The Iranian regime’s treacherous policies towards the education system have created a real national crisis.
According to former Minister of Education in Ebrahim Raisi’s government, there are around “9 million absolute illiterates” in Iran. He also mentioned that the number of “children deprived from education” has currently exceeded 160,000, and there is a total of “970,000 children deprived from education” in the country across three educational levels.
The existence of over 9 million absolute illiterates signifies “illiteracy exceeding 10 percent of Iran’s population,” indicating a significantly high illiteracy rate in the country.
In a television program Yousef Norouzi, the former Minister of Education, said, “Regarding the number of illiterate individuals, according to the 2016 census and statistics announced by the Statistical Center of Iran, we have 8,795,000 illiterate people in Iran.”
The former Minister of Education added that this statistic represents the number of illiterates based on self-declaration by individuals aged six and above who are “absolutely illiterate and cannot read or write.” He also stated that his estimate for the absolute illiteracy rate for the current year is around the same figure.
Yousef Norouzi mentioned the difference in educational goals between Iran and other countries and said that currently, “the educational goal in Iran is set from ages 6 to 49, while the world’s educational goal is lifelong education.”
According to Norouzi, the government has not done anything to educate people aged 49 and above, while according to research, “for every 10 percent increase in literacy, two percent is added to the Gross Domestic Product.”
The announcement of the existence of over 9 million absolute illiterates in the country by Yousef Norouzi comes in contrast to his statement in December 2022 as the “Minister of Education” when he said, “According to statistics, there are 1,400,000 illiterate people in the country, and we need to create the foundation for their literacy through a combined approach and the use of information and communication technologies.”
The former Minister of Education also provided two statistics regarding the number of school dropouts. He stated that currently, “the coverage of primary education in the country is 98.6 percent, but 160,373 children have not been enrolled in elementary school” and are considered as school dropouts.
He also declared the total number of individuals who have dropped out of school in Iran as “970,000” and stated that “according to the latest information, there were 970,000 school dropouts in the country, of which approximately 150,000 have been reduced.”
School dropouts refer to the age group of the population that should be in school but are not present in the country’s education cycle or have never entered the education system.
The statistics for dropouts in the primary education level were announced to be around 136,000 according to the 2016 census, which, according to the former Minister of Education, has now reached over 160,000.
The announcement of the existence of “9 million absolute illiterates” in Iran is related to the deliberations of the Parliament’s Joint Commission during the review of the seventh five-year development plan, aiming to “dissolve the current structure of the literacy movement.” According to this decision, the responsibilities of the “Literacy Movement Organization” will be transferred to the “Primary Education Deputy of the Ministry of Education.”
Alireza Abdi, the head of the Literacy Movement Organization, stated on Saturday, “In 1984, we deviated from our path, and that was the government’s intervention in the Literacy Movement.” The recent decision of the Joint Commission of the Seventh Development Plan further reinforces the government’s intervention in the Literacy Movement.
Meanwhile, Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi, a member of the Education, Research, and Technology Commission as well as the Joint Commission of the Seventh Development Plan, who supports the dissolution of the Literacy Movement, stated that “by transferring the Literacy Movement to the Primary Education department, an ‘Adult Education Unit’ will be established within this department.”
Previously, the Research Center of the regime’s Parliament reported in 2019 that the number of “absolute illiterates” in Iran was close to 9 million. However, that same year, the World Bank and UNESCO assessed the number of “absolute illiterates” in Iran to be higher than the statistics provided by the Research Center of the Parliament.
According to World Bank statistics, the literacy rate among the Iranian population was approximately 85.5 percent in 2016, with around 11.6 million literate individuals. According to UNESCO’s statistical report in 2019, about two percent of Iranians under the age of 24 were “absolute illiterates.”
Mohsen Gharaati, a cleric close to previous and current regime’s leaders, represented them in Literacy Movement Organization for years and served as its head until 2010. However, some government officials now acknowledge that after 44 years of operation, the organization has failed and, therefore, they are seeking its dissolution.
In addition to the poverty that the mullahs’ regime has created in four decades of ruling Iran, due to a continuing decrease of educational budgets, there is a lack of educational space and educators, and available educational space isn’t up to safety standards.
It’s noteworthy many believe that Ebrahim Raisi, the regime’s president, attended school for only six grades. His role was to issue death sentences for those who opposed Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In a country where a cleric with a sixth-grade education becomes the president, obviously the government doesn’t value education at all.
In recent times, the Iranian regime has found itself in the global spotlight for reasons that extend beyond its geopolitical engagements. Amidst the political landscape, a darker undercurrent has been steadily gaining attention—the pervasive issue of corruption and its intimate tie to money laundering. This complex web of illicit financial activities has been alleged to fuel not just personal enrichment but also serve as a means to support terrorism on an international scale.
The Iranian regime’s apparent involvement in money laundering schemes has cast a shadow over its financial integrity. Despite international efforts to combat money laundering and curb the funding of terrorism, Iran’s alleged association with these practices raises critical questions about its commitment to global stability. From the manipulation of financial systems to evade sanctions to allegations of illicitly funding extremist groups, the regime’s actions have prompted concerns on a global scale.
On Tuesday, August 21, Zabihollah Khodaian, the head of the General Inspection Organization, expressed his concerns during the inaugural conference titled ‘Combating Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism’. This event, in the presence of the regime’s Minister of Economy, shed light on the challenges the Inspection Organization faces in implementing intelligent supervision, primarily due to resistance from officials and government representatives.
