Iran’s Regime is One of the Largest Exporters of Low-Cost Weapons
In a report on the rise of the Iranian regime as one of the global arms suppliers, The Wall Street Journal states that buyers of low-cost weapons with advanced technology view the Iranian government as a threat to the interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East, Ukraine, and beyond.
According to the report, published on February 17, the transformation of Iran’s arms industry, which accelerated with the sale of thousands of drones to Russia in 2022 and altered the battlefield dynamics in Ukraine, aided the regime in supporting quasi-military groups in the Middle East. These groups have intensified their attacks concurrently with the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.
The Wall Street Journal, citing U.S. officials, writes that one of Iran’s most significant arms exports is the suicide drones, exemplified by their use in the January 28 attack by an Iraqi paramilitary group that killed three American soldiers in Jordan.
On February 15, the United States announced that on the same day, the U.S. Coast Guard seized over 200 weapon shipments originating from Iran and destined for Yemen.
The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), responsible for military operations in the Middle East, stated that the seized cargo included missile components and guided underwater and surface unmanned vehicles.
A report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, published earlier this month, revealed that models from the same family of drones used to kill American soldiers in Jordan were employed in various fronts, including by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, Iraqi paramilitary groups targeting Israel, and by Russia in the war against Ukraine.
Mehdi Farahi, Deputy Minister of Defense for the Iranian regime, stated in November of last year that Tehran had sold approximately one billion dollars’ worth of weapons in 2022, triple the figure from the previous year.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a calculation excluding arms trafficking statistics indicates that in 2022, Iran became the sixteenth largest arms seller globally with $123 million in exports. This marks a significant leap compared to 2017 when Iran was the thirty-third largest arms exporter with $20 million worth of sales.
The Wall Street Journal previously reported, citing U.S. officials, that Russia is planning to purchase short-range ballistic missiles from the Iranian regime, and Iran has also sent ammunition to Russia.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which controls the defense industry, provides free weapons to its allies in the Middle East, including Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon, to support their activities.
Iran’s representative to the United Nations stated on Monday, February 12, to the Wall Street Journal, “We assist Palestinians in achieving military capability to resist independently against attacks.” The statement added, “Based on international laws and UN Security Council resolutions, Iran faces no restrictions or prohibitions on buying and selling weapons.”
The trade restrictions on Iran’s arms were lifted last year by the United Nations, but the United States and the European Union continue to enforce these restrictions.
Iranian suicide drones gained international recognition in 2019 when one of its paramilitary groups conducted a missile and drone attack on Saudi oil facilities.
The production of drones increased after the sale of more than 2,000 Shahed drones to Russia in 2022. According to Iranian officials, with a price of around $20,000 each, the Iranian government received a minimum of $40 million.
The Wall Street Journal had previously reported on another agreement between Moscow and Tehran to establish a factory for producing around 6,000 drones in Russia as part of a billion-dollar arms deal between the two countries.
A few days after the drone attack on January 28 against U.S. forces in Jordan, President Joe Biden blamed Iran, stating that Iran was responsible for supplying these drones.
A few days later, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed new sanctions against companies supplying components and parts for drones and missiles to Iran.
The growth of the arms industry has been a major source of income for the Iranian regime, which has been isolated due to sanctions and restrictions on oil sales and banking transactions.
Internal Documents Reveal Damning Information About Iran’s Parliament
The dissident group “Ghiam ta Sarnegouni” (meaning “Uprising Until Regime Overthrow”) has taken responsibility for disabling the news agency of Khaneye Mellat, the news agency of the Iranian regime’s parliament (Majlis). This group claims to have disabled more than 600 servers of the regime’s Majlis.
The Parliament’s public relations, in a statement, confirmed the defacing of its websites. The opposing group “Uprising until Overthrow” stated in its announcement that the main servers of the parliament, commission servers, main hall servers, parliament support servers, parliament database servers, and some other servers related to the secretariat, deputies, and representatives’ offices have been disabled.
One of these documents pertains to the approvals of the Supreme National Security Council regarding methods to circumvent sanctions.
The group has also published some internal documents of the parliament, including the list of representatives’ salaries in June 2023, on their Telegram channel.
