Key IRGC Commander Killed Alongside Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of the Iranian regime has confirmed the death of Abbas Nilforoushan, the Deputy for Operations of this military force.
Abbas Nilforoushan was killed in an Israeli airstrike in the Dahiya area of southern Beirut, Lebanon’s capital, on the afternoon of Friday, September 27.
This is the same attack that resulted in the death of Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, and several other commanders of the group, which is supported by the Iranian regime and designated as a terrorist organization by the United States.
U.S. Citizen Charged with Having Ties to Iranian Intelligence
The U.S. Department of Justice announced on Friday, September 27, that Abuzar Rahmati, a former contractor for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was officially charged in a Washington court for acting and attempting to act as an agent of the Iranian government on U.S. soil without notifying the Attorney General.
According to the indictment, 42-year-old Abuzar Rahmati, a U.S. citizen, had contact with Iranian regime officials and their intelligence agents from December 2017 to June 2024.
The report states that Rahmati accessed sensitive, non-public information through his work as an FAA contractor and provided non-public information about the U.S. solar energy industry to Iran.
According to U.S. judicial officials, Rahmati lied about his background during the hiring process and did not disclose his service in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The U.S. Department of Justice emphasized in its statement that it will use all available tools to identify and prosecute Iranian agents or those from any foreign government attempting to infiltrate U.S. companies or government agencies.
On August 14, the U.S. Department of Justice also charged Jeffrey Chance Nader, a 68-year-old Iranian-American, with illegally exporting U.S.-made aircraft parts to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Matthew Olsen, the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division, said Nader’s arrest reflects America’s commitment to preventing the Iranian regime from acquiring military equipment and added that the U.S. will continue to aggressively investigate, disrupt, and hold accountable the criminal networks supplying sensitive technologies to hostile and repressive governments.
Robert R. Wells, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, highlighted Nader’s arrest and stressed that circumventing U.S. export control laws is unacceptable. He added that the FBI, in cooperation with global partners, is committed to identifying and prosecuting individuals and companies that violate export laws.
Iran’s Shared Oil and Gas Fields Are in Dire Condition
With Kuwait and Saudi Arabia completing their studies for developing the “Al-Durra” (Arash) field, Abdolreza Abed, the commander of the IRGC Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, has issued a warning and requested that this institution be involved in the field’s development.
Abed also claimed that Khatam al-Anbiya has the capability to develop the Esfandiar and Farzad fields, which are shared with Saudi Arabia.
Iran has 28 shared oil and gas fields with neighboring countries, in almost all of which it has fallen behind its neighbors.
The main reasons for Iran’s lag in oil and gas extraction from shared fields are a lack of investment and modern technology.
Iran’s most important shared fields are with Iraq, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. These countries, with the help of international, particularly Western, companies, have significantly increased their oil and gas production and continue to expand extraction from these fields.
In contrast, Iran’s Oil Ministry, lacking foreign investments and a capable private sector, relies on 14.5% of oil revenues for investments in the fossil energy sector.
According to the Parliamentary Research Center, annual investment in the country’s oil and gas fields has dropped from around $18 billion in the 2000s to approximately $7 billion in the early 2010s, and since 2019, this figure has plummeted to $3 billion.
Shared oil fields account for 20% of Iran’s recoverable oil reserves and 30% of its gas reserves.
With 33 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves and 157 billion barrels of oil reserves, Iran ranks second and fourth globally in hydrocarbon reserves.
The Foroozan Field and Falling Behind Saudi Arabia
Iran shares several oil and gas fields with Saudi Arabia but has only managed to produce 35,000 barrels per day (bpd) from the Foroozan field, while Saudi Arabia produces 14 times more oil from the same field. Saudi Arabia has signed a $12 billion contract with international companies over the past five years, aiming to increase oil production by 60% to 800,000 bpd and boost gas production by 70 million cubic meters per day.
The Farzad Field and Failure in Development
Iran has another large shared gas field with Saudi Arabia near Foroozan, called the “Farzad” field. Negotiations between Iran and the Indian companies that discovered the field have dragged on for over a decade without success, and Iran itself lacks the $5 billion investment needed to develop this field, which has a highly complex structure.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia immediately began developing the field after its discovery by the Indians in 2008 and started gas production in 2013. Saudi Arabia is now producing over 30 million cubic meters of gas per day from the field, and Aramco’s plan to increase production to 75 million cubic meters per day is progressing rapidly.
