700,000 Jobs Lost in Iran as A Result of War

Sia Rajabi
-
0
700,000 Jobs Lost in Iran as A Result of War
While the fate of the war in the region remains uncertain, reports from Iran indicate a suffocating livelihood crisis for the population. Alireza Mahjoub, secretary-general of the Workers’ House (a regime-affiliated labor organization) in Iran, announced on Wednesday, April 22, that during the recent war between the Iranian regime and the United States and Israel, more than 700,000 jobs have been lost. He said in a press conference that 130,000 people became unemployed directly due to the bombing of workplaces, and 600,000 job opportunities were lost indirectly. He also warned that the consequences of unemployment caused by the post-war economic crisis will be far greater than these figures.
Iran’s War-Stricken Economy and Structural Deadlock
During the recent war, some of the country’s largest steel and petrochemical production facilities suffered serious damage due to airstrikes, and their production lines were halted. Other commercial and industrial units were also damaged. Mohammad Hadi Asgari, deputy for cultural and social affairs at the Ministry of Labor of the Iranian regime, also said at the Wednesday press conference that the ministry is identifying and following up on the problems of the affected units and promised that the government would provide support packages for their reconstruction, but did not provide further details. These figures are confirmed by the authorities, and the real numbers of unemployment and lost jobs are far higher. In one instance alone, thousands of jobs were affected due to nearly two months of internet shutdown.

Iran: How Pahlavi’s Name Stole the January 2026 Uprising

Mehdi Hosseini
-
0
Iran: How Pahlavi’s Name Stole the January 2026 Uprising
In the biting cold of mid-January 2026, the air in Tehran’s Vali-e-Asr Square was thick with the scent of burning tires and the metallic tang of tear gas. Thousands of young Iranians, born decades after the 1979 Revolution, stood shoulder-to-shoulder, their chants for “Freedom” and “Bread” echoing off the concrete facades of a city that seemed finally on the brink of a systemic collapse. Then, almost as if on cue, a small but loud contingent began a rhythmic chant for the return of the monarchy, invoking the name of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Shah. It was a jarring shift in tone that left the frontline protesters momentarily confused. This scene raises a fundamental question that has haunted the aftermath of the winter protests: Was the sudden prominence of monarchist slogans a genuine expression of a nation’s nostalgia, or was it a sophisticated diversionary tactic engineered by the state to paralyze the revolution?
The Pahlavi Restoration: A Legacy of Torture and Revisionism
The January 2026 uprising began as a decentralized, grassroots explosion of rage against decades of economic mismanagement and social repression. Unlike previous movements, this one appeared to have bridged the gap between the urban middle class and the rural poor. The mullahs’ regime faced an existential threat that was neither ideological nor factional, but total. In this atmosphere of genuine revolutionary potential, the sudden injection of Reza Pahlavi’s name into the narrative served as a lifeline for a drowning regime. By shifting the conversation from a democratic future to a monarchical past, the focus of the uprising was successfully blurred. For the clerical establishment, the promotion of the Pahlavi brand was a masterstroke of psychological warfare. The regime has long understood that a decentralized, multi-ethnic, and democratic movement is far more difficult to defeat than one centered around a single, divisive figure, with no popular base and organization. By allowing—and in some cases, covertly encouraging—the propagation of monarchist sentiment, the security apparatus created a “bogeyman” that served two purposes. First, it alienated the country’s ethnic