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IRGC Officer Killed in Drone Strike in Syria

The Iranian regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that one of its Aerospace Force officers has died due to injuries sustained in an airstrike in Syria. Tehran claims that this attack was carried out by the U.S.-led coalition.

In a statement published by Iranian regime news agencies on Thursday, August 15, Hossein Salami, the commander of the IRGC, identified Ahmadreza Afshari as one of the “Aerospace industry specialists of the IRGC in Syria” who died from injuries caused by the airstrike.

Government officials and Iranian regime media refer to members of the IRGC operating in Syria as “advisors,” but most of them are members of the Quds Force, the IRGC’s extraterritorial branch, playing a crucial role in maintaining Iran’s proxy groups.

In his “condolence message,” Hossein Salami stated that Ahmadreza Afshari was injured during an attack by “coalition forces” in Syria that took place a few days ago. He was transferred to Iran for medical treatment but succumbed to his injuries on Thursday.

The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had previously reported that five Iran-backed militiamen were killed in Syria due to a drone strike in Deir ez-Zor province.

On August 11, Agence France-Presse (AFP), citing this report, announced that a vehicle carrying militia groups near the Iraq-Syria border was targeted in this strike. Reuters, in a separate report, also confirmed the deaths of five individuals in the attack, quoting two security sources.

The location of this incident was reported to be in eastern Deir ez-Zor province, where Iran’s proxy forces have a significant presence and have frequently been targeted by the U.S. or Israel. However, neither of these countries has claimed responsibility for this attack.

Israel rarely acknowledges its attacks on Iran-backed militias.

The August 11 drone strike on Iran-backed forces followed a drone attack on the International Coalition base in “Kharab al-Jir” near Hasakah in northeastern Syria, during which several U.S. and coalition soldiers were injured.

Since the start of the Syrian civil war over a decade ago, Iran’s proxy forces and Hezbollah have been fighting in support of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Israel has also conducted hundreds of strikes against these forces.

An Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1 is an example of these attacks, which resulted in the deaths of several Iranian military personnel, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force.

In retaliation for this attack, Iran launched unprecedented drone and missile strikes on Israeli territory in the early hours of April 13.

Regional tensions, which had previously escalated with the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza, entered a new phase after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, during his visit to Tehran on July 31.

Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.

Since then, the Iranian regime has repeatedly threatened retaliatory action against Israel, while the U.S. has expressed its expectation that Iran will refrain from any potential military strike against Israel in response to Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination.

It appears that the Iranian regime is caught between the dilemma of whether to attack or not. If it attacks, it may face a severe response from Israel, and if it refrains, its claims of power will be questioned.

What is certain is that the Iranian regime is much weaker than it appears.

The regime’s primary fear is of an uprising by the Iranian people and potential overthrow, similar to what nearly happened in 2022 when the regime was brought to the brink of collapse. This fear makes the Iranian regime increasingly cautious of further causing tension in the region and weakening its stance.

Halt in Iran’s Oil Production Growth Since Early Spring, Per OPEC, IEA 

New statistics from the International Energy Agency and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) show that Iran’s oil production experienced significant growth last year, but this growth has stalled since the beginning of this spring.

The International Energy Agency estimated Iran’s daily oil production in July at around 3.35 million barrels, while OPEC’s assessment placed it at about 3.27 million barrels.

Before U.S. sanctions, Iran’s daily crude oil production was 3.8 million barrels, but this figure dropped to less than 2 million barrels towards the end of Donald Trump’s administration. However, production started to rise again after Joe Biden took office.

Data from Vortexa, a tanker tracking company, indicates that Iran’s daily exports of oil and gas condensates have remained steady at around 1.7 million barrels over the past few months.

Before the U.S. sanctions, Iran’s regime exported about 2.5 million barrels of crude oil and gas condensates (a type of ultra-light crude oil produced from gas fields) daily, but this figure dropped to 330,000 barrels towards the end of Trump’s presidency.

