Grossi: A Very Robust Verification System is Needed for Iran’s Nuclear Program
Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said that a very robust verification system is needed to ensure that nuclear weapons are not developed in Iran.
Speaking to reporters in Japan on Friday, June 26, Grossi said, that he thinks the objective of this recent agreement between the United States and Iran is to ensure that nuclear weapons are not developed in Iran. Iran’s regime has also clearly stated that it has no such intention.”
Grossi continued, but merely declaring an intention is not enough. IAEA must establish a very robust verification system as soon as possible, whenever it is practically feasible.
Rafael Grossi also announced that the memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran allows IAEA inspectors access to Iran’s nuclear facilities.
At his press conference in Japan, Grossi said that an agreement exists and that, to implement it, the IAEA must have access to Iran and conduct inspections. He expressed hope that he would be in Iran soon.
The IAEA chief’s remarks came after officials from Iran’s regime had previously stated that access to some key nuclear sites would not be possible until a final agreement with the United States is concluded and sanctions are lifted.
Renewable Water Per Capita in Iran Falls To 1,200 Cubic Meters Per Year
Reports from Iranian regime government institutions show that the “renewable water per capita” indicator for each Iranian citizen has declined from about 7,000 cubic meters in past decades to less than 1,200 cubic meters.
Iran’s water industry spokesperson announced this on Friday, June 19, adding that population growth alongside declining rainfall and the consequences of climate change has placed unprecedented pressure on the country’s water resources.
Issa Bozorgzadeh, Iran’s water industry spokesperson, said regarding the status of this indicator in Iran compared with global standards: “This figure in earlier years, when the country received more rainfall, was about 130 billion cubic meters per year and has now fallen to less than 103 billion cubic meters per year.”
The Iranian Plateau Is Turning into a DesertAccording to him, in the 1950s and 1960s, each Iranian had access to nearly 7,000 cubic meters of water per year, but this figure has now declined significantly. Renewable water per capita, measured in cubic meters per person per year, represents each citizen’s share of the country’s natural water resources and is considered one of the most important global indicators for assessing national water security. This indicator refers to the total renewable freshwater resources of a country or region, including surface water and groundwater that are replenished annually through rainfall and the natural water cycle, divided by the population of that country or region. The minimum desirable per capita level for sustainable water resources is 1,700 cubic meters per person per year, and countries with a lower figure enter the category of “water stress.” Experts emphasize the importance of this indicator for evaluating a country’s water security, planning sustainable water management, enabling fair comparisons among countries, and protecting resources for future generations. Iran has faced severe drought for years, but in addition, water waste, excessive extraction from underground aquifers, structural weaknesses including inefficient or overly interventionist water management, and the expansion of agriculture have intensified the crisis in the country. However, Iran’s water industry spokesperson described population growth as the “main reason” for the sharp decline in per capita water availability in Iran and said: “The country’s population has increased, and these resources are divided among more people, therefore each person receives a smaller share.” According to Bozorgzadeh, part of this decline is also due to climate change and reduced rainfall. Previously, average rainfall in Iran was about 250 millimeters, but it has now decreased. “Different studies show different figures, but climate change has caused the country’s average rainfall to decline by about 10%, although in some regions the decrease has been greater.” The impact of rising temperatures on increased evaporation and transpiration, higher water consumption by plants and other living organisms, and changes in the geographic distribution and type of precipitation were also among the factors cited by the official as affecting the renewable water per capita indicator. According to global standards, renewable water availability of more than 1,700 cubic meters per person per year indicates a favorable condition without water stress; between 1,000 and 1,700 cubic meters indicates water stress; between 500 and 1,000 cubic meters indicates severe water scarcity; and less than 500 cubic meters per person per year indicates absolute water scarcity (water crisis). On this scale, values above 5,000 cubic meters per person per year indicate very abundant water resources. The figure of 1,700 cubic meters per person per year is regarded as the minimum globally acceptable threshold. However, renewable water per capita differs from the amount of water each individual consumes. This indicator shows how much water nature provides to each citizen annually, not how much water each citizen uses. Official statistics show that water inflow into Iran’s dams during the first 243 days of the current water year, from September 22, 2025, to May 23, 2026, increased by 72% compared with the previous year. However, 33% of the country’s dam reservoir capacity remains empty, and experts say the uneven distribution of rainfall continues to pose challenges for water resource management.
The Iranian Plateau Is Turning into a Desert
Every year on June 17, the World Day to Combat Desertification serves as an opportunity to focus on one of the world’s greatest environmental threats. For Iran, however, this day is not merely an international observance; it is a reminder of a crisis whose effects are visible every day in the lives of millions of people, from dust storms and the drying of farmland to rural migration and threats to the country’s food security.
Iran has long been located within the world’s arid belt, but what is being witnessed today is not merely the result of climatic conditions. Many experts believe that a significant part of the current crisis is the product of decades of mismanagement, unscientific decision-making, and the Iranian regime’s destructive policies in the fields of water and the environment.
Iran’s Water Crisis: Women on the Front Lines of a Silent DisasterAccording to official statistics, of Iran’s 164 million hectares of land area, about 32 million hectares consist of desert lands, and half of that area is in a critical condition and has become a source of dust storms. Studies by the University of Tehran and Iran’s Ministry of Energy also show that about 88% of the country’s territory has been affected by desertification.
