Home Blog Page 149

The Iranian Regime Increases Military Budget By 200%

Massoud Pezeshkian, the president of the Iranian regime, has called for a “200 percent” increase in the military budget in his first budget proposal since taking office.  

Fatemeh Mohajerani, the government spokesperson, stated in a press conference on Tuesday, October 29, that “the doubling of the budget is to strengthen the country’s defense capabilities.”  

Pezeshkian’s government spokesperson did not specify the total amount allocated for the 2025 military budget.  

The official, non-confidential segment of Iran’s military budget  

The military budget that various Iranian administrations include in the budget bill and present to parliament constitutes the official and disclosed funds allocated to the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. It does not cover classified budget items, with a large portion of the military budget going to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  

Iran’s 2024 military budget was officially announced at approximately 4.7 quadrillion rials (around $16.49 billion at the official exchange rate and $6.8 billion at the free market rate), accounting for one-sixth of the entire year’s budget. Later, the parliament, at the request of Ebrahim Raisi‘s administration, approved an additional allocation of over 1.32 quadrillion rials (around $4.63 billion at the official rate and $1.92 billion at the free market rate) in crude oil for the armed forces to sell and supplement their budget.  

Iran is the only government globally that officially allows its armed forces to participate in selling the nation’s natural resources and directly acquire a portion of them.  

It is notable that these dollars are provided to military organizations at the official rate, while ordinary citizens must obtain dollars from the free market.  

Iran’s military budget in international reports  

Due to a lack of financial transparency and the presence of multiple military institutions in Iran, various international financial bodies, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, have continually attempted to approximate Iran’s actual military budget. However, these global organizations have never succeeded in providing a definitive report.  

For example, SIPRI estimated Iran’s military budget at $10.3 billion in 2023.  

According to reports, Iran’s 2024 military budget, based on an official exchange rate of 285,000 rials per dollar (while the free market rate currently hovers around 685,500 rials per dollar), was equivalent to $25.3 billion, reflecting a 21 percent increase from the previous year.  

Based on details released so far from Iran’s upcoming budget bill, it is estimated that 47 percent of the country’s oil export revenues will again be directly allocated to the armed forces, as it was this year. This amount equates to 5.61 quadrillion rials (approximately $19.68 billion at the official exchange rate and $8.18 billion at the free market rate), while the government’s own share of these resources is only 43 percent, or around 5.09 quadrillion rials.  

Beyond the country’s oil resources allocated directly to the armed forces for sale, Iran’s National Development Fund has consistently served as an accessible source to meet the government’s urgent needs, preventing it from succumbing to severe economic and military crises.  

During his three years in office and in the few months since Pezeshkian’s administration began, the Iranian government has repeatedly emphasized its access to National Development Fund resources based on the approval of the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and has expressed gratitude for his “benevolence.”  

Pezeshkian’s administration stated that it inherited a relatively empty treasury from its deceased predecessor and still lacks funds to pay wheat farmers and meet nurses’ demands, with some needs met through withdrawals from the National Development Fund.  

Amid Iran’s dire economic and livelihood conditions this year—characterized by continued capital flight, persistent inflation, and a declining stock market—evidence suggests that the Iranian regime has not refrained from using secret budgets for its security operations abroad, particularly to provide financial and military support to its proxy groups.

EU Condemns Execution of Jamshid Sharmahd, Weighs Actions Against Iran’s Regime

0

The announcement of the execution of Jamshid Sharmahd, an Iranian-German political prisoner under the Iranian regime, on Monday, October 28, has sparked widespread domestic and international reactions.

A few hours after Germany summoned its ambassador from Tehran in protest of Jamshid Sharmahd’s execution, the European Union also issued a strongly worded statement condemning the killing of this Iranian-German citizen and announced plans to pursue targeted and significant actions against the Iranian regime.

In its statement, the EU did not specify details of these actions but called on the Iranian regime to end its “troubling” practice of detaining foreign and dual nationals to gain political leverage.