China is currently the buyer of over 95% of Iran’s oil exports, with the remaining oil being sent to Syria.

The International Energy Agency states that global oil demand growth in the second quarter of this year has slowed to nearly the same level as in the spring. It is expected that global oil consumption will increase by only 1 million barrels per day this year, with a similar increase anticipated for next year.

This is in contrast to last year when global oil consumption increased by 2.5 million barrels per day.

The slowdown in global oil demand growth is primarily due to the Chinese market, where electric vehicle purchases have surged. In the first half of this year, more than half of the cars sold in China were electric.

Oil consumption in Europe is expected to decline this year, and the Americas will see only a slight increase in oil consumption.

The Tehran Stock Exchange Index Has Dropped Twenty Times in the Last 24 Days  

Reports indicate that the Tehran Stock Exchange index once again fell on Tuesday, August 13, dropping to 1,991,000 points.

Over the past 24 days, the overall index has been negatived for 20 days, with the total index declining by 210,000 points, equivalent to more than a 10% drop.

The National Development Fund recently injected 6 trillion rials (approximately 10 million dollars) into the stock market in two separate rounds, but this action failed to prevent the index from declining.

On Tuesday, following a 7,568-point drop in the overall index, Mohammad Reza Farzin, the Governor of the Central Bank, announced that in today’s Supreme Council of the Stock Exchange meeting, it was agreed that support from the banking system for the capital market would begin on Wednesday.

He did not explain exactly what measures the banking system would take to “support” the stock market or why the recent financial interventions by the National Development Fund have not helped the stock market’s situation.

Earlier, the Stock Exchange Organization had requested the creation of a credit line or the deposit of at least 500 trillion rials (approximately 833.33 million dollars) into the stock market.

Estimates show that nearly 50 trillion rials (approximately 83.33 million dollars) of real money has exited the stock market in just the past two weeks. The largest capital flight from this market occurred on July 31, following the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the subsequent threats of retaliation by the Iranian regime the following day.

With reports circulating about the possible “definitive decision” by the Iranian regime to attack Israel, nearly 12 trillion rials (approximately 20 million dollars) exited the stock market again on August 12.

The drop in the stock index and the outflow of real money from the market means significant losses for individuals who, for whatever reason, have been unwilling to sell the shares they purchased.

The fluctuations in the stock index over the past few years have followed an unusual pattern. For example, during the economic crisis and the decline in Iran’s GDP, the stock index rose from 500,000 points in mid-March 2020 to 2.5 million points in the spring of last year.

Some experts have reported deliberate manipulation of the stock market by the government, a claim that both the twelfth and thirteenth administrations have denied.

5 Iranian Female Activists Sentenced to Over 20 Years in Prison

The human rights organization Hengaw announced on Monday, August 12, that five female activists from Gilan (northern Iran), who were active in media and environmental issues, have been sentenced by the Iranian regime’s judiciary to a total of more than 20 years and seven months of imprisonment.
According to this report, Anahita Dustdar, Nina Golestani, Rezita Rajai, Anahita Hejazi, and Negin Edalatkhah were each sentenced to three years, six months, and one day in prison on charges of “collusion and assembly,” and to seven months and sixteen days for “propaganda against the regime.”

The sentences were given by Judge Mehdi Rasekhi, and officially communicated to the activists.
Rezita Rajai, a writer, Anahita Hejazi, the director of Anna Animal Shelter in Rasht, along with three others, were arrested by the Iranian regime’s security forces on November 11, 2023, and were temporarily released from Lakan Prison in Rasht after posting bail.

Previously, on July 13, 2024, six civil and women’s rights activists from Gilan, named Forough Samii-Nia, Jelveh Javaheri, Shiva Shah-Sia, Negin Rezaei, Matin Yazdani, and Azadeh Chavooshian, had been transferred to Lakan Prison in Rasht to serve their prison sentences.

According to reports from human rights organizations, Iranian regime officials, following the nationwide protests triggered by the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the Morality Police in 2022, have intensified their crackdown on women’s rights activists and human rights defenders, resorting to harsher methods and issuing heavy sentences to silence dissenting voices.

