80% of Pharmacies in Iran on the Verge of Bankruptcy
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Iran War: Escalating Drug Shortages and Disruption of Healthcare Services
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has warned that the consequences of U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran could place the country’s healthcare system under strain for months or even years.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies stated that after weeks of bombardment, Iran is facing the risk of a serious crisis in the provision of healthcare services, and shortages of equipment along with disruptions in supply chains may persist for an extended period. At the same time, the state-run newspaper Donya-ye-Eqtesad reported that drug shortages—especially specialized and imported medications—have intensified in Tehran pharmacies, forcing patients either to wait for supplies or to use alternatives with lower effectiveness.
US Sanctions Chinese Refinery, Tehran-linked Shipping Companies
The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced a new package of Iran-related sanctions on Friday, which includes a major Chinese refinery and about 40 shipping companies and vessels associated with what has been described as Iran’s shadow fleet.
According to the department, Hengli Petrochemical Refinery in Dalian, one of the largest buyers of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products, has been targeted by sanctions. At the same time, a general license has been issued to allow for the gradual wind-down of transactions involving the company, giving related parties time to exit commercial dealings.
U.S. Sanctions Tehran’s Drone and Missile NetworksThe Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also announced sanctions on nearly 40 shipping companies and vessels involved in Iran’s oil transportation network. This network is considered part of the so-called shadow fleet used to evade sanctions and transport oil. The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump also sanctioned several so-called “teapot” refineries—small independent Chinese refineries—last year. These measures created restrictions for these refineries, including difficulties in obtaining Iranian crude oil and forcing them to sell refined products under different names. Teapot refineries account for about one-quarter of China’s refining capacity and operate with low or even negative profit margins. In recent months, they have also faced increased pressure due to declining domestic demand. Reuters news agency reported that these sanctions, by freezing the entities’ assets in the United States and prohibiting U.S. citizens from doing business with them, have also discouraged some larger independent refiners from purchasing Iranian oil. According to 2025 data from Kpler, China buys more than 80% of Iran’s exported oil. At the same time, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that several cryptocurrency wallets linked to Iran have also been sanctioned. He wrote on the social media platform X that OFAC has frozen 344 million dollars in cryptocurrency through these measures. Bessent emphasized that they will track the financial flows that Tehran is trying to move out of the country and will target all financial channels linked to the Iranian regime. These measures come as Washington, alongside an existing ceasefire with Iran, continues its economic pressure by intensifying sanctions, restricting export routes, and increasing pressure on the ports and financial networks of Iran’s regime.
War and its Impact on Children’s Education in Iran
Repeated school closures during the war between the United States and Iran’s regime have severely reduced the quality of education in the country. This critical situation has significantly lowered learning quality, especially at the elementary level and among first-grade students. The current conditions not only undermine students’ academic futures but also create numerous challenges for parents.
Failure of virtual alternatives and infrastructural crisis in the education system
In the current situation, the need for alternative options to traditional classes is felt more than ever. Solutions such as virtual classes, televised schooling, and printed materials are among these options. Although the Ministry of Education of Iran’s regime claims to have implemented these measures, the reality on the ground suggests otherwise. Conversations with families and education activists indicate that these options have failed to provide adequate quality. A shortage of internet servers has made access to the SHAD system (the regime’s student education network) extremely difficult. Additionally, high costs and time limitations have significantly reduced the effectiveness of televised schooling.The Shadow of Anxiety Over Iran’s Education, School Seats Are EmptyingTeaching lessons by parents who lack instructional expertise is considered nearly impossible. Parents may be able to supervise homework, but they are not capable of effectively conveying educational concepts to their children. This issue is even more serious for first-grade students who are just beginning their academic journey. A boys’ school principal states that since the introduction of virtual education into the system, he has seen no benefit. He believes that with current methods, the true concept of studying and education has been entirely hollowed out. In his view, the developmental and character-building aspects of education have also been completely neglected.