The Esfandiar and Arash Fields
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also share the Esfandiar (Lulu) and Arash (Al-Durra) oil and gas fields with Iran. They have developed the Esfandiar field for years, and with a $10 billion investment, plan to begin producing 30 million cubic meters of gas and 84,000 barrels of condensate daily from Arash by the end of the year, within five years.
These two countries have rejected Iran’s claim to a share in the Arash field, asserting exclusive rights to its extraction, a position Iran does not accept.
Shared Fields with Iraq
Iran’s largest shared oil fields are with Iraq, a neighbor that extracts four times as much oil as Iran from these fields. Iraq has signed massive contracts with Chinese, Russian, and Western companies to increase extraction from these fields.
The Salman and Nosrat Fields
Iran shares two oil fields with the United Arab Emirates, named “Salman” and “Nosrat.”
The UAE produces 65,000 bpd from the Nosrat field, which is 20 times more than Iran’s production from the same field.
South Pars and Qatar
Iran’s largest gas field, South Pars, is shared with Qatar. Qatar started extracting gas ten years before Iran and has produced twice as much gas.
While Iran’s share of the South Pars gas field entered its second half of life last year, causing a reduction of 10 billion cubic meters in its production annually, Qatar has signed $29 billion worth of contracts with international companies over the past two years. These agreements aim to increase gas production by 40% by 2027 and 60% by 2030.
Currently, both Iran and Qatar produce approximately 180 billion cubic meters of gas annually from South Pars.
To maintain production from this massive gas field, Iran needs to install 20,000-ton platforms (15 times the size of current platforms) and large compressors, technology that is exclusively held by Western companies.
Qatar also extracts 450,000 barrels of crude oil daily from the oil layer of the South Pars gas field, which is 13 times more than Iran’s production from the same layer.
Iran’s Budget for IRGC’s Baqiatollah Base Quadruples in Three Years
The budget for the Baqiatollah Base, a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has seen a staggering increase over the past three years, according to a report by Iran Open Data on Wednesday, September 25. This military and cultural unit has had its funding increase from 668 billion tomans in 2021 to 888 billion tomans in 2022, reaching nearly 3,000 billion tomans in the 2024 budget. This quadrupling of financial resources underscores the growing support for institutions tied to the regime’s cultural and social agenda.
Cultural and Social Influence
The Baqiatollah Base primarily uses its funding to support a range of cultural and social institutions, including the Owj and Seraj institutions. These organizations are heavily involved in media, artistic projects, and cyberspace activities that align with the regime’s ideological objectives. These initiatives allow the regime to exert influence across various forms of cultural expression, including film production, social media campaigns, and online content creation.
Despite the substantial increase in government funding, the Baqiatollah Base’s official website does not disclose the full extent of its budgetary allocations from the state. Instead, it claims that its activities are sustained through public donations, which it terms “cultural jihad.” The site invites financial contributions from citizens via an online payment portal and provides a bank account number under the name “Baqiatollah Cultural Jihad Base” for direct transfers. However, no specific details regarding the amount of these donations or their impact on the overall budget are available, leading to questions about the transparency of the base’s finances.
Key Projects
One of the most prominent programs managed by the Baqiatollah Base is the “Khademin Arbaeen Megaproject,” which organizes volunteer services for pilgrims during the Arbaeen pilgrimage. The base claims that these services, carried out by unpaid volunteers, include tasks such as safeguarding pilgrims’ shoes, providing directions, securing personal belongings, and assisting lost children at religious sites. The program highlights the use of volunteers to manage labor-intensive operations without incurring substantial direct costs.
However, while volunteers contribute time and effort, the massive budget increase suggests a much broader scope of activities beyond unpaid labor. The budgeted amount far exceeds the operational costs typically associated with volunteer services. This has raised questions about the true allocation of funds, especially given the regime’s opaque handling of state finances.
In addition to religious services, the base runs the “Surplus Medicine Plan,” which seeks to collect unused, expired, or surplus medicines from homes across the country. This initiative is positioned as a public health and humanitarian effort, relying on voluntary participation. Collected medicines are sorted and distributed by volunteers, continuing the base’s model of using unpaid labor for public service projects.
