Iranian regime officials have repeatedly sought to suggest that the fate of global energy flows lies in Tehran’s hands. But oil market data and tanker tracking paint a different picture.
Fresh data from Kpler shows that tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains very low. On Tuesday, August 25, only five cargo vessels passed through the waterway. The 10-day average has been 15 vessels.
At the same time, major regional producers have found other ways to get their oil to market. Ship-to-ship transfers outside the Strait of Hormuz are among the most important alternatives. This development raises an important question about the claim that the global energy route is “locked.”
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Iran’s Oil Exports Under Multiple Pressures
Iran’s main problem is not simply the failure of tankers to pass through Hormuz. Sanctions, maritime restrictions, rising shipping and insurance costs, and difficulties accessing customers have all placed simultaneous pressure on Iran’s oil exports.
Reuters reported on August 21 that the supply of new Iranian cargoes to Chinese buyers had declined significantly. Iran’s exports to China in August were estimated at around 534,000 barrels per day. In 2025, the figure averaged around 1.4 million barrels per day.
The same report shows that a large volume of Iranian oil remains in floating storage. Iran’s oil held at sea has declined from around 105 million barrels to nearly 80 million barrels. About 30 million barrels of this oil are located in Asian waters.
A decline in floating storage does not necessarily mean that exports are booming. Some of the existing oil may already have been committed to customers. At the same time, Iran’s supply of new cargoes has faced greater restrictions.
Breaking the Strait of Hormuz Monopoly
Saudi Arabia is now delivering some of its cargoes through ship-to-ship transfers near Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates and off the coast of Oman. Reuters said in its latest report that Saudi Aramco has used this method to sell its September cargoes.
Two giant tankers have also headed to China after receiving Saudi cargoes in ship-to-ship transfers near Oman. The cargoes contain a total of around four million barrels of oil.
China has also changed its transportation routes to reduce risk. Since late July, the country’s state-owned shipping companies have stopped using some high-risk routes through Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Instead, they have increased oil-transfer operations near Fujairah and Omani ports.
Kpler data shows that the volume of ship-to-ship transfers involving Chinese and Hong Kong tankers in the Gulf of Oman exceeded 600,000 barrels per day in June and July. This figure was much lower in the first months of the year. Qatar has also moved in the same direction. QatarEnergy held its first tender for exporting crude oil through ship-to-ship transfers outside the Strait of Hormuz.
These developments show that the energy market has not waited for a single route to reopen. Companies and governments have activated alternative routes.
The oil market has managed part of the risk through rerouting, ship-to-ship transfers, and shifting loading points.
This does not mean that conditions have returned to normal. Traffic through Hormuz remains far below normal levels. Based on Kpler data, Reuters reported an approximately 90% decline in traffic compared with the pre-crisis baseline in the week ending August 21. Therefore, the main issue is not whether Hormuz is absolutely open or closed. The more important issue is the market’s ability to adapt to the disruption.
Iran’s regime has for years portrayed the Strait of Hormuz as a geopolitical trump card. But oil data itself now shows that other producers have developed new ways to reduce their dependence on the waterway.
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. No data negates its strategic importance. But Hormuz’s geopolitical significance is different from claiming to possess the “absolute key” to the global energy economy.
Meanwhile, Iran’s oil exports are facing a dual problem. Tehran is dealing with both sanctions’ restrictions and difficulties in transportation and sales. As a result, the same strait that the regime has long portrayed as an instrument of power is now witnessing a new competition to circumvent restrictions.
The reality of the oil market is far removed from the regime’s propaganda. Hormuz remains important, but it can no longer be regarded as an exclusive key to controlling energy trade. Regional competitors have built alternative routes, and customers have adapted to the new conditions. In contrast, Iran’s oil exports are facing reduced supply, higher costs, and a shrinking customer base.
Therefore, what remains for Iran’s regime is less an absolute economic lever than a propaganda tool for domestic consumption. The market, however, responds with tankers, contracts, and numbers—not propaganda.