minorities and the republican-minded youth who viewed a return to hereditary rule as a step backward. Second, it provided the state with a familiar enemy to rail against, allowing them to frame the protests not as a domestic cry for justice, but as a foreign-backed plot to restore an old autocracy. This strategy was not executed in a vacuum. It relied heavily on the cooperation, whether intentional or incidental, of Persian-language satellite television channels operating from abroad. For years, these networks have provided a disproportionate amount of airtime to the Pahlavi family, often presenting a sanitized and nostalgic version of the pre-1979 era. During the 2026 uprising, these broadcasts became an echo chamber. They focused their cameras on the few who shouted for the Shah, ignoring the vast majority who were demanding a modern, democratic republic. The regime in Tehran did not merely tolerate this coverage; it weaponized it. By letting these broadcasts reach Iranian living rooms, the state ensured that the most divisive possible alternative to their rule remained at the forefront of the public’s imagination. The deception extended far beyond Iran’s borders, successfully clouding the judgment of Western policymakers and international media. For a Washington or Brussels looking for a simple narrative, the “return of the Prince” was an easy story to sell. It suggested a ready-made successor and a clear, albeit flawed, alternative to the mullahs. Western intelligence agencies and diplomatic circles were led to believe that the Iranian street was clamoring for a restoration. This belief had a paralyzing effect on international support for the uprising. Instead of backing the diverse, decentralized councils and labor unions that were the true engines of the protest, Western capitals waited for a “leader” who had no real presence on the ground, effectively stalling any meaningful intervention or support for the democratic movement. The question of who benefited most from this narrative is easily answered by looking at who survived the winter. While Reza Pahlavi enjoyed a surge in media mentions and international invitations, his actual political capital inside Iran remained largely symbolic and deeply contested. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic used the resulting internal friction among the opposition to catch its breath. The movement, once a unified front against tyranny, fractured into debates over the merits of monarchy versus republic, and centralized rule versus ethnic autonomy. The regime’s survival strategy has always been “divide and rule,” and in 2026, they found their most effective wedge in the despots they replaced. The tragedy of the January 2026 uprising lies in the gap between the courage of the people on the streets and the narrative that was imposed upon them. The young men and women facing down security forces were not fighting to replace one form of authoritarianism with another; they were fighting for the right to choose their own destiny. By allowing the movement to be branded with the seal of the Pahlavi crown, the international community and parts of the diaspora played right into the hands of the Revolutionary Guard. In the end, the promotion of Reza Pahlavi served as a brilliant, if cynical, insurance policy for the status quo. It allowed the regime to tell its supporters that the only alternative to the current system was a return to the past, while telling the West that the revolution was a chaotic mess of competing nostalgias. As the smoke cleared from Vali-e-Asr Square, the clerical elite remained in power, not because they were loved, but because they had successfully convinced the world that the only alternative was a ghost. The lesson of 2026 is clear: a revolution that looks backward is a revolution that has already been defeated by those who control the present. For Iran to move forward, it must first exorcise the shadows that the regime so carefully cultivates to keep the country in the dark.