Another significant program is the “Karim Ahl al-Bayt Charity,” aimed at providing dowries to low-income families. According to the Baqiatollah Base, each dowry set costs around 16 million tomans. With the 2024 budget increase, the base theoretically has enough funds to supply 187,500 dowries. Yet, as of the latest update, only 23 dowries have been distributed. The disparity between the allocated funds and the minimal distribution of dowries has raised concerns about how the budget is being utilized and whether the funds are being directed toward the intended beneficiaries.
Public Charity and Government Funding
The Baqiatollah Base consistently emphasizes that its work is supported by public donations and volunteerism. For example, the “Sympathy and Faithfulness Exercise” program in 2019, which claimed to have provided 313 food packages to needy families, was described as a project funded through public donations. However, with the dramatic rise in the base’s budget, the need for public donations seems increasingly questionable. If adjusted for inflation and the rise in the cost of goods, the current budget would allow the base to provide food packages for at least one million families, far exceeding the impact of previous efforts.
In another initiative, the “Caravan of Eid al-Ghadir Joy,” the base distributed cake and juice to celebrate the religious occasion. While this project was also funded through public donations, its comparatively modest scope contrasts sharply with the enormous financial resources now at the base’s disposal. These smaller projects, such as distributing snacks and organizing festive activities, may continue to be symbolic gestures, but the disproportionate budget raises questions about the actual financial management and priorities of the Baqiatollah Base.
Leadership and Strategic Role
The Baqiatollah Base is commanded by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the former commander-in-chief of the IRGC. Under Jafari’s leadership, the base has broadened its scope, engaging in both cultural and social projects as well as religious and military initiatives. Jafari’s background in the IRGC suggests a strong link between the base’s activities and the broader ideological goals of the IRGC, particularly its efforts to expand cultural influence and maintain social control through a network of affiliated organizations.
The increase in funding for the Baqiatollah Base also signals a wider trend of militarization of cultural and social activities in Iran. The financial prioritization of institutions like the Baqiatollah Base demonstrates the regime’s strategy to consolidate power through cultural influence, while also building up social programs that align with its ideological mission.
Conclusion
The quadrupling of the Baqiatollah Base’s budget over the past three years points to its increasing significance within the IRGC’s broader mission to project influence across Iran’s social and cultural spheres. While public donations and volunteer efforts are frequently cited as the primary sources of support for the base’s initiatives, the sharp rise in state funding raises questions about transparency and resource allocation. With a budget that now surpasses 3,000 billion tomans, the Baqiatollah Base’s activities have come under greater scrutiny, particularly in light of the relatively limited impact of its public service projects compared to the funds it receives. This development highlights the regime’s strategy of intertwining military, cultural, and social influence, using vast financial resources to sustain its ideological control over the country.
Pope Francis Offers Condolences for Deaths of Tabas Mine Workers in Iran
On Wednesday, September 25, Pope Francis, the leader of the worldwide Catholic Church, responded via telegram to the explosion at the Tabas coal mine in northeastern Iran, which resulted in the deaths of over 50 Iranian workers.
According to “Vatican News,” the Pope expressed his sorrow over the loss of the Iranian workers’ lives in his message and said that he is praying for them.
In his message, Pope Francis also conveyed his “spiritual solidarity” with the injured, adding that he prays for the deceased and their grieving families. He further wished “strength, comfort, and peace” to all those affected by this tragedy.
Iranian media reported that the explosion occurred while approximately 70 workers were inside the mine.
According to local sources, the necessary safety measures required by Iranian regulations had not been followed in the mine.
Following the explosion at the Tabas “Madanjou” coal mine on the evening of Saturday, September 21, the head of the South Khorasan Provincial Crisis Management and the Red Crescent announced that 51 people had died and 20 were injured. Reports also indicated that several workers were still missing.
In a video released by survivors of the incident, the workers said they had smelled methane gas since the morning and informed the authorities, but they were told that nothing would happen, and they must continue working.
Iran’s disadvantaged workers are forced to continue working under these conditions, otherwise they risk being fired. These miners earn approximately 200 dollars per month for 12-hour workdays.
Despite supplying 76% of the country’s coal, this mine lacks basic safety standards and working conditions, as short-term profit and financial gain have been prioritized over the lives and health of Iranian workers.
