Rental Crisis in the Shadow of War; Livelihood Deadlock for Iranian TenantsIn these two districts, unlike the overall city average where the main pressure is more concentrated on the deposit, landlords have assigned approximately equal weight to the deposit and monthly rent. The average size of the units offered is 91 square meters, and the average building age is reported to be 5.5 years. A monthly rent of 310 million rials for couples who are both employed and earn average incomes is no longer just a number; it has become a serious and exhausting barrier to continuing life in Tehran. For many families, such a cost means eliminating a large portion of basic living needs and falling further below the poverty line. It had previously been reported that the overall average rent in Tehran is about 90 million rials (approximately $60) in monthly rent and 12 billion rials (approximately $80,000) as a deposit. However, in Districts 4 and 5, due to the income conditions of some tenants, it appears that charging high monthly rent remains possible for landlords and has become unavoidable for tenants.
The Collapse of Livelihoods in Tehran; Housing Rent Has Become a Nightmare
An examination of rental listings in Tehran’s Districts 4 and 5 shows that the average asking rates in April have reached about 10 billion rials as a deposit and 310 million rials in monthly rent (approximately $6,700 and $205); heavy and shocking figures that clearly demonstrate the depth of the housing crisis and the growing inability of households to secure shelter.
This is while the minimum wage of a worker with two children barely reaches about $100 per month.
Iran’s ‘No To Executions Tuesdays’ Campaign Marks 117th Week
On Tuesday, April 21, the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign entered its 117th week. On this occasion, prisoners participating in the campaign issued a statement referring to 52 days of internet shutdown and condemned the execution of political prisoners Hamed Validi and Mohammad Masoumi Shahi, emphasizing the continuation of the strike and the campaign until the main demand of the prisoners—the abolition of the death penalty—is achieved.
Full text of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign statement
Continuation of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign in its one hundred seventeenth week across 56 different prisonsCommemorating the memory of 12 executed political prisoners
After 52 days of digital and internet shutdown and lack of communication, which has now been partially restored, we write this statement addressed to the honorable people of Iran. As we mark the one hundred seventeenth week of the “No to Execution” campaign, the ruling regime in Iran executed two more political prisoners, Hamed Validi and Mohammad Masoumi Shahi, just yesterday.Execution of PMOI Members Hamed Validi and Nima Shahi in TehranThe execution-driven regime, concerned about public anger and sentiment over these executions, is desperately trying to accuse these prisoners and other detainees and recent executions of espionage and ties to Israel in order to justify its actions under wartime conditions. However, such baseless accusations against brave men and women—whose only goal is equality, freedom, and the independence of Iran and its people, and who have sacrificed everything for this cause—only intensify public outrage. Over the past month, the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign also faced another crime by the execution-driven regime, in which it lost six of its members—Vahid Bani Amerian, Pouya Ghabadi, Shahrokh (Akbar) Daneshvarkar, Babak Alipour, Mohammad Taghavi, and Abolhassan Montazer—during the 115th week. On the night of March 29, dozens of security agents in Ghezel Hesar Prison, led by Ashkan Kamali, Hassan Ghabadi, and Ghasem Sahraei, carried out a brutal and inhumane nighttime raid on the political prisoners’ ward in Unit 4 of Ghezel Hesar Prison. They severely beat the inmates, removed all prisoners—most of whom were members of the “No to Execution” campaign—from the ward, and transferred them to solitary confinement. Six of the above-mentioned individuals, who had been sentenced to death by Judge Afshari, were executed. They were hanged while their legal proceedings had not yet concluded, without a final meeting with their families, and in complete isolation. The regime also executed four political prisoners from the January 2026 uprising—Amirhossein Hatami, Mohammadamin Biglari, Shahin Vahedparast, and Ali Fahim—in secrecy and without final family visits, demonstrating its continuation of the legacy of Ruhollah Khomeini, who viewed war as a blessing and an opportunity for killing and executions. The regime, fearful of the Iranian people’s uprising, has so far refused to return the bodies of any of these fallen individuals to their families, thereby subjecting them to psychological and emotional torment. The “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign sincerely expresses its condolences to the families of these executed prisoners—families who never grew weary and stood with the campaign every week, in both cold and heat, raising the call of “No to Execution,” which reflects the public demand of the Iranian people. The oppressive and desperate regime based on the doctrine of “Velayat-e Faqih” executed at least 12 individuals in the month of Farvardin (March–April), all of whom were political prisoners, thereby taking revenge on them. At a time when war and its hardships have cast a shadow over Iran and captured public attention, the illegitimate ruling regime is carrying out systematic executions to create an atmosphere of fear and terror in society and to prevent uprising and revolution. Today, many protesters from the January uprising are held in solitary confinement and the regime’s underground detention cells in complete isolation. According to reports, dozens are held in solitary confinement in Ward 35 of Unit 3 of Ghezel Hesar Prison alone, most of them young, and their lives are in serious danger. The “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign calls on all human rights organizations and international bodies to act to save the lives of political prisoners sentenced to death and demands serious and practical pressure on the Iranian regime. We call on all human rights, labor, civil, and political activists, and anyone who opposes executions, not to be intimidated under the suffocating conditions in which the regime has effectively taken control of the streets and imposed a form of martial law, and to protest these repressions and the long lines of executions by any possible means. Undoubtedly, the future belongs to those who have paid the price for freedom. The “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign, while honoring the memory of these executed individuals, is observing a hunger strike on Tuesday, April 21, in its one 117th week across 56 prisons in the country.