The statement described capital punishment as a “cruel and inhumane” punishment and, noting the significant increase in executions in Iran over the past and current year, urged the Iranian regime to end the use of the death penalty.

Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian regime’s Foreign Minister, responded to Germany’s protest over Sharmahd’s execution by calling him a “terrorist” and stated that no terrorist is immune in Iran, even if supported by Germany. He added that a German passport does not grant immunity to anyone.

Amnesty International declared that Sharmahd’s arbitrary execution by Iranian authorities is yet another egregious and blatant violation of the right to life. Amnesty noted that the use of the death penalty is appalling under any circumstance and wrote that the arbitrary execution of Sharmahd following a grossly unfair trial, coupled with the relentless oppression inflicted on him and his family by Iranian officials, is even more horrific.

Sharmahd, 67, who had previously resided in the United States, was kidnapped by Iranian regime agents on August 1, 2020, during a trip from Germany to India after a three-day layover in Dubai. He was subsequently transferred to Iran and sentenced to death.

Many citizens, political and civil activists, and families seeking justice have also described the execution of Jamshid Sharmahd as a state-sponsored murder and have condemned it in the strongest terms. Additionally, they have referred to Sharmahd’s killing as yet another instance of the Iranian regime’s retaliation against its people following recent attacks by Israel.

Ariane Tabatabai’s New Position at the Pentagon Reduces Her Security Clearance

0

On Monday, October 28, the Free Press website reported that Ariane Tabatabai, who previously served as Chief of Staff to the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, has taken on a new role in the department, significantly reducing her access to classified U.S. military information and programs.

According to the report, the U.S. Department of Defense recently transferred Tabatabai to her new position quietly. Previously working in the “Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict” (SO/LIC) at the Pentagon, she will now serve as the “Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education and Force Training.”

Tabatabai’s name had previously been linked to an Iranian regime influence network within the U.S.

In early 2014, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed a group of analysts and researchers abroad under the “Iran Experts Initiative,” utilizing this network for years to expand the Iranian regime’s soft power and enhance its influence on the international stage.

Three of Robert Malley’s aides, the suspended U.S. Special Envoy for Iran, including Ariane Tabatabai, reportedly maintained close and unconventional ties with the Iranian regime.

In addition to Tabatabai, Ali Vaez and Dina Esfandiary are members of the network guided by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with records of their exchanges with Iranian diplomats having been exposed.

Malley’s security clearance was suspended in April 2023, and he was placed on unpaid leave.

According to several former U.S. Department of Defense officials who spoke to the Free Press, Tabatabai’s new role provides her with much less access to classified military information and programs.

The report added that, on paper, Tabatabai’s appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education and Force Training does not constitute a promotion, as she was previously a Chief of Staff and is now serving as a Deputy Assistant Secretary.

Another member of the Pentagon’s Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict told the Free Press that Tabatabai’s previous role was among the most sensitive positions in the entire U.S. government.

The anonymous source added: “I cannot underscore: The things SO/LIC… are doing are more sensitive than what the CIA is doing.”

Recently, before Israel’s attack on the Iranian regime on the morning of October 26, the leak of several Pentagon documents regarding the Israeli military’s plan for this operation made headlines.

Several news outlets at that time reported that Tabatabai was involved in leaking this information, although the report was not officially confirmed by either the U.S. or Israel.

Following these reports, the U.S. Department of Defense emphasized that no evidence has emerged regarding the potential role of a Pentagon official in leaking details of Israel’s plan.

Iran’s Regime Still Pursuing the Assassination of Mike Pompeo

0

The U.S. Department of State has informed Congress through a confidential and non-public memo that the Iranian regime is actively plotting to assassinate two senior officials of the Donald Trump administration, including Mike Pompeo, the former U.S. Secretary of State, according to a new report by Washington Free Beacon.

The publication, emphasizing that it had seen the State Department’s confidential memo, added that this memo was sent to Congressional leaders last week.

According to the Washington Free Beacon report, the memo given to Congressional leaders states that Pompeo and Brian Hook, the former U.S. Special Representative for Iran, continue to face “serious and credible” threats from a foreign nation.