Khodaian highlighted the deteriorating situation of money laundering in Iran. He pointed out that the Inspection Organization, the Audit Bureau, and the Ministry of Intelligence aren’t prohibited from employing intelligent monitoring methods for overseeing the nation’s financial transactions.
Acknowledging substantial evidence of extensive money laundering within the regime, Khodaian, a senior supervisory official, underscored the involvement of entities and individuals in illicit profits through various criminal activities such as human trafficking, embezzlement, and the trade of drugs and weapons.
These groups, as Khodaian observed, exhibit high levels of intelligence, possessing intricate knowledge about the banking and legal systems. He emphasized that even so-called ‘white-collar individuals’ collaborate with these groups, indicating their complexity beyond ordinary citizens.
Khodaian pointed to the real estate market and bank deposits as attractive avenues for money laundering. He highlighted that an opaque and unhealthy economy with underground sectors easily becomes a breeding ground for the proceeds of money laundering.
Iran’s economic conditions, Khodaian asserted, strongly indicate the presence of money laundering, leading to the weakening of the private sector. He attributed the sudden spikes in gold coin, dollar, and housing prices to this situation. Interestingly, experts and insiders of the coin and currency market note that major players in these markets over the years have been the regime’s main economic and financial institutions mostly under the supervision of the regime’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei and the regime’s main economic cartel the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).
In Iran, only economic entities associated with this group can hinder the supervision of the Audit and Organization Court, thereby enabling comprehensive inspection across the country.
The inaugural ‘Combating Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism’ conference coincided with Iran’s notoriety for its support of terrorism, evident in its backing of militant groups in the Middle East, provision of weaponry, financial resources, and organized smuggling of goods and drugs. This support contributes to the regime’s absence from the Palermo Convention and the failure of FATF bills to gain approval from the Expediency Council.
Following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement in Hassan Rouhani’s administration, on June 20, 2018, Ali Khamenei preemptively stressed the parliament’s independent role in legislating against terrorism and money laundering.
Although on October 7, 2018, the parliament approved Iran’s participation in the CFT, only two of four FATF bills—the ‘Amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Law’ and the ‘Amendment of the Anti-Money Laundering Law’—received approval from the Guardian Council. The bills ‘Joining Iran rejected the Palermo Convention’ and ‘Iran’s accession to the CFT’ were deferred to the resolution committee. Majlis members believed that their approval might unveil strategies for evading sanctions.
It should be noted that high-ranking IRGC and Quds Force leaders oppose the bill’s approval, fearing disclosure of their financial structures and potential repercussions on their ability to fund proxy groups and engage in extensive money laundering.
On June 24, 2023, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) retained Iran on its blacklist, urging member nations to subject Iranian entities to enhanced scrutiny in financial, commercial, and banking relations. The FATF attributed this decision to Iran’s endorsement but non-implementation of the Palermo and CFT conventions.
Despite the regime’s need to improve financial transparency to be removed from the FATF blacklist, the fate of these bills appears to be influenced by factors beyond the government entities and the Expediency Council. Unidentified groups have determined the destiny of these bills, turning Iran into a global haven for money laundering, as lamented by Zabihollah Khodaian.
The “Committee for following up the condition of detainees” (FollowupIran) citing an informed source, has published a report on severe torture inflicted upon the detainees of last year’s protests in the city of Karaj, followed by the execution of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyed Mohammad Hosseini. Prior to their execution, the two prisoners were told that they would be pardoned.
FollowupIran released a detailed report on X (formerly Twitter) about the torture and execution of detainees involved in nationwide protests in Iran, related to the case of the Rouhollah Ajamian, a member of the Basij who was killed while engaging in suppressing protesters on the Karaj highway.
According to this report, alongside the confirmation of sentences for eight individuals charged in the Rouhollah Ajamian case by the Supreme Court, FollowupIran has obtained new details about what the detainees in this case have experienced.
While various news and reports had been published in recent months about the torture of the defendants in this case, and the forced confessions extracted from them on social networks, many details regarding what transpired during the interrogations and the night of the execution of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyed Mohammad Hosseini had not been revealed.
A source close to the defendants in this case told FollowupIran, “After the arrest of these individuals, they were subjected to torture to the point of death.” This informed source, speaking about the matter after months, said, “From the moment of their arrest and throughout their transportation and detention, the torture of the defendants in this case has been continuous.”
The source further states that various forms of torture were employed, including punching, kicking, the use of electric shockers, and beating for long periods. One of the methods frequently used was a torture technique known as “fried chicken” (Juje Kabab). In this method, the person is suspended from the ceiling with their hands and feet tied together with chains from behind. After hanging them from the ceiling, several torturers would beat them while using vulgar words to insult them.
Convicted individuals in the Rouhollah Ajamian case
The source, quoting one of the defendants, said, “After the torture, they transferred him to a multi-tenant cell because they thought he couldn’t survive on his own given his condition! After being transferred to that cell, one of the inmates passed out upon seeing his condition. His entire head and face were covered in blood, his body was so swollen from electric shocks that they couldn’t even remove his clothes. His whole body had severe injuries.”