Iran on the path to desertification
Researchers have stated that Iran ranks fifth in the world in terms of desert expansion, with about 40 hectares of land turning into desert every day. In addition, about 100 million hectares of Iran’s land are affected by water erosion, while more than 20 million hectares face wind erosion. Soil erosion in some parts of the country has been estimated at up to six times the global average. The main question, however, is why a country with such extensive natural resources has reached this point. Experts have repeatedly warned that excessive extraction of groundwater, extensive dam construction without environmental assessments, unscientific water transfer projects, the destruction of wetlands, unregulated mining, and the conversion of rangelands into agricultural fields have been among the main factors intensifying desertification in Iran. Many of the country’s wetlands, including Hoor al-Azim, Gavkhouni, Bakhtegan, and Jazmourian, have faced severe drying in recent years, and these areas have now become major sources of dust storms. Alongside this mismanagement, structural corruption has also played a significant role. Many infrastructure and water projects have been carried out not based on environmental needs but on the economic and political interests of powerful factions. The ruling establishment’s neglect of this problem is evident in the fact that the budgets allocated to combat the phenomenon are not even equal to the price of a domestically manufactured car. For example, according to the governor of Dehloran County, only 30 billion rials (about $17,000) from government development funds were allocated last year for desertification control projects in the county. According to a report by Iran’s Natural Resources and Watershed Management Organization, the direct damage caused by wind erosion and the expansion of deserts is estimated at no less than 30 trillion rials (approximately $17 million) annually. This figure represents only part of the economic losses and does not include damage to agricultural lands, rangelands, roads, railway lines, industrial facilities, or the costs of treating respiratory illnesses caused by dust storms, unemployment, poverty, and widespread rural migration. The real cost of these policies is ultimately paid by the Iranian people through declining agricultural production, the destruction of rangelands, rising respiratory diseases, unemployment, poverty, and the widespread migration of rural populations.Iran’s Economic Growth Decline Accelerates
The Statistical Center of Iran, a government agency of Iran’s regime, announced in its latest report that the country’s economic growth in the past year, including oil revenues, was only 0.2%, a figure that shows a significant decline compared to the 3.1% growth recorded in 2024.
According to the report, if oil revenues are excluded from the calculations, economic growth falls to negative 0.3%, meaning that Iran’s economy effectively contracted during the past year.
The data show that key sectors of the economy experienced declines. Agriculture contracted by 2.9%, industry by 1.5%, and the water and electricity sector by 6.5%—areas that directly affect employment, people’s livelihoods, and the energy crisis. In contrast, oil and gas extraction grew by 1.8%, making it the only factor preventing overall economic growth from turning negative.
In the services sector, although overall growth was reported at 0.3%, the real picture of the economy is different. While financial activities expanded by 8.4%, sectors tied to people’s daily lives, such as wholesale trade, retail trade, hotels, and restaurants, shrank by 1.8%.
Meanwhile, under the expenditure-based method of calculation, economic growth was reported at nearly 0%. At the same time, household consumption declined by 1.4% and fixed investment fell by 2.8%, indicating weaker demand and reduced investment in the economy.
Another important finding of the report is the 20% decline in imports of goods and services. Although this has prevented economic growth from appearing negative from an accounting perspective, experts say the decline is primarily the result of foreign currency shortages, weaker demand, and restrictions on imports of raw materials, rather than any improvement in economic conditions.
The Statistical Center’s report also shows that investment in machinery declined by 5.8%, a development that points to reduced production capacity in the coming years.
Meanwhile, economic growth in the winter of 2026 was recorded at negative 2.2%, a figure indicating that Iran’s economy had entered a contractionary phase by the end of the past year.
The Statistical Center of Iran emphasized that these figures are still preliminary and may be revised after the annual accounts are finalized.
New Wave of Protests Across Various Iranian Cities
On June 21 and 22, a new wave of protest gatherings emerged across various cities in Iran. Students, university students, retirees, and employees from different government and service sectors took to the streets and gathered in front of administrative offices to protest educational, livelihood, and employment-related problems and to demand that their grievances be addressed.
Widespread Student Protests in Several Cities
Students in the cities of Ilam, Khorramabad, Shahrekord, Urmia, Kerman, Tehran, Yazd, Shiraz, and several other cities held protest gatherings to express their opposition to the decision to postpone final examinations until after Arbaeen and to increase the intervals between exams. The protesters described the decision as a cause of confusion, increased psychological pressure, and educational difficulties for students, and called for its cancellation.University Students Gather Outside Shahrekord Governorate
On June 22, a group of university students gathered outside the Shahrekord Governorate building, calling on officials to address their educational and student-related demands. The students participating in the gathering emphasized the need for accountability from officials and practical action to address student concerns.Telecommunications Retirees Protest in Kurdistan Province
Retired telecommunications workers in Kurdistan Province also held a protest gathering, demanding payment of overdue claims, full implementation of a legislation dating back to 2010, and improvements in supplemental insurance services.Renewed Protests Erupt in IranThey also protested what they described as the Iranian regime officials’ disregard for their professional and livelihood-related demands.