Iranian Political Prisoners Face Escalating Wave of Executions Amid Nationwide Protests

Since Tuesday of last week, August 6, the Iranian regime has executed more than 45 people, with 29 of them in a single day and 26 executed collectively at Ghezel Hesar Prison, setting a new record for state-sanctioned killings and executions in recent years.

In recent weeks, a large number of political prisoners have been sentenced to death under vague judicial processes on charges fabricated by the regime, such as “baghi” (rebellion against the Islamic government) and “efsad fil-arz” (spreading corruption on earth).

Meanwhile, six Sunni political prisoners face imminent execution by the Revolutionary Court in Mashhad.

The rise in executions followed the inauguration of the new president of the Iranian regime, who has claimed that “Iran is the safest country in the Middle East.”

Political prisoners across Iran are engaging in a hunger strike as part of a campaign called “No to Executions Tuesdays,” protesting the execution sentences of fellow inmates.

Activists in this campaign, many of whom are well-known prisoners participating in the hunger strike, have pointed out that following the death of Ebrahim Raisi, a member of the “Death Committee” responsible for the 1988 massacre (where the majority of the 30,000 executed political prisoners were members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, the largest opposition group to the regime), and in the lead-up to the regime’s staged “presidential elections,” the Iranian regime’s repressive apparatus temporarily reduced the number of executions. However, we, the prisoners of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign, warned at that time that this reduction was temporary and that a widespread wave of executions was likely to follow.

Last week, female prisoners in Evin Prison protested the execution of Reza Rasaei and were met with beatings by security forces.

Poverty In Iran Causing an Increase in Child Marriage

The state-run donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper reported that economic challenges such as high inflation and income inequality are key factors contributing to child marriage in Iran and claimed that the shrinking middle class has also exacerbated this issue.

On Tuesday, August 13, Donya-e-Eqtesad published the results of a study on “child marriage,” stating, “In Iran, factors such as low per capita income, high inflation, and income inequality are among the main causes of early child marriages.”

Donya-e-Eqtesad claimed that contrary to popular belief, the “prevailing religious view in the country” has not had a “significant” impact on early child marriages. Instead, factors such as economic sanctions and the shrinking middle class in Iran have played a larger role in child marriage.

The newspaper wrote that “studies” show that in Iran, early marriage is more often related to girls getting married before reaching puberty.

The report notes that there are many obstacles to stopping early child marriages in Iran. For example, the government opposes enacting strict laws on marriage due to concerns about a decline in birth rates.

According to the latest official statistics released in Iran by the government’s Statistical Center, at least 27,448 marriages involving girls under 15 years old occurred across various parts of Iran from winter 2021 to the end of autumn 2022.

Academic research shows that early marriage is a significant factor in domestic violence, school dropout rates among girls, and is considered a form of child sexual abuse in the context of marital relationships.

According to previous reports, some instances of child marriage have occurred due to poverty and the availability of marriage loans. Additionally, a 2021 report from Iran’s Ministry of Welfare stated that one in three Iranians lives below the poverty line and cannot meet their basic needs, leading some families to prefer reducing the number of dependents by forcing children, who lack understanding of sexual matters, into sexual relationships without their consent or awareness.

The promotion of “childbearing” by order of Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran’s regime, and the provision of banking facilities for marriage and childbearing in recent years have led some families in parts of Iran to marry off their under-18 children due to poverty to benefit from these incentives.

For years, the United Nations and its oversight mechanisms have called on the Iranian regime to change its laws to prevent child marriage and criminalize domestic violence. However, in practice, the regime has not only failed to take structural action in response to these requests but has also manipulated statistical categories to distort official data related to marriage and motherhood ages.

It is worth noting that official reports only include marriages that have been “officially registered,” while two years ago, the state-run ISNA news agency quoted experts stating that most child marriages are unregistered, and no accurate statistics are available on them.