The source, referring to other defendants in this case, said “Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyed Mohammad Hosseini were subjected to more torture than others. For example, while others were kept in the ‘fried chicken’ position for 20 minutes, in the case of Seyed Mohammad Hosseini, it would reach up to 50 minutes because even in the midst of torture, he would not make any noise or cry out for them to bring him down.”
He said, “This situation lasted for more than thirty days, and during this time, they have been artificially executed several times. The prisoners have been told that they would take them and execute them, they took them to the courtyard, blindfolded them. They said they should kneel down, and after a few minutes, they dragged them by their hair or beard on the ground and threw them back into their cells.”
According to the informed source, the defendants were subjected to torture, harassment, and mistreatment even before their first court hearing and before being brought to the court. They were brought to the court without being informed about their trial.
The first court hearing of the defendants in the case of Rouhollah Ajamian was held on November 30, 2022, and in the photos and images available from the day of the trial, the defendants appear very tired and shocked.
The source reports, “That morning, they made all the defendants in this case stand in a line in the courtyard of the detention center on one leg. It was a cold day, and they were only wearing the same clothes we saw in the photos of the first court hearing. Thin and worn-out prison clothes. For two and a half hours, they sat in the freezing morning of the city of Karaj on one leg and were subjected to insults, beatings, and electric shocks with the slightest movement. Then, even the guards sat on their necks and smoked cigarettes, and if they couldn’t withstand standing on one leg, they were beaten again. After two and a half hours, their numb bodies were transferred to the court with beatings and kicks in a black van.”
After the trial, all the defendants are transferred to Karaj Central Prison, and after two weeks, their sentences were communicated to them in prison. According to this source, the behavior of the prison chief and other guards towards the defendants in this case was very violent and accompanied by repeated insults and threats. For example, they frequently told them, “You’re only worthy of sleeping in front of the toilets, you are not human, you are criminals, you are hypocrites.” (By using this word the Iranian regime refers to the members and supporters of the MEK.) They also frequently used vulgar insults against these prisoners.
Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyed Mohammad Hosseini
The source says, “On the day they issued the sentences, they all were sentenced to 25 years in prison, and five were sentenced to death. They were extremely concerned and terrified that these sentences might be carried out, so they made an agreement among themselves that if these heavy sentences were to be executed, they would commit mass suicide. Mohammad-Mehdi Karami had confidently said, ‘I won’t let them execute me, I will kill myself first.'”
“After the issuance of the sentences, they sent a psychologist who forcibly prescribed sedatives for the prisoners and forced the prison authorities to make them take the drugs. Those who protested and refused to take the pills were faced with threats and verbal abuse and were forced to take them in the presence of officers.”
This source describes the day when news broke about the sentences being overturned for most defendants and the confirmation of the death sentences for Mohammad-Mehdi Karami and Seyed Mohammad Hosseini. According to the source, they were in touch with outside the prison while they were in the public prison. In early January, it was announced that the sentences had been overturned, except for Mohammad-Mehdi Karami and Seyed Mohammad Hosseini, whose death sentences were confirmed. They were terrified and concerned.
According to the source, Mohammad-Mehdi Karami had decided to go on a hunger strike, and a prison officer tried to persuade him not to, saying, “If you go on a hunger strike, the charge of disrupting prison order will be added to your case, which has dire consequences.”
The source reports that on the morning of January 6, Abbasi (the prison chief) went to the ward for a “discussion about the prisoners’ issues” and later took Mohammad-Mehdi Karami and Mohammad Hosseini to his office. The source adds, “However, in the middle of the way, they separated them from the group and took them to specific individuals among the death row prisoners.”
According to the source, “Until around 9 pm, there was no news about the prisoners who had gone to talk to the prison chief about their problems. At the same time, others realized that the television was also cut off, and the phones were not working. Then they read out the names of several people through the loudspeaker and took them solitary confinement as well.”
The prisoners who were in solitary confinement that night described the situation as follows: “Around dawn, the sound of prayers was heard in the corridors, and there was a lot of movement. Some reported that they saw someone with a camera in the hallway and heard voices saying, ‘You have been forgiven. Pardoned.’ The prisoners saw through the crack in the cell that Mohammad-Mehdi and Seyed Mohammad were in. But the next morning, when the administrative staff came and took them back to the ward, they realized that the death sentences for Mohammad-Mehdi and Seyed Mohammad had been carried out.”
The brother of one of the prisoners in this case had previously told the media that his brother’s arrest was accompanied by severe beatings, to the extent that one of his ribs was broken, and later, during interrogations, five more of his ribs were also broken, and the lack of proper medical attention resulted in a punctured lung for him.
The Iranian regime’ Statistical Center has announced in its latest report that the income and expense balance of urban and rural households in the past year was “positive” and claimed that the average annual income growth of urban households exceeded the average annual expense growth.
This is despite the fact that the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare of the Iranian regime had previously announced in a report that in 2022, the poverty line for a four-person household was 77 million rials (approximately $154) for the entire country and 71.4 million rials (approximately $143) in Tehran. Whereas in 2021, this figure was 45.41 million rials (approximately $91) for the entire country.
In recent years, statistical inconsistencies and their mismatch with the country’s economic realities have become the subject of criticism by experts and members of the parliament. In this regard, the regime’s ILNA news agency wrote on July 18 that “inflation is 120 percent, the government says it is 40 percent.” The news agency stated that a member of the regime’s parliament questioned the data provided by the government regarding inflation and rising prices.