Escalating Executions in Iran Put EU Policy Under Scrutiny

Jubin Katiraie
-
0
Escalating Executions in Iran Put EU Policy Under Scrutiny
A conference held at the European Parliament in Brussels on April 22, 2026, brought renewed attention to the escalating use of executions in Iran and the European Union’s response to the crisis. Titled “Iran: Take Action to Stop Executions — Where Does the EU Stand?”, the event gathered a cross-party group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), political figures, and international representatives to address what participants described as a critical moment in Iran’s internal and external trajectory. The meeting unfolded against the backdrop of a reported increase in executions in Iran, particularly targeting political prisoners. Speakers repeatedly referenced recent cases, including the execution of individuals identified as members of the opposition, as well as broader figures indicating a surge in capital punishment over the past month. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), delivered the keynote address. She framed the current situation as a decisive confrontation between Iranian society and the ruling system. According to her remarks, the authorities in Tehran view internal dissent and organized opposition as a greater threat than external conflict. She pointed to ongoing resistance activities inside Iran, including a reported attack on a key leadership site earlier in the year, as evidence of intensifying domestic tensions. Mrs. Rajavi also referred to recent executions as part of a broader pattern of repression, describing them as measures aimed at maintaining control amid growing unrest. Her speech included calls for a shift in European policy, including recognition of a provisional political framework announced by opposition groups and the closure of Iranian diplomatic missions in Europe. Opening the conference, Spanish MEP Javier Zarzalejos emphasized that support for democratic principles in Iran has been a longstanding position within the European Parliament. He described the recent wave of executions as part of a systematic pattern, suggesting that the scale and timing of these actions reflected a broader strategy by Iranian authorities. He stated that such developments raise questions about the adequacy of the EU’s current stance. Lithuanian MEP Petras Auštrevičius, who chaired the session, connected the situation in Iran to European security concerns. He noted that developments in Iran, including military capabilities and regional activities, have implications beyond its borders. He also cited figures indicating that multiple political prisoners had been executed in recent weeks, presenting this as an indicator of the regime’s internal dynamics. Several speakers addressed the EU’s policy approach directly. Portuguese MEP Francisco Assis referred to what he described as a “moral crisis” in European political responses, suggesting that existing engagement strategies have not adequately addressed human rights concerns. He called for any future agreements with Iran to be conditioned on measurable improvements in human rights, including a halt to executions. Other participants reflected on the historical context of EU-Iran relations. Spanish MEP Antonio López-Istúriz White pointed to decades of engagement with successive Iranian administrations, arguing that expectations of reform had not materialized. He noted that different political factions within Iran had been approached as potential partners, but the overall trajectory of repression had persisted. Italian MEP Leoluca Orlando focused on the broader ideological framework of the Iranian regime, particularly the relationship between religion and state. He suggested that this structure has contributed to both political and social constraints, including limitations on civil liberties and political participation. Italian MEP Carlo Ciccioli provided a historical perspective on repression in Iran, referencing estimates of casualties from past crackdowns on protests. While acknowledging that exact figures remain contested, he cited accounts suggesting large-scale violence against demonstrators over time. He described the current situation as part of a longer pattern rather than an isolated development. The issue of alternative political futures for Iran was also discussed. Multiple speakers referred to the NCRI’s Ten-Point Plan, which outlines proposals for governance based on democratic elections, separation of religion and state, gender equality, and a non-nuclear policy. Supporters at the conference described this framework as a structured alternative to the current system. At the same time, some participants addressed competing narratives about Iran’s political future. References were made to discussions within European institutions involving figures associated with Iran’s former monarchy. Critics at the conference argued that such engagements risk overlooking the perspectives of groups currently active within Iran. Former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt delivered one of the more direct critiques of EU policy, describing it as ineffective in addressing both regional conflicts and internal repression in Iran. He pointed to what he characterized as a gap between stated European values and practical policy measures, particularly in relation to executions. Other speakers highlighted the human dimension of the issue. Anna Strolenberg, a representative from the Netherlands, shared accounts of Iranian women affected by recent events, including those who had lost family members. Her remarks focused on personal experiences and the persistence of activism despite losses. Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Germany’s former Federal Minister of Justice, drew parallels with historical experiences, recalling opposition to the previous monarchy and warning against revisiting earlier political models. She emphasized the importance of pluralism and legal frameworks in any future system. Throughout the conference, calls for specific actions were repeated. These included proposals to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, reassess diplomatic relations, and place greater emphasis on human rights conditions in policymaking. While no formal policy decisions were announced during the event, the range of perspectives presented reflected an ongoing debate within European institutions about how to respond to developments in Iran. The discussion highlighted both the urgency of the issue and the diversity of views on the appropriate course of action.

U.S. Sanctions Tehran’s Drone and Missile Networks

Jubin Katiraie
-
0
U.S. Sanctions Tehran’s Drone and Missile Networks
As part of its ongoing maximum pressure policy, the United States imposed new sanctions targeting supply networks linked to the Iranian regime’s drone and missile programs; a move that U.S. officials say is intended to disrupt the regime’s weapons activities.Under this decision, eight individuals and four entities involved in managing support networks for the Iranian regime’s drone and ballistic missile programs have been sanctioned. Additionally, two aircraft linked to Mahan Air—a regime airline previously accused by Western governments of supporting military logistics—have been designated as blocked assets; according to officials, these aircraft had been used in the past by agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to transport weapons, equipment, and money.
Iranian Regime Missile Stockpiles Are Running Out
Tommy Pigott, Deputy Spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, said in a statement that ” These designations support Operation Epic Fury and President Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 directive to counter Iran’s weapons programs. Today’s action also supports the implementation of United Nations sanctions and restrictive measures on Iran, which were reimposed as a direct result of Iran’s ‘significant non-performance’ of its nuclear commitments.” Another part of the statement said that “The United States will continue to use all available means to expose, disrupt, and counter Iran’s threatening activities to protect America’s interests.” These sanctions have been imposed under executive orders related to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorist groups. Previously, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, referring to the policy of economic pressure, said that the Treasury Department would strongly target regime figures such as the Shamkhani family—referring to Ali Shamkhani, a former senior advisor to Iran’s regime leadership—who are accused of amassing wealth at the expense of the Iranian people.  

How Do the Children of Iranian Regime Officials Manage Smuggled Wealth?

