Housing Market Stagnation in Iran: Despite Rising Dollar Rates, “No Buyers for Housing”
According to reports from Iranian economic sources, the stagnation in Iran’s housing market has intensified, with real estate agents reporting a decline in visits and a lack of pre-holiday market activity.
Studies indicate that buyers with limited budgets are turning to small-sized, older units and even basement apartments.
The state-run newspaper Donya-e-Eqtesad reports that apartments priced below 40 billion rials (approximately $51,280) are mostly located in eastern and southern Tehran, with areas ranging from 30 to 80 square meters.
For instance, a 75-square-meter, 30-year-old unit in the Jashnvareh neighborhood is priced at 30 billion rials (approximately $38,400).
Similarly, Davood Beigi-Nejad, the deputy head of the Tehran Real Estate Consultants Union stated that due to the “deep stagnation” in the housing market, there are no buyers despite the rising dollar rate.
On Monday, December 23, Beigi-Nejad told the state-run ILNA news agency that while the number of properties listed for sale has increased significantly, activity in the housing market is not demand-driven and does not lead to finalized contracts.
According to this industry representative, housing seekers only inquire about prices at real estate agencies without making purchases.
Beigi-Nejad believes that “reduced purchasing power” and “declining liquidity in the market” have decreased housing transactions.
He explained, “Most contracts and transactions are based on bartering; meaning assets must be sold first to enable a housing market transaction.”
The deputy head of the Tehran Real Estate Consultants Union noted that while construction costs and housing prices have risen due to the higher dollar rate, prices remain unchanged because of the “lack of buyers.”
The free-market dollar rate has been on the rise in recent months and has now surpassed 790,000 rials.
Traditionally, Iranian markets react to rising dollar rates, but housing transactions have remained stagnant despite the increase in the dollar’s value.
Meanwhile, other investment markets in Iran, such as stocks and gold, have grown alongside the rising dollar rate.
The purchasing power of housing loans has declined with ongoing inflation in recent years, and other government initiatives, such as the “National Housing Scheme” (Maskan-e Melli), have yielded no results.
On November 22, Gholamreza Mirzaei, a member of Iranian regime’s Majlis (parliament), remarked during a warning to the Minister of Roads and Urban Development that “owning a home has become a dream for people,” adding that “the National Housing Scheme has not achieved its goals.”
The increased risk of military conflict between Iran and Israel and ongoing security and political developments in the Middle East have also driven liquidity holders toward safer markets, such as currency and gold, exacerbating the housing market stagnation.
Syria Denies Diplomatic Talks with Tehran and Prepares to File $300 Billion Lawsuit
In a firm response to recent statements by Iranian officials, sources close to Syria’s new political leadership have denied any diplomatic communication with the Iranian regime regarding the reopening of embassies in Damascus and Tehran. This denial came in response to statements by Fatemeh Mohjarani, the spokesperson for the Iranian regime, who announced on December 13, 2024, that negotiations were underway to renew diplomatic relations and reopen diplomatic services between the two countries.
In an interview with Al Arabiya on December 24, 2023, a Syrian source stated, “There has been no contact between the Syrian political administration and Iran, including diplomatic discussions about reopening the embassies or consulates.” The source confirmed that the current Syrian leadership does not intend to establish any relations with Iran in the foreseeable future, including the presence of an embassy in Damascus or an Iranian consulate in Aleppo.
In addition to the diplomatic estrangement, it appears that the Syrian government is preparing to file an international lawsuit against Iran. The source revealed that the lawsuit seeks compensation estimated at $300 billion for alleged damages caused by the Iranian regime’s military support for the ousted Bashar al-Assad regime. The source told Al Arabiya that this compensation is based on “the destruction of infrastructure, crimes against the Syrian people, and active participation in suppressing peaceful protests.”
The lawsuit aims to hold the Iranian religious regime accountable for what the source described as “criminal and repressive policies” that caused severe destruction to Syrian infrastructure and resulted in immense human suffering. These actions include the deployment of military forces and proxy militias that supported the Assad government during the ongoing Syrian civil war.
Despite Mohjerani’s claims, Ismail Baqaee, the spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, previously referred to limited communication with Syria’s new leaders. While acknowledging Tehran’s interactions with various Syrian opposition groups, he confirmed the absence of direct contacts with the current ruling administration in Damascus.