In response to the statistics and figures presented by the government in the economic field, Gholamreza Nouri Ghazaljeh, a member of the regime’s Majlis (parliament), said, “To put it briefly, when it is said that inflation is controlled or reduced and the government presents some statistics and figures about it, they are all products of the government’s and officials’ minds and are not accurate.”
According to Nouri, the criteria used to determine the official inflation rate have no resemblance to the realities of people’s lives.
On January 3, in response to controversies surrounding the announcement of the poverty line, the regime’s Ham-Mihan newspaper quoted Hamid Haj Esmaeili, a labor market expert, as saying, “We have been experiencing an inflation rate of over 40 percent in the country for nearly three years, and people’s incomes barely make it to the end of the year.”
According to the latest report by the Statistical Center of Iran, the average annual income of urban households in 2022 was estimated at 1669.64 million rials (approximately $3,340), and rural households had an income of 986.38 million rials (approximately $1,973), which shows an increase of 48.5 percent and 54.8 percent, respectively, compared to the previous year. The center also estimated the net expense of urban households in the past year to be 137.146 million rials (approximately $2,743) and stated that this amount had increased by 48.3 percent compared to 2021.
According to the announcement of this center, the net expense of rural households in the past year was estimated to be 788.59 million rials (approximately $1,577), indicating a growth of 51.9 percent compared to 2021.
The ambiguity arising from government statistics lies in the type of items listed in the price index and the method of discovering their prices. Critics argue that in the housing sector, the average price per square meter in Tehran has exceeded 700 million rials (approximately $1,400), while the figures cited in the reports are based on prices below 500 million rials (approximately $1,000).
In another section of the report on income, the statistical center considers “income from rental properties” for households that do not pay it, which, on average, has a 20 percent impact on the reported income increase.
Regarding the reason for ceasing the announcement of inflation statistics, Mohammad Reza Farzin, the governor of the Central Bank, had previously said, “Regarding inflation statistics, since the law requires the Statistical Center to publish it, we no longer publish it, and it is more of a legal decree. Although there are still disputes over the source of its publication, due to its legal nature, we have prevented the publication of the inflation statistics.”
The widespread poverty in Iran, manifested in issues such as inadequate housing, slum dwelling, and homelessness, has reached such dimensions that it is reflected in reports by regime’s government institutions.
One example is a report by the regime’s Majlis Research Center titled “Evaluation of the Seventh Development Plan from the Perspective of Housing Provision for Low-Income and Vulnerable Groups,” which was published on August 14.
The report discusses the “pervasive and multifaceted housing crisis” in Iran and programs such as the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development’s “National Housing Movement” and Tehran Municipality’s “Housing Jihad Headquarters” are mentioned as initiatives that are being pursued.
The main objective of these initiatives is primarily to increase homeownership. However, conducted surveys indicate that even in periods when the rate of homeownership has increased due to construction activities, the proportion of rental occupancy has also risen.
As the number of property owners has increased, the number of tenants has also risen
The research conducted by the Majlis Research Center indicates that, “Although from 2011 to 2016, the equivalent of 3.5 million residential units were added to the total housing stock of the country, instead of reducing the number of renters, during the same period, 2.5 million renter households were added to the population of renters.”
In other words, housing policies have “practically contributed to the increased homeownership of existing homeowners” rather than reducing the number of renters. Furthermore, in recent decades, instead of transitioning from rental occupancy to homeownership, many citizens have faced the “inevitable fate” of remaining renters indefinitely while housing policies have also neglected the situation of renters.
It takes one-and-half centuries for young people to become home owners
The severe state of inflation and wages that don’t increase in accordance with the costs of living have made the dream of becoming homeowners not only more inaccessible but also turned rent affordability into a serious problem for many individuals.
The Research Center had previously concluded in another study that in the five years leading up to 2022, the cost of housing had increased by more than nine times on average, while the average increase in wages was less than seven times.
Two weeks earlier, the regime’s Donya-ye-Eghtesad newspaper estimated that individuals born in the 1990s, under the condition of equal growth in income, housing prices, and a 20 percent savings rate, would have to wait seventy years in the best-case scenario and a century and a half under normal conditions to become homeowners.
Eight Forms of Homelessness: From Graveyard Sleeping to bus sleeping
The research center has highlighted the “abject failure” of housing policies in addressing the citizens’ housing needs and the consequent “fall from the housing ladder” experienced by renters. This situation has led to the emergence of various forms of homelessness as alternatives to renting.
The Research Center identifies eight common examples of homelessness: rooftop sleeping, car sleeping, bus sleeping, graveyard sleeping, makeshift shelters, job-seeking for the sake of shelter, and cohabitation of multiple families in a single dwelling.
Previously, reports on new phenomena such as graveyard sleeping and bus sleeping had been published in Iranian media, which were initially denied by officials. However, the research conducted by the Parliament’s Research Center has confirmed their existence.
The “abject failure” of housing policies spans across different governments, not exclusively limited to the regime’s president Ebrahim Raisi, whose slogan during the election campaign included the construction of one million housing units per year.
The government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had introduced the “Mehr Housing plan” as a purported solution to the housing issue. However, this plan faced significant criticism since its inception and in subsequent administrations.
