man who neither possessed a weapon nor harmed anyone represents “the height of injustice.”

The only basis used by the Revolutionary Court judge to accuse him of “enmity against God” (moharebeh) was the minor financial damage to the door and façade of the Rasht courthouse.

Lawyers argue that the ruling is riddled with flaws and that the case file lacks any evidence that could justify charging Fallah with moharebeh or issuing a death sentence.

The Basis for the Death Sentence

Panahipour explained that the cited legal article concerns the destruction of vital public facilities; however, in Fallah’s case, no such facilities were damaged, no one was injured, and no public service was disrupted—the only damage was a minor dent in a metal door.

He stressed that the case involved merely the explosion of a very small sound firecracker at midnight with no bystanders present, yet the court wrongly interpreted Article 687 of Iran’s Penal Code as “destruction of vital facilities.”

The lawyer added that the Gilan courthouse operated normally the very next day, with no disruption of services or harm to citizens, asking: “So what destruction or confrontation with the government are they talking about? Is this what justice demands?”

According to him, despite legal and technical flaws, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal, and his client, after more than two and a half years in prison, is now on the verge of execution. During his last visit, Fallah said, “My life is for the people of Iran.”

Panahipour called the ruling a clear violation of the principle of proportionality between crime and punishment.

Arrest and Sentencing

Fallah was arrested in July 2023 by agents of the Ministry of Intelligence at Rasht Airport and charged with “propaganda against the regime,” “insulting Ali Khamenei, the regime’s supreme leader,” “membership in the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK),” “destruction of public property,” and “manufacturing and using a homemade sound bomb.”

In November 2023, this political prisoner was sentenced by Branch 3 of the Rasht Revolutionary Court to one year, three months, and one day in prison for “insulting Khamenei,” and seven months and 16 days for “propaganda against the regime.”

After he accepted the verdict, one-quarter of his sentence was reduced, and his prison term for that case ended in May 2024.

In another case, on December 11, 2024, he was tried via video conference at the Rasht Revolutionary Court presided over by Judge Mohammad Ali Darvish-Goftar and, in February 2025, was sentenced to death by hanging on the charge of moharebeh (“enmity against God”).

In February 2025, Fallah wrote a letter to his daughter Asal on her 16th birthday anniversary: “On the eve of your birthday, Judge Mohammad Ali Darvish-Goftar delivered my death sentence, perhaps thinking it would make me surrender. But he is unaware that the path I have chosen was not learned from books, but from life itself and from the suffering of the people.”

Currently, in addition to prisoners convicted of common crimes who are executed daily in Iran’s prisons, about 70 political prisoners nationwide face the risk of their death sentences being confirmed or carried out, while more than 100 others face the possibility of new death sentences on similar charges.

U.S. Treasury Identifies $9 Billion in ‘Iranian Shadow Banking’ Activity

The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced that financial networks linked to Iran conducted approximately $9 billion in suspicious transactions through U.S. bank accounts in 2024. The report is part of President Donald Trump’s renewed “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran.

According to the U.S. Treasury, its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has uncovered an extensive network of Iranian shadow banking in its latest financial trend analysis. The network consists of domestic exchange houses, front companies, and foreign intermediaries that operate to evade sanctions, launder money, sell oil illegally, and finance Tehran’s regional proxy forces.

U.S. Treasury Sanctions Financial Network Supporting IRGC And Defense Ministry of Iranian Regime

“Identifying Iran’s complex financial lifelines and shadow networks is an essential part of cutting off the funding for their military, weapons programs, and terrorist proxies,” said FinCEN Director Andrea Gacki. “By issuing this public analysis, we hope to draw attention to Iran’s shadow banking activity and encourage financial institutions to be vigilant.”

The report emphasizes that Iran has conducted billions of dollars in transactions through shell companies and intermediaries based in the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, and Singapore. According to FinCEN’s findings, foreign shell companies were responsible for about $5 billion in transactions in 2024, while Iran-linked oil companies handled another $4 billion. In addition, companies suspected of supplying sensitive technologies to Iran engaged in over $413 million worth of financial exchanges during the same year.

The report comes as President Donald Trump, since February 2025, has launched a new phase of his maximum pressure campaign against Tehran. Its objectives include preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, curbing its military activities, and cutting off the financial networks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regime’s regional proxy groups.

Iran’s Regime Remains on FATF Blacklist

Despite the Iranian regime’s approval of the Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) announced in its latest statement that Iran remains on the list of high-risk countries for money laundering, terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The organization urged all countries to continue their effective countermeasures against Tehran.

In the FATF statement released on Friday, October 24, it said that since February 2020, the Iranian regime’s reports submitted in January, August, and December 2024, as well as August 2025, have shown no substantial progress in Iran’s situation.

Financial Action Task Force (FATF): A New Wave of Disputes Among Iranian Regime Factions

FATF reminded that Iran had committed in 2016 to address deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing systems; however, this plan expired in January 2018, and most of it remains unimplemented.

In October 2019, FATF called on its members to apply enhanced supervision, more precise reporting, and broader financial inspections for Iranian financial institutions.

On October 1, the Iranian regime’s Expediency Council conditionally approved Iran’s accession to the Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention.

According to the council’s resolution, Iran’s accession to the convention would only be possible if it “does not contradict the country’s constitution or domestic laws.”

The law for Iran’s regime to join the CFT treaty was finally communicated to relevant executive agencies on October 21 by Masoud Pezeshkian, the regime’s president.

The CFT convention complements the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (known as the Palermo Convention), which was adopted to prevent the financing of terrorist activities and to facilitate international cooperation in identifying and cutting off sources of terrorist funding.

In May, the Expediency Council had also conditionally approved Iran’s accession to the Palermo Convention.

Iran’s Broad Reservations Incompatible with FATF Standards

FATF continued in its statement that although Iran had announced the ratification of the Palermo Convention, this action was insufficient.

According to FATF, Tehran’s extensive reservations regarding the provisions of the Palermo Convention have rendered its domestic implementation inconsistent with FATF standards.

Referring to UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iran’s non-compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, FATF reminded all countries that, according to its standards, they are obligated to identify and mitigate the risks arising from Iran’s financing of weapons proliferation.

FATF also, citing the ongoing threats related to terrorist financing from Iran and the incomplete implementation of Tehran’s action plan, once again called on its members to take effective measures against the Iranian regime.

The Financial Action Task Force, emphasizing the need for Iran’s immediate cooperation, urged Tehran to swiftly advance in fully implementing its action plan and to address its remaining deficiencies.

Full criminalization of terrorist financing, identification and freezing of terrorist assets, establishing an effective and binding system for customer identification and verification, and proving the capability of supervisory institutions to identify and punish unauthorized money transfer service providers are among FATF’s demands from the Iranian regime.

Meanwhile, on October 24, FATF removed South Africa, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria from its special monitoring list.