Mehdi Hosseini
-
0
How Do the Children of Iranian Regime Officials Manage Smuggled Wealth?
Sky News published a report on April 19 about the children of Iran’s ruling elites, who are known as “Aghazadehs” and, as people call them, “parasite-born.” The decision by the government of Dominica to revoke the citizenship of one of the children of Iranian regime officials, Abolfazl Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a senior official and former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, has revealed a new dimension of financial influence networks through which the children of Iran’s ruling elites are believed to manage vast sums of money abroad; this comes amid growing accusations that they serve as fronts for managing wealth linked to the Iranian regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
U.S. Treasury Sanctions Shamkhani Oil Network

Revocation of Abolfazl Shamkhani’s citizenship by Dominica

Dominica’s decision to revoke Shamkhani’s citizenship came after he was accused of concealing key information when applying for what is known as a golden passport. An investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project found that he had obtained citizenship under the alias Sami Haik before the data manipulation was exposed and his citizenship was subsequently revoked. According to observers, this incident is part of a broader phenomenon in Iran known as the “Aghazadeh”—the children of elites—who are accused of running complex financial networks abroad, including investments, companies, and banking fronts across multiple countries. Controversial estimates suggest that the volume of funds linked to the children of Iranian elites abroad may reach $148 billion; according to a previous statement by Mahmoud Bahmani, former governor of the Iranian regime’s Central Bank, who said that the children of elites hold $148 billion in foreign bank accounts and added that about 5,000 of them live outside Iran.

U.S. sanctions

In a related development, recent U.S. sanctions against Hassan Shamkhani, another of these individuals, have provided further indications of what Washington describes as the intertwining of financial interests between influential families and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, particularly in the oil, petrochemical, and port sectors. Sanctions records indicate that the two Shamkhani brothers run a shipping conglomerate that, according to U.S. allegations, serves as a central hub in transporting Iranian oil. The U.S. Department of Justice also announced on March 6, 2026, the filing of two civil forfeiture actions targeting assets worth more than $15.3 million, describing them as part of a network led by Hossein Shamkhani that launders Iranian oil revenues through international entities.

A parallel government beyond borders

These networks have evolved into something resembling a parallel government run by the children of ruling elites—individuals who have transformed from a privileged social class into a financial backbone that, according to these allegations, is used to fund political and military influence beyond Iran’s borders. In this context, reports point to indirect roles played by certain figures within the inner circle of power, including Mojtaba Khamenei, son of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Media reports, including those by Bloomberg, point to his ownership or management of investment and real estate networks abroad, including assets in London and across Europe, managed through intermediary companies. Ali Ansari is also cited as one of the most prominent financial figures in this system, through managing companies believed to be used to conceal the true ownership of assets linked to the regime.

Extensive networks and multiple fronts

The U.S. Treasury has also sanctioned financial institutions and exchange companies that it says have played a role in transferring tens of millions of dollars to benefit the IRGC Quds Force through multilayered financial networks. In this regard, experts told Sky News Arabia that Tehran uses an organized strategy to manage money abroad, relying on the use of elite children as financial fronts, enabling the transfer of oil and petrochemical revenues outside the country beyond the reach of international sanctions oversight.

The gap between rhetoric and reality

On the other hand, an Iranian researcher believes that the phenomenon of elite children reflects a growing gap between the regime’s rhetoric and economic and social realities, adding that this phenomenon has become a tool for circumventing Western sanctions. In an interview with the Sky News Arabia website, the researcher said that the financial class of Iranian elites’ children enter Western countries as investors or businessmen, often bringing substantial capital. These individuals act as channels for transferring money out of Iran and operate under the cover of private projects while maintaining their ties to the system that enabled their wealth accumulation. He added that these individuals also contribute to supporting Iran’s influence in the countries where they are present and back its regional proxies, creating a complex network that is difficult to trace and is used to circumvent sanctions and transfer oil and petrochemical revenues. The policy of transferring money abroad and managing it through the children of regime officials stems from their understanding of the risks posed by public discontent. The so-called elite children, or the offspring of high-ranking officials and IRGC commanders, have become an external economic force through shell companies, real estate, and shipping networks used to bypass sanctions. The regime’s representatives abroad benefit from extensive financial support, while Tehran spends generously to keep conflicts away from its borders, increasing economic pressure inside Iran.