Alarming statistics of closures and inability to manage the crisis
Due to numerous difficulties, families are reluctant to use the SHAD system. The disruption of international internet access has also eliminated the possibility of using alternative solutions. Rezvan Hakimzadeh, Deputy Minister for Primary Education in the Ministry of Education, claims that they had prior preparedness for such circumstances. She states that school closures due to air pollution and energy imbalances had already occurred in various provinces. Now, the war has added to existing problems, leading to one-month closures in some provinces. In the current academic year, Khuzestan Province has experienced 34 days of closure and Tehran Province 31 days of closures.Educational inequality and poverty among lower classes
Regarding final exams, it has been reported that teachers’ children are correcting exam papers at home. This disorder occurs at a stage where these grades account for 60% of the national university entrance exam results. School closures and reliance on virtual education have now become a routine approach in the education system. The reasons for this decision range from virus outbreaks to air pollution, energy imbalances, and most recently war. Iran’s regime has completely ignored the serious access and quality crises resulting from this structural shift. This crisis is directly tied to families’ economic status and exacerbates inequality in society. Providing smart devices or high-quality internet for underprivileged and lower-income families is very difficult and sometimes impossible. In many households, there is only one mobile phone, which is not always available to the student. The lack of sufficient devices in multi-child families leads to absenteeism and severe academic decline for one of the children.Decline in national literacy and rise in dropout rates
Virtual education has resulted in sixth-grade students having literacy levels comparable to second grade. Wealthier families compensate for this weakness with private tutors, but poorer families lack such essential resources. Inequality in university entrance exam results significantly intensifies feelings of helplessness among underprivileged students. From 2022 to April 2026, schools across the country have operated virtually for more than 350 days. This is equivalent to the complete closure of an academic year and represents a severe blow to the education system. The number of dropouts in 2022 was estimated at around 911,000 students. The number of out-of-school children rose to 950,000 in 2025 and has now exceeded 1 million. These children, after dropping out, enter cycles of informal labor and exploitation in the market. In 2025, numerous reports highlighted severe weaknesses among students in the Persian language. The state-run Ham-Mihan newspaper reported an inability to read and write in deprived areas. In those regions, five out of every 20 students lack basic literacy skills. An examination of the current situation shows that the education system, under the influence of war-driven policies and mismanagement, is on the verge of collapse. Class disparities in access to education have pushed a generation of children out of school and into the labor market. Repeated closures and the inefficiency of virtual platforms have turned the right to education into a luxury commodity that is out of reach for many.Iran: Violent Transfer of Political Prisoners to the Notorious Ghezel Hesar Prison
On Monday, April 13, seven political prisoners held in Ward 7 of Evin Prison in Tehran were abruptly, violently, and humiliatingly transferred to solitary confinement cells in Unit 3 of Ghezel Hesar Prison, a facility whose name is associated for many families of political prisoners with pressure, isolation, and serious threats to prisoners’ lives.
Among those transferred are Miryousef Younesi, a 71-year-old political prisoner, and Mehdi Vafaee, a 40-year-old political prisoner. Mehdi Vafaee was arrested in June 2022 and sentenced to 6 years in prison on charges of “assembly and collusion against national security” and “membership in the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).” His mother, Shiva Esmaili, is also a political prisoner held in the women’s ward of Evin Prison; she was arrested in February 2023 and sentenced to 10 years in prison.
Iran’s ‘No To Executions Tuesdays’ Campaign Marks 117th WeekAt the same time, three other political prisoners—Abolfazl Rahbar, Omid Rahbar, and Farshid Dolatiyari—were also transferred from Fashafouyeh Prison (also known as Greater Tehran Penitentiary) to Ghezel Hesar Prison. The charges against these three prisoners have also been described as “membership in the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran.” According to the published report, agents of the Iranian regime’s judiciary shaved the heads of the seven political prisoners before transferring them from Evin, and then moved them while handcuffed, shackled, and blindfolded. The prisoners were also beaten with water hoses prior to the transfer and were injured. The sudden transfer of these prisoners to Unit 3 of Ghezel Hesar, accompanied by beatings, humiliation, and the severing of their contact with their previous environment—has increased concerns about their physical condition and safety. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (an opposition coalition) has also called on the UN Special Rapporteur and an international fact-finding mission to immediately visit the place where these prisoners are being held and to clarify the reasons for their transfer to this prison.
