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The Broken Chain of Healthcare in Iran’s Most Deprived Province

In recent days, the death of a teenager once again exposed healthcare deficiencies in Sistan and Baluchestan in southeastern Iran; shortages of hospital beds, doctors, ambulances, medicine, and blood in underserved areas sometimes delay treatment and at times cost patients their lives. On August 17, 13-year-old Melika Hemmatzadeh, from the village of Dasak, was taken to Nikshahr’s 22 Bahman Hospital after being stung by a scorpion; however, along the way, a doctor, ambulance, platelets, and ultimately an ICU bed were unavailable. According to Melika’s father, the village health center was closed because there was no doctor, the city of Bent had no ambulance, and the platelets she needed were available neither at Nikshahr Hospital nor in Chabahar. Melika suffered a seizure at 10 p.m. and subsequently died. Saeed Baluchi, head of the Nikshahr Health and Medical Services Network, attributed the death to “a delay of several hours in seeking medical care,” but at the same time confirmed that a pediatrician had determined that Melika urgently needed intensive care and that she was not transferred to the ICU because there was no available bed; efforts to transfer her to a better-equipped facility also proved unsuccessful. This account offers no response to the family’s claim that they waited for hours to obtain the platelets she needed. Meanwhile, according to Baluchi, since March 22, 2026, 2,771 cases of scorpion stings and five resulting deaths have been recorded in the Bent district, the Kuchink and Abgah areas, and other rural regions; figures that underscore the importance of rapid access to medical care.
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1,600 Missing Beds; Absent Doctors and Nurses

In southern Sistan and Baluchestan, there are only about 350 active beds for the population covered by six counties, while a shortage of more than 1,600 beds has been reported. At the same time, the province has been reported to have 6.5 doctors per 10,000 people, while the shortage of nurses has also been described as critical; in many counties, even specialties such as obstetrics and gynecology, pediatric surgery, and anesthesiology are unavailable. These shortages exist amid a situation in which the province has at least about 3,500 thalassemia patients, each of whom typically needs two units of blood per month. Sistan and Baluchestan has faced blood shortages for years, and given the high number of thalassemia patients, declining blood supplies directly harm these patients. Sometimes a patient goes to the hospital for a transfusion, but no blood is available and they have to return home; at other times, a patient who needs two units of blood receives only one and must wait to receive the remainder.

80 Million Rials for Monthly Medication

For patients, however, the crisis does not end there. Medication shortages are also part of the same chain. Desferal, a medication used for iron chelation that has now returned to the market after months, is currently available only at a price of 80 million rials. This affects patients who cannot even afford the cost of traveling from their villages to cities, and even if they somehow manage to purchase it at this price, while a patient needs about 120 doses per month for iron chelation, at this price they can obtain only 80 doses. The high cost of medications such as supplements, calcium, heart medications, and drugs for osteoporosis has also left some patients unable to continue taking them. This province has faced years of accumulated and multilayered deprivation in healthcare; shortages of hospital beds, specialist doctors, nurses, diagnostic and medical equipment, ambulances, medicines, and blood products, alongside a weak referral system.
Iran’s Healthcare Services in Crisis with Shortage of 100,000 Nurses
In southern parts of the province, healthcare officials reported in November 2025 a shortage of more than 1,600 medical beds compared with about 350 active beds, highlighting the gap between existing healthcare capacity and the region’s population and geographic size. A significant proportion of patients from rural and border areas are forced to travel to larger cities to receive specialized care; under such circumstances, referring a patient is not necessarily a routine step in the treatment process, and the treatment journey itself becomes an obstacle.

There Is a Hospital Building, but No Services

The problem is not whether a county has a hospital or not; “The issue is how many beds that hospital has, how many specialist doctors work there, what diagnostic equipment it has, and whether it has an operating room, ICU, and emergency services commensurate with the needs of the population of that area.”