Despite Mohjerani’s confirmation during a weekly press conference that “we are committed to diplomacy and ready for discussions. Dialogues are ongoing regarding the reopening of embassies,” these statements reveal a noticeable contradiction in the official stance of the Iranian regime, indicating possible confusion within the regime about its policy towards Syria. This contradiction highlights the broader confusion in Tehran’s narrative about its relations with Damascus, suggesting a decline in its influence in the region.
Syria’s outright rejection of re-establishing relations with Iran and its plan to file the lawsuit represent a clear departure from the diplomatic policy during Bashar al-Assad’s era. This shift towards seeking compensation and distancing from Iran indicates a radical change in Syria’s foreign policy priorities, with a focus on accountability and national reconstruction efforts.
These developments highlight the waning influence of the Iranian regime in the Middle East, as neighboring countries seek to hold Tehran accountable for its interventions and the extensive damage they have caused. However, it remains to be seen how the international community will respond to the legal actions taken by Syria, but the clear message from Damascus is that Tehran’s role in the country’s crisis will not be forgotten or forgiven.
The New Syrian Leadership’s Open Warning to the Iranian Regime
As’ad Hassan al-Sheibani, Syria’s new foreign minister, on Monday, December 23, warned the Iranian regime to refrain from creating and spreading chaos in Syria. This is the most explicit public warning from Syria’s new rulers to the Iranian regime since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, concerning Tehran’s approach to developments in Syria.
Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of Tahrir al-Sham, which now holds power in Syria, had previously criticized the Iranian regime’s actions in the country, accusing its military presence and proxy groups supporting Bashar al-Assad’s government of causing the deaths and displacement of millions of Syrian citizens.
However, this is the first time the new Syrian officials have openly responded to statements by Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Iranian regime, and other Iranian officials opposing Tahrir al-Sham and the ongoing developments in Syria.
As’ad Hassan al-Sheibani wrote in a post on the social media platform X: “Iran must respect the will of the Syrian people, the sovereignty, and the security of this country. We warn them to refrain from creating chaos in Syria, and we also hold them responsible for the consequences of their recent statements.”
On Sunday, December 22, the Iranian regime’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei, in a speech to a group of eulogists, said: “We predict that a strong and honorable collective will also emerge in Syria, as today Syrian youth have nothing to lose; their schools, universities, homes, and streets are unsafe. Therefore, they must stand with strong resolve against those who plan and execute insecurity and overcome them.”
Earlier, on December 11, he had stated: “Everyone should know that things will not remain as they are, with groups attacking homes in Damascus and the Zionist regime advancing with bombardments, artillery, and tanks. Brave Syrian youth will surely rise and, by resisting, even at the cost of casualties, will overcome this situation, just as the courageous Iraqi youth, with the help, organization, and leadership of our dear martyr (Qasem Soleimani), managed to expel the enemy from their homes and streets. This task in Syria may take a long time, but the outcome is certain and definite.”
In contrast, Ahmed al-Sharaa, without addressing the future of Damascus-Tehran relations, repeatedly criticized the Iranian regime’s performance and military presence in Syria. In an interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper, published on December 20, he said that by overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s government, the opposition had set the Iranian regime’s regional project back by 40 years.
He stated that under Assad, “Syria had become a platform for Iran to control key Arab capitals, expand wars, and destabilize the Gulf with narcotics like Captagon.”
Following Ali Khamenei’s speeches, other military officials and government-affiliated media in Iran intensified their attacks on the ongoing developments in Syria, especially targeting Tahrir al-Sham and Ahmed al-Sharaa, even labeling him as “Jewish and affiliated with Israel.”
On December 23, Esmail Baqai, the regime’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, stated in a press conference that the Iranian regime has still been unable to establish a direct communication channel with the new Syrian rulers.
The Iranian regime’s embassy in Damascus, the only diplomatic facility remaining in Syria, was attacked by rebel forces on December 8, following Bashar al-Assad’s escape to Russia.
The Crisis in Iran’s Pharmaceutical Industry
Studies indicate that the profitability of many Iranian pharmaceutical companies has dropped by over 30%, reducing their net profit margins to less than 25%.