Telecommunications Retirees Hold Protest in Tehran
Telecommunications retirees also staged a protest gathering in Tehran on Monday, June 22, 2026. The protesters cited the non-payment of overdue claims as the main reason for the gathering and directed their criticism toward the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) and the Etemad-e Mobin Consortium, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Khuzestan Regional Electricity Employees Protest
Employees of the Khuzestan Regional Electricity Company also held a protest gathering over salaries, benefits, and the payment structure. They called for reforms to the payment system, the elimination of wage discrimination, and fairness in employee compensation.Kermanshah Medical Sciences Employees Continue Protests
Employees of Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences gathered for the nth time outside the city’s Governorate building. The employees protested the 20% salary increase and argued that, given the rising cost of living, the increase was inadequate. They called for a review of the government’s decision and for adjustments to employee salaries and benefits.126th Week of ‘No to Executions Tuesdays’ Campaign in 57 Prisons
In the 126th week of the protest campaign “No to Executions Tuesdays,” political prisoners in 57 prisons across Iran once again expressed their opposition to the continued issuance and implementation of death sentences through a hunger strike on Tuesday, June 23. With Kerman Prison joining this protest movement, the number of prisons participating in the campaign has reached 57, a figure that reflects the expansion and growing influence of this demand among prisoners in different parts of the country.
Over the past nearly three years, the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign has become one of the most enduring and widespread protest movements inside prisons. Despite security pressure, threats, communication restrictions, and the potential consequences of hunger strikes, participants continue to insist on maintaining their protests. They believe that the death penalty not only violates the fundamental right to life but has also become a tool for intensifying an atmosphere of fear and silencing critical voices.
UN Officials Call for a Halt to Executions and Repression in Iran
The full text of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign statement is as follows:
Kerman Prison joins the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign Continuation of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign in its 126th week across 57 different prisons At a time when human dignity should be the foundation of law, justice, and governance, the killing and execution machine of Iran’s executioner regime continues to operate at full speed. According to reports received, on June 7, two women aged 28 and 32, identified as Asieh Farahmand and Zeynab Zarini, were hanged in Qazvin Prison. Due to the lack of transparent reporting, news of their executions has only recently reached us. Also, on June 16, two political prisoners arrested during the January protests in Shahroud, Abolfazl Saeedi and Javad Zamani, were executed. Accordingly, the number of prisoners executed between May 22 and June 22 has reached 134. The death penalty in Iran is not a tool for achieving justice but rather a mechanism for spreading fear, silencing dissenting voices, and strengthening the authoritarian structure of power. On the other hand, after months of military conflict and the costs imposed on the lives of the Iranian people, the Iranian regime and the United States reached a preliminary understanding in recent weeks. According to the published terms, no attention was given to human rights, repression, or the horrific executions in Iran. This demonstrates that the people of Iran must rely on themselves to bring about change. Amnesty International and Ms. Mai Sato, the United Nations Special Rapporteur, along with a number of UN experts, warned in separate statements about the neglect of human rights violations in Iran and the continued impunity of those responsible for violating the human rights of the Iranian people from international accountability and prosecution. We declare to all awakened consciences, international institutions, human rights advocates, and opponents of the death penalty: We, the prisoners participating in the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign, who for 126 consecutive weeks have protested every Tuesday in prisons across Iran through hunger strikes and every means available to us against medieval-style executions in Iran, once again declare that the human rights of the Iranian people, especially prisoners, are not negotiable. Together with the people of Iran, we will defend freedom, equality, and the abolition of the death penalty until our last breath and final ounce of strength. We call on all honorable and aware people of Iran, as well as the awakened consciences of the world and international human rights organizations, not to remain indifferent to the growing wave of executions in Iran and to take responsible and effective action to stop this organized crime carried out by the religious fascism ruling Iran. History has shown that no tyranny has endured through reliance on violence, and no government has been able to permanently silence people’s demands for justice. What will endure are the ideals of freedom, equality, and respect for the right to life and human dignity—values for which the people of Iran have paid a heavy price and continue to uphold. The “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign informs the public that a group of prisoners in Kerman Prison has joined the campaign in protest against death sentences and participates in hunger strikes every Tuesday alongside other prisoners. Prisoners participating in the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign are on hunger strike on Tuesday, June 23, during the campaign’s 126th week in 57 prisons across the country.Inflation in Iran and the Limits of What an Agreement with the United States Can Achieve
A sick political system inevitably produces a sick economy. In an absolute dictatorship where political and social freedoms are suppressed, independent institutions have been dismantled, the rule of law has been replaced by the will of those in power, and the country’s resources are directed towards preserving political rule, the emergence of a healthy, transparent and development-oriented economy is virtually impossible. The profound crisis now engulfing Iran’s economy is not merely the result of one mistaken decision, the incompetence of a particular administration, or a single period of sanctions. It is the direct product of a totalitarian structure that, for nearly five decades, has placed the preservation of its rule above freedom, public welfare and the country’s development.