The War Descends on Dilapidated Infrastructure

Sistan and Baluchestan’s healthcare system was already facing serious shortages before the war, and the recent war cannot be considered the starting point of these problems, but this crisis placed new pressure on the same dilapidated and inefficient infrastructure. During the war, the Chabahar emergency medical base was reported among the damaged medical facilities, while disruptions to transportation, patient transfers, and the supply of medicine and blood placed additional pressure on the province’s healthcare system. Accounts regarding Chabahar’s Imam Ali Hospital were also contradictory. The state-run IRNA and ISNA news agencies denied that it had been damaged, but Fars reported that it had been hit by shrapnel and sustained “minor damage.” A few days later, IRNA reported that 40 billion tomans had been allocated for the hospital’s reconstruction, while the same report continued to identify the shortage of beds as one of the main problems in the south of the province. No regular and transparent statistics are published on patients who have died because of delays in diagnosis or transfer, or the absence of specialized facilities, and documented cases are mostly limited to cases that media outlets or human rights organizations have been able to access. Human rights reports have also documented the consequences of these delays, including the death of a 20-year-old woman in Nikshahr who, after being stung by a scorpion, was transferred to the hospital with a delay of about 24 hours and died after five days of hospitalization, as well as a patient in Chabahar who, after spending six days in the ICU without a definitive diagnosis, was transferred to Kerman and died after the infection spread.

A Patient Without an Identity Card Is a Patient Without Access

People without birth certificates and identity documents face more serious barriers to accessing public and healthcare services. When a patient encounters an identity-related barrier to accessing treatment, the lack of documentation can become part of the breakdown in the chain of healthcare deprivation. However, the lack of transparent statistics in this area also makes it difficult to assess the true extent of this deprivation. A province may show increases in medical equipment and healthcare services in official statistics, but these figures do not necessarily explain the experience of a patient in a remote village who urgently needs medical care.

Sharp Decline in the Value of the Iranian Rial Against the U.S. Dollar

The decline in the value of the rial in Iran has entered a new phase amid intensified U.S. financial and sanctions pressure on the Iranian regime. As Washington has expanded measures to restrict the regime’s access to the international financial system, the price of the dollar in Iran’s market surpassed 2.08 million rials on Sunday, August 30, setting a new record. According to the state-run Donya-e Eqtesad newspaper, the U.S. dollar was trading at around 2.061 million rials on Sunday morning. This surge came as the regime’s Central Bank claims to have made large amounts of dollars available through the banking network, and had announced that supply in the first phase was 25 times demand—an assertion that the actual trend in the foreign exchange market has effectively rendered meaningless.
The Iranian regime’s policies have caused structural hyperinflation
Abdolnaser Hemmati, the head of the regime’s Central Bank, has attributed the rise in the exchange rate to “U.S. posturing and propaganda.” At the same time, however, external pressure on the Iranian regime’s financial network has taken on new dimensions. The Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates has announced that it will conduct an immediate and special inspection of the branches of “Banque Misr” in the country. The move came after the U.S. Treasury Department accused the bank of conducting Iran-related transactions and warned that its access to the U.S. financial system could be cut off.

Economic Exclusion: The Largest Economic Assault on the Iranian Regime

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on Friday, August 28, that supporters of the Iranian regime cannot continue to use the dollar and the global financial system. He accused “Banque Misr” of continuing to support the Iranian regime and warned that individuals involved in money laundering for the regime would also be denied access to the U.S. financial system. At the same time, U.S. officials have referred to the intensification of economic pressure on the Iranian regime as “economic exclusion.” Bessent has described these measures as the final stage of economic warfare and one of the most extensive financial assaults by the United States against an adversary country. U.S. President Donald Trump, referring to Iran’s economic situation, has also said that the regime is in an extremely difficult position and does not even have the ability to pay the salaries of its military personnel. He emphasized that economic pressure does not mean ruling out the military option. The dollar’s rise to more than 2.06 million rials, alongside the regime’s increasingly restricted banking and financial channels, is another sign of the deepening economic crisis—a crisis whose costs are borne first and foremost by the people of Iran and which further darkens the regime’s economic outlook.

The IRGC Fears Protests and Uprisings by Iranian People

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization issued a statement warning about the possibility of a new wave of protests in Iran. The warning comes as economic and livelihood pressures on the people have increased, while problems such as rising prices, declining purchasing power, the rising price of the dollar, and gasoline shortages have intensified social discontent. In a statement issued on the afternoon of Thursday, August 27, the IRGC Intelligence Organization accused the United States and Israel of designing a plan “to exert pressure from within” against the Iranian regime, claiming that the plan is being pursued following the “failure of efforts to change Iran’s government through military attacks.” The security organization also wrote: “Opponents of the Islamic Republic are changing their strategy.” However, what stands out most in the statement is its indirect acknowledgment of the existence of domestic conditions for protests. The IRGC Intelligence Organization cited “activating crisis-generating centers, psychological warfare, turmoil in monetary and financial markets, and anti-security operations” as options that the “enemy” could use to “manage the Iran file,” while a significant part of the existing crises stems, above all, from the Iranian regime’s domestic policies and performance.
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Concern over the formation of centers of crisis