This memo was presented to Congressional leaders amid intense competition in the U.S. presidential elections, and at a time when numerous reports have emerged regarding the Iranian regime’s efforts to assassinate Donald Trump.

As reported by the Washington Free Beacon, Tehran’s assassination plots first surfaced in January 2022, when the publication reported that Congress was informed of threats against Brian Hook’s life. Shortly after, it became apparent that Pompeo was also a target due to his role in isolating the Iranian regime during his tenure as Secretary of State.

The Washington Free Beacon further stated that since January 2021, this is the twentieth time that Congress has been informed of credible threats against Brian Hook, a key architect of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign on the Iranian regime. According to the Beacon, Congress has also been notified 17 times of similar threats against Mike Pompeo.

Mike Pompeo, Brian Hook, and John Bolton, the former National Security Advisor to the White House, are all under U.S. government protection due to these threats.

In May, the FBI announced that it was actively pursuing an Iranian regime intelligence agent planning to assassinate Pompeo and other American officials. This individual, identified as Majid Dastjiani Farahani, is reportedly recruiting individuals for operations in the United States, including the targeted assassination of current and former U.S. government officials.

In September, Matthew Olsen, the U.S. Assistant Attorney General, told Politico: The Iranian government has made it clear that it is determined to avenge the death of Qassem Soleimani against former officials involved in his killing.

The Washington Free Beacon then noted remarks by Hossein Mousavian, a former member of the Iranian regime’s nuclear negotiation team who now works as a Middle East security and nuclear policy expert at Princeton University. In a documentary produced by the IRGC in 2022, Mousavian promoted threats against Brian Hook, the U.S. Special Representative for Iran.

In the 72-hour documentary, Mousavian stated: “I went to America, and an American told me that Brian Hook’s wife cannot sleep. She cries and trembles. She told Brian: They will kill you. Hook is complicit in Haj Qassem’s death, and that is why they are so afraid and trembling.” Qassem Soleimani was the head of the terrorist IRGC Quds Force. He was eliminated in a U.S. drone strike in Iraq in January 2020.

Iran: Cyrus Day and the Closed Gates of Pasargadae

0

Since 2016, following the gathering of thousands of people at Pasargadae to participate in the Cyrus Day commemorations, the Iranian regime’s State Security Forces have blocked the roads leading to his tomb each year.  

Iranian state media report that for several consecutive years, the gates of Pasargadae and Persepolis have been closed to enthusiasts and domestic tourists on “Cyrus Day.”  

Since October 25, police and security forces have been stationed at Cyrus’s tomb, setting up barriers along the roads leading to it.  

Excavation work has also begun on the road leading to Persepolis, and tomorrow, although neither Persepolis nor Pasargadae are officially closed, the roads to these two major historical and tourist sites will be blocked.  

Despite the restrictions for Iranian citizens, foreign tour groups entering Iran are allowed to visit Pasargadae and Persepolis until October 30.  

The newspaper “Payam-e Ma” also announced on Sunday that on October 28, the staff at the World Heritage site of Pasargadae could take leave, as no one is permitted to enter the site.  

The newspaper reported: “For several days, local businesses have had to close. Pasargadae is going dormant, and its tourism is shutting down.”  

Since 2016, the State Security Forces have been blocking the roads leading to Cyrus’s tomb each year following the gathering of thousands of people at Pasargadae for Cyrus Day commemorations.  

That year, a group of attendees chanted slogans against the Iranian regime.  

Following the event, the Shiraz prosecutor announced the arrest of the organizers and the initiation of “legal proceedings” against them.  

A Babylonian clay tablet records that Cyrus, the Persian emperor, entered Babylon on October 28, and upon conquering the city, freed the Jews who had been enslaved.  

The symbol of this event is the Cyrus Cylinder, commissioned by Cyrus, and it is regarded as the first charter of human rights.