Within this structure, Iran’s economy has not been managed according to the needs of society, free competition, productive investment and long-term planning. Instead, it has been shaped by the regime’s political and security priorities. A substantial share of public resources, oil revenues, the state budget and the country’s economic capacity has been diverted away from infrastructure, job creation, productivity, public services and higher living standards, and placed at the disposal of military and security institutions, regime-controlled foundations, and regional and weapons programmes. At the centre of this structure stand the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Office of the Supreme Leader and a vast network of unaccountable and opaque institutions that control a large part of the economy.
In most countries, politics influences the economy. Under the Islamic Republic, however, Iran’s economy has effectively become a hostage to the regime’s policies. Economic decisions are made not primarily to serve the public interest, but to meet security requirements and preserve the ruling system. For this reason, the economy has remained close to crisis for much of the past two decades, and successive administrations have failed to resolve its fundamental problems. Without changing the underlying structure, each government has merely replaced one set of short-term measures with another, ultimately adding to the budget deficit, public debt, liquidity, corruption and instability.
The central problem is therefore not simply the replacement of governments or executive officials. It lies with the principal policymaker and the structure that determines the broad direction of the economy, the budget, foreign policy and the distribution of resources. The scale of the crisis has become so evident that even regime-affiliated media and experts have been forced to acknowledge it. On 10 June 2026, the state-run Jahan-e Sanat daily published the striking headline, “Treating Iran’s sick economy by changing the policymaker.” Such an admission shows that even within the official establishment, the political roots of the economic crisis can no longer be concealed indefinitely.
For years, Iran’s economy has resembled a half-living body on an autopsy table. Despite their differences, state-affiliated and independent experts increasingly agree on one essential point: the ruling structure places its own survival above the basic needs of the population. Over the past four decades, public welfare, sustainable employment, economic security and the protection of purchasing power have been subordinated to the regime’s security, military and regional objectives. The result has been a state-dominated command economy marked by expanding monopolies, institutionalised corruption, rent-seeking, capital flight, declining investment and the gradual destruction of productive sectors.
One of the clearest consequences of this structure is a chronic and expanding budget deficit. When genuine government revenue cannot cover expenditure, and the regime is unwilling to reduce its non-productive and security-related spending, it resorts to borrowing, expanding the monetary base and drawing directly or indirectly on central bank resources. This increases liquidity, weakens the national currency and drives a continuous rise in prices. A vicious cycle is created: budget deficits lead to money creation, money creation fuels inflation, inflation erodes purchasing power, and falling purchasing power deepens poverty, stagnation and social discontent.
On the other side of this cycle, parts of the ruling establishment and their associates use preferential access to foreign currency, commercial monopolies, privileged information and public resources to accumulate immense wealth. At the same time, ordinary people watch the value of their wages and savings decline day by day, while groups close to power use the crisis itself to enrich themselves further. Inflation in Iran is therefore not merely a monetary or statistical phenomenon; it also operates as a mechanism for transferring wealth from the majority of society to a small minority connected to power.
Among the many consequences of this structure, inflation is the most visible and pervasive crisis affecting the daily lives of millions of Iranians. The continuous rise in the cost of food, housing, medicine, transport, education and other basic needs has widened the gap between household income and expenditure and pushed a large part of society below, or close to, the poverty line. Chronic inflation has also deprived households and businesses of the ability to save, plan and invest, making uncertainty a permanent feature of economic life.
This study examines the scale of inflation in Iran, its structural causes and its effects on living standards, wages, employment, housing and quality of life. To avoid exaggeration, and to ensure that the findings can be assessed even against the regime’s own stated criteria, the analysis relies exclusively on official figures published by institutions of the Iranian regime, including the Statistical Centre of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, the Supreme Labour Council and other official bodies.
Reliance on official figures, however, does not mean that those figures are accepted as accurate or complete. The Iranian regime has a long record of concealing economic realities, releasing data selectively, changing calculation methods, delaying reports and understating the scale of crises. The lack of independence among statistical institutions, discrepancies between figures published by the Statistical Centre and the Central Bank, the absence of public access to detailed datasets, the exclusion or neglect of much of the informal economy, and political pressure on data-producing bodies all raise serious questions about the credibility and completeness of the official numbers.
The figures presented in this report should therefore not be treated as a full reflection of economic reality. They are better understood as the minimum scale of a crisis that the regime itself can no longer completely hide. The true extent of inflation, poverty, unemployment and the loss of purchasing power—particularly among low-income groups, workers, pensioners, rural communities and residents of deprived regions—is likely to be considerably worse than official reports suggest. With this limitation in mind, the following analysis examines inflation and its economic and social consequences using the Islamic Republic’s own published data.
The index levels published by the two institutions are not directly comparable because their base years and coverage differ. The discrepancies do not necessarily mean that one institution has simply made an error. The statistical population, base year, weights assigned to goods and services, geographical coverage and timing of price collection may all differ. Nevertheless, when two official institutions report figures several percentage points apart, a research article must identify the source of each number clearly and avoid combining indicators without attribution.
A nominal wage increase of 60 per cent may initially appear substantial. Yet when overall year-on-year inflation is 83.9 per cent and food inflation is around 130 per cent, the purchasing power of wages for basic necessities still falls. The problem is not only the level of pay but also the timing gap between wage adjustment and continuous price increases. Wages are generally revised once a year, while prices change every month.