The German Government Will Not Receive the Son of Iran’s Last Shah
Following reports of Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, traveling to Germany to attend a session at the Bundestag (Germany’s federal parliament), the German government announced that it will not receive him and sees no reason to negotiate with him.
Stefan Kornelius, spokesperson for the German government, said that during the Thursday visit of the son of Iran’s last Shah to Berlin, German government representatives will not receive him, and the German government sees no reason to negotiate with him.
He added that the German government expects the people of Iran to have the right to freely choose their own leadership.
Additionally, 21 political figures in Germany addressed a letter to the Bundestag president and the heads of parliamentary factions, expressing serious concern about the visit of the former Shah’s son to Berlin and emphasizing that this trip would be an insult to millions of Iranians who overthrew the Shah’s dictatorship.
More than 24 associations and groups of Iranians residing in Germany across different parts of the country have strongly criticized the planned trip of Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to Berlin this week and warned about its consequences. These groups emphasized that any meeting between members of the German parliament and him could legitimize a figure who, according to them, does not represent the will and demands of the Iranian people and plays a divisive role.
A number of active associations, particularly organizations representing segments of Iran’s ethnic groups, including Kurds, have reiterated these concerns. Among Iranian Kurds in particular, references to historical background and bitter memories of repression during the Pahlavi era have intensified these criticisms.
Press Portal (a media outlet) writes that these groups, representing a diverse spectrum of Iranians living in Germany, believe that Reza Pahlavi’s positions and actions are in conflict with the principles of democracy, human rights, and coexistence among ethnic groups. According to Iranian groups in Germany, Reza Pahlavi’s notoriety stems from the disgraceful past of his father, a dictator who ruled for 37 years through a one-party system based on the notorious SAVAK intelligence organization, as well as through the killing and torture of political opponents and intellectuals.
Reza Pahlavi has not distanced himself from his father’s documented crimes. Just last week in Sweden, he described his father’s bloody record as a source of pride.
These groups also criticized Reza Pahlavi’s positions regarding developments in Iran, stating that his calls for foreign military action against Iran are unacceptable to them. According to them, some of his close associates have also expressed similar views regarding the country’s infrastructure.
Sania Kohansal, spokesperson for the Voices of Youth Association, also stated: “Reza Pahlavi does not have a clear mandate from Iranian society. His statements about connections with certain elements within Iran’s power structure, as well as positions that have increased divisions among opposition groups, are concerning. As part of the younger generation of Iranians living in Germany, we see no reason for Bundestag representatives to meet with him.”
According to this report, Reza Pahlavi’s recent trips to European countries, including Sweden and Italy, have also been met with reactions and criticism from some Iranians abroad as well as certain political and academic circles.
700,000 Jobs Lost in Iran as A Result of War
While the fate of the war in the region remains uncertain, reports from Iran indicate a suffocating livelihood crisis for the population. Alireza Mahjoub, secretary-general of the Workers’ House (a regime-affiliated labor organization) in Iran, announced on Wednesday, April 22, that during the recent war between the Iranian regime and the United States and Israel, more than 700,000 jobs have been lost.
He said in a press conference that 130,000 people became unemployed directly due to the bombing of workplaces, and 600,000 job opportunities were lost indirectly.
He also warned that the consequences of unemployment caused by the post-war economic crisis will be far greater than these figures.
Iran’s War-Stricken Economy and Structural DeadlockDuring the recent war, some of the country’s largest steel and petrochemical production facilities suffered serious damage due to airstrikes, and their production lines were halted. Other commercial and industrial units were also damaged. Mohammad Hadi Asgari, deputy for cultural and social affairs at the Ministry of Labor of the Iranian regime, also said at the Wednesday press conference that the ministry is identifying and following up on the problems of the affected units and promised that the government would provide support packages for their reconstruction, but did not provide further details. These figures are confirmed by the authorities, and the real numbers of unemployment and lost jobs are far higher. In one instance alone, thousands of jobs were affected due to nearly two months of internet shutdown.