The security organization also identified “exaggerating and exploiting certain domestic weaknesses, shortages, and limitations in running the country” and “inciting the people to spread their discontent to the streets” as key elements of the plans it attributed to the “enemy.” The rising cost of living, declining purchasing power, problems with fuel supplies, and mounting economic pressure are among the difficulties people face in their daily lives. Under such circumstances, social discontent is, before requiring any foreign incitement, a direct result of the accumulation of problems and the Iranian regime’s inability to meet society’s basic livelihood needs. The IRGC Intelligence Organization also announced its readiness to deal with potential protests, writing that it has put “a focus on guidance and confronting any action that disrupts peace, solidarity, and national cohesion in the country” on its agenda. In practice, this part of the statement shows that the Iranian regime’s security apparatus is primarily concerned about the emergence of domestic protests and the transformation of scattered discontent into street protests. In recent days, alongside the rising price of the dollar and gasoline shortages, warnings from regime officials and state-run media about the possibility of a new wave of protests have increased. The repeated warnings indicate that the Iranian regime’s security apparatuses are concerned about the high level of discontent in society and the possibility of protests and popular uprisings emerging again. It should be recalled that the crisis that has frightened the IRGC more than anything else is the transformation of livelihood grievances and labor and professional demands into political demands. The regime has experienced this in previous uprisings and does not want it to happen again.

Widespread security arrests by the Iranian regime in various cities

The Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence announced the arrest of 30 citizens in the counties of Mahallat and Nimvar. The security agency accused those arrested of leading the January protests and having links to networks outside the country. State-run media described these actions as part of the regime’s security operations to counter popular protests. This wave of arrests was carried out as part of efforts to create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation in Markazi Province. Having failed to contain the people’s economic and livelihood crises, the Iranian regime has once again resorted to its repeated tactic of making security-related accusations and portraying protesters as agents of foreign powers. Widespread arrests and the creation of a police-state atmosphere have never succeeded in extinguishing the flames of protests and the legitimate demands of the oppressed masses.

The Iranian regime’s policies have caused structural hyperinflation

The Statistical Center of Iran reported a 128.6% increase in the prices of food items in August compared with the previous year. Cooking oil recorded the largest increase, with prices rising by 258%. The prices of protein products, dairy products, energy carriers, and transportation services also rose by more than 100%. This upward trend indicates a deepening livelihood crisis and the Iranian regime’s inability to contain inflation. In its latest report, the Statistical Center of Iran put the year-on-year inflation rate for August at 89%. According to the report, the consumer price index for households across the country rose by 3.4% compared with the previous month, reaching 700.1. The 12-month inflation rate through the Persian month of Mordad (July-August) stood at 69.9%, indicating the continuation of the country’s economic crisis. These official figures point to a severe erosion of people’s purchasing power and the shrinking of household budgets.

The plundering of insurance funds has brought Iran’s healthcare and medical system to the brink of collapse

More than 4,300 pharmacies operating in Tehran are on the verge of closure due to unpaid insurance claims. Bahman Sabour, a member of the Tehran Pharmacists Association, announced that the insurance organizations’ debts to these pharmacies have exceeded 200 trillion rials (approximately $100 million). Payment delays of six to nine months, coupled with severe inflation, have deprived pharmacies of the ability to purchase medicines in cash and have seriously endangered patients’ lives.
Iranian Patients Face Soaring Medication Costs as Drug Prices Soar by 300%