The government of Hassan Rouhani, whose officials were among the most vocal critics of the Mehr Housing Scheme, claimed to address the issues by implementing “Social Housing” for the lowest-income segments of society. However, these efforts have been accompanied by the expansion of substandard housing, marginalization, and various forms of homelessness.
These days and weeks, the housing crisis in Iran is breaking the back of tenants and sometimes even leading to the breakup of families. The reason is, of course, the gang of corrupt thieves who are ruling the country and are spending the country’s wealth to keep their hold on power.
On August 12, the Deputy Minister of Interior and the Head of the Iranian regime’s Social Affairs Organization announced the prohibition of “reporting on damages” by government entities and departments, stating that these statistics will be announced by this organization.
In an interview with the regime’s ILNA news agency, Mohammad Abbasi stated that the “Atlas of Social Damages” is prepared and ready every year, mentioning, “Contradictory statistics of social damages are mentioned by some officials and deputies.”
The Deputy Minister of Interior of the Iranian regime described the publication of statistics on social damages by various institutions and entities as causing “concern in society” adding, “From now on, none of the entities are allowed to report such statistics, and the Social Organization of the country will be the sole authority for this matter.”
This announcement came at a time when the online newspaper Faraz Daily reported on August 1, citing official statistics, that 30 percent of Iran’s population live below the poverty line, and another 27 percent have conditions very close to poverty, so nearly 60 percent of the country’s population either live in absolute poverty or have basic living conditions.
The regime’s Research Center of the Majlis (Parliament) also announced that over the course of a decade, the poverty rate in Iran has increased from 19 percent to over 30 percent, which, considering the country’s population of 88 million, means that more than 30 million Iranians live below the poverty line.
Hadi Mousavi, the Director-General of Social Welfare Studies at the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare, said on July 11 that 57 percent of Iran’s population suffers from malnutrition.
Furthermore, according to a report by Etemad newspaper posted in June, “The inflationary conditions of the society and the high growth of inflation have resulted in the short, transient, sorrowful, and challenging, rapid and difficult adulthood for individuals born in the 1990s and even 2000s.
According to this report, the damages and abnormalities existing in daily relationships, family, friendship, and employment are among the issues that have increased due to “increased inflation.”
“Inflation has not only weakened, loosened, and faded support and assistance between families, but also led to artificial relationships,” according to Etemad.
These statistics were announced at a time when the minimum monthly wage for covered workers under the labor law, with a spouse and child, is about 80 million rials per month (approximately $160 while the poverty line in Iran is more than $600). However, some reports in the regime’s media indicate that workers who are not covered by labor laws receive much lower wages.
In another part of his interview with ILNA, the Head of the regime’s Social Affairs Organization, also mentioned the “intensification of social damages” in 2015 and 2016 and said that at that time, Ali Khamenei, the regime’s Supreme Leader, had a meeting with the “then President and officials” in this regard; a meeting whose details were not announced, but after that, the trend of publishing some public information in this field decreased significantly.
According to the Jamaran website, Hossein Raghefar, an economist, said on August 2, “The class gap that has emerged in Iran is the most dangerous capacity for psychological, mental, and social damages, and there is no necessary political determination to overcome it.”
Fereydoun Abbasi, a member of the Iranian regime’s parliament, supported the non-disclosure of statistics and economic indicators, stating that the publication “any data” including wheat, essential commodities, river water levels, and dams, can pose “security threats.”
Abbasi, the former head of the Atomic Energy Organization and a member of the regime’s parliament’s Energy Commission, stated on August 21, “Security and commercial data should not be transparent because the enemy can use them and harm the country.”
Abbasi further stated that during times of economic warfare, it is crucial not to disclose the country’s economic information. He emphasized that certain economic data can be even more significant than security data, and if such data were to be revealed, it could pose a threat to food security.
Abbasi emphasized that even statistics related to “wheat as a strategic commodity” should not be published, stating that “if enemies find information, they can hinder wheat imports,” and presenting statistics and “transparency” in the discussion of oil sales is also a mistake.
Fereydoun Abbasi further emphasized that the publication of any statistics and data, including “geographical issues of the country, river water levels, dams, and electricity consumption,” is “detrimental to the country.”
In recent days, Peyman Qorbani, the economic deputy of the Central Bank, accused Abdolnaser Hemmati, the former governor of the Central Bank, of providing “confidential information of the country, including the exchange rate and inflation rate,” to the International Monetary Fund in order to receive a $5 billion loan during the coronavirus period.
At least two indicators, “inflation rate” and “foreign exchange reserves,” are not considered “confidential statistics and data” in many countries around the world. However, the Iranian regime, by not disclosing economic and social statistics, is attempting to prevent public protests similar to those that occurred last year.
The statistics announced by various officials of the regime and media outlets linked to the government do not reflect the reality and can only provide a general indicator of the severe social and economic situation in Iran.
Sowlat Mortazavi, the Minister of Minister of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Welfare of the Iranian regime, stated on August 20, “A significant portion of absolute poverty has been eradicated.” This claim is made while in June, the Majlis (Parliamentary) Research Center reported that approximately 11 million more people have been added to the country’s poverty-stricken population between 2011 and 2021.
According to the Majlis Research Center’s report, the poverty rate in Iran has been on an increasing trend since 2006, and since 2018, more than 30 percent of the Iranian population has become poorer.