Additionally, pharmaceutical industry experts, due to delayed payments and financial issues, have either left some domestic companies or relocated their factories to neighboring countries.
According to the state-run Ham-Mihan newspaper, the decline in pharmaceutical companies’ profitability stems from price-fixing policies, which, amid inflation and severe currency fluctuations, have placed these companies in financial distress.
The report adds that the financial challenges of these companies are not limited to profitability; rising debts and liquidity issues are other aspects of this crisis. The debt-to-asset ratio for some pharmaceutical companies has increased from 58% to 64%, forcing many entities, both public and private, to borrow from banks to continue operations.
According to the report, companies like Roozdaru and Pakhsh Razi have faced reduced production, and some may shut down, leading to drug shortages.
The Director General of Pharmaceuticals at the Food and Drug Organization announced that one holding company with 140 trillion rials (approximately $180 million) in sales now cannot pay its employees’ salaries.
The Sobhan Oncology company has also reported increasing debts and an inability to pay them.
Vahid Mahallati, a pharmacist and the secretary of the state-run Distribution Companies Association, suggests that “quasi-governmental companies should transfer their managerial shares to the private sector to better utilize existing capacities.”
Mahallati added that income limitations in the public sector have created significant problems in attracting talent and affecting its performance.
He further stated, “Publicly traded governmental companies account for about 30% of the pharmaceutical market value. However, the limited production of some public companies places pressure on private companies.”
Mahallati warned, “Quasi-governmental and governmental pharmaceutical companies, with their market share halved in the past decade, are heading toward complete inefficiency.”
Drug Supply Issues in Sistan and Baluchestan Province
In another report by the state-run ILNA news agency, in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, drug import restrictions due to “national macro-policies” have caused difficulties in providing specific medications, particularly for diabetic patients and those undergoing dialysis. According to Dariush Mohabi, the Pharmaceuticals Manager at Zahedan University of Medical Sciences, “Domestically produced drugs are abundantly available, but there are challenges in supplying imported drugs.” He noted that some patients visit multiple pharmacies to obtain medications and are even forced to purchase them on the open market at high costs. Farnaz Firouzkouhi, a diabetic patient, reported issues in accessing imported insulin, stating that domestic insulin was unsuitable for her and she had to obtain the imported version at a high cost. Similarly, Karbasi, another diabetic patient, mentioned that due to the incompatibility of domestic insulin with his blood sugar levels, he had to purchase the imported drug. Nasrati, who has a sick family member, reported severe issues in obtaining medications in the province, saying they must travel from various cities to Zahedan to acquire them. Another citizen shared the difficulties in securing medicine for their MS patient, emphasizing that many pharmacies either lack the required drugs or do not provide them in sufficient quantities. Experts attribute the crisis in pharmaceutical companies to heavy debts, high costs, delays in payment claims, and the inefficient management of the Iranian regime.Iran’s Economic Growth Halving, According to Central Bank Report
New data from the Central Bank of the Iranian regime indicates that GDP growth from March 20 to September 22 has halved compared to the same period last year.
According to Central Bank statistics, the country’s economic growth was 5.3% from March 20 to September 22, 2023, but this year, it has fallen to 2.9% during the same period.
The details reveal that economic growth in the summer of this year was even lower than in the spring, registering 2.7% with oil included and only 2.3% without oil.
A significant point in the Central Bank’s data is that economic growth over the past two years has been primarily driven by increased oil exports rather than sectors such as services, industry, agriculture, and others directly affecting people’s livelihoods.
According to this governmental body’s estimates, Iran experienced overall economic growth of 5% last year, driven by an 18.8% increase in the oil sector’s added value. In the first half of this year, the oil sector’s growth was 9.3%, contributing to the overall rise in the national economy.
Data from the commodity information company Kpler, along with tanker tracking firms like Vortexa, show that Iran’s oil exports have grown by 34% this year compared to last year and by approximately 100% compared to the year before.
Iran exports 40% of its oil and condensate production and 7% of its gas production.
The halving of the country’s economic growth in the spring and summer occurred while data from Kpler and Vortexa indicate that Iran’s oil exports decreased by 500,000 barrels (about one-third) in the fall compared to the summer, increasing the likelihood of further economic decline in the fall.