Iran: How Pahlavi’s Name Stole the January 2026 Uprising
In the biting cold of mid-January 2026, the air in Tehran’s Vali-e-Asr Square was thick with the scent of burning tires and the metallic tang of tear gas. Thousands of young Iranians, born decades after the 1979 Revolution, stood shoulder-to-shoulder, their chants for “Freedom” and “Bread” echoing off the concrete facades of a city that seemed finally on the brink of a systemic collapse. Then, almost as if on cue, a small but loud contingent began a rhythmic chant for the return of the monarchy, invoking the name of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Shah.
It was a jarring shift in tone that left the frontline protesters momentarily confused. This scene raises a fundamental question that has haunted the aftermath of the winter protests: Was the sudden prominence of monarchist slogans a genuine expression of a nation’s nostalgia, or was it a sophisticated diversionary tactic engineered by the state to paralyze the revolution?
The Pahlavi Restoration: A Legacy of Torture and RevisionismThe January 2026 uprising began as a decentralized, grassroots explosion of rage against decades of economic mismanagement and social repression. Unlike previous movements, this one appeared to have bridged the gap between the urban middle class and the rural poor. The mullahs’ regime faced an existential threat that was neither ideological nor factional, but total. In this atmosphere of genuine revolutionary potential, the sudden injection of Reza Pahlavi’s name into the narrative served as a lifeline for a drowning regime. By shifting the conversation from a democratic future to a monarchical past, the focus of the uprising was successfully blurred. For the clerical establishment, the promotion of the Pahlavi brand was a masterstroke of psychological warfare. The regime has long understood that a decentralized, multi-ethnic, and democratic movement is far more difficult to defeat than one centered around a single, divisive figure, with no popular base and organization. By allowing—and in some cases, covertly encouraging—the propagation of monarchist sentiment, the security apparatus created a “bogeyman” that served two purposes. First, it alienated the country’s ethnic minorities and the republican-minded youth who viewed a return to hereditary rule as a step backward. Second, it provided the state with a familiar enemy to rail against, allowing them to frame the protests not as a domestic cry for justice, but as a foreign-backed plot to restore an old autocracy. This strategy was not executed in a vacuum. It relied heavily on the cooperation, whether intentional or incidental, of Persian-language satellite television channels operating from abroad. For years, these networks have provided a disproportionate amount of airtime to the Pahlavi family, often presenting a sanitized and nostalgic version of the pre-1979 era.
During the 2026 uprising, these broadcasts became an echo chamber. They focused their cameras on the few who shouted for the Shah, ignoring the vast majority who were demanding a modern, democratic republic. The regime in Tehran did not merely tolerate this coverage; it weaponized it. By letting these broadcasts reach Iranian living rooms, the state ensured that the most divisive possible alternative to their rule remained at the forefront of the public’s imagination. The deception extended far beyond Iran’s borders, successfully clouding the judgment of Western policymakers and international media. For a Washington or Brussels looking for a simple narrative, the “return of the Prince” was an easy story to sell. It suggested a ready-made successor and a clear, albeit flawed, alternative to the mullahs. Western intelligence agencies and diplomatic circles were led to believe that the Iranian street was clamoring for a restoration. This belief had a paralyzing effect on international support for the uprising. Instead of backing the diverse, decentralized councils and labor unions that were the true engines of the protest, Western capitals waited for a “leader” who had no real presence on the ground, effectively stalling any meaningful intervention or support for the democratic movement. The question of who benefited most from this narrative is easily answered by looking at who survived the winter. While Reza Pahlavi enjoyed a surge in media mentions and international invitations, his actual political capital inside Iran remained largely symbolic and deeply contested. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic used the resulting internal friction among the opposition to catch its breath. The movement, once a unified front against tyranny, fractured into debates over the merits of monarchy versus republic, and centralized rule versus ethnic autonomy. The regime’s survival strategy has always been “divide and rule,” and in 2026, they found their most effective wedge in the despots they replaced. The tragedy of the January 2026 uprising lies in the gap between the courage of the people on the streets and the narrative that was imposed upon them. The young men and women facing down security forces were not fighting to replace one form of authoritarianism with another; they were fighting for the right to choose their own destiny. By allowing the movement to be branded with the seal of the Pahlavi