The Collapse of Livelihoods in Tehran; Housing Rent Has ‌Become a Nightmare

Sia Rajabi
-
0
The Collapse of Livelihoods in Tehran; Housing Rent Has ‌Become a Nightmare
An examination of rental listings in Tehran’s Districts 4 and 5 shows that the average asking rates in April have reached about 10 billion rials as a deposit and 310 million rials in monthly rent (approximately $6,700 and $205); heavy and shocking figures that clearly demonstrate the depth of the housing crisis and the growing inability of households to secure shelter. This is while the minimum wage of a worker with two children barely reaches about $100 per month.
Rental Crisis in the Shadow of War; Livelihood Deadlock for Iranian Tenants
In these two districts, unlike the overall city average where the main pressure is more concentrated on the deposit, landlords have assigned approximately equal weight to the deposit and monthly rent. The average size of the units offered is 91 square meters, and the average building age is reported to be 5.5 years. A monthly rent of 310 million rials for couples who are both employed and earn average incomes is no longer just a number; it has become a serious and exhausting barrier to continuing life in Tehran. For many families, such a cost means eliminating a large portion of basic living needs and falling further below the poverty line. It had previously been reported that the overall average rent in Tehran is about 90 million rials (approximately $60) in monthly rent and 12 billion rials (approximately $80,000) as a deposit. However, in Districts 4 and 5, due to the income conditions of some tenants, it appears that charging high monthly rent remains possible for landlords and has become unavoidable for tenants.

Iran’s ‘No To Executions Tuesdays’ Campaign Marks 117th Week

Sia Rajabi
-
0
Iran’s ‘No To Executions Tuesdays’ Campaign Marks 117th Week
On Tuesday, April 21, the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign entered its 117th week. On this occasion, prisoners participating in the campaign issued a statement referring to 52 days of internet shutdown and condemned the execution of political prisoners Hamed Validi and Mohammad Masoumi Shahi, emphasizing the continuation of the strike and the campaign until the main demand of the prisoners—the abolition of the death penalty—is achieved.

Full text of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign statement

Continuation of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign in its one hundred seventeenth week across 56 different prisons

Commemorating the memory of 12 executed political prisoners

After 52 days of digital and internet shutdown and lack of communication, which has now been partially restored, we write this statement addressed to the honorable people of Iran. As we mark the one hundred seventeenth week of the “No to Execution” campaign, the ruling regime in Iran executed two more political prisoners, Hamed Validi and Mohammad Masoumi Shahi, just yesterday.
Execution of PMOI Members Hamed Validi and Nima Shahi in Tehran
The execution-driven regime, concerned about public anger and sentiment over these executions, is desperately trying to accuse these prisoners and other detainees and recent executions of espionage and ties to Israel in order to justify its actions under wartime conditions. However, such baseless accusations against brave men and women—whose only goal is equality, freedom, and the independence of Iran and its people, and who have sacrificed everything for this cause—only intensify public outrage. Over the past month, the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign also faced another crime by the execution-driven regime, in which it lost six of its members—Vahid Bani Amerian, Pouya Ghabadi, Shahrokh (Akbar) Daneshvarkar, Babak Alipour, Mohammad Taghavi, and Abolhassan Montazer—during the 115th week. On the night of March 29, dozens of security agents in Ghezel Hesar Prison, led by Ashkan Kamali, Hassan Ghabadi, and Ghasem Sahraei, carried out a brutal and inhumane nighttime raid on the political prisoners’ ward in Unit 4 of Ghezel Hesar Prison. They severely beat the inmates, removed all prisoners—most of whom were members of the “No to Execution” campaign—from the ward, and transferred them to solitary confinement. Six of the above-mentioned individuals, who had been sentenced to death by Judge Afshari, were executed. They were hanged while their legal proceedings had not yet concluded, without a final meeting with their families, and in complete isolation. The regime also executed four political prisoners from the January 2026 uprising—Amirhossein Hatami, Mohammadamin Biglari, Shahin Vahedparast, and Ali Fahim—in secrecy and without final family visits, demonstrating its continuation of the legacy of Ruhollah Khomeini, who viewed war as a blessing and an opportunity for killing and executions. The regime, fearful of the Iranian people’s uprising, has so far refused to return the bodies of any of these fallen individuals to their families, thereby subjecting them to psychological and emotional torment. The “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign sincerely expresses its condolences to the families of these executed prisoners—families who never grew weary and stood with the campaign every week, in both cold and heat, raising the call of “No to Execution,” which reflects the public demand of the Iranian people. The oppressive and desperate regime based on the doctrine of “Velayat-e Faqih” executed at least 12 individuals in the month of Farvardin (March–April), all of whom were political prisoners, thereby taking revenge on them. At a time when war and its hardships have cast a shadow over Iran and captured public attention, the illegitimate ruling regime is carrying out systematic executions to create an atmosphere of fear and terror in society and to prevent uprising and revolution. Today, many protesters from the January uprising are held in solitary confinement and the regime’s underground detention cells in complete isolation. According to reports, dozens are held in solitary confinement in Ward 35 of Unit 3 of Ghezel Hesar Prison alone, most of them young, and their lives are in serious danger. The “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign calls on all human rights organizations and international bodies to act to save the lives of political prisoners sentenced to death and demands serious and practical pressure on the Iranian regime. We call on all human rights, labor, civil, and political activists, and anyone who opposes executions, not to be intimidated under the suffocating conditions in which the regime has effectively taken control of the streets and imposed a form of martial law, and to protest these repressions and the long lines of executions by any possible means. Undoubtedly, the future belongs to those who have paid the price for freedom. The “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign, while honoring the memory of these executed individuals, is observing a hunger strike on Tuesday, April 21, in its one 117th week across 56 prisons in the country.