In the initial response, the Parliament’s public relations rejected the authenticity of these documents and stated, “Preliminary examination of the images indicates that some of these documents have been tampered with and are not credible.”
The announcement mentioned that “hackers probably manipulated real documents with limited access to some documents. As an example, in a file titled ‘Representatives’ Salaries in June 2023,’ a column titled ‘Final Sum’ contains unreal figures that do not exist in the parliament’s payment records.”
The disabling of the Parliament’s news agency comes two weeks before the upcoming parliamentary elections. The twelfth parliamentary elections, like previous rounds, have been accompanied by widespread disqualification of candidates and are scheduled to be held on March 1.
After defacing the parliamentary systems, the “Uprising until Overthrow” group published a collection of internal and confidential documents on their Telegram channel.
In recent years, this group has repeatedly targeted Iranian government agencies. In June 2023, they defaced the Presidential system in Iran and exposed numerous documents from this institution, revealing some of the Revolutionary Guard’s activities in equipping and suppressing protests.
Despite the leakage of such information from the servers of government institutions, Gholamreza Jalali, the head of the Passive Defense Organization, stated on October 23, 2023, “From last year until now, 10 major cyber attacks on the country’s vital infrastructure have been discovered and thwarted.”
Population Growth in Iran Near Zero Due to Poor Life Quality
The state-run Donya-ye Eghtesad newspaper, in its analysis of economic conditions and their correlation with population growth and fertility rates, wrote that the decline in the quality of life has brought Iran to the bottom of the global table, with the population growth reaching six-tenths of a percent.
Donya-ye Eghtesad, on February 15, reported that the population growth rate in Iran in 2022 reached 0.6%, and the fertility rate also reached 1.66 units.
The newspaper emphasized that the fertility rate was over 6.4% in 2016, and the average annual population growth between 1976 and 1986 was 3.91%.
The report highlighted that measures such as childbearing loans, car lotteries, subsidies, and increasing the marriage loan amount by the government have not led to improvements in fertility.
According to the Donya-ye Eghtesad, the Quality-of-Life Index, which measures individuals’ living conditions in various aspects, ranked Iran 80th out of 84 countries in 2023. In such circumstances, households naturally lean towards having fewer children.
The report also noted that economic conditions have negatively impacted marriage and divorce statistics.
In this regard, the Etemad newspaper, in May 2023, reported on a study examining the cumulative statistics of “divorce, marriage, and birth” over the past 14 years, indicating a more pronounced role of economic factors in the fluctuations of these statistics than in the past.
The Etemad report showed that based on statistics published in 2008, there were over 110,000 divorces, more than 881,000 marriages, and over 1.3 million births recorded. These numbers decreased in the fall of 2022 to 146,000 divorces, 391,000 marriages, and 810,000 births.
A review of economic statistics indicates that in 2008, the poverty index was over 35%, the unemployment rate was 10.5%, and the inflation rate was 25.4%. These figures rose in the fall of 2022 to a 52% inflation rate, an 8% unemployment rate, and a poverty index of over 60%.
Some experts believe that the current poverty index has exceeded 60%, and the reduction in the unemployment rate is not due to the government creating jobs but rather because of a decrease in the participation rate influenced by job search discouragement and the unattractiveness of wages.
Western universities collaborated with Sharif University on drone technology research.
The United Against Nuclear Iran organization (UANI) disclosed a study in which researchers from universities in Britain, Australia, and the United States collaborated with Sharif University on drone technology. The Guardian also investigated the dimensions of this research collaboration in a report.
The research, published in 2023 on the platform of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), involved the participation of the University of Southampton in Britain, the University of New South Wales in Australia, University of Houston in the United States, and Sharif University in Iran.
Financial backing for this research came from research councils associated with the European Union, as well as the governments of Britain and Australia.
A security expert told The Guardian that the research had direct military applications, and another security expert described its nature as highly dangerous.
Referring to the direct connection between the researched technology and military applications, one security expert mentioned that this technology enables the creation of a new communication channel if enemy forces disrupt signals.
He stated that this capability is directly relevant to current drone warfare in the war in Ukraine.
Another security expert told The Guardian that given the “very dangerous” nature of this research, no university should participate in such projects.
Sharif University is under financial sanctions from Britain and the European Union.