The Naval Blockade And the Structural Fracture of Iran’s Economy
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has now become one of the most decisive variables in Iran’s political economy.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has occurred under conditions where Iran’s economy was already suffering from deep structural dysfunctions. This structure is heavily dependent on maritime routes, through which more than 80% of its foreign trade is conducted. Under such conditions, any disruption to this route amounts to a direct blow to the backbone of the economy.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz effectively targets exports of oil, petrochemicals, and other energy-based products. This quickly reflects in the balance of payments and exacerbates the budget deficit. As a result, rising inflation and a surge in exchange rates will be inevitable consequences for this situation.
Strait Of Hormuz Declared Open Again; Trump: Naval Blockade Against Iran’s Regime Will ContinueHowever, the crisis is not limited to exports. Imports are also at serious risk. Iran’s economy depends annually on tens of millions of tons of imports of essential goods, medicine, and production inputs. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz disrupts this chain, and particularly with the removal of the United Arab Emirates’ role as a regional trade hub, the supply network collapses. The key point is that alternative routes, such as land transportation or northern corridors, lack sufficient capacity. These routes are not only limited but also far more costly. Therefore, even if imports continue, the final cost of goods will rise sharply. In fact, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is not a temporary shock but a “structural shock”; one that irreversibly alters Iran’s foreign trade patterns and pushes the economy into a phase of gradual collapse.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the transmission of the crisis to people’s livelihoods
A significant portion of Iran’s imports is allocated to essential goods, from grains and rice to cooking oil and livestock feed. Disruption in this sector directly leads to rising food prices and reduced access to necessities for the population. Even if famine does not occur, shifting import routes to land corridors multiplies costs several times over. This increase is directly passed on to consumers and reduces living standards. At a time when inflation has already reached unprecedented levels, this pressure can further erode purchasing power. Alongside this, production enterprises also face a crisis. The dependence of industries on imported machinery and components means that trade disruptions lead to production stoppages. The result of this trend is rising unemployment and expanding poverty. Available statistics show that even before the escalation of conflict, hundreds of thousands of jobs were lost and millions were at risk of unemployment. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz accelerates this trend and can trigger a wave of widespread joblessness. Under such conditions, the support structure is also incapable. The unemployment insurance system is limited and unable to cover millions of newly unemployed individuals. As a result, the economic crisis quickly turns into a social crisis.Geopolitical deadlock and the inability of allies
One of the key questions under these circumstances is the role of powers such as China and Russia. However, the reality is that these countries also face serious limitations. China, as an energy-intensive economy, is harmed by rising energy prices. Although it may continue trade with Iran, this trade will be conducted at much higher costs. As a result, it not only fails to help resolve the crisis but itself becomes a factor in increasing costs. Russia is in a similar position. Its dependence on limited markets and the challenges arising from sanctions have reduced its ability to effectively support Iran. Any potential cooperation is largely confined to areas such as food supplies, which cannot replace extensive maritime trade.The blockade as a consequence of a flawed structure
A final analysis of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would be incomplete without considering the structural roots of Iran’s economy. Iran’s economic problems are not merely the result of war or blockade but are rooted in institutional structures that have developed over decades. The weakening of private property rights, the expansion of rent-seeking institutions, and the elimination of independent economic actors are among the factors that have made the economy vulnerable. In such a structure, any external shock quickly turns into an internal crisis. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has, in fact, exposed these structural weaknesses. An economy heavily dependent on oil revenues and limited trade routes lacks resilience against such shocks. Ultimately, it is Iranian society that pays the highest price. A population already under economic pressure now faces an even deeper crisis.Iran’s Regime Moves to Seize Assets of Dissidents
Iran’s regime has once again revealed its true nature in the form of an overt state-backed theft; this time by confiscating and seizing the assets of opponents and closing all legal avenues to defend private property.