The Naval Blockade And the Structural Fracture of Iran’s Economy

Hoshang Amiri
-
0
The Naval Blockade And the Structural Fracture of Iran’s Economy
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has now become one of the most decisive variables in Iran’s political economy. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has occurred under conditions where Iran’s economy was already suffering from deep structural dysfunctions. This structure is heavily dependent on maritime routes, through which more than 80% of its foreign trade is conducted. Under such conditions, any disruption to this route amounts to a direct blow to the backbone of the economy. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz effectively targets exports of oil, petrochemicals, and other energy-based products. This quickly reflects in the balance of payments and exacerbates the budget deficit. As a result, rising inflation and a surge in exchange rates will be inevitable consequences for this situation.
Strait Of Hormuz Declared Open Again; Trump: Naval Blockade Against Iran’s Regime Will Continue
However, the crisis is not limited to exports. Imports are also at serious risk. Iran’s economy depends annually on tens of millions of tons of imports of essential goods, medicine, and production inputs. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz disrupts this chain, and particularly with the removal of the United Arab Emirates’ role as a regional trade hub, the supply network collapses. The key point is that alternative routes, such as land transportation or northern corridors, lack sufficient capacity. These routes are not only limited but also far more costly. Therefore, even if imports continue, the final cost of goods will rise sharply. In fact, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is not a temporary shock but a “structural shock”; one that irreversibly alters Iran’s foreign trade patterns and pushes the economy into a phase of gradual collapse.

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the transmission of the crisis to people’s livelihoods

A significant portion of Iran’s imports is allocated to essential goods, from grains and rice to cooking oil and livestock feed. Disruption in this sector directly leads to rising food prices and reduced access to necessities for the population. Even if famine does not occur, shifting import routes to land corridors multiplies costs several times over. This increase is directly passed on to consumers and reduces living standards. At a time when inflation has already reached unprecedented levels, this pressure can further erode purchasing power. Alongside this, production enterprises also face a crisis. The dependence of industries on imported machinery and components means that trade disruptions lead to production stoppages. The result of this trend is rising unemployment and expanding poverty. Available statistics show that even before the escalation of conflict, hundreds of thousands of jobs were lost and millions were at risk of unemployment. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz accelerates this trend and can trigger a wave of widespread joblessness. Under such conditions, the support structure is also incapable. The unemployment insurance system is limited and unable to cover millions of newly unemployed individuals. As a result, the economic crisis quickly turns into a social crisis.