Currency and Oil Markets Disrupted After Israel’s Attack Against Iran’s Regime

After concerns about Israel attacking Iran’s energy facilities subsided, Iran’s stock index showed consecutive growth, while global oil prices fell by 6%. However, the dollar’s exchange rate against the rial has remained at a high level.  

Following Iran’s large-scale missile attack on Israel on October 1, the U.S. dollar exchange rate in Iran’s open market quickly surged from 600,000 rials to 690,000 rials.  

Prior to Israel’s attack, there were concerns about Iran’s energy and nuclear infrastructure being targeted. However, after Israel’s limited military strikes, the dollar’s rate briefly dropped to 657,500 rials but quickly reversed and began rising again over the past two days.  

On Monday evening, October 28, the dollar was trading at 675,500 rials.  

Massoud Pezeshkian’s administration and the Central Bank have not explained why, despite the diminished threat of potential attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure, the dollar exchange rate continues to climb.  

Meanwhile, on Monday, a spokesperson for the regime’s Plan and Budget Organization claimed that essential goods will continue to be imported at a rate of 285,000 rials per dollar next year.  

This claim was made despite the fact that the 2025 budget bill explicitly states that the exchange rate for essential goods will gradually increase compared to 2024 in line with the inflation rate.  

Simply put, given this year’s 33% inflation rate and the forecast of over 30% inflation for next year (according to official regime statistics, though, the real rate is higher), the preferential dollar rate in 2025 will be at least 370,000 rials.  

Despite the dollar’s resilience in Iran’s currency market, the Tehran stock exchange index, which had declined after Iran’s missile strikes on Israel, has surged by 80,000 points over the past three days, reaching 2,050,000 points. However, this is still 80,000 points below its level on the day before Iran’s October 1 missile attack on Israel.  

On Monday, the first trading day in global oil markets, oil prices dropped by 6%, with the Brent Crude index trading below $72, exactly matching its price on the day before Iran’s missile attack on Israel.

Iranian Teachers Disqualified From Work For “Having a Mustache”

In ongoing protests over the selection process for student-teachers and candidates in Iran’s Ministry of Education, some applicants report being rejected based on non-professional reasons, such as reading philosophy books, their style of dress, having a mustache, wearing nail polish, missing prayers, or having minimal attendance at Friday prayers or rallies.

Having interactions with classmates of the opposite sex, liking Instagram pages, not wearing the chador, and visible hair are other reasons cited that have led to these individuals being denied education or teaching positions.

The Shargh news website, run by the regime, reported on Sunday, October 27, in a piece titled “Unprofessional Selection,” that several applicants and student-teachers have protested the Ministry of Education’s selection process, though their grievances have gone unanswered.

Strange Reasons for Rejection in the Selection Process  

One rejected candidate stated that this year, “Code Six,” an unexplained addition to the Teacher Recruitment Exam, was introduced and led to their disqualification.

Another candidate explained to Shargh that they were rejected under “Code 19,” which pertains to political issues, dress code, hijab, not participating in elections, and liking Instagram pages. “Many candidates were told they were disqualified due to Code 19. I was rejected for the same reason.”

Mohammad Heydari-Verjani, former secretary of the Islamic Association at Rajaei Teacher Training University, said that a student was told during the selection process, “Because of your mustache style, you have a Marxist appearance in our opinion, and you are disqualified.”

According to Heydari, a female student studying at Sari University was rejected on the first day of selection because she once crossed from the women’s section to the men’s section for a university association program.

In its report, Shargh described the rejection of an Isfahani student for reading philosophy books as the most bizarre action taken in the selection process. Citing Heydari, the report stated that the student was told, “You read philosophy books, and in our view, people who read too many books have psychological issues,” leading to their expulsion with “psychological problems” noted in their record.

A teacher with 18 years of experience, who has faced selection issues multiple times, told Shargh, “In the Education Ministry’s selection process, interviewers and experts start probing the candidate’s religious and political beliefs from the very beginning.”