Water Crisis Peaks in Isfahan with Seven-Hour Water Cuts

The energy imbalance in Iran has entered a new phase with the escalating crisis in the supply of drinking water in Isfahan, as the state-run Shargh newspaper reported that some neighborhoods in Isfahan are without water for up to seven hours. Meanwhile, media outlets report the continued and worsening imbalance in the water and electricity sectors across the country.

On Tuesday, August 13, Shargh wrote that the water crisis in Isfahan has reached residential areas, with some neighborhoods experiencing water cuts for up to seven hours.

The newspaper also emphasized that the water cuts in Isfahan have disrupted daily life, and water tankers have been unable to meet the residents’ needs. Shargh described the situation as “unbearable” for the people and warned of the consequences of water shortages.

In another report, the newspaper addressed the issue of electricity, highlighting that the electricity imbalance has led to frequent power outages in Tehran neighborhoods.

In some parts of the capital, the supply of city electricity has faced challenges, leaving streets in darkness and traffic lights non-functional.

The continuous and widespread power outages have not only affected citizens’ well-being but have also caused severe traffic congestion in Tehran.

Nournews website, close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, also addressed the issue, writing, “Record-breaking electricity and water consumption due to unprecedented heat continues, and the water situation is similarly critical. While in drought conditions, water consumption is defined as 133 liters, the current average consumption in Tehran is 233 liters.”

Nournews wrote, “Electricity and water consumption during the country’s hot and feverish days have surpassed the red level, and the situation is not in good condition.”

This media outlet identified the signs of this crisis and the crossing of the red level as the serial, long-term, and widespread power outages in Tehran. It emphasized that with the continuation of “tropical heat,” electricity and water industry officials are now warning that if energy consumption increases in the coming days, the blackouts and water cuts will continue.

According to media reports, as the weather heats up, water consumption has also increased, setting new records for drinking water use.

In this context, on Monday, August 12, a water and sewage manager mentioned that Tehran residents have broken records in water consumption, stating that this year, average water use in Tehran reached nearly 4 million cubic meters, compared to 3.7 million cubic meters in previous years.

Donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper also discussed the consequences of the energy imbalance, stating, “If frequent power outages continue, industrial production may decline in the coming months, and we may be forced to import extensively to meet domestic demand, even though the country is facing a currency shortage.”

Donya-e-Eqtesad wrote that with the increase in blackouts, the risk of economic shutdowns will bring the country into even more severe problems.

The newspaper emphasized that this trend is likely to repeat in Iran’s future, stating, “This is not a prediction but a technical reality based on a type of specialized optimization.”

In a report on August 10, Shargh addressed the challenges in the production sector and the impact of power outages on the country’s production process, noting that an examination of the performance of 120 publicly traded companies shows that nearly 60% of these companies faced a decline in production in the first four months of this year (from March 21 to July 21) compared to the same period last year, with some companies experiencing a production drop of up to 70%.

However, some experts do not attribute the energy sector’s crisis to any specific government, believing that this situation is the result of the Iranian regime’s governance over the past four decades. A look at energy-related incidents shows that under various governments, people have witnessed power outages, gasoline shortages, and water and gas cuts, with weather conditions determining their severity.

Published reports indicate that while the Iranian regime has spent a significant portion of the country’s resources over the past 20 years on developing its nuclear program and “completing the Bushehr power plant” under the pretext of “electricity production,” the people have repeatedly faced widespread power outages during the summer and rising temperatures in Iran.

Experts believe that the lack of planning and behavior outside of economic frameworks in developmental matters is the main cause of the energy imbalance and argue that under this style of governance, there is little hope for improving the situation.

10 Women Murdered in Iran Over 10 Days

The Hengaw Human Rights Organization, in a new report highlighting the rising trend of “femicide” in Iran, announced that in the past 10 days, at least 10 women have been killed in various cities across the country.