Iran: Long Fuel Lines Form in Wake of 17-Million-Liter Daily Gasoline Shortages

Mohammad-Jafar Ghaem-Panah, executive deputy to the president of Iran’s regime, admitted that the regime is unable to import gasoline due to the U.S. naval blockade. Currently, daily gasoline consumption in the country stands at 132 million liters, while daily production reaches only 115 million liters. This 17-million-liter shortfall has led to the closure of some gas stations and the formation of long lines in Tehran. At the same time, regime officials have warned of the security consequences of higher fuel prices and the possibility of new protests.
Iran’s Fuel Shortage Crisis and Its Consequences
Meanwhile, on Friday evening, August 28, Iranian regime President Masoud Pezeshkian announced the regime’s decision to increase the price of the third-tier gasoline quota from 50,000 to 100,000 rials, a move that, if implemented, would double the price of this quota. The timing for implementing the plan has not yet been announced. He did not provide details on when the price increase would take effect, saying that the necessary public notification and coordination must take place before implementation. The announcement comes as reports in recent days have indicated that some fuel stations in Tehran have been closed and long lines have formed outside gas stations. Pezeshkian attributed the price increase and fuel supply problems to what he described as “wartime conditions,” restrictions on gasoline imports, and declining revenues of the Iranian regime. He said that in addition to reduced domestic production, securing imported gasoline also requires financial resources.

Iran’s Oil Exports: The Strait of Hormuz No Longer Tehran’s Leverage

Iranian regime officials have repeatedly sought to suggest that the fate of global energy flows lies in Tehran’s hands. But oil market data and tanker tracking paint a different picture. Fresh data from Kpler shows that tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains very low. On Tuesday, August 25, only five cargo vessels passed through the waterway. The 10-day average has been 15 vessels. At the same time, major regional producers have found other ways to get their oil to market. Ship-to-ship transfers outside the Strait of Hormuz are among the most important alternatives. This development raises an important question about the claim that the global energy route is “locked.”
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Iran’s Oil Exports Under Multiple Pressures

Iran’s main problem is not simply the failure of tankers to pass through Hormuz. Sanctions, maritime restrictions, rising shipping and insurance costs, and difficulties accessing customers have all placed simultaneous pressure on Iran’s oil exports. Reuters reported on August 21 that the supply of new Iranian cargoes to Chinese buyers had declined significantly. Iran’s exports to China in August were estimated at around 534,000 barrels per day. In 2025, the figure averaged around 1.4 million barrels per day. The same report shows that a large volume of Iranian oil remains in floating storage. Iran’s oil held at sea has declined from around 105 million barrels to nearly 80 million barrels. About 30 million barrels of this oil are located in Asian waters. A decline in floating storage does not necessarily mean that exports are booming. Some of the existing oil may already have been committed to customers. At the same time, Iran’s supply of new cargoes has faced greater restrictions.

Breaking the Strait of Hormuz Monopoly

Saudi Arabia is now delivering some of its cargoes through ship-to-ship transfers near Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates and off the coast of Oman. Reuters said in its latest report that Saudi Aramco has used this method to sell its September cargoes. Two giant tankers have also headed to China after receiving Saudi cargoes in ship-to-ship transfers near Oman. The cargoes contain a total of around four million barrels of oil. China has also changed its transportation routes to reduce risk. Since late July, the country’s state-owned shipping companies have stopped using some high-risk routes through Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Instead, they have increased oil-transfer operations near Fujairah and Omani ports. Kpler data shows that the volume of ship-to-ship transfers involving Chinese and Hong Kong tankers in the Gulf of Oman exceeded 600,000 barrels per day in June and July. This figure was much lower in the first months of the year. Qatar has also moved in the same direction. QatarEnergy held its first tender for exporting crude oil through ship-to-ship transfers outside the Strait of Hormuz. These developments show that the energy market has not waited for a single route to reopen. Companies and governments have activated alternative routes. The oil market has managed part of the risk through rerouting, ship-to-ship transfers, and shifting loading points. This does not mean that conditions have returned to normal. Traffic through Hormuz remains far below normal levels. Based on Kpler data, Reuters reported an approximately 90% decline in traffic compared with the pre-crisis baseline in the week ending August 21. Therefore, the main issue is not whether Hormuz is absolutely open or closed. The more important issue is the market’s ability to adapt to the disruption. Iran’s regime has for years portrayed the Strait of Hormuz as a geopolitical trump card. But oil data itself now shows that other producers have developed new ways to reduce their dependence on the waterway. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. No data negates its strategic importance. But Hormuz’s geopolitical significance is different from claiming to possess the “absolute key” to the global energy economy. Meanwhile, Iran’s oil exports are facing a dual problem. Tehran is dealing with both sanctions’ restrictions and difficulties in transportation and sales. As a result, the same strait that the regime has long portrayed as an instrument of power is now witnessing a new competition to circumvent restrictions. The reality of the oil market is far removed from the regime’s propaganda. Hormuz remains important, but it can no longer be regarded as an exclusive key to controlling energy trade. Regional competitors have built alternative routes, and customers have adapted to the new conditions. In contrast, Iran’s oil exports are facing reduced supply, higher costs, and a shrinking customer base. Therefore, what remains for Iran’s regime is less an absolute economic lever than a propaganda tool for domestic consumption. The market, however, responds with tankers, contracts, and numbers—not propaganda.