Abstract
Official data for May 2026 show that Iran’s economy has entered a period of extremely high and accelerating inflation. The Statistical Centre of Iran reported monthly inflation of 8.8 per cent, year-on-year inflation of 83.9 per cent and twelve-month average inflation of 57.7 per cent. Using a different methodology and geographical coverage, the Central Bank reported corresponding urban figures of 8.5, 77.2 and 53.9 per cent. The gap between the two official institutions itself demonstrates the need for caution when interpreting the figures. Inflationary pressure has not been distributed evenly. Year-on-year inflation for food, beverages and tobacco reached roughly 130 per cent. The corresponding rate was 101.8 per cent in rural areas and 80.8 per cent in urban areas, while annual inflation for the second-lowest expenditure decile exceeded that of the wealthiest decile. Low-income households, which spend a larger share of their budgets on food and basic necessities, have consequently borne the greatest pressure. The central finding of this study is that a possible agreement with the United States could reduce the pace of inflation in the short term by lowering inflation expectations, bringing relative stability to the foreign-exchange market, increasing oil exports, reducing transaction costs and improving access to foreign currency. It would not, however, be sufficient to resolve the crisis on a lasting basis. Without budgetary discipline, control over liquidity growth, reform of banking imbalances, stronger investment, greater public confidence and statistical transparency, external relief would probably function more as a temporary painkiller than as a cure.Research Question and Method
The central questions of this report are: how severe is Iran’s current inflation, which groups are most heavily affected, what are the principal causes of its persistence, and to what extent could an external agreement alter its course? To address these questions, the study distinguishes between three official measures: monthly inflation, year-on-year inflation and twelve-month average inflation. Data from the Statistical Centre and the Central Bank are then compared with official information on wages, the cost-of-living basket and the labour market. This is a descriptive and scenario-based analysis, not an econometric estimate of causal relationships. Whenever the possible effects of an agreement, sanctions, war or exchange-rate policy are discussed, the conclusions are stated conditionally. Expert statements are also kept separate from official data and presented as scenarios or expert assessments rather than firm predictions.The Official Inflation Picture in May 2026
According to the Statistical Centre of Iran, the consumer price index for Iranian households rose by 8.8 per cent in May 2026 compared with April and by 83.9 per cent compared with May 2025. The average index during the twelve months ending in May was 57.7 per cent higher than in the preceding twelve-month period. For urban areas, the Central Bank reported monthly inflation of 8.5 per cent and twelve-month average inflation of 53.9 per cent, while reports based on Central Bank data placed year-on-year inflation at 77.2 per cent.Official Inflation Indicators for May 2026
| Institution | Coverage | Monthly Inflation | Year-on-Year Inflation | Twelve-Month Average |
| Statistical Centre of Iran | All households nationwide | 8.8% | 83.9% | 57.7% |
| Central Bank of Iran | Urban areas | 8.5% | 77.2% | 53.9% |
Understanding the Indicators and Avoiding Common Misinterpretations
Monthly inflation measures the change in the price level compared with the previous month. Year-on-year inflation compares the price of the same basket with the corresponding month a year earlier. Twelve-month average inflation compares the average index during the most recent twelve months with the average during the preceding twelve months. Year-on-year inflation is therefore an official statistical measure and should not simply be described as “the inflation people feel”. A household’s experienced inflation depends on its consumption pattern, location, income and the prices of the goods and services it purchases most frequently. When prices are accelerating, twelve-month average inflation usually rises with a delay because earlier, lower-inflation months remain within the average. The gap between year-on-year inflation of 83.9 per cent and twelve-month average inflation of 57.7 per cent is therefore less a contradiction than a sign that the inflationary wave has intensified sharply in recent months.Food Inflation, Geographical Inequality and Pressure on Low-Income Households
The most important feature of the current wave is its concentration in essential goods. According to figures attributed to the Statistical Centre, year-on-year inflation for food, beverages and tobacco reached approximately 130 per cent in May 2026. In other words, the price level for this group more than doubled in a single year. Twelve-month average inflation for the same group was reported at about 83 per cent, again demonstrating the recent acceleration in food prices. The geographical burden has also been uneven. Year-on-year inflation was recorded at 80.8 per cent for urban households and 101.8 per cent for rural households. This difference may reflect variations in the composition of household consumption, the greater share of food in rural budgets, transport costs, more limited access to competitive markets and differences in local prices. Across the income distribution, annual inflation ranged from 55.9 per cent for the wealthiest expenditure decile to 63.2 per cent for the second-lowest decile, producing an inflation gap of 7.3 percentage points. This pattern highlights the regressive nature of inflation: the larger the share of food, rent and energy in a household budget, the greater the proportion of income absorbed by rising prices. A national average is therefore insufficient for assessing living standards. Two households with different incomes and locations may experience very different inflation rates. For a low-income rural household, the disaggregated official indicators are closer to lived reality than the national average, although even those indicators do not necessarily capture every change in local markets.Wages, the Food Basket and the Loss of Purchasing Power
The Supreme Labour Council increased the basic minimum wage for the Iranian year 1405, which began in March 2026, by 60 per cent to approximately 16.625 million tomans[1] per month. The minimum gross monthly income of a single worker with no prior service was announced at about 21.826 million tomans, while that of a married worker with two children was approximately 26.151 million tomans. During the same negotiations, the workers’ cost-of-living basket was estimated at 42.9 million tomans per month. An estimate based on the Ministry of Welfare’s subsidised-goods basket and average prices published by the Statistical Centre placed the cost of a limited food basket for a family of four at 21.212 million tomans in May 2026. This basket did not include rent, transport, healthcare, education, clothing or communications. On this basis, the limited food basket alone consumed about 81 per cent of the minimum income of a married worker with two children. For a single worker, its cost was almost equal to the entire monthly income. The minimum income of the four-person household covered only about 61 per cent of the cost-of-living basket agreed by the Supreme Labour Council. These ratios are calculated before insurance and other deductions and exclude housing rent.Minimum Wage and Estimated Living Costs in 2026
| Indicator | Monthly Amount |
| Basic minimum wage | 16.625 million tomans[2] |
| Minimum income of a single worker | 21.826 million tomans |
| Minimum income of a married worker with two children | 26.151 million tomans |
| Limited food basket for a family of four | 21.212 million tomans |
| Cost-of-living basket agreed by the Supreme Labour Council | 42.900 million tomans |
Why Has Inflation Become Chronic?