In Iran, especially in industries related to mining, not only are international standards ignored, but even the country’s internal safety regulations are often neglected.
Iran’s Regime Continues Efforts to Hack and Leak Documents from Donald Trump’s Election Campaign
The hacking of the election campaign of Donald Trump, the Republican nominee in the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, by the Iranian regime has continued over the past ten days and may still be ongoing.
According to U.S. media, journalist and political newsletter writer Judd Legum revealed this on Tuesday, citing a set of “special and confidential” documents emailed to him by a person named “Robert.”
In his newsletter, Legum wrote that on September 18, he received a set of documents from an anonymous sender named “Robert,” which included internal files and emails from Trump’s campaign.
One of these documents, dated September 15, indicates that the hackers’ efforts continued even after Trump’s campaign and various media outlets reported on it.
Legum wrote that Robert refused to identify himself but indicated that he was the same “Robert” who had provided stolen materials from Trump’s campaign in July and August to media outlets like Politico, The New York Times, and The Washington Post.
Robert sent Legum 271 pages of documents about J.D. Vance, Trump’s running mate and vice-presidential candidate, along with other similar “special and confidential” documents concerning two other potential candidates for this role: Marco Rubio and Doug Burgum.
The journalist verified with the editor of The New York Times the authenticity of one of Trump’s lawyer’s letters, dated September 15, which had not been published anywhere but was sent to him by Robert. He concluded that the person or persons identifying themselves as Robert had stolen the electronic communications of individuals connected to Trump’s campaign.
A spokesperson for Donald Trump’s campaign responded simply by saying that the “terror regime in Iran” fears “Trump’s strength and resolve.”
On August 9, Microsoft released a report revealing evidence of the Iranian regime’s hackers attempting to breach the email account of a “high-ranking official” in U.S. election campaigns in June.
On August 10, Donald Trump’s campaign revealed that it had been hacked, stating that Iranian regime operatives had stolen and disseminated sensitive internal documents.
U.S. intelligence agencies confirmed that the Iranian government had attempted to hack both Trump’s and Joe Biden’s election campaigns before Biden withdrew from the race.
The U.S. Department of Justice announced on September 13 that it was preparing to file criminal charges related to the hacking of Donald Trump’s campaign by the Iranian government.
A spokesperson for the U.S. National Security Council emphasized that the Biden administration strongly condemns any government or foreign entity that attempts to interfere in our electoral process or seeks to undermine confidence in our democratic institutions.
Protests in New York Against Iranian President’s UN Visit
On September 24, 2024, supporters of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) rallied in New York City to protest Iranian regime President Masoud Pezeshkian’s attendance at the 79th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The protestors, mostly from the Iranian diaspora, strongly condemned the Iranian regime for its human rights abuses, especially its increasing number of executions, and its support for terrorism.
Chanting slogans like “No to the regime of massacres, no to war and terrorism,” protestors expressed their opposition not only to Pezeshkian’s presence at the UN but also to the overall policies of the Iranian government. They accused Pezeshkian of being involved in crimes, including the 1988 massacre of political prisoners in Iran. The demonstrators claimed that under his administration since August 2024, around 180 people had been executed, while the regime continued to support terrorist proxies abroad.
The Organization of Iranian American Communities (OIAC), which organized the protests, said the event was part of a larger movement to highlight ongoing human rights violations in Iran. “Pezeshkian, hear us. Your regime’s time is ending. Khamenei, the leader in Tehran, will soon be overthrown by the Iranian people,” OIAC declared.