According to a report by the Washington Institute in May and April 2022, Sharif University’s support has played a role in advancing Iran’s drone program.
Daniel Roth, the research director of the UANI, stated that the Iranian regime strategically uses knowledge from domestic and foreign universities to strengthen its security priorities.
In June 2023, according to findings from the Jewish Chronicle, British universities collaborated with the regime on the development of technologies for drones and fighter jets. At least 11 universities in Britain, including the University of Cambridge and Imperial College London, participated in these studies.
In the summer of 2023, the British government initiated an investigation into allegations that some of its universities collaborated with their Iranian counterparts on drone research.
In January 2024, the Canadian government released a list of universities in Iran, China, and Russia directly or indirectly associated with military and security entities of these countries. According to Canada’s announcement, researchers collaborating with these universities will not receive government funding.
The list includes Sharif University, Pasteur Institute of Iran, University of Tehran, Aerospace Research Institute, Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences, Institute for Defense Studies and Research, Imam Hussein University, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Explosion Research Center, Physics Research Center, and the Air Force University Star in Iran.
In the past five years, the use of Iranian-made drones has intensified in various military engagements worldwide, including Ukraine, Iraq, and Syria, as well as the Red Sea.
On January 28, in a drone attack by Iran-affiliated paramilitary forces on the U.S. forces base in Jordan, three American soldiers were killed, and more than 40 were injured.
Iran’s Former Nuclear Chief Alludes to Tehran’s Nuclear Weapons Capability
Ali Akbar Salehi, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, confirmed the implicit achievement of the Iranian regime in the ability to build an atomic bomb, stating, “We have all the thresholds of nuclear science and technology.”
Nuclear negotiations between Iran and global powers have been suspended for several months.
In a television interview, Salehi refrained from giving a direct answer to a question about whether the Iranian regime has reached the ability to build nuclear weapons or not, adding, “We have all the thresholds of nuclear science and technology. I’ll give you an example. What does a car want? It wants a chassis, an engine, a steering wheel, and a gearbox. You tell me, did you make the gearbox? I say yes. Did you make the engine? Yes, but each one is for its own purpose.”
In addition to serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salehi has also headed the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran for a while and is considered one of the close figures to the Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
This is not the first time that regime’s officials claim to have achieved the ability to build an atomic bomb.
In July 2022, Kamal Kharrazi, the head of the regime’s Strategic Council for Foreign Relations and an advisor to Ali Khamenei, stated in an interview with Al Jazeera that Iran has the technical capabilities to build a nuclear bomb but has no intention of doing so.
Regarding the regime’s capabilities to build a nuclear bomb, Kharrazi, in the interview with Al Jazeera, added: “In just a few days, we increased the uranium enrichment level from 20% to 60%, and it can easily be raised to 90%.”
Earlier, Mohammad Eslami, the current head of the AEOI, did not rule out the possibility of enriching uranium to the level required for making a bomb in an interview with the same network and stated that the decision for 90% enrichment depends on the “relevant authorities.”
Khamenei commands all the armed and military forces of the country and is the ultimate decision-maker in the field of the regime’s nuclear activities.
Regime officials have repeatedly stated that, based on a decree (Fatwa) by Khamenei, building an atomic bomb is not on Tehran’s agenda. However, this regime has a long history of reversing its own edicts when its interests require it.
Salehi continued in his recent television interview about secret negotiations with the United States in Oman during his tenure, saying that these negotiations took place with the permission of the Supreme Leader of the Iranian regime.
He added that then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad opposed these negotiations.
Nuclear negotiations between Iran and global powers, which resumed after the inauguration of U.S. President Joe Biden, have not yet reached a conclusion.
Following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA during the presidency of Donald Trump, the Iranian regime repeatedly called for guarantees to prevent a repeat of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA if it is revived.
Some experts at the beginning of the Biden era had said that providing such a guarantee from the U.S. government is not possible due to the power structure in the country.
In late December 2023, the International Atomic Energy Agency announced that the Iranian regime had increased the production of enriched uranium with a purity of up to 60% to about 9 kilograms per month.
According to the agency, this amount of uranium is produced at the Fordow and Natanz sites.