Growth of Liquidity and the Monetary Base
Recently released Central Bank data show that twelve-month liquidity growth reached approximately 47.3 per cent in February 2026, while the monetary base grew by 54.7 per cent. When money and near-money expand more rapidly than real output, the potential pressure on prices increases, although the strength and timing of the transmission to inflation depend on the velocity of money, expectations and production conditions.Budget Deficits and Banking Imbalances
Structural budget deficits, government debt, off-budget obligations and imbalances within the banking system can lead to an expansion of the monetary base and credit. The Iranian Parliament’s Research Centre had already warned, before the latest surge, about worsening fiscal and banking imbalances. When current expenditure is not supported by sustainable revenue, financing the deficit through the banking network or central bank resources strengthens the monetary foundations of inflation.The Exchange Rate, Sanctions and Transaction Costs
Iran’s economy depends heavily on imported intermediate goods, raw materials, medicine, animal feed and equipment. Depreciation of the rial, restrictions on money transfers, higher insurance and transport costs and difficulty obtaining foreign currency all raise the cost of imports and domestic production. Empirical studies of Iran have also found that stronger sanctions, operating partly through the exchange rate, are associated with higher inflation and lower output.Removal of the Preferential Exchange Rate and War-Related Shocks
Changing the exchange-rate policy for essential goods can reduce the gap between official and market prices. If implemented without targeted support, adequate competition, sufficient reserves and exchange-rate stability, however, it can trigger an abrupt rise in the prices of basic necessities. Using official rates, economist Mohammad-Taghi Fayyazi calculated that average monthly inflation rose from about 3.6 per cent before January 2026 to approximately 7.34 per cent afterwards. He identified the removal of the preferential exchange rate and the subsequent war-related shock as important intensifying factors. These figures represent an expert interpretation of official data rather than an independent estimate by this study.Expectations and Declining Confidence in the National Currency
In an inflationary economy, businesses and households do not respond only to present costs. Expectations of future increases in the exchange rate and prices also alter behaviour. Bringing purchases forward, reducing holdings of rials, pricing with wider safety margins and shortening the duration of contracts can accelerate the transmission of shocks. In such an environment, even news of an agreement or the failure of negotiations may influence exchange rates and prices before the actual supply of foreign currency changes.Is Iran Approaching Hyperinflation?
In the classical literature, hyperinflation is generally defined as an increase of more than 50 per cent in the price level within a single month. Monthly inflation of 8.8 per cent in May was extremely severe and destructive, but by this definition it was not yet hyperinflation. Triple-digit annual inflation is also not the same as hyperinflation: a country may record annual inflation above 100 per cent without prices rising by 50 per cent every month. To illustrate the severity of the monthly figure, if an 8.8 per cent monthly increase were repeated unchanged for twelve months, the compounded annual rate would be about 175 per cent. This is only a mathematical scenario, not a forecast, because base effects, economic policy, the exchange rate, the supply of goods and political developments will change over subsequent months. Valiollah Seif, a former governor of the Central Bank, has likewise distinguished between “very high chronic inflation” and “classical hyperinflation”. He identifies liquidity growth, budget deficits, exchange-rate volatility, geopolitical shocks and falling confidence in the national currency as a combination of risks that must be taken seriously. The analytical value of this assessment lies in its warning about a dangerous trajectory, not in a claim that hyperinflation has already begun.The Labour Market and the Social Consequences of Inflation
For the winter of 2025-26, the Statistical Centre reported an unemployment rate of 7.6 per cent among people aged 15 and over and an economic participation rate of 39.7 per cent. The population aged 15 and over was approximately 66.5 million, while the economically active population was close to 26.4 million. This means that more than 40 million people of working age were outside the labour force. A relatively low unemployment rate alone is not evidence of a healthy labour market because it measures only those unemployed people who are actively seeking work within the labour force. A fall in participation can keep the unemployment rate low even when the economy is failing to create sufficient opportunities. An analysis of inflation and living standards must therefore also consider underemployment, withdrawal from the labour market, job quality and real wages. High inflation changes patterns of employment. Holding several jobs, compulsory overtime, the entry of more family members into the labour market and the expansion of informal work all become means of compensating for lost purchasing power. These strategies may increase nominal household income, but they do so at the cost of less rest, greater exhaustion and increased employment insecurity. In housing, rising rents can force families to accept smaller homes, move to cheaper areas or share accommodation. In healthcare and education, inflation can lead people to postpone medical appointments, buy less medicine, withdraw from private education and reduce household investment in skills. These effects are not captured fully in headline inflation figures, but their long-term consequences for human capital and inequality are serious. Psychological pressure is also part of the economic cost of inflation. When prices change rapidly, planning even a few months ahead becomes difficult. Savings held in rials lose value, contract horizons shorten, and major life decisions—from marriage and having children to buying a home and emigrating—are made under far greater uncertainty.What Effect Could an Agreement with the United States Have?