Calls for International Support
The protesters urged the international community, especially Western countries, to stop appeasing the Iranian regime and to support the Iranian people’s right to overthrow the despotic regime. “End appeasement. Recognize the Iranian people’s right to overthrow the criminal regime of Khamenei and his puppets like Pezeshkian,” they chanted. Several notable figures voiced their support for the protests. U.S. Senator Ted Cruz sent a message of solidarity, stating, “The time is long passed for the Iranian regime to end up discarded into the ash heap of history.” He criticized the regime for its consistent opposition to freedom and democracy, pointing out its use of terrorism, hostage-taking, and sham trials to maintain power. Cruz also condemned the fact that despite its poor human rights record, Iran’s leadership was still welcomed on the international stage, specifically at the United Nations. Sam Brownback, the former Governor of Kansas and U.S. Ambassador for Religious Freedom, also voiced his support. He praised the resilience of the protesters and stressed the need for maximum economic pressure on the Iranian regime. Brownback argued that the regime used its financial resources to fund terrorism, and called for international support of the Iranian resistance. He echoed the protesters’ call for regime change, stating, “If we want peace in the Middle East, this regime must be removed.”International Reactions and Continued Criticism
Ambassador Mark Ginsberg was another notable speaker at the event. He condemned the Iranian regime, calling it an “unreformable” and “unsalvageable.” Ginsberg argued that the Iranian people had not chosen their leaders and called for international recognition of their demand for the prosecution of Iran’s rulers. He highlighted the regime’s widespread terrorist activities across the region and claimed that its fall would be a victory for not just Iran, but the broader Middle East. Professor Alan Dershowitz also voiced strong criticism of the Iranian regime, calling it “the most dangerous regime in the world since the Nazis assumed power in the 1930s in Germany.” He supported the ten-point plan of Iranian opposition leader Maryam Rajavi, which calls for a free and democratic Iran. Dershowitz insisted that the people of Iran want a life free of repression and the right to determine their future. He also argued that the fight against the Iranian regime was a global issue, urging the United Nations to stop giving a platform to leaders who do not represent their people.The Ongoing Fight for Freedom
The protests in New York represent a broader, ongoing movement among the Iranian diaspora and supporters of freedom around the world. The demonstrators are calling for an end to the Iranian regime’s brutal dictatorship and advocating for the establishment of a free, democratic, and non-nuclear Iran. As the New York protests show, the fight for a free Iran continues. With growing international attention, the movement’s supporters believe that the Iranian regime’s time is running out.Iran Faces Daily Deficit of 10 Million Liters of Gasoline
Ahmad Maroufkhani, head of the Union of Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Exporters, stated that by the end of next year, Iran will face a daily deficit of 10 million liters of gasoline, and during winter, a diesel fuel deficit will add to this problem.
In an interview with the state-run ILNA news agency, Maroufkhani attributed the main reasons for these imbalances to a lack of proper planning for consumption management and insufficient investment in the refinery sector.
He stated that despite the country’s need to address the gasoline shortage, many petrochemical companies are exporting gasoline additives.
Maroufkhani emphasized that one of the solutions to increase gasoline production is using the petroleum product “Reformate.” He said, “For example, last week we witnessed the export of Reformate to the UAE market,” adding, “This product could instead be combined with naphtha domestically to produce high-quality gasoline.”
The head of the Oil Products Exporters Union, pointing out the lack of regulation in the production and export of petroleum products, explained that the Ministry of Oil must implement regulations to control the export of products related to gasoline production. He also emphasized the need for policies to prevent the export of essential materials needed for domestic gasoline production.
He explained that gasoline products and additives are sent to countries like the UAE, where they are turned back into gasoline and then re-imported into Iran. He said the fundamental solution is that “in the short term, we should stop exporting these products to help meet the country’s fuel needs.”
Maroufkhani, who was speaking as part of the government’s recent initiative to prepare the public and mitigate potential anger, proposed an increase in gasoline prices as “one of the solutions to control consumption.”
However, regarding the implementation of higher gasoline prices, he emphasized the need for “appropriate cultural and social measures” to minimize the “negative effects of this action.”
Previously, in response to widespread criticism of gasoline price increases, Mohammad Reza Aref, the First Vice President of Iran’s regime under Masoud Pezeshkian (President of Iran), stated that the government “will not make any hasty decisions” and “in every decision, we will consider all social, cultural, and justice-related aspects.”
The defense of the gasoline price increase by government officials, media, and its supporters continues, while independent labor and professional organizations, along with numerous social media users, have strongly criticized the decision.
They pointed to the Iranian regime’s large-scale financial support for its proxy groups in the Middle East, the exemption of institutions linked to the regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, from paying taxes, and widespread corruption in the government. They called on the government to abandon economic policies that harm workers and wage earners, rather than increasing gasoline prices, which would place further economic strain on them.