Iran’s Regime Faces Political Turmoil As It Approaches Parliamentary Elections
Iran’s forthcoming parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections, scheduled for March 1, are shrouded in predictability and controversy, underscoring a regime grappling with internal discord and widespread public disillusionment. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) has highlighted the regime’s deep-seated crises in its latest analysis. The report dives into the unprecedented election boycott anticipated by the regime, the disqualification of key regime figures, and an overarching inability to address its multifaceted crises.
The election boycott represents a significant challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. The NCRI article points out a record-high anticipated boycott, driven by a broad societal disenchantment. Abdolvahed Mousavi Lari, a former Minister of Interior, expressed concerns that “people’s anger towards the ballot boxes may be more serious than in 2019,” a year when voter turnout plummeted to the lowest since the mullahs’ rise to power in 1979. This anticipated boycott underscores a pervasive belief among the populace that abstention is a more principled stance than participation in a flawed electoral process.
Further complicating the regime’s predicament is the major disqualification of security veterans and political figures. Notably, the exclusion of Hassan Rouhani, a two-term president and long-time member of the Assembly of Experts, along with three former intelligence ministers and other high-profile officials, signals a significant purge within the regime’s own ranks. The NCRI article underscores the severity of these disqualifications: “The most prominent person to be eliminated from the race is Hassan Rouhani.” This wave of exclusions reveals deep internal rifts and a strategy aimed at consolidating power, eliminating dissent, and ensuring the survival of the ruling clique.
Amidst these challenges, the regime’s inability to resolve its crises becomes glaringly apparent. Iran is entangled in a web of interconnected and intricate crises, with economic and social turmoil, political grievances, and regional and global isolation threatening the regime’s stability. The NCRI describes a regime that “cannot afford any missteps or criticism,” relying heavily on repression and a shrinking circle of loyal officials to maintain its grip on power. This approach, however, fails to address the underlying issues, instead exacerbating the regime’s isolation and the public’s discontent.
Attempts by regime supreme leader Ali Khamenei to leverage the elections to project strength and legitimacy is indicative of a broader strategy to navigate these crises. By engineering the electoral process to ensure a high turnout, the regime seeks to present an image of social support and stability. However, the NCRI highlights the inherent flaws in this strategy, noting that “in Iran’s ruling religious dictatorship, genuine partisanship and ideological divides that prioritize public interest are nonexistent.” This lack of genuine political competition and the suppression of dissenting voices only further alienate the populace and undermine the regime’s credibility.
The disqualifications and the anticipated election boycott are not merely symptoms of a political system in distress; they are indicative of a deeper, systemic inability to engage with the public’s demands for change. Ahmad Zeydabadi, a state-affiliated analyst, warns of a “very, very dangerous downhill slide,” highlighting the regime’s precarious position and the urgent need for a fundamental shift in approach.
The NCRI’s report reveals a regime that is facing insurmountable challenges. The unprecedented election boycott, the disqualification of key figures, and the regime’s overarching crises are interwoven elements of a system struggling to maintain its legitimacy and control. As the regime tightens its grip, it inadvertently highlights its vulnerabilities, driving the country further into turmoil.
“Despite his efforts to purge his own ranks ‘for purity’ to stave off the overthrow of his regime, Khamenei overlooks the very fact that his regime becomes weaker by the day, while the people and the Iranian Resistance become bolder and more determined,” the NCRI writes.
Annual Inflation Rate For Housing In Tehran Surpasses 82%
The Research Center of the Iranian Regime’s Parliament (Majlis) announced in August 2023 that various government initiatives in the Islamic Republic to reduce housing prices have failed. The latest official report from the Iranian regime indicates that the surge in housing prices in Tehran continues, with the annual inflation rate for residential apartments in this city reaching 82.8% in January.
The Statistical Center of Iran, affiliated with the Organization of Planning and Budget, declared on February 12 that the monthly housing inflation rate in Tehran for January 2024 was 2.2%. The center mentioned that the average price of sold residential apartments in the capital of Iran has reached 806.1 million rials per square meter (approximately $1,450).
Previously, in October 2023, after months of discontinuing the publication of government statistics, the Statistical Center of Iran announced that in September 2023, compared to the same month in 2022, housing prices had experienced a 75% surge.