Shortly after the release of the Majlis Research Center’s report, Mohsen Pirhadi, a member of the Majlis, also warned about the increase in the population below the poverty line, stating that this population is 28 million people, a statistic that occurred following the rapid growth of inflation, followed by a significant number of people in the country falling below the poverty line. The population of Iran is currently 88 million.
Although the announced statistics are general and not distinguishable in terms of how many Iranians have fallen into poverty and absolute poverty simultaneously with the increase in the inflation rate, some critical economists, including Hossein Raghfar, believe that the number of poor people in Iran is higher than the reported figures.
Raghfar has stated, “It does not seem that the number of people who have fallen into absolute poverty today is less than 50 percent of the country’s population.” According to him, these individuals do not even have the minimum necessities of human life.
Extreme poverty, as defined by the World Bank, refers to conditions in which individuals are unable to meet basic needs such as food, clothing, and shelter.
The World Bank has recognized a daily income of less than $1.90 as the global poverty line.
Based on this definition, the continued growth of inflation and the significant gap between wages and inflation have made living conditions more difficult for the people of Iran. Incomes have not experienced significant growth, while the inflation rate continues to rise. As a result, individuals who may have been above the poverty line at the beginning of the year have fallen below the poverty line due to monthly inflation in the final months of that year.
Free fall below the poverty line
Livelihood and shelter are among the most fundamental factors that determine the poverty line. In a report titled “Poverty Monitoring” published in January, the Social Welfare Studies Office of the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Labor announced that by considering a food basket providing 2,100 calories as the threshold of the poverty line, more than half of Iran’s population received less than the minimum specified calories between the years 2017 and 2021.
According to the same report, the average poverty rate in Iran has increased by 10 percent over four years, reaching 30 percent from 20 percent. The poverty monitoring report estimates the poverty rate in rural areas to be over 35 percent. This means that living conditions in rural areas are significantly more challenging than in cities.
If the Majlis Research Center’s report is added as another official document to the data on the increasing poverty of the Iranian people, 30 percent of the population, approximately 28 million people in Iran, have not had access to minimum facilities such as food and shelter since the beginning of 2021. These statistics indicate the worsening poverty of Iranians over the past decade.
Since 2021, the Iranian economy has experienced two more waves of inflation. As a result of these conditions, life for individuals below the poverty line has become even more difficult, and more people have fallen below the poverty line.
The first wave of inflation occurred simultaneously with the removal of preferential currency and was followed by an increase in the exchange rate, which raised the inflation rate to over 40 percent by the end of 2021. The second wave of inflation in 2022 pushed the inflation rate to around 70 percent by the end of the year.
The effects of these two waves of inflation have led to a 2.5-fold increase in rental prices in just one year.
According to statistics from the regime’s Central Bank, over 37 percent of urban households in the country are renters, and rental costs constitute the largest share of their expenses. This means that alongside the increasing inflation rate, this segment of the population has faced additional pressure, and their descent into extreme poverty has accelerated.
The Majlis Research Center has confirmed that tenants are forced to reduce other expenses, particularly their food consumption, in order to afford rental costs.
The future is uncertain for 28 million people.
It is not only “absolute poverty” that is concerning; the poverty line has moved at an accelerating pace over the past five years.
The extent of the expansion of the population at risk of poverty and absolute poverty in Iran is so significant that Ali Aghamohammadi, the head of the economic group in the office of regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei and a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, stated on May 18, “At least 19.7 million people in Iran are deprived of basic amenities such as housing, employment, education up to 12 years, health, food, and clothing.”
In the past two years, along with the increasing inflation rate, there have been numerous reports highlighting the poverty line. Some unofficial reports state that the poverty line in Iran reached 200 million rials (approximately $400) at the end of last year and has increased to 300 million rials (approximately $600) this year.
It is worth noting that the minimum monthly salary of wage earners in Iran is approximately 80 million rials, meaning a mere $155.
Furthermore, inflation reached 68.6 percent this March despite a minimum 27 percent increase in wages. This gap between wages and the inflation rate has resulted in more people falling into absolute poverty.
Given these official statistics and figures, it is unclear on what basis the Minister of Labor of the Iranian regime has made such a claim.
On August 1, 2023, the statements of Hossein Salami, the head of Iran regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on Khabar TV revealed a new dimension of confusion, fear, desperation, and ignorance within the regime. These statements underscored, more than ever before, that the rhetoric of the regime’s leaders and stalwarts serves as a smokescreen to conceal the dire state of the regime.
Let’s revisit the significant points made by Hossein Salami:
1. He referred to the series of uprisings, particularly the 2022 uprising, as “the most potent, perilous, grave, unequal, and far-reaching global challenge” against the regime.
2. In an attempt to counteract the inclination towards regime overthrow on the anniversary of the nationwide uprising, he urged the regime’s supporters and disheartened operatives to “broaden their understanding, identify leaders, and constrain them.” He issued a warning, “lest we regret our inaction.”
3. He advised them to oversee universities and schools, emphasizing that vulnerabilities can arise through small openings. He likened societal damage to a dam rupture caused by a minor crack, highlighting the importance of sealing these vulnerabilities.
Salami’s statements undeniably underscore that the Velayat al-Faqih system is now more fragile than ever in the aftermath of substantial setbacks.