IRGC Prohibits Communication Devices Following Attacks on Hezbollah
Senior Iranian security officials told Reuters on Monday, September 23, that after the explosion of thousands of pagers and wireless devices by Hezbollah allies during last week’s deadly attacks, the IRGC ordered all its members to cease using any communication devices.
Reuters said: “One of the security officials said a large-scale operation is underway by the IRGC to inspect all devices, not just communication equipment. He said most of these devices were either homemade or imported from China and Russia.”
Reuters added: “One of the security officials said a large-scale inspection of all devices, not just communication equipment, is underway by the IRGC. He mentioned that most of these devices are either homemade or imported from China and Russia.”
The Iranian government is concerned about Israeli infiltration, including Iranians working for Israel, leading to extensive investigations of its forces, particularly mid-level and senior IRGC members.
“This includes scrutiny of their bank accounts both in Iran and abroad, as well as their travel history and that of their families,” the security official said.
The security official did not provide details on how the IRGC, which consists of 190,000 personnel, would communicate.
He stated, “We are currently using fully encrypted messaging systems.”
According to the same official, there is widespread concern within Iran’s ruling elite. IRGC officials have contacted Hezbollah for technical assessments, and several examples of the exploded devices have been sent to Tehran for examination by Iranian experts.
Another Iranian official mentioned that the regime’s primary concern is the protection of its nuclear and missile facilities, especially those underground.
He said, “However, security measures at these sites have significantly increased since last year.” This official referred to measures that were heightened following Israel’s attempted sabotage of Iran’s missile program in 2023. Israel has never commented on this.
He added that the current security measures are stricter than ever before, indicating that after the pager explosions in Lebanon, security has increased significantly beyond previous levels.
According to these sources, the Iranian military uses a range of encrypted communication devices, including wireless radios, for secure communication. While specific models and brands may vary, Iran’s military communication equipment is mostly domestically produced or sourced from a combination of domestic and foreign suppliers. He mentioned that Iran’s armed forces have not used pagers for over two decades.
To avoid reliance on foreign imports, especially due to Western sanctions imposed on Iran’s nuclear program, the Iranian regime has developed its own military radios through its defense industries.
However, the Iranian regime has previously imported communication devices from countries such as China, Russia, and even Japan.
Explosion in A Coal Mine in Iran Claims Lives Of 51 Miners
In the wake of an explosion at a coal mine in Tabas, the Iranian regime’s official news agency IRNA reported that 51 miners lost their lives in this incident.
Reports also provided figures for the injured miners, stating that 20 workers have been wounded so far.
The deadliest mining accident in Iran prior to this was the explosion at the Yurt mine in 2017, which claimed 44 lives. However, the Saturday night explosion in Tabas has now surpassed this record as the deadliest labor incident in the country.
Javad Ghanat, the governor of South Khorasan, initially announced on the morning of Sunday, September 22, that 30 people had died and 17 were injured. However, by noon, the death toll had risen to 51.
The explosion occurred around 9 p.m. on Saturday, and initially, Iranian media reported only one death and indicated that other workers trapped in the mine tunnel were unreachable.
According to the South Khorasan governor, the explosion occurred in two blocks, where “22 people were working in Block B and 47 in Block C.”
The 30 deaths reported earlier were all from Block C, and there was no information about the 22 workers in Block B.
No detailed report on the cause of the incident has been published yet. However, on Saturday night, the head of the Tabas Labor Department stated that the explosion was caused by a “methane gas leak in Block C of Madanjo Company.”
On Sunday, Javad Ghanat added: “Due to the methane gas leak in Tunnels C and B of the Tabas Madanjo mine, the workers suffocated from the gas. So far, 30 workers have died, and 17 have been taken to hospitals.”
The number of labor accidents in Iran is high, mainly due to substandard equipment and unsafe working conditions. According to the Forensic Medicine Organization, in 2023, there were 2,115 labor-related deaths and more than 27,000 injuries.
In September last year, a gas explosion in one of the tunnels of the Tarzeh mine in Damghan resulted in the deaths of six workers.
In the explosion at the Yurt coal mine on May 3, 2017, 44 miners were killed. A fact-finding committee later attributed responsibility for the accident to the employer.
Mohammad Mojtahedzadeh, the head of Iran’s Coal Association, reacted to the incident by stating that coal mining equipment in the country is very outdated.