Short-Term Channels of Influence
An agreement that effectively reduces restrictions on oil, banking, insurance and transport could help restrain inflation through several channels: increasing the supply of foreign currency, reducing import and transaction costs, improving access to raw materials, lowering risk and inflation expectations, and facilitating the supply of essential goods. Even before full implementation, a change in expectations could affect the exchange rate and asset prices. The release of frozen assets would not necessarily have a single, uniform effect. If the funds were used for essential imports, repayment of foreign obligations and strengthening reserves, they could reduce pressure on supply and the exchange rate. If, however, they were converted into higher rial expenditure without fiscal discipline, part of their anti-inflationary effect could be lost. How the resources are used is therefore as important as their total value. Kamal Seyed-Ali, a former deputy governor of the Central Bank for foreign-exchange affairs, has proposed an optimistic scenario in which oil sales of 2.5 million barrels per day, combined with 35 billion dollars in non-oil exports, could reduce inflation to around 20 per cent. This should be treated as an expert scenario rather than an official forecast. Its realisation would depend on genuine access to revenues, exchange-rate stability, budgetary control and the reaction of public expectations.The Post-JCPOA Experience: Real but Unsustainable Improvement
The experience following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action shows that the claim that external relief had no effect on inflation is inconsistent with official data. According to the Central Bank’s annual series, inflation fell from 34.7 per cent in the Iranian year 1392 (2013-14) to 9.0 per cent in 1395 (2016-17) and 9.6 per cent in 1396 (2017-18). This decline was not caused by the agreement alone; monetary policy, exchange-rate conditions and weak demand also played a role. Nevertheless, reduced risk and a degree of external opening contributed to the more favourable environment of that period. After the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and sanctions were restored, inflation rose again. During six of the eight Iranian calendar years from 1397 to 1404, the official Central Bank rate exceeded 40 per cent. This experience supports two conclusions at once: an agreement can produce a meaningful and genuine reduction in inflation, but if it lacks political durability and is not accompanied by domestic reform, its gains will remain fragile.Why an Agreement Alone Is Unlikely to Reduce Inflation Significantly
Even under a scenario in which an agreement with the United States leads to higher oil exports, the release of frozen assets and improved access to foreign currency, a significant and lasting decline in inflation would remain highly unlikely without a fundamental change in the regime’s economic and political priorities. Chronic inflation can be brought under control only if government spending and the budget deficit are restrained, the banking system is prevented from creating undisciplined credit, the Central Bank is able to pursue a coherent and independent monetary policy, and the business environment becomes sufficiently predictable to encourage productive investment. Additional oil revenue may temporarily ease pressure on the currency and provide resources for economic reform, but it cannot substitute for reform itself. The more fundamental problem, however, lies in the nature of the ruling system. The regime has consistently placed the preservation of its own power above the economic welfare of the Iranian people. Its primary priorities have long been the security and repressive apparatus, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, nuclear and missile programmes, and the financing and arming of proxy groups across the region. Economic development, public welfare, employment, healthcare, housing and the protection of people’s purchasing power have repeatedly been treated as secondary concerns. Past experience reinforces this conclusion. Whenever the regime has gained access to greater oil revenues or previously restricted financial resources, there has been no guarantee that these funds would be directed towards productive investment or improving living standards. A substantial share of available resources has instead been channelled towards military, security, nuclear, missile and regional projects, as well as opaque institutions that operate beyond meaningful public oversight. For this reason, the release of frozen assets or an increase in oil income would not automatically translate into lower prices or greater economic security for ordinary citizens. There is also a risk that new foreign-currency revenues would be used primarily to stabilise the exchange rate temporarily or to suppress prices through short-term market intervention. Such measures may create a brief period of relative calm, but they can deplete reserves and pave the way for another currency shock if the underlying causes of inflation remain untouched. A sustainable anti-inflation policy would have to address monetary expansion, the budget deficit, banking imbalances, production, trade, investment and social protection simultaneously. Support for low-income households would also need to be targeted and adjusted to the actual inflation of essential goods. Yet the regime’s record gives little reason to expect that it would place such reforms above the financial needs of its security apparatus and strategic projects. Therefore, even if an agreement with the United States were to reduce external pressure and generate a temporary improvement in the currency market, it is doubtful that inflation would fall substantially or remain low. As long as the regime continues to prioritise its own survival, repression, nuclear and missile programmes, and regional proxy networks over the economy and the welfare of the population, any improvement is likely to be limited, temporary and vulnerable to reversal. All figures used in this study are drawn from official Iranian institutions or state-reported data. Calculated figures have been rounded to one decimal place where appropriate. As explained at the outset, these official figures should be regarded as a minimum indication of the crisis rather than a complete account of economic reality. [1] At the free-market exchange rate on 17 June 2026, one million tomans was equivalent to approximately US$6.50. [2] At the free-market exchange rate on 17 June 2026, one million tomans was equivalent to approximately US$6.50.Day 2 of Free Iran 2026: International Figures Rally Behind NCRI Alternative
PARIS — The second day of the Free Iran 2026 World Summit brought together a broad range of former senior officials, parliamentarians, diplomats, military leaders, and human rights advocates who voiced support for the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and its vision for political change in Iran.