crown, the international community and parts of the diaspora played right into the hands of the Revolutionary Guard. In the end, the promotion of Reza Pahlavi served as a brilliant, if cynical, insurance policy for the status quo. It allowed the regime to tell its supporters that the only alternative to the current system was a return to the past, while telling the West that the revolution was a chaotic mess of competing nostalgias. As the smoke cleared from Vali-e-Asr Square, the clerical elite remained in power, not because they were loved, but because they had successfully convinced the world that the only alternative was a ghost. The lesson of 2026 is clear: a revolution that looks backward is a revolution that has already been defeated by those who control the present. For Iran to move forward, it must first exorcise the shadows that the regime so carefully cultivates to keep the country in the dark.How the Regime Used Pahlavi as Cover to Divert the 2026 Uprising #IranProtests #IranRevolution #FreeIran2026 #No2ShahNo2Mullahs https://t.co/y1SuWbM2lH via @irannewsupdate1
— Iran News Update (@IranNewsUpdate1) April 23, 2026
Escalating Executions in Iran Put EU Policy Under Scrutiny
A conference held at the European Parliament in Brussels on April 22, 2026, brought renewed attention to the escalating use of executions in Iran and the European Union’s response to the crisis. Titled “Iran: Take Action to Stop Executions — Where Does the EU Stand?”, the event gathered a cross-party group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), political figures, and international representatives to address what participants described as a critical moment in Iran’s internal and external trajectory.
The meeting unfolded against the backdrop of a reported increase in executions in Iran, particularly targeting political prisoners. Speakers repeatedly referenced recent cases, including the execution of individuals identified as members of the opposition, as well as broader figures indicating a surge in capital punishment over the past month.
Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), delivered the keynote address. She framed the current situation as a decisive confrontation between Iranian society and the ruling system. According to her remarks, the authorities in Tehran view internal dissent and organized opposition as a greater threat than external conflict. She pointed to ongoing resistance activities inside Iran, including a reported attack on a key leadership site earlier in the year, as evidence of intensifying domestic tensions. Mrs. Rajavi also referred to recent executions as part of a broader pattern of repression, describing them as measures aimed at maintaining control amid growing unrest. Her speech included calls for a shift in European policy, including recognition of a provisional political framework announced by opposition groups and the closure of Iranian diplomatic missions in Europe. Opening the conference, Spanish MEP Javier Zarzalejos emphasized that support for democratic principles in Iran has been a longstanding position within the European Parliament. He described the recent wave of executions as part of a systematic pattern, suggesting that the scale and timing of these actions reflected a broader strategy by Iranian authorities. He stated that such developments raise questions about the adequacy of the EU’s current stance. Lithuanian MEP Petras Auštrevičius, who chaired the session, connected the situation in Iran to European security concerns. He noted that developments in Iran, including military capabilities and regional activities, have implications beyond its borders. He also cited figures indicating that multiple political prisoners had been executed in recent weeks, presenting this as an indicator of the regime’s internal dynamics. Several speakers addressed the EU’s policy approach directly. Portuguese MEP Francisco Assis referred to what he described as a “moral crisis” in European political responses, suggesting that existing engagement strategies have not adequately addressed human rights concerns. He called for any future agreements with Iran to be conditioned on measurable improvements in human rights, including a halt to executions. Other participants reflected on the historical context of EU-Iran relations. Spanish MEP Antonio López-Istúriz White pointed to decades of engagement with successive Iranian administrations, arguing that expectations of reform had not materialized. He noted that different political factions within Iran had been approached as potential partners, but the overall trajectory of repression had persisted. Italian MEP Leoluca Orlando focused on the broader ideological framework of the Iranian regime, particularly the relationship between religion and state. He suggested that this structure has contributed to both political and social constraints, including limitations on civil liberties and political participation. Italian MEP Carlo Ciccioli provided a historical perspective on repression in Iran, referencing estimates of casualties from past crackdowns on protests. While acknowledging that exact figures remain contested, he cited accounts suggesting large-scale violence against demonstrators over time. He described the current situation as part of a longer pattern rather than an isolated development. The