Azam Ghoveydel, spokesperson for the State Organization for Registration of Deeds and Properties, announced that the assets of individuals seized by the judicial system of Iran’s regime cannot be transferred even with a power of attorney. In clearer terms, the regime has not only limited itself to suppressing individuals but has also designed an official and online mechanism to plunder their assets.
This official said that even if a power of attorney for selling a property has been issued before the seizure, as long as the official transfer has not been registered, the property remains under the ownership of the individual, and as soon as a judicial order is issued, the seizure is recorded in electronic records, making any official transfer impossible from that moment onward.
These remarks come as the judiciary of Iran’s regime had previously reported the seizure of assets belonging to hundreds of opponents of the regime under fabricated charges such as cooperation with the enemy—security-related and repressive accusations that for years have become a standard tool of the regime and its affiliated judiciary to take revenge on opponents.
The confiscation of assets belonging to Iranian activists abroad and restrictions on providing legal services constitute a clear violation of Iranians’ rights and a trampling even of the regime’s own existing laws. What is happening today is not the implementation of justice, but the continuation of a policy of extortion, intimidation, and organized looting that the regime employs to silence dissenting voices.
Iran’s regime has now clearly shown that for its survival, it targets both the lives and the property of the people. A regime incapable of accountability imposes theft on the people under the guise of judicial rulings instead of the rule of law.
Execution of PMOI Members Hamed Validi and Nima Shahi in Tehran
In the early hours of Monday, April 20, Hamed Validi and Mohammad (Nima) Massoum Shahi, two members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), were executed in what was described as a criminal act by the Iranian regime’s judiciary. Mizan News Agency, affiliated with the regime’s judiciary, reported the news and identified them as Mohammad Massoum Shahi and Hamed Validi, falsely linking them to a spy network.
These two members of the PMOI had previously been sentenced to death in September 2025 on charges of membership in the organization. Hamed Validi, a 45-year-old civil engineer, and Mohammad Shahi, a 38-year-old technical worker, were arrested on May 13, 2025, in Tehran along with several of their relatives and were subjected to pressure and medieval torture during interrogations.
Details of the Execution of six PMOI MembersOn September 27, the head of the judiciary in Alborz Province accused these individuals and two other detainees of espionage in connection with a 12-day war, despite the fact that they had been arrested about one month before the conflict began. Earlier, the PMOI had submitted their identities to international bodies, including the United Nations and human rights organizations. News of their arrest had also been published on September 7, 2025. The Iranian regime executed 6 other members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) in late March and early April. It also executed two other members of the organization in August 2025.
At the time, the Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an opposition coalition, had called for the case to be reviewed by an international fact-finding mission. On the night before the execution, the NCRI also issued an urgent appeal to international bodies, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, and other human rights authorities, calling for immediate action to prevent the execution.At dawn this morning, Hamed Validi and Nima Masoom Shahi, were executed in Karaj Central Prison by the clerical regime ruling Iran. The two members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) join a growing number of heroic members executed this month under the rule… pic.twitter.com/xozMPptV5X
— Maryam Rajavi (@Maryam_Rajavi) April 20, 2026
The Shadow of Damage and Destruction Over the Livelihoods and Lives of Iranian Citizens
The Iranian regime’s adventurist policies in its nuclear program, missile development, and proxy forces in the region have ultimately imposed irreparable costs on Iran’s civil society.