Held on June 21, the gathering marked the 45th anniversary of June 20, 1981, when Iranian security forces opened fire on a mass demonstration in Tehran. Throughout the day, speakers repeatedly referred to the role of organized resistance inside Iran, the need to reject both religious rule and monarchical restoration, and the importance of supporting democratic change led by Iranians themselves.
The event unfolded against the backdrop of restrictions imposed on a planned mass rally by Iranian expatriates in Paris. Several speakers criticized the move, arguing that it reflected broader challenges faced by Iranian opposition groups abroad.
Opening the session, Professor Ramesh Sepehrad commemorated those killed during the events of June 1981 and described the summit as a platform representing political prisoners, workers, and young protesters inside Iran. She argued that neither administrative restrictions nor international policies of engagement with Tehran had diminished the momentum of the opposition movement.
NCRI President-elect Mrs. Maryam Rajavi delivered the keynote address, focusing on the role of organized resistance and what she described as the necessity of a domestic force capable of confronting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Rajavi paid tribute to members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) who lost their lives over decades of confrontation with the Iranian authorities.
She reiterated the NCRI’s proposal for a transitional process in which a provisional government would organize free elections within six months of political change. Rajavi also emphasized that Iran’s future should exclude both the current religious system and a return to monarchical rule.
The summit featured remarks from a number of former senior Western officials.
Former U.S. National Security Advisor Gen. James L. Jones described the Iranian government as facing significant internal pressures, including economic challenges and public dissatisfaction. He argued that political transformation is most likely when popular discontent converges with an organized opposition movement. Jones also urged governments and media organizations to challenge what he characterized as Tehran’s disinformation efforts and to examine the NCRI’s political platform more closely.
British MP Bob Blackman, Chairman of the British Committee for Iran Freedom, told participants that more than 3,000 parliamentarians worldwide had expressed support for the NCRI’s proposed transitional framework. Blackman highlighted recent developments in the United Kingdom concerning legislation that could facilitate the proscription of the IRGC.
Former UK Secretary of State for Wales David Jones criticized what he described as decades of Western appeasement toward Tehran, arguing that dialogue and concessions had failed to moderate the Iranian government. He endorsed what supporters of the NCRI refer to as a “third option” — neither military intervention nor accommodation, but political change led by Iranians.
Former U.S. Special Envoy Gen. Keith Kellogg pointed to the NCRI’s 2002 disclosures regarding Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak as evidence of the organization’s intelligence capabilities. He argued that weakening the regime’s strategic position could create opportunities for domestic political change.
Former UK Defense Secretary Sir Liam Fox focused on regional security concerns, warning that any easing of economic pressure could strengthen the Iranian authorities and their regional activities. He maintained that only Iranians themselves should determine the country’s political future.
Accountability and human rights were recurring themes throughout the conference.
Former FBI Director Louis Freeh called for greater international efforts to investigate and prosecute officials involved in human rights abuses. He argued that establishing individual criminal responsibility for acts committed by Iranian authorities should remain a priority for the international community.
Former Finnish Prime Minister Anneli Jäätteenmäki drew comparisons between contemporary Iranian opposition efforts and historical democratic movements in Europe. She expressed support for the NCRI’s political program and argued that meaningful change would come from those actively resisting inside Iran rather than through foreign intervention.
Belgian lawmaker Kathleen Depoorter highlighted the situation of women in Iran and called for human rights considerations to become a central factor in diplomatic relations with Tehran. She praised the NCRI’s proposals regarding secular governance, judicial independence, and gender equality.
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Tod Wolters emphasized what he described as the growing presence of Resistance Units throughout Iran. He argued that organized opposition networks inside the country demonstrate the persistence of anti-government sentiment despite ongoing repression.
Religious freedom and minority rights also featured prominently in the discussions.
Dr. Margot Käßmann, former Chairperson of the Evangelical Church in Germany, condemned the persecution of religious minorities in Iran and stressed the importance of separating religion from state institutions. She noted that a group of bishops and rabbis had jointly condemned recent executions in Iran.
Former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt drew attention to recent executions of activists and Resistance Unit members. She argued that younger generations of Iranians increasingly reject both the current political system and the prospect of restoring the monarchy.
Several speakers specifically addressed the debate over potential alternatives to the current Iranian government. Former U.S. Ambassador Carla Sands, former Icelandic Prime Minister Geir Haarde, former White House official Linda Chavez, and former U.S. Ambassador Robert Joseph all