According to this report, during the first 10 days of August 2024, at least 10 women were killed in the cities of Sib and Saravan (two cases), Shiraz (two cases), Kouhrang, Shahriar, Tehran, Fasa, Rudan, and Zanjan.

Data from a specialized platform on gender-based killings in Iran also shows that in the first half of 2024, the rate of femicide in Iran increased by 60% compared to the same period in the previous year.

Femicide in Iran targets girls and women from all social strata, with these crimes, often committed by male family members, occurring in both urban and rural areas across all levels of socio-economic status.

The highest number of gender-based killings has been recorded in Tehran, a city diverse in terms of ethnicity, society, and economy. Analysis of the age distribution of victims shows that “40% of the victims are young, between 15 and 35 years old, and a wide range of age groups are affected by gender-based killings.”

The majority of femicide perpetrators are male family members, particularly husbands, and many of these killings are due to family disputes.

The Iranian regime uses the term “honor killing” to cover up cases of femicide and filicide, aiming to prevent the spread of news related to these murders. The regime’s laws, culture, and ideology facilitate and, in many cases, encourage violence against women and girls. The regime’s misogynistic laws institutionalize discrimination against women.

Iran’s New Cabinet: Pezeshkian’s Government Under Khamenei’s Control

The list of proposed ministers presented by Massoud Pezeshkian, the new president of the Iranian regime, to the parliament was predictably formed after extensive consultations with the regime’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and securing his approval. Pezeshkian has essentially established a joint-stock company managed by Khamenei with significant participation from hardliners and moderates.

For those who have no hope for reform within the regime, nothing has changed. However, regime insiders who participated in the elections with the hope of the so-called reform faction gaining power have once again realized the futility of elections in the Iranian regime.

A brief look at Pezeshkian’s proposed list of ministers provides a more accurate assessment.

Pezeshkian has notably reappointed Esmail Khatib, the intelligence minister under Raisi’s government, as the proposed minister for the same ministry. Khatib is a hardline cleric with a history of collaboration with the Revolutionary Guards, the Intelligence Ministry, and the Judiciary. He notably served as the intelligence minister under Ebrahim Raisi in 2022, overseeing significant repression of protesters, particularly women and youth.

Pezeshkian’s proposed interior minister, Eskandar Momeni, has a long history in the police force and will be the second-highest security official in the new government. Coordinating with Khamenei, Pezeshkian has nominated someone who described the protesters against the 2009 election results as “misguided mercenaries tied to foreign powers” and played a significant role in suppressing those protests.

Momeni had previously stated, “The enemies of the regime are waiting for something to happen through internal elements to exploit it fully. We saw this during the 2009 sedition. Therefore, it is necessary to be extremely vigilant in this area to prevent this wave from spreading in society.”

Pezeshkian has deemed only one-woman worthy of being in his cabinet: Farzaneh Sadegh as the Minister of Roads and Urban Development. In other words, Pezeshkian did not consider any other woman, even symbolically or superficially, suitable for leading any of his ministries.

Pezeshkian’s proposed minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance is also one of Khamenei’s trusted figures: Abbas Salehi, who held a similar position in Hassan Rouhani’s second administration.

Alireza Kazemi, who is the deputy secretary-general of the Drug Control Headquarters and served as the acting minister of Education for a few months in Raisi’s government, has been proposed for the Ministry of Education.

Hossein Simayi Sarraf, Pezeshkian’s nominee for the Ministry of Science, has 20 years of religious studies (seminary education) and a background in law, and he is set to lead the Ministry of Science.

Abbas Aliabadi, the Minister of Industry, Mine, and Trade in Raisi’s government, has been nominated for the Ministry of Energy. He is one of the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards and served as the CEO of the MAPNA Group during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration, overseeing the majority of Iran’s power plant projects.

Abbas Salehi Amiri, with a security background, has been nominated as the Minister of Cultural Heritage, Tourism, and Handicrafts.

The selection of Abbas Araghchi as the proposed foreign minister, given his close relationship with Mohammad Javad Zarif and Khamenei’s trust in him was expected. Similarly, the nomination of Abdolnaser Hemmati, the Central Bank president during Rouhani’s second term, as the Minister of Economy was predictable.