This teacher noted that during the hiring phase, candidates are evaluated on things like the type of pants they wear, the length of their shirt sleeves, liking posts on social media, performing daily prayers, the number of prayer units (rak’ahs) and supplications, and participation in rallies and religious events. “This certainly does not suffice to assess their capability.”

He added, “Sometimes in the selection process, even attire in family gatherings is questioned. No reasonable standard accepts such inquiries for employment.”

The teacher pointed to questions of belief during selection, stating, “Beyond belief-related issues, interviewers sometimes insist so strongly on candidates expressing certain political inclinations that out of fear of saying something contrary to their political views, individuals may falsely declare insincere political tendencies.”

In January, the Coordinating Council of Teacher Trade Unions reported that around 3,000 to 6,000 candidates were rejected on political and religious grounds in Iran’s Education Ministry recruitment exams in 2023.

Alireza Kazemi, the Education Minister under regime President Massoud Pezeshkian, said on September 9 that “sensitivity” must be shown in the recruitment of teachers and school administrators and that “all teachers should possess precise scientific and moral profiles.”

Since the autumn of 2022, following the nationwide uprising that year, dozens of teachers have been suspended or permanently dismissed by the Ministry of Education’s Disciplinary Board for professional activities and support of revolutionary movements.

Iran’s Regime Will Not Meet Projected Oil Revenues This Year or Next

Iran’s regime Majlis (parliament) Research Center reports that during the first four months of this year (March 21 to July 22), the government’s oil revenue budget faced a deficit, and the revenue target set by the government in the 2025 budget bill for oil exports is unlikely to be achieved.

In next year’s budget bill, the government has set oil and gas export revenue at 5,090 trillion tomans (approximately $7.7 billion based on the free-market rate of 660,000 rials per dollar).

The government projects daily oil exports of 1.85 million barrels for the coming year, with 1.25 million barrels valued at 5,090 trillion rials allocated to the government, 550,000 barrels valued at 6,870 trillion rials (about $10.4 billion) set aside for the armed forces and specific programs, and 50,000 barrels designated to meet commitments under Article 12.

The reason why the government’s oil export volume is more than double that of the armed forces but generates less revenue is that a portion of the government’s foreign exchange revenue from oil exports is allocated for importing essential goods at a lower rate. Meanwhile, the exchange rate for euros derived from oil sales for the armed forces is set above 500,000 rials.

The Majlis Research Center, noting an 18% shortfall in the government’s oil budget for the first four months of this year, has projected that 18% of next year’s oil budget is also unlikely to be realized.

According to this center’s estimates, the government has set next year’s oil export price at $63 per barrel, but this figure may only reach $60. “The government expects daily oil exports of 1.25 million barrels (excluding allocations for the armed forces and specific programs) for itself, but actual achievement may be only 1.1 million barrels. The government also projects 16 billion cubic meters of gas exports, though the actual figure may only reach 12 billion cubic meters,” the report by the Majlis Research Center reads.

Iran’s gas exports last year also amounted to just 12 billion cubic meters, and it is unclear why the government has projected 16 billion cubic meters for next year given the increasing gas shortfall.

The daily export target of 1.85 million barrels set by the government and armed forces contrasts with tanker-tracking company data, which shows that Iran’s oil exports this year have averaged 1.5 million barrels per day.

In the 2025 budget bill, the National Development Fund’s share of the country’s oil exports is set at 48%, with 20% allocated to the fund and 28%—valued at 5,410 trillion rials (around $8.19 billion)—to be borrowed by the government.

50,000 Nurses Unemployed in Iran

With 50,000 nurses reportedly unemployed in Iran despite a shortage of healthcare personnel, Mohammad Sharifi Moghaddam, Secretary-General of Iran’s Nurses’ Home, stated, “Unless we fix the infrastructure, hiring is like pouring water into a sieve.”

Sharifi Moghaddam told the state-affiliated newspaper Shargh that nurses are currently emigrating, leaving their jobs, or switching to other professions.

According to this labor official, the Ministry of Health also acknowledges that new hires often leave within a month or two due to low income.