Geopolitical deadlock and the inability of allies

One of the key questions under these circumstances is the role of powers such as China and Russia. However, the reality is that these countries also face serious limitations. China, as an energy-intensive economy, is harmed by rising energy prices. Although it may continue trade with Iran, this trade will be conducted at much higher costs. As a result, it not only fails to help resolve the crisis but itself becomes a factor in increasing costs. Russia is in a similar position. Its dependence on limited markets and the challenges arising from sanctions have reduced its ability to effectively support Iran. Any potential cooperation is largely confined to areas such as food supplies, which cannot replace extensive maritime trade.

The blockade as a consequence of a flawed structure

A final analysis of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would be incomplete without considering the structural roots of Iran’s economy. Iran’s economic problems are not merely the result of war or blockade but are rooted in institutional structures that have developed over decades. The weakening of private property rights, the expansion of rent-seeking institutions, and the elimination of independent economic actors are among the factors that have made the economy vulnerable. In such a structure, any external shock quickly turns into an internal crisis. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has, in fact, exposed these structural weaknesses. An economy heavily dependent on oil revenues and limited trade routes lacks resilience against such shocks. Ultimately, it is Iranian society that pays the highest price. A population already under economic pressure now faces an even deeper crisis.

Iran’s Regime Moves to Seize Assets of Dissidents

Mehdi Hosseini
-
0
Iran’s Regime Moves to Seize Assets of Dissidents
Iran’s regime has once again revealed its true nature in the form of an overt state-backed theft; this time by confiscating and seizing the assets of opponents and closing all legal avenues to defend private property. Azam Ghoveydel, spokesperson for the State Organization for Registration of Deeds and Properties, announced that the assets of individuals seized by the judicial system of Iran’s regime cannot be transferred even with a power of attorney. In clearer terms, the regime has not only limited itself to suppressing individuals but has also designed an official and online mechanism to plunder their assets. This official said that even if a power of attorney for selling a property has been issued before the seizure, as long as the official transfer has not been registered, the property remains under the ownership of the individual, and as soon as a judicial order is issued, the seizure is recorded in electronic records, making any official transfer impossible from that moment onward. These remarks come as the judiciary of Iran’s regime had previously reported the seizure of assets belonging to hundreds of opponents of the regime under fabricated charges such as cooperation with the enemy—security-related and repressive accusations that for years have become a standard tool of the regime and its affiliated judiciary to take revenge on opponents. The confiscation of assets belonging to Iranian activists abroad and restrictions on providing legal services constitute a clear violation of Iranians’ rights and a trampling even of the regime’s own existing laws. What is happening today is not the implementation of justice, but the continuation of a policy of extortion, intimidation, and organized looting that the regime employs to silence dissenting voices. Iran’s regime has now clearly shown that for its survival, it targets both the lives and the property of the people. A regime incapable of accountability imposes theft on the people under the guise of judicial rulings instead of the rule of law.

Execution of PMOI Members Hamed Validi and Nima Shahi in Tehran

Sia Rajabi
-
0
Execution of PMOI Members Hamed Validi and Nima Shahi in Tehran
In the early hours of Monday, April 20, Hamed Validi and Mohammad (Nima) Massoum Shahi, two members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), were executed in what was described as a criminal act by the Iranian regime’s judiciary. Mizan News Agency, affiliated with the regime’s judiciary, reported the news and identified them as Mohammad Massoum Shahi and Hamed Validi, falsely linking them to a spy network. These two members of the PMOI had previously been sentenced to death in September 2025 on charges of membership in the organization. Hamed Validi, a 45-year-old civil engineer, and Mohammad Shahi, a 38-year-old technical worker, were arrested on May 13, 2025, in Tehran along with several of their relatives and were subjected to pressure and medieval torture during interrogations.
Details of the Execution of six PMOI Members
On September 27, the head of the judiciary in Alborz Province accused these individuals and two other detainees of espionage in connection with a 12-day war, despite the fact that they had been arrested about one month before the conflict began. Earlier, the PMOI had submitted their identities to international bodies, including the United Nations and human rights organizations. News of their arrest had also been published on September 7, 2025. The Iranian regime executed 6 other members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) in late March and early April. It also executed two other members of the organization in August 2025. At the time, the Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an opposition coalition, had called for the case to be reviewed by an international fact-finding mission. On the night before the execution, the NCRI also issued an urgent appeal to international bodies, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, and other human rights authorities, calling for immediate action to prevent the execution.
1...678...3,783Page 7 of 3,783