Continuing with these declarations, it’s worthwhile to examine Salami’s discourse during the so-called “Conference on the Implementation of the Basij Mobilization Order.” This speech, aside from revealing heightened anxiety over the anniversary of the nationwide uprising, exposes additional facets of the regime’s fragility.
In one segment of his speech, he asserted, “Basij bases must devise a strategic plan!”
A strategic plan to counter what type of threat?
Following the proliferation of slogans like “our enemy is right here/they are lying, it is America,” there are few who remain unaware that demonizing America or other illusory adversaries serves to mask the four-decade-long conflict between the Iranian people and resistance on one side and the regime on the other. This conflict has reached a pivotal juncture. Salami’s call for a “strategic plan!” implies the array of measures the regime needs to forestall the potential overthrow. However, there are implications beyond mere words. Presently, the regime grapples with diminished motivation, demoralization, and erosion within its repressive apparatus. The nationwide uprising showcased the populace’s uncontrollable fury, creating deep-seated apprehension about facing it anew.
In a separate portion of his speech, the outspoken leader of the IRGC mentioned “mistakes” and “regrets” in the aftermath of adversity:
“If a nation and society stumble at a historical juncture, it’s plausible for this failure and Islam’s weakness to be exposed perpetually. The divine light may remain obscured for a protracted period, mosques could fall silent, and only the collective efforts of believers can extricate Islam from these predicaments and emancipate Muslims from tyranny’s yoke.”
Salami referred to crises, any one of which could potentially topple the regime. The use of terms like “psychological warfare” and “spiritual depletion and humiliation!” underscore his critical evaluation of the repressive apparatus. Moreover, his reassurance to Khamenei about the Basij’s stance signifies a precarious state within the government’s repressive forces. The deployment of these forces to the streets and rebellion-prone zones exposes the regime’s limited reserves amid the uprising’s outbreak and the looming specter of overthrow. This year presents a higher probability of confrontation compared to the previous one, and Salami provides a preemptive alert:
“Last year, the enemy aimed to alienate youth from the revolution, transforming universities, factories, markets, media, and every domain into battlefields. Basij brothers and sisters, you hold an extraordinary position in history, and the future shall judge you accordingly. As you castigate those who squandered past opportunities, empower the youth.”
These declarations from the highest echelons of repression and terrorism within the Revolutionary Guards and other anti-populist elements of the regime underscore the government’s fragility against the rage of rebellious youth and the uprising population of Iran. Instead of projecting strength, these mournful outcries radiate vulnerability, fatigue, and impending collapse. Their message is the uncompromising overthrow of religious fascism, an indomitable prospect on the horizon.
Continuing the theme of revealing the fragility and failures of the religious regime, another significant insight emerges from the recent speech of regime president Ebrahim Raisi. Raisi, who was a member of the death commission of the 1988 massacre of political prisoners, spoke during a ceremony commemorating the regime’s ‘martyrs of the shrine,’ shedding light on the depths of the regime’s depravity and desperation.
In his speech, Raisi emphasized the imperative of preserving the ‘sacred system,’ drawing parallels to the words of the slain former head of the regime’s Quds force Qassem Soleimani, thereby underscoring the regime’s desperate struggle to maintain its grasp on power. His use of the term ‘sanctuary’ to describe the regime’s existence echoes its past manipulation of religious terminology to justify its actions, both at home and abroad.
Raisi’s speech serves as a poignant reminder of the regime’s singular focus on self-preservation, underscoring the fact that all of its actions and rhetoric are geared towards avoiding its downfall. This obsession with survival has led to a cascade of disgraceful measures, from interfering in the affairs of other nations to investing exorbitant resources in military pursuits and weaponry.
However, behind these desperate actions lies a growing uncertainty within the regime’s leadership. Raisi’s conditional use of the word ‘if’ – ‘If this sanctuary remains, other sanctuary places will also remain’ – reveals the deep-seated doubt that now permeates the highest echelons of power. This doubt is rooted in the realization that the regime’s survival is hanging by a thread, and this last chance to maintain control could very well slip through their fingers.
The regime’s rhetoric, once filled with claims of ‘strategic depth,’ ‘global reshaping,’ and ‘endogenous capabilities,’ now rings hollow in the face of its impending collapse. The once-touted ‘strategic depth’ has crumbled as the regime’s ambitions have been curtailed, with Raisi referencing the ‘defenders of the shrine’ – a plain contrast to the regime’s past efforts to establish a ‘Shia crescent.’ Now, their battle for survival is not fought in foreign lands, but within the heart of Iran itself.
As the regime’s highest leaders voice their concerns about preservation and survival, their words reveal a deeply fractured and vulnerable entity. Together with the observations from Hossein Salami’s statements, these declarations highlight the regime’s rapidly diminishing strength, its internal demoralization, and its impending collapse in the face of the Iranian people’s determination for change.
Iranian regime media have reported that according to the decisions of the water sector in the “Seventh Development Plan” in the Agriculture Commission of the regime’s Majlis (parliament), “water transfer projects” have been excluded from “environmental assessment.”
According to the Didbaniran website, water transfer projects no longer require approval from relevant authorities such as the Environmental Protection Organization or the Organization of Cultural Heritage. As a result, these projects only need to obtain “technical approvals” and approval from the Supreme Water Council.
Therefore, according to this report, most of the current “water transfer” projects, which are labeled as “drinking water supply,” have been met with objections from the public and environmental activists, who believe that these projects are actually intended for “industrial and agricultural water supply.”