issue of alternative political futures for Iran was also discussed. Multiple speakers referred to the NCRI’s Ten-Point Plan, which outlines proposals for governance based on democratic elections, separation of religion and state, gender equality, and a non-nuclear policy. Supporters at the conference described this framework as a structured alternative to the current system. At the same time, some participants addressed competing narratives about Iran’s political future. References were made to discussions within European institutions involving figures associated with Iran’s former monarchy. Critics at the conference argued that such engagements risk overlooking the perspectives of groups currently active within Iran. Former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt delivered one of the more direct critiques of EU policy, describing it as ineffective in addressing both regional conflicts and internal repression in Iran. He pointed to what he characterized as a gap between stated European values and practical policy measures, particularly in relation to executions. Other speakers highlighted the human dimension of the issue. Anna Strolenberg, a representative from the Netherlands, shared accounts of Iranian women affected by recent events, including those who had lost family members. Her remarks focused on personal experiences and the persistence of activism despite losses. Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Germany’s former Federal Minister of Justice, drew parallels with historical experiences, recalling opposition to the previous monarchy and warning against revisiting earlier political models. She emphasized the importance of pluralism and legal frameworks in any future system. Throughout the conference, calls for specific actions were repeated. These included proposals to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, reassess diplomatic relations, and place greater emphasis on human rights conditions in policymaking. While no formal policy decisions were announced during the event, the range of perspectives presented reflected an ongoing debate within European institutions about how to respond to developments in Iran. The discussion highlighted both the urgency of the issue and the diversity of views on the appropriate course of action.Iran: Take Action to Stop Executions Where Does the EU Stand?https://t.co/TAwhiUNVGL
— Iran Focus (@Iran_Focus) April 22, 2026
U.S. Sanctions Tehran’s Drone and Missile Networks
As part of its ongoing maximum pressure policy, the United States imposed new sanctions targeting supply networks linked to the Iranian regime’s drone and missile programs; a move that U.S. officials say is intended to disrupt the regime’s weapons activities.Under this decision, eight individuals and four entities involved in managing support networks for the Iranian regime’s drone and ballistic missile programs have been sanctioned. Additionally, two aircraft linked to Mahan Air—a regime airline previously accused by Western governments of supporting military logistics—have been designated as blocked assets; according to officials, these aircraft had been used in the past by agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to transport weapons, equipment, and money.
Iranian Regime Missile Stockpiles Are Running OutTommy Pigott, Deputy Spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, said in a statement that ” These designations support Operation Epic Fury and President Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 directive to counter Iran’s weapons programs. Today’s action also supports the implementation of United Nations sanctions and restrictive measures on Iran, which were reimposed as a direct result of Iran’s ‘significant non-performance’ of its nuclear commitments.” Another part of the statement said that “The United States will continue to use all available means to expose, disrupt, and counter Iran’s threatening activities to protect America’s interests.” These sanctions have been imposed under executive orders related to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorist groups. Previously, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, referring to the policy of economic pressure, said that the Treasury Department would strongly target regime figures such as the Shamkhani family—referring to Ali Shamkhani, a former senior advisor to Iran’s regime leadership—who are accused of amassing wealth at the expense of the Iranian people.
How Do the Children of Iranian Regime Officials Manage Smuggled Wealth?
Sky News published a report on April 19 about the children of Iran’s ruling elites, who are known as “Aghazadehs” and, as people call them, “parasite-born.”
The decision by the government of Dominica to revoke the citizenship of one of the children of Iranian regime officials, Abolfazl Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a senior official and former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, has revealed a new dimension of financial influence networks through which the children of Iran’s ruling elites are believed to manage vast sums of money abroad; this comes amid growing accusations that they serve as fronts for managing wealth linked to the Iranian regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
U.S. Treasury Sanctions Shamkhani Oil Network