The recent war, rooted in the regime’s tension-inducing activities, extended beyond military battlefields and directly targeted people’s daily lives.
By impacting strategic infrastructure, this conflict has inflicted deep damage on the food security, health, and housing of ordinary citizens. Now, with a ceasefire in place, the catastrophic dimensions of this confrontation on public life have become even more evident.
The horrifying scale of damage to the economy and housing sector
The first official statistics on the damage caused by the recent clashes indicate a large-scale human catastrophe. Fatemeh Mohajerani, spokesperson for the government of Iranian regime president Masoud Pezeshkian, stated in striking remarks that the initial estimate of Iran’s damages is 270 billion dollars.Hollow Show of Power by Supporters of Iran’s Regime in the StreetsShe emphasized that this astronomical figure is not final and may increase in subsequent assessments. This massive financial damage has directly targeted the livelihoods of Iranian people at all levels. Across different layers of this conflict, the housing sector and urban services have suffered the heaviest blows. According to the government spokesperson, 83,351 residential units across the country have been damaged. The share of Tehran, the capital and largest city, accounts for 39,508 residential units and small commercial centers. The destruction of these structures has left thousands of families facing homelessness and the loss of their life savings. Targeting residential areas directly undermined the psychological and physical security of citizens. This physical damage to homes is not just a number; it represents the collapse of family life. Additional statistics indicate that rebuilding this scale of destruction will require years and enormous budgets. The continuation of this situation has placed extra pressure on lower-income segments of society with limited assets. A large portion of this damage has occurred due to the placement of facilities near densely populated urban areas.
Destruction of healthcare, education infrastructure, and small businesses
The recent war was not limited to people’s homes and also devastated public service centers. A total of 322 medical centers and hospitals, along with 763 schools and 55 libraries across 12 provinces, have been destroyed. These centers were directly tied to the lives, health, and future of the country’s children. The destruction of hospitals in crisis conditions has severely disrupted access to vital services for ordinary patients. Such a situation has left behind an irreparable human loss whose effects will persist for generations. At the same time, the private sector and workers’ livelihoods have suffered severe blows. Mahmoud Najafi-Arab, head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, reported that 300 damaged industrial units have been identified in Tehran province alone. Each destroyed industrial unit means unemployment for hundreds of workers whose sole source of income has been cut off. This economic damage to production units has also disrupted the supply chain of goods and basic necessities. The shutdown of these units has triggered a wave of inflation and shortages of essential goods in domestic markets. Economic analysts believe that restoring the production capacity of these factories under current sanctions conditions will be extremely difficult and complex. Damage to health infrastructure in border provinces has sharply increased the risk of infectious disease outbreaks. This type of hidden damage endangers the lives of thousands of children and elderly people in silence.Iran’s War-Stricken Economy and Structural Deadlock
Long-term consequences of the war on social life and public welfare
The scale of this destruction has completely shattered the structure of social welfare and expanded poverty. Every rial of damage to urban infrastructure translates into a decline in the quality of life for the general population. The destruction of water and electricity distribution networks has made daily life difficult in many areas. This situation stems from policies that prioritize military capabilities over public welfare. People must now pay the heavy price for decisions in which they had no role. The extent of environmental damage and harm to vital resources has also been described as deeply alarming in unofficial reports. Pollution caused by explosions in residential areas has posed serious long-term threats to citizens’ health. The flight of domestic and foreign capital after these events has reduced hopes for improving livelihoods to a minimum. This psychological and moral damage to society is considered heavier than any dollar figure. Despair about the future and fear of renewed conflict have accelerated the migration of elites and the workforce. Iran’s government will be forced to cut development and welfare budgets to compensate for this massive financial loss. This means that people’s livelihoods will shrink in the coming years, and economic pressures will increase exponentially. The collective life of Iranians is now under the heavy burden of ruins that are the direct product of political tensions.Head of the Iranian Regime’s Judiciary Emphasizes Accelerating Executions
Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, the head of the Iranian regime’s judiciary, has once again, in a commanding tone, called on courts to review cases at an abnormal speed and outside standard frameworks—an approach that effectively amounts to eliminating minimum standards of fair trial. In his latest remarks, he went even further and labeled detainees in advance as foot soldiers of the enemy, a designation that indicates many of these individuals have effectively been sentenced before any judicial process has taken place.