Financial Corruption Network Operating in Shadow of Iran Sanctions Exposed

The “trustee companies” case is now more than just a judicial case. It has become one of the most important signs of the Iranian regime’s opaque economy. Judicial officials have announced that 59 cases have been opened against managers of trustee companies. In 43 cases, orders to proceed with prosecution have been issued. In addition, 22 defendants have been referred to prison, and Red Notices have been issued by Interpol for 15 people. The head of Iran’s General Inspection Organization said that around $11 billion in resources had been placed at the disposal of trustee companies. The state-run IRNA news agency writes: “Trustee companies are considered an emergency mechanism in Iran’s economy that was created because of sanctions.”

What Are Trustee Companies?

Trustee companies emerged amid the intensification of international sanctions. Restrictions on oil sales and the closure of conventional banking channels pushed the regime to use intermediaries. These intermediaries sold oil or export products. The task of transferring the money was then assigned to networks outside the formal banking system.
Financial Corruption Network Operating in Shadow of Iran Sanctions Exposed
This mechanism could be used to keep exports going under sanctions. When the identities of the buyer and intermediary, the bank account, and the route for transferring money remain hidden, the possibility of public auditing also disappears—quite apart from the fact that such economic oversight essentially does not exist within Iran’s governing structure.

Failure to Return Billions of Dollars in Foreign Currency

In recent weeks, different figures have been cited regarding foreign currency that has not been returned. One is the approximately $11 billion in resources held by trustee companies. Another figure of approximately $1.6 billion has been cited in connection with funds that were misappropriated. These two figures should not be considered the same. An official from the General Inspection Organization has explicitly said that not all of the $11 billion constitutes wrongdoing. A figure of €94 billion in unresolved foreign-exchange obligations has also been cited. However, this figure concerns the total foreign-exchange obligations of 20,676 individuals and legal entities. No transparency has been provided regarding the €94 billion. At the same time, the existence of dozens of judicial cases and billions of dollars in resources under the control of corrupt networks raises serious questions about the oversight system.

Who Chose the Intermediaries for Corruption and Rent-Seeking?

Perhaps the most important economic question in the case is not about the trustee companies themselves. The more important question is who selected them. An intermediary needs managerial decisions and authorizations to gain access to hundreds of millions of dollars in oil resources. Therefore, investigating the case cannot be completed simply by arresting the intermediaries. It must be determined who signed the contracts. This question becomes even more significant. A published report, quoting the former CEO of NIOC’s international trading arm NICO, says that in one case involving $200 million worth of oil, only $1 million in guarantees had been obtained. Such a situation could indicate serious weaknesses in oversight and behind-the-scenes involvement by power structures, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Why Does Transparency in the Trustee Companies Case Matter?

The trustee companies case also shows that sanctions have not merely imposed an external cost on Iran’s economy. The opaque mechanisms arising from sanctions have also created the conditions for intermediary networks to emerge. The larger these networks become, the greater the gap between the country’s actual revenues and its auditable resources. The fundamental question remains: What structure entrusted billions of dollars in oil revenues to a network of opaque intermediaries? From an economic perspective, corruption becomes entrenched when only the recipient of the money is visible while the decision-maker behind the scenes remains hidden. People should know how much of the country’s resources has been placed at whose disposal and how much of it has not been returned. Undoubtedly, amid the fog created by state-run media and influential figures within the power structure, efforts are being made to keep the main actor—the IRGC—in the shadows and conceal the organization’s involvement.

Livelihoods Continue to Collapse in Iran While Regime Supporters Profit from Sanctions

As the United States implements its policy of “economic exclusion,” supporters of the Iranian regime speak of resilience. But in the view of many citizens, ordinary people are paying the main price for this isolation through empty tables, businesses on the verge of collapse, and deteriorating livelihoods. Meanwhile, there is a deep gap between the official narrative and what is unfolding in society. While some government supporters on social media view these sanctions as a “resilience test” for the people of Iran, who have supposedly grown accustomed to them over the decades, the reality of citizens’ daily lives is miles away from these slogans.