In August 2023, the Majlis (Parliament) Research Center also reported an increase in various homelessness methods in Iran, stating that this is an “indicator of the severe failures of the country’s housing system.”
The research center wrote that in past decades, the initiatives of various governments “have been entirely detrimental to low-income and vulnerable groups lacking housing assets.”
The cessation of housing statistics publication by the Statistical Center and the Central Bank started in winter 2023 (from January to March 2023). Meanwhile, the new report from the Statistical Center shows that in winter 2023, the housing price growth suddenly intensified, reaching 120% inflation even in May 2023. In August 2023, housing inflation was also above 84%.
The Iranian governments have consistently halted the publication of the economic section in a highly critical situation, including the monthly statistics of the Central Bank regarding the state of government general budgets, which have been discontinued since autumn 2018.
One of the significant reasons for the notable increase in housing prices in Iran is related to the halving of the rial’s value over the past year. Additionally, the higher inflation in housing compared to the growth rate of the dollar in spring 2023 also indicates a severe recession in new construction projects in the country.
During the electoral campaign and the initial months of the presidency, Ebrahim Raisi promised to build one million housing units annually. This claim was met with widespread skepticism from experts at the time.
In another report, the Statistical Center states that in spring 2023, fewer than 30,000 building construction permits were issued by the country’s municipalities, showing a 27% decrease compared to winter 2022.
In Tehran, less than 10,000 housing construction permits were issued in spring 2023, which is 28% less than the first three months of 2023.
Iran: Even Living in Basements is a Dream
These days, the cost of renting a house in Iran has become so high that some people are considering renting basements for living.
According to advertisements on real estate platforms, a 60-square-meter basement in the city of Shiraz is being offered for a monthly rent of 130 million rials upfront (approximately $2,347).
In Mashhad, a 50-square-meter basement is advertised for 500 million rials upfront (approximately $903) and a monthly rent of 50 million Iranian rials (approximately $90).
In Tehran’s Tehranpars district, a 180-square-meter basement is listed for a monthly rent of 300 million rials (approximately $542) with an upfront payment of 2 billion rials (approximately $3,610).
It is worth noting that the approved minimum wage in 2023 is approximately 90 million rials (approximately $163). Iran has an inflation rate of around 50 percent.
The state-run Shargh newspaper reported on February 10 that the construction of “micro-apartments” has begun to address the housing crisis. It mentioned a planned city in Tehran province covering one million square meters, with the capacity to build 20,000 affordable housing units. Preliminary infrastructure work has already started for the construction of affordable housing in this city.
In recent days, media reports have highlighted the extreme rental prices, such as a 10-square-meter single room in Tehran’s Amin Hozoor neighborhood being offered for a monthly rent of 100 million rials (approximately $180) and an upfront payment of 30 million rials (approximately $55).
Media also reported in November 2023 that a record-breaking rent had been set in Tehran, the highest in the last 30 years.
Despite this, there seems to be a preference for 10-square-meter rooms. However, Donyaye Eghtesad wrote on November 7, 2023, that statistics indicate a record in residence registrations for homes up to 40 square meters in the capital during the current year.
Iran’s Statistical Center indicates that the average price per square meter of an apartment has risen from 62 million rials (approximately $1,000) in the spring of 2018 to over 808 million rials at present (approximately $1,462) (considering 50 percent inflation).
In August 2023, the Research Center of the Iranian government reported on the increase in eviction notices from the housing market, stating that households with one to three eviction notices and even some in the “relatively” sixth category are unable to secure the housing they need for residence.
The Tasnim news agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran, reported the ineffectiveness of a nearly 10 billion rials housing loan for citizens becoming homeowners.
According to the agency, the average housing price has exceeded 800 million rials, and with a 9.6 billion rials loan (approximately $17,329), considering loan expenses, one can only buy an eight-and-a-half-square-meter house.
Iranian media also reports the continuation of a recession in the housing market and the concerns of construction companies about the ongoing recession. They have announced that the buying and selling statistics in Tehran alone amount to only 3,000 cases in a month.
The regime’s Donyaye Eghtesad daily wrote on January 7 in this regard that transaction volume has dropped by over 70% compared to the first half of the 2010s decade, before the onset of price hikes.
During his presidential election campaign, Ebrahim Raisi promised to build one million homes annually, a commitment he has reiterated in recent years.