Ejei’s continued insistence on speeding up proceedings comes as a wave of executions has unfolded in recent weeks, raising serious concerns among human rights organizations. In such a climate, emphasizing the abandonment of normal procedures not only fuels suspicion but presents a clear picture of a rushed and non-transparent process.
On the other hand, widespread arrests based on stereotypical accusations such as espionage and treason—without disclosing the identities of the accused or details of the cases—reinforce the question of whether anything resembling an independent judiciary still exists, or whether everything serves a predetermined scenario.
Ejei’s recent statements—from demanding that case files be delivered within a matter of hours to call for interrogations inside prisons to expedite indictments—resemble managing an assembly line of verdicts more than administering justice.
Iran’s War-Stricken Economy and Structural Deadlock
Iran’s war-stricken economy is now in a condition where economic growth has effectively reached zero, while inflation and unemployment have simultaneously risen to unprecedented levels. This situation is not a temporary phenomenon but the result of decades of inefficient policymaking within the structure of Iran’s regime, where development plans have largely become propaganda tools rather than genuine roadmaps.
Historic Failure of Economic Planning
The 20-year vision document, drafted in 2005, was intended to turn Iran into the region’s leading economic power. However, by 2026, not only has this goal not been achieved, but many indicators have worsened compared to the starting point. Today, Iran’s war-stricken economy is faced with a sharp devaluation of its national currency, declining investment, and rising uncertainty.Rental Crisis in the Shadow of War; Livelihood Deadlock for Iranian TenantsThe five-year development plans, which were supposed to pave the way for achieving this vision, have effectively become ineffective documents. In the economic structure of Iran’s regime, policymaking is driven by ideological and security considerations rather than economic principles. This has made even minimum goals such as sustainable growth or full employment unattainable. Declining economic participation, increased migration of the workforce, and expanding corruption are clear signs of the failure of this planning. A war-stricken economy built on rent-seeking and monopolies lacks the capacity for regional competition. Under such conditions, talk of becoming the top economic power resembles an empty slogan. On the other hand, external tensions and international isolation have imposed heavy costs on the economy. These tensions have not only limited access to global markets but have also disrupted the flow of capital and technology. The result is reduced productivity and structural backwardness in Iran’s war-stricken economy.
Zero Growth and Exploding Inflation; Signs of Collapse
Estimates indicate that economic growth in 2025 has fallen to around zero. This means a complete halt in the engine of production in the war-stricken economy. While the population grows and needs increase, the economy is effectively stagnant. This deep recession is the result of a combination of sanctions, mismanagement, and extensive state intervention in the economy. Alongside this recession, inflation has exceeded 50%. This level of inflation has severely reduced people’s purchasing power and expanded poverty. In Iran’s war-stricken economy, even rising wages have failed to prevent this decline in purchasing power. The gap between income and expenses continues to widen. The labor market is also under severe pressure. Many businesses, due to uncertainty and declining demand, have been forced to lay off workers. In such conditions, unemployment and underemployment have increased. A war-stricken economy that cannot create sustainable jobs gradually loses its human capital. Moreover, recent war and military tensions have pushed uncertainty to its peak. Even after the cessation of hostilities, fear of a return to conflict has disrupted economic decision-making. Investors avoid entering such a market, and economic actors prefer to limit their activities. Ultimately, the combination of zero growth, high inflation, and instability paints a picture of an economy on the verge of collapse. Iran’s war-stricken economy has not only failed to achieve its development goals but has moved in the opposite direction. This situation shows that the problem lies not only in economic policies but in the structure of power itself. As long as this structure does not change, Iran’s war-stricken economy will remain trapped in a cycle of crisis.Hollow Show of Power by Supporters of Iran’s Regime in the Streets
While the consequences of around 50 days of conflict between Iran, the United States, and Israel have left the country’s infrastructure facing a serious crisis, and the situation—caught between a fragile ceasefire and the possibility of renewed war—has left society in uncertainty, different scenes are emerging in some major Iranian cities. At the same time as indirect negotiations between Tehran and Washington began in Islamabad with Pakistan’s mediation, Iran’s regime has attempted to present an image of strength and popular support by organizing coordinated gatherings.