Pezeshkian has not nominated any ministers from religious minorities. The representation of youth in his cabinet is almost non-existent, with the youngest minister being 48 years old and the average age of the ministers around 60. Moreover, half of his proposed ministers align with various factions of hardliners, and as mentioned, only one woman is included in Pezeshkian’s proposed cabinet.

Iran’s fundamental problems and the economic, social, and political crises are deeply intertwined with the structure of power in the Islamic Republic. The authoritarian, inefficient, corrupt, and plundering regime continues its undemocratic rule by suppressing the majority. In this context, Pezeshkian’s government, with a lineup of ministers that essentially represents a joint-stock company managed by Khamenei, will only deepen the despair over any improvement in conditions.

In this situation, it seems that only those who see the solution outside the circle of dictatorial rulers and seek democracy through popular movements and protests have so far had a realistic outlook.

220 Pages of Documents Link the Islamic Center Hamburg to Khamenei’s Office

Documents obtained by Der Spiegel reveal how the Hamburg Islamic Center followed directives from Khamenei’s office, including supporting Hezbollah and promoting the October 7th attack on Israel.

The German Ministry of the Interior provided Der Spiegel with a 220-page document detailing the activities of the Islamic Center Hamburg (known as the “Blue Mosque“), showing its close ties with the Iranian government and its support for the terrorist group Hezbollah.

The center was closed on July 24th. The German Ministry of the Interior announced that the Islamic Center Hamburg and its subsidiaries in Frankfurt, Munich, and Berlin were banned for following “extremist Islamist objectives.”

According to documents obtained by Der Spiegel, Mohammad Hadi Mofatteh, the head of the Islamic Center Hamburg, who was expelled from Germany in November 2022 during the peak of nationwide protests in Iran, had direct contact with the office of Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran.

Investigators discovered WhatsApp chats between Mofatteh and Mehdi Mostafavi, the Deputy of Communications and International Affairs in the Supreme Leader’s office, revealing that the two exchanged over 650 messages from late 2021 to the end of 2023.

In these chats, Mostafavi provided detailed instructions to Mofatteh, including guidelines on “Khamenei’s messages for German-speaking pilgrims” in 2023 or the center’s main activities in 2024. Mostafavi also sent Mofatteh content for anti-Israel propaganda.

Connections with Hezbollah and Financial Aid to Yemen

The documents also show that alongside the name of the head of the Islamic Center Hamburg is the personal seal of the “Supreme Leader of the Revolution” approving financial support for Yemen’s Houthis, indicating that the center was a direct arm of Iran’s foreign missions.

Investigators also found evidence of direct and close ties between the Islamic Center Hamburg and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This includes a report from a Hezbollah cleric responsible for its “foreign relations,” detailing his travels in Germany. In 2016, he expressed gratitude for the financial and advisory support provided by the Iranian regime to Hezbollah.

Two years later, he wrote about “participating in regular meetings at the Imam Ali Center,” which is the name of the Blue Mosque in Hamburg. Investigators also found the phone numbers of several other Hezbollah representatives on the mobile phones of Mofatteh and other officials at the center.

Confidential documents show that Hezbollah representatives and the Islamic Center Hamburg were apparently involved in a project to build a mosque in the city of Hanover, Germany.

According to the German Ministry of the Interior, the foreign relations officer of Hezbollah played a significant role in planning this mosque project, and operational issues had to be reported to Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah.

Currently, the German prosecutor’s office in Karlsruhe is investigating several officials of the Niedersachsen Mosque Association on suspicion of membership in the terrorist organization Hezbollah. Questions on this matter posed to a lawyer for the Islamic Center Hamburg have gone unanswered.

Mofatteh had previously claimed that these centers are “purely religious institutions.” He had stated, “The Islam we promote here is the Islam of rationality, peace, friendship, and peaceful coexistence among people.”