The Death of Price Tags in Supermarkets

A middle-aged man who owns a small grocery store in a neighborhood in southern Tehran speaks with despair about the brutal fluctuations in prices. He explains that he stopped putting price tags on his merchandise long ago because the prices printed on the goods lose their validity even before the products reach the customer.
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According to him, instability is no longer limited to the gold and dollar markets; consumer goods and people’s daily necessities are also subject to changes on a daily and even hourly basis. He says bitterly that he can clearly see people’s purchasing power shrinking before his eyes. His regular customers shorten their shopping lists month after month, while the store’s credit ledger continues to grow.

Regime Supporters Profit From Sanctions

This crushing pressure is not limited to supermarkets; it has also paralyzed the very heart of commerce. The impact of sanctions on the regime cannot be denied, but it should not be forgotten how a group known as “sanctions profiteers” makes a living by circumventing these restrictions and pockets huge profits. It is precisely these enormous financial interests that cause the small circle of loyalists to the system to become even more closely tied to the regime. With financial dealings with the outside world cut off, the possibility of trade has effectively disappeared, and the limited exports that were previously carried out with great difficulty through unofficial channels have become completely impossible with the imposition of new sanctions. This marks the end of decades of efforts by family-run and small businesses. It is this bitter combination of international isolation, crippling sanctions, and domestic mismanagement that has placed the heaviest burden on ordinary people and established businesses.

Sharp Decline in Childbearing

Perhaps the most tangible, concrete, and at the same time painful face of this runaway inflation can be seen in the expenses faced by families with infants and children. The mother of an infant reveals the growing inability of families to meet their children’s most basic needs. Providing a rough calculation, she estimates the monthly cost of meeting a child’s completely ordinary, everyday needs at about 150 million rials (approximately $75). This is while the minimum monthly wage of a worker with one child and one year of work experience barely reaches $120.
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According to this mother, the price of a very simple and basic plastic toy has reached 2 million rials (approximately $1), let alone educational and intellectual toys, which carry astronomical price tags. But the real crisis becomes apparent when special dietary needs or a child’s illness are involved. She explains that the price of infant formula for babies suffering from gastric reflux, such as the “Aptamil AR” brand, has reached an exorbitant 45 million rials because of severe shortages in the market and illegal, smuggled imports through the borders of the Kurdistan Region or Turkey.

A Return to the Past; Replacing Diapers With Cloth

The inflation crisis in children’s hygiene products has also left families desperate. The price of a package of diapers has risen from 2.5 million rials to 9 million rials since January. This price surge has been so crippling that it has forced many families to return to using training pants and washable cloth diapers; each of these items also costs parents about 10 million rials (approximately $5). This long list also includes visits to subspecialist doctors costing 8 million rials, several-million-rial expenses for vitamin drops, and a 100% increase in the price of domestically produced detergents.

The Plight of the Younger Generation in “Wonderland”

The heavy shadow of sanctions and the freefall in the value of the national currency have also left the future and daily lives of the younger generation in a state of limbo. Despite every effort to save money and quickly convert income into gold or dollars, domestic inflation is accelerating at such a frightening pace that expenses continually outstrip savings. A student who is trying to immigrate to Germany explains that the registration fee alone for the IELTS language test is about $300, but when that amount is converted into tomans, paying it becomes a terrible nightmare for a student. He says that in these turbulent conditions, no one feels comfortable making purchases because waking and sleeping in this country is accompanied by bizarre price fluctuations. A product that was worth 300 million rials the previous day may be sold for 400 or 500 million rials the next morning. Replacing electronic devices such as laptops or smartphones also requires budgets of several hundred million rials, beyond the means of most young people. The intertwined accounts of citizens from different cities across Iran clearly and without any concealment show that, contrary to officials’ official rhetoric about national resistance and resilience, it is the fragile structure of ordinary people’s daily lives and livelihoods that is being crushed under the heavy burden of international sanctions. The combination of severe and crippling economic isolation with inefficient administrative structures has not only further marginalized and weakened the middle class, but has also turned meeting the most essential and basic human needs into a grueling, bitter, and daily struggle for survival.