Sharifi Moghaddam also criticized healthcare management, stating, “Everyone says there’s no budget. In fact, there is a budget, but unfortunately, it’s spent elsewhere and on other groups within the healthcare system.”

Previously, Ahmad Nejatian, head of the Iranian Nursing Organization, had stated that “standards and metrics related to human resources” in the healthcare sector are very low.

In an interview with the state-run ISNA news agency, Nejatian warned that to compensate for the staffing shortage, “nurses are forced into mandatory overtime,” but “their compensation does not match the services provided and the hardship of the work.”

In August, the worsening issues facing nurses led to an extended nationwide strike, during which hundreds of nurses and medical staff in public hospitals held protests and strikes across at least 16 provinces in Iran, emphasizing their demands for fair labor and economic conditions. These actions continued into September.

One-Third of Iranians Deprived of Basic Needs

A report from Iran’s Majlis (Parliament) Research Center shows that, with the poverty rate stabilized above 30.1%, one-third of the nation’s citizens are unable to meet their basic needs.

According to the report, Iran’s poverty rate reached 30.1% of the population in 2023, and projections from the Majlis Research Center indicate this rate will remain at the current level in 2024.

The poverty rate in Iran has risen significantly since 2018, reaching 31% in 2019. Over the past five years, this rate has only dropped below 30% once, in 2022, by a margin of just 0.3%.

Experts note that due to the relative stability of poverty rates over the past few years, it can be concluded that the 30% poverty rate in Iran has become entrenched.

The stabilization of the poverty rate implies that the percentage of the population living below the poverty line remains steady, with no immediate improvement in their living conditions.

The latest findings from the Majlis Research Center indicate that the poverty gap (the income disparity of the poor relative to the poverty line) in Iran has reached 0.28.

This index, which measures the income gap of the poor relative to the poverty line, reflects the likelihood of escaping poverty. Essentially, the wider the poverty gap, the lower the chances for the poor to escape poverty.

These statistics indicate that while economic growth is typically a key remedy for rising poverty, Iran’s poverty rate has grown despite a 4.5% economic growth in 2023.

A look at poverty indicators shows the poverty gap decreased slightly from 0.28 in 2022 to 0.27 in 2023. In other words, in 2022, the poor earned on average about 72% of the poverty line income, which rose to 73% in 2023.

In effect, using the 2023 poverty line, the poor have slightly higher incomes than in 2022; however, this marginal income increase has not been sufficient to alleviate poverty or reduce the poverty rate.

Reasons for the Spread of Poverty in Iran  

Experts believe the main causes of poverty expansion in Iran are macroeconomic instability and persistently high inflation.

Statistics show that over the past decade, sustained high inflation has significantly eroded the economic power of the population annually, leading to a rise in the impoverished population.

The main reason behind the rise in poverty in Iran, despite economic growth, is the high contribution of oil to economic growth, meaning that economic growth in Iran is not inclusive.

In other words, Iran’s economic growth in 2023 has not been inclusive, and the lower-income deciles have not benefited from this growth.

According to Iran’s Central Bank data, Iran’s economic growth in 2023 was 4.5% including oil, and 3.6% excluding oil.

The Research Center’s report on the rise in Iran’s poverty rate indicates that the government’s support policies in recent years have been unsuccessful, with the cost of fulfilling subsidy commitments becoming a heavy burden on the budget.

The Center, reviewing the latest developments in Iran’s economy, emphasized that policymakers should avoid inaction and delays, instead pursuing gradual reform policies to address some of the existing imbalances.

The Research Center stresses the need for appropriate solutions to tackle energy imbalances, banking imbalances, budget deficits, and price stabilization policies.

In 2018, the World Bank announced that approximately 420,000 Iranians were living below the absolute poverty line. Additionally, according to the Research Center’s 2018 report, between 23% and 40% of Iran’s total population lives below the poverty line.

It is worth noting that these government statistics are not entirely reliable, as the Iranian regime often attempts to portray conditions as better than they are. However, official statistics can still provide a basis for comparison.