Meanwhile, Ahmad Vazifeh, the head of the National Center for Climate and Drought Management of the Meteorological Organization of the regime, announced on July 26 that there is a “drinking water supply crisis” in all regions of the country and told the “Ecoiran” website that the water situation is “very critical” in the eastern half and some parts of the northern regions.
He emphasized that the drinking water supply situation in most areas of the country, especially in metropolises, has become a “problematic issue,” and in the case of continued low precipitation in some cities, including Mashhad, “supplying drinking water will not be possible.”
On the other hand, Tajarat News website also reported on July 28 that based on “official statistics,” “16 large dams” in Iran have “less than 50 percent” of their water capacity, the reservoirs of dams in Golestan province have been declared “zero,” and the Roodbal Dam in Fars province has only “two million cubic meters” of water.
The crisis of “water scarcity” has intensified in recent months, to the extent that repeated power and water outages in various urban, industrial, and agricultural areas have posed problems for the lives of citizens and disrupted some services.
Despite these serious and vital challenges for Iranian citizens, improper water management, clandestine dam construction, and unauthorized extraction from underground resources continue. Currently, the environmental assessment and obtaining the required permits have been excluded from the necessary measures for carrying out water transfer projects.
On August 10, Emtedad News wrote in an article referring to the drying of wetlands, lakes, and plains in Iran: “Currently, the annual extraction of groundwater resources through wells has increased from 9 billion cubic meters to 47 billion cubic meters, and the number of wells has increased 16 times, while the extraction volume has increased 5 times.”
Iran is facing one of the most critical challenges in its modern history – a looming water crisis that threatens the very existence of its land. Over the past four decades, the clerical regime has implemented policies that have led to severe mismanagement of water resources, resulting in a significant depletion of surface and underground water reservoirs. As the world experiences the hottest summer on record in 2023, scientists’ warnings about the escalating global warming have become even more pressing. The question remains: Is contemporary humanity ready to face this unforeseen and daunting guest? For the people under the oppressive rule of the religious fascism in Iran, the answer is bitter and tragic.
The devastating consequences of the regime’s mismanagement and negligence have led to a catastrophic depletion of water resources.
According to a report by the regime’s Etemad newspaper, per capita consumption of red meat has decreased from 13 kilograms in 1390 (2011) to 3 kilograms in 1401 (2022).
Similarly, the price of chicken per kilogram has increased from 250,000 rials (approximately $0.5) in 2011 to 1,200,000 rials (approximately $2.4) in 2023.
Etemad newspaper attributed this phenomenon to the substitution of low-quality goods and stated that with the increase in prices, the resources available to poor families are diminishing.
According to the latest reports, the inflation of red meat has reached 86 percent and the inflation rate for chicken has reached 82 percent, resulting in smaller portions on people’s tables.
Seyed-Morteza Afghah, an economist linked to the regime, told Etemad newspaper that we are currently witnessing an increase in inflation and a decrease in investment. All of these factors contribute to a decrease in food availability and a lower consumption rate.
“With the continuation of these policies, along with a decline in production, an increase in unemployment, and growing inflation, the number of impoverished individuals in the country will increase, and the middle class will gradually fall below the poverty line. If they remain in this category, their consumption levels will be lower than before,” Afghah added.
On May 3, Etemad newspaper reported that “many” people have resorted to bartering goods for meat and chicken, either for their present or future needs or for hosting guests, and they have replaced them with local yogurt, cheese, pickles, or homemade jams.
The reports indicate that the price situation is also chaotic for other consumer goods. Accordingly, the price of rice, which was around 260,000 rials (approximately $0.52) in 2020, is now priced between 1.3 and 1.8 million rials (approximately $2.6 to 3.6) at best.
The price of one liter of milk, which was announced by the government as 60,000 rials (approximately $0.12) in 2020, is now being sold for 300,000 rials (approximately $0.6) in dairy stores.
Iran needs billions of dollars in foreign investment, including in the oil and gas industries. However, in the Iranian economy, all the human, natural, and financial resources of the country are controlled by a limited group dependent on the regime supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.
During the 2021 presidential election, Ebrahim Raisi promised in his programs to “eliminate dependence on essential goods and exchange rates, bridge the class gap and injustice by changing incorrect economic policies, adjust people’s wages according to inflation, support families and marginalized groups, and provide minimum livelihood by issuing a purchase card for the lower three deciles.”
In March 4, 2021, Raisi even gave the order to “eradicate absolute poverty” by the end of the Persian year (March 20), which means within just two weeks.
Raisi had promised to resolve the country’s economic issues, emphasizing during his election campaign that the main problem is in management. “I will be able to use many economy experts to resolve the country’s economic problems, and I will do so” he claimed before assuming office.
During his tenure, however, Raisi has failed to resolve any of the surmounting economic crises plaguing Iran. All the while, various prices of different daily necessities are increasing, resulting in more and more protesters venting their anger and frustration in the streets by holding anti-regime demonstrations.
The multitude of economic challenges, especially the rising inflation rate is eroding the middle and lower classes’ purchasing power. Addressing these problems will require a comprehensive and strategic approach that prioritizes economic stability and growth, investment, and the creation of a favorable business environment. Unfortunately, such matters happen to be at the bottom of the list of the regime’s priorities.