Rental Crisis in the Shadow of War; Livelihood Deadlock for Iranian TenantsState-run media outlets, including the Student News Agency, described these gatherings in a report from Mashhad as a sign of “steadfastness” and spoke of people presenting over consecutive nights and praying for frontline forces. In these narratives, participation by different segments of society—even in unfavorable weather conditions—is portrayed as a symbol of national unity. However, field reports present a different picture. According to various sources, at a time when the country is facing one of its most severe economic crises, significant costs have been spent on organizing these gatherings. In cities such as Tehran and Mashhad, incentives such as cash payments (around 50 million rials per passenger in flag-bearing vehicles, equivalent to 33 dollars and one-third of a worker’s monthly wage), as well as distribution of fuel and food, have been reported to attract participants. Alongside this, while many citizens face internet restrictions or disruptions, in some gathering points such as Valiasr Square and Enghelab Street in Tehran, temporary communication facilities—including high-speed internet—have been provided to participants so they can publish related content on social media. Reports also indicate a form of administrative and educational coercion; from indirect pressure on students through disciplinary grades to pressure on employees to attend gatherings under threat of losing benefits. In some areas such as Varamin, images have also been published showing individuals with militia symbols and cold weapons, which contrasts with the public atmosphere of concern in society. Some analysts consider these actions an attempt to create a “parallel reality”; an image of public support that is far removed from the living conditions of a large part of society. At the same time, users on the social media platform X have shared images of the distribution of essential goods such as meat and rice at gathering sites, pointing to shortages of these items in the open market. Participation in these gatherings, which had declined in recent years, this time has even included some non-ideological segments of the population. It appears that wartime conditions, while creating a degree of solidarity, have also intensified the gap between the regime and society, as well as within social layers. In this environment, the regime, in addition to external conflict, has also sought to control domestic protests. In this context, the National Council of Resistance of Iran had previously emphasized that external war alone will not lead to regime change and could serve as a pretext for suppressing opponents. In recent days, the regime has also executed several dissidents, including members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK). At the analytical level, the question arises whether these street mobilizations indicate that the predictions of some opposition groups, especially those advocating change through external military pressure, are incorrect. Experience shows that relying on external attacks and expecting a general uprising under wartime conditions is accompanied by serious uncertainties. On the other hand, the nature of slogans and the atmosphere of these gatherings show that hardline factions have not only not weakened but have found more opportunity to manifest themselves in this environment. These groups, through active presence in the streets, seek to play a more prominent role in the political and cultural field. Overall, these gatherings can be seen as part of the regime’s effort to reproduce legitimacy and maintain an ideological presence in the public sphere; an effort that, in the context of crisis and emergency conditions, has become one of the main tools for managing society.
Rental Crisis in the Shadow of War; Livelihood Deadlock for Iranian Tenants
The end of military conflict and the ceasefire between the United States and Iran’s regime have not restored calm to the economic environment; instead, it has imposed a new wave of crushing pressure on vulnerable groups. While it was expected that relative stability would improve living conditions, the cost-of-living crisis driven by widespread unemployment and workforce reductions in companies has placed tenants in a far more difficult position. According to official statistics for 2024, about 30% of all households in the country and nearly 60% of residents of the capital, Tehran, rely on renting as their only housing optional population now trapped between the two blades of unemployment and securing shelter.
Intensification of the rental crisis following the war and collapse of incomes
Workforce reductions in February and March marked a turning point in the rental crisis. The shutdown or reduced activity of companies under wartime conditions has eliminated the income of many households. This situation has left tenants facing a severe cost-of-living crisis, with many households now struggling to pay even the base rent.The Collapse of Iran’s Economy; How Long Can People Endure?According to 2024 data, about 30% of households in the country are tenants. This share rises to around 40% in major metropolitan areas. Considering a population of approximately 28 million households, nearly 8 million households are renters. These figures indicate the nationwide scale of the crisis. Although rent increased by about 30% over the past year, the main issue now is the base rent amount. Tenants who have lost their jobs have reached a deadlock in covering housing costs. At the same time, uncertainty in the labor market has created severe stress for those still employed. In March, the average rent in Tehran reached 90 million rials per month, with a deposit of 12 billion rials (approximately 600 dollars and 80,000 dollars, respectively). Such cost levels have placed unprecedented pressure on households.