In recent months, the regime’s officials have claimed to be in the process of constructing close to two million housing units. However, experts reject these claims based on the statistics of issued permits for housing construction.
In the latest decision by the Tehran municipality, it was announced that reserve lands in some areas will be allocated to Chinese companies for construction.
Fire Department: Tehran has 18,000 High-Risk Buildings
Jalal Maleki, the spokesperson for the Tehran Fire Department, announced that there are 18,000 high-risk buildings in the city and stated that these buildings pose a danger to the city’s future.
Maleki also declared that 75 buildings in Tehran are in a critical condition.
Incidents such as the Plasco Building collapse, Gandhi Hospital fire, and Sina At’har Medical Center have raised concerns among the public.
Following the fire at Gandhi Hospital in Tehran on January 25, sensitivity towards high-risk buildings has increased. Maleki mentioned that out of 2,300 medical centers examined, only 1,800 have received certification from the firefighting department.
Since the Plasco Building fire in the center of Tehran on January 19, 2017, which claimed at least 22 lives, until the collapse of the Metropol tower in Abadan (southwest Iran) on May 23, 2022, resulting in 43 fatalities, numerous warnings have been issued regarding the safety of public buildings in the country, especially in Tehran.
In this regard, 129 public and government buildings have been identified as high-risk, according to the Tehran Fire Department. This list includes Boali, Fajr, Yafteh Abad, Fiaz Bakhsh, Ghiasy, Ziaian, Tarfeh, and Shah Abadi medical centers, as well as Shahid, Technical and Vocational University, and Yadegar-e Imam universities.
On May 8, 2023, the regime’s Farhikhtegan newspaper wrote that, based on available information, due to the age, concentration, and density in districts 11 and 12, these two areas in Tehran host the most unsafe buildings and structures. Only in district 11, 129 buildings are considered very high-risk.
Names of compromised shopping centers have also been mentioned, including Aluminum, Alaeddin, Mahistan, Azad, and Champs-Élysées.
These incidents and various lists of unsafe, high-risk, and very high-risk buildings in Tehran occur while Ali Reza Zakani, the mayor of Tehran, denies the existence of such a list, stating that our duty is only to identify.
High-risk and unsafe buildings are divided into two categories: old and new. Old buildings need renovation or closure due to their age and the absence of many safety principles and equipment during construction. In new buildings, the only factor contributing to their insecurity is the municipality’s approach in issuing permits, supervision, and reducing penalties for violations.
The Central Bank of Iraq Revokes Operating License of of Bank Melli Iran.
The Central Bank of Iraq has revoked the operating license of Bank Melli Iran, the largest Iranian bank, as reported by Reuters on Thursday, February 8. According to a document from the Central Bank of Iraq dated January 31, confirmed by two senior officials of the bank, the reason for this decision is the international sanctions imposed on Bank Melli Iran.
A section of the document from the Central Bank of Iraq states: “Due to the losses incurred by your branch in Iraq, its restricted operations, and the inability to expand banking activities, as well as being listed in the international sanctions, it has been decided to revoke your operating license.”
In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Bank Melli Iran for its use by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to distribute financial resources among Shiite militia groups in Iraq. The U.S. Treasury claimed that the activities of Bank Melli Iran in Iraq were part of the financial network supporting these groups.
More than $100 billion of Iraq’s foreign exchange reserves, closely tied to both Iran and the U.S., is held in special accounts in the United States. Iraq relies on the goodwill of the U.S. to access funds from its oil revenues and financial resources.
Despite the current Iraqi government coming to power with the support of Shiite groups and Iran-backed militias in October 2022, it has collaborated with the U.S. in restricting the financial activities of the Iranian regime in Iraq.
The Iraqi government recently prohibited the operations of eight local commercial banks in dollar transactions and exchanges. It has also taken measures against bank fraud, money laundering, and other forms of illegal use of U.S. dollars, actions that have been welcomed by the U.S. Treasury.
According to Iraqi and U.S. officials, in July 2023, the Iraqi government, at Washington’s request and as part of the fight against dollar smuggling, revoked the licenses of 14 Iraqi banks for the transfer and trading of dollars through the Iraqi banking network to Iran.
