Following the announcement of the agreement between Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister of Iran’s regime, some members of Majlis (parliament) reacted harshly to the deal.

This behavior raises questions about the hidden objectives behind these actions and their contradiction with the foreign policy of Iran’s regime.

Even though any international agreement is made in full coordination with Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran’s regime, and higher security institutions, why do Majlis members take such positions?

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One day after the announcement of the agreement between Iran’s regime and the IAEA, Javad Hosseini-Kia, a member of Majlis, stated: “We know for sure that the Agency has given information about nuclear sites to Mossad.” He also added: “Grossi himself is a Mossad agent, and we demand his prosecution.”

Before him, Fatemeh Mohammadi-Beigi, a representative from Qazvin, had made the same claim. She said: “Grossi will not be allowed to enter our country.” She further added: “If he enters, he must be arrested and tried as an accused for his crimes.” She continued: “The Iranian people will never forget the betrayals of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Grossi.”

In the same line, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of the state-run Kayhan newspaper and a close confidant of Khamenei, had called for the execution of Rafael Grossi.

These statements come at a time when Iran’s regime foreign policy is working to prevent the implementation of the “trigger mechanism” or snapback sanctions, which are being pursued by the three European countries at the United Nations Security Council.

Its implementation would lead to the re-imposition of crippling and broad UN sanctions against Iran’s regime.

This situation clearly highlights the contradiction between the statements of some Majlis members and the regime’s diplomatic approach.

On June 9, Mojtaba Zarei, a Majlis representative from Tehran, made claims in a Twitter post. He alleged: “We now know which bombs of the Israeli gang are located at which point and in which shelter.” He also referred to technical details and calculations regarding these bombs.

He also stated: “We brought more than 10 million pages of documents.” According to Zarei, the publication of parts of these documents would cause crises in Asia, Europe, and the United States. These remarks were followed, four days later, by an Israeli attack against Iran’s regime and the assassination of its military commanders and scientists.

Such behaviors from some Majlis members are not unprecedented. On May 9, 2018, in reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal (JCPOA), Majlis members burned the U.S. flag and a copy of the JCPOA during a public session.

This action increased the level of tension between Iran’s regime and the United States. Ultimately, following the deadlock in negotiations and escalating tensions, including an attack by Khamenei’s proxy forces on the U.S. embassy in Iraq, Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the IRGC, was assassinated on the orders of U.S. President Donald Trump.

Then, the Ukrainian passenger plane was shot down by the IRGC’s air defense on orders. This incident triggered widespread protests within Iran’s regime.

The accusations against Rafael Grossi and demands for his prosecution by some parliament members faced a reaction from another representative.

Mojtaba Tavangar, a representative from Tehran, on September 9, 2025, objected to these behaviors during a parliament session. He said: “The cost of the words and actions of some individuals should not be paid by the entire parliament.” Tavangar added: “They make such a mess that they overshadow the parliament’s historic action.”

He further said: “This is happening in a parliament that proudly carries the sign of being revolutionary.” Then he posed a critical question: “Does revolutionary behavior have any meaning without ethics and rationality?”

Question regarding parliament members’ behavior and explanation of their conduct

Now the question is, why do parliament members, despite knowing about the coordination of the foreign ministry with Khamenei and higher authorities, take such positions?

A former parliament member said in this regard: “The troublemakers in the parliament are Khamenei’s proxy representatives.”

He believes that just as Khamenei authorizes the signing of international agreements, he also orders the application of pressure and disorder. He added: “They do not accuse the IAEA Director General of espionage on their own.”

According to this former parliament member, if one looks at the backgrounds of these representatives, they are generally long-standing figures. These individuals are not reprimanded for their crisis-provoking remarks. He added: “On the contrary, they are even encouraged, and their eligibility is approved in every election.”

In his view, a representative who makes unconventional statements does not act independently but carries out an assigned mission. He named Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel and Hossein Fadaei as intermediaries between Khamenei’s office and the parliament. The former member said: “In the past, Khamenei’s messages were conveyed to the parliament troublemakers through them.”

These remarks clearly show that this policy, like Khamenei’s “hardliner vs. reformist” scenario, is used domestically to influence the shaky base of loyal regime forces, giving them the impression that part of the regime opposes such negotiations.

Ultimately, if things go wrong, these same figures place the blame on the defeated faction of the regime, just as they did with the failure of the nuclear deal (JCPOA). In this way, Khamenei and his faction are always whitewashed.

This policy, however, seems to have lost its previous effectiveness in the current context of Khamenei’s deepening weakness across foreign, regional, proxy, and especially domestic fronts.