However, the Central Bank’s estimates of economic growth in certain sectors face significant skepticism. For example, while reports from the Statistics Center indicate a shrinking share of industry and agriculture in the economy due to summer power outages, the Central Bank claims growth of 1.7% and 2.8% in the industrial and agricultural sectors during the summer.
The slowing economic growth comes as the government’s Seventh Development Plan, implemented this year for five years, aims for an “annual 8% economic growth.”
However, according to the International Monetary Fund, Iran’s economic growth rate is expected to decline steadily from this year over the next five years, falling to 2%.
Data from the regime’s Statistics Center shows that Iran’s “national income per capita” fell by 20% in 2023 compared to 2011, reaching approximately 884 million rials (around $1,134).
The findings of this report indicate that in 2023, Iran has become poorer than before, a poverty now evident in most economic indicators and data.
The 48th Week of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” Campaign in Iran
In the 48th week of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign, its members announced that with the participation of Rudsar Prison in Gilan Province, hunger strikes would take place in 28 prisons on Wednesday, December 24.
The statement from the “No to Executions Tuesdays” prisoners reads:
“On the eve of the New Year, we celebrate the birth of Christ, the harbinger of peace and freedom, and wish a year free from oppression, executions, and killings for all nations, especially Iranians who suffer under the rule of the Supreme Leader’s regime.”
“In 2024, the authoritarian regime in Iran has executed at least 953 individuals via hanging; among them, approximately 33 were women, and 8 were political prisoners. Additionally, 96 Kurdish compatriots and 101 Baluchi compatriots were executed within this year.”
The statement from the hunger striking “No to Executions Tuesdays” prisoners further stated:
“Out of the total executions in 2024, 158 occurred at the Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj.”
“The ‘No to Executions Tuesdays’ campaign has sought to amplify the voices of anonymous prisoners and those on death row by exposing parts of the atrocities and executions carried out in prisons across the country. The campaign, along with other political and human rights organizations, has revealed these crimes, which led to Ghezel Hesar Prison being placed on international sanctions lists after years of executions and killings.”
“Last week, on Wednesday, December 18, the execution regime hanged a Kurdish political prisoner named Rahim Barin in Mahabad Prison after 19 years of torture.”
“Additionally, another political prisoner in Urmia Prison, Rezgar Bigzadeh Babamiri, who was arrested during the 2022 protests in Bukan, has been charged with ‘waging war against God’ and rebellion by Branch 10 of the Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office in Urmia, putting him at risk of receiving the death penalty.”
The hunger-striking prisoners’ statement also reads:
“As we have repeatedly emphasized, it is evident that the regime uses suppression and executions to prevent public protests, and all executions in Iran have political implications. Therefore, the members of this campaign once again urge all organizations and human rights institutions, both inside and outside the country, to make serious efforts to stop executions in Iran. The key to victory and halting the execution machinery lies in solidarity and collective unity. We can and must stand against executions to put an end to this systematic killing.”
30% Decrease In Iran’s Autumn Crops Due to Power Outages
Qassem Pishehvar, the head of the Iranian regime’s Agricultural Guild Chamber announced a 30% reduction in autumn crop production due to power outages.
On Saturday, December 21, Pishevar also told the state-run Mehr News Agency that the damage caused by power outages is not limited to agricultural products but also seriously affects equipment for wells.
According to Pishehvar, electricity to agricultural wells is currently cut daily from 4:00 PM to 9:00 PM.
Two weeks ago, an inspector from the National Broiler Farmers Union reported a 20% loss to poultry farms due to power outages.
The government’s inability to supply electricity during autumn comes despite electricity demand being one-third lower in cold months than in warmer seasons. The government is unable to meet even this reduced demand due to gas shortages and insufficient liquid fuel for power plants.
Statistics from the Ministry of Energy show that agriculture accounts for 13% of the country’s electricity consumption, but this figure peaks in summer and drops significantly in colder seasons.
Iran’s agricultural sector has faced a drought crisis for years, compounded by a power crisis since last year. Consequently, agriculture’s share in total national employment fell to its lowest in 19 years last autumn. The latest report from the Statistics Center shows that this summer, the sector’s share in total employment dropped by 1% compared to last summer, reaching approximately 14.5%.
Meanwhile, Iran’s annual agricultural imports have peaked at $17 billion, most of which comprises grains like wheat and barley, planted in both spring and autumn.
In addition to agriculture, the government has severely limited electricity supply to industries, while widespread blackouts are also implemented in residential areas.
Iran’s annual electricity consumption grows by 7%, but since 2011, electricity generation has not even reached half that growth rate.
For example, last year, 6,000 megawatts of power generation capacity was supposed to be added, but only one-third of this target was achieved, exacerbating electricity shortages and causing widespread blackouts during summer.
This summer, the electricity shortfall reached 20,000 megawatts, meaning the government was unable to meet 25% of peak demand.
Meanwhile, due to the energy crisis, all university classes in Iran will be held online until the end of the current semester (January 10, 2025). Additionally, many highways and streets in Iranian cities have experienced blackouts.
Iranian regime officials continue to blame the public and high consumption for the crisis, but the main causes are lack of investment in this sector, government indifference, the aging electricity transmission and distribution network, and poor management.
The Iranian Chamber of Commerce warns about worker layoffs due to power outages
A day after the Iranian regime’s Majlis (Parliament) Research Center reported on the persistent decline in industrial sector growth, the head of the Industry Commission of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce warned about potential worker layoffs in this sector due to repeated power outages.
On Sunday, December 22, Alireza Kolahi Samadi stated that over the past three years, investment in electricity generation, transmission, and distribution has been “zero,” leaving Iran facing a massive electricity shortage.
The Majlis Research Center also reported the previous day that energy imbalances in the country have caused Iran’s industrial economic growth to decline sharply since 2023. This trend worsened in the second and third quarters of 2024, approaching “zero.”
Some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, wood and paper, automotive, ceramics, tiles, and cement, experienced negative growth in the first half of this year.
Samadi mentioned that the government is obligated to compensate industries for damages, but it fails to do so and lacks the resources to fulfill this responsibility.
Mahmoud Najafi Arab, head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, said last week that the industry and mining sector’s share of GDP decreased by 1% in 2025 compared to the previous year, falling to 15.2%, with the decline continuing.
Warnings about worker layoffs come as 8.5 million people in Iran are employed in the industrial sector, accounting for one-third of the country’s workforce.
The damage caused by power outages is not limited to the industrial sector.
Previously, the head of the Iranian Agricultural Guild Chamber reported a 30% decrease in autumn crop production, while an inspector from the National Broiler Farmers Union mentioned 20% losses to poultry farms due to power outages.
Kolahi Samadi stated that at least $10 billion in investment is needed to address the electricity shortfall. Due to the water crisis, building high-efficiency combined cycle power plants is no longer feasible.
He elaborated: “Under these circumstances, decentralized power generation has increased, but continued reliance on it will lead to a diesel supply crisis. Additionally, the mazut and diesel used in the country are substandard, with high-sulfur diesel damaging engines.
He emphasized that in the short term, the only way to increase electricity capacity is through solar energy. However, renewable energy requires significant investment in the transmission network, and given the state of the country’s grid, high-quality solar electricity distribution is not feasible.
Renewable energies such as solar, wind, and geothermal currently account for about 1% of Iran’s total electricity production, compared to over 30% in Turkey and the European Union.
300% increase in tuition fees at Azad University has left students indebted
Ramadan Rahimi Dasht-Louie, a member of the Education Committee of the Iranian regime’s Majlis (Parliament), noted the 300% increase in tuition fees for medical sciences programs at Islamic Azad University, stating that students in these programs have become indebted to the university due to their inability to pay the fees.
On Sunday, December 22, Rahimi announced in an interview with the state-run ILNA news agency that the tripling of tuition fees for medical sciences at Islamic Azad University was abruptly announced, leaving the Parliament and the Ministry of Science uninformed.
This Majlis member stated that if Islamic Azad University intended to increase tuition fees, it should have been mentioned in the registration guide for entrance exams, adding that this decision has violated the rights of university entrance exam candidates.
He pointed out: “If candidates are admitted to medical sciences programs but do not register, they can no longer participate, and in this way, their rights are also violated.”
Students of medical sciences at Islamic Azad University have been staging protests since October 13 against the tuition fee hikes and the resulting economic pressures.
During this time, they have repeatedly protested in front of university buildings and various institutions, including the Majlis, the Presidential Office, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology, and the Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education.
Rahimi called for the appointment of an oversight body by Massoud Pezeshkian to monitor Islamic Azad University, saying: “There must be clarity regarding supervision of tuition fees, activities, registrations, and all educational and training affairs of Islamic Azad University.”
Rahimi added that currently, there is no regulatory body in the executive branch to evaluate the performance of Islamic Azad University, and it is unclear which ministry, or agency should be addressed in case of issues at this university.
Tuition hikes at Islamic Azad University in recent years have also sparked student protests.
Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, President of Islamic Azad University, described tuition increases as natural in June 2022, stating: “We are a cost-revenue organization and do not rely on governments.”
Islamic Azad University was established in May 1982 on the proposal of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and is considered the wealthiest university in Iran.
The university’s expenses are funded through tuition fees from students, governmental and public contributions, and support from state institutions, as per its charter.
Tuition per semester for high-demand fields such as dentistry, pharmacy, and medicine has tripled, reaching 90 million rials (annually 180 million rials), approximately $1,168–$2,336. The total semester payment for these fields ranges from 112 million to 135 million rials ($1,455 to $1,754), with some universities also requiring 50%, 25%, or 10% of the next semester’s tuition upfront at the beginning of the first semester.
According to applicants in these fields, in higher semesters, tuition can reach 450 million rials (approximately $5,845), and by the end of their studies, they must pay 3 billion rials (approximately $39,000) to Islamic Azad University.
The minimum wage for a worker with two children in Iran is approximately $142.
Khamenei Urges Syrian Youth to Oppose New Rulers
Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran’s regime, once again vowed to reclaim Syria from Bashar al-Assad’s successors and encouraged the youth of Syria to stand against the new government.
On Sunday, December 22, Khamenei spoke of the “emergence of an honorable and strong force in Syria” opposing the country’s new rulers.
He emphasized, “The Syrian youth have nothing to lose. Their universities, schools, homes, and streets are unsafe. What should they do? They must stand with strength and determination against those who have designed and executed this insecurity.”
Earlier, on December 11, Khamenei had promised to reclaim Syria and implicitly referred to Turkey’s role, describing the fall of Bashar al-Assad as “the result of a joint American-Israeli plan.”
In his latest speech, Khamenei rejected the attribution of regional militias to Iran, saying, “They keep saying that Iran has lost its proxy forces in the region. This is another false claim; Iran does not have proxy forces.”
He stressed, “If one day we decide to act, we won’t need proxy forces.”
Khamenei added that groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis “fight because their beliefs compel them to do so.”
These remarks come despite Khamenei’s repeated mentions in recent years of Iran’s “strategic depth” and “strategic influence.”
For instance, in December 2022, Khamenei referred to countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon as “Iran’s strategic depth.” In another speech, he stated that a pillar of national power is “to influence other nations and create strategic depth for the country.”
In 2019, during a meeting with IRGC commanders, Khamenei said, “Do not lose sight of this expansive vision of the geography of resistance; do not abandon this transnational perspective. We should not settle for just our region.”
Meanwhile, some Iranian regime officials have threatened that proxy forces will assist in suppressing protests in Iran.
For example, in 2018, Mousa Ghazanfarabadi, head of Tehran’s Revolutionary Courts, stated, “If we do not support the revolution, the Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi, Afghan Fatemiyoun, Pakistani Zainabiyoun, and Yemeni Houthis will come and support the revolution.”
Similarly, in 2017, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, wrote to Khamenei about the end of ISIS in Syria, saying, “On behalf of all commanders and the thousands of Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Afghan, and Pakistani martyrs and veterans defending the shrine, I congratulate Your Excellency on this great and decisive victory.”
In recent days, various reports have emerged about the potential weakening of Iran’s proxy groups, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon.
For example, Naim Qassem, Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah in Lebanon, stated that with Bashar al-Assad’s fall, the group has lost its route for securing military resources through Syria.
Referring to Syria, Khamenei said that the United States now “imagines it has achieved victory” and that “they have lost control of their tongues and are talking nonsense.”
He added, “One of the American figures said that anyone who riots in Iran, we will help them. Fools have smelled barbecue.”
These threats from Khamenei come at a time when the Iranian people are facing widespread poverty, and the regime is struggling even to provide electricity and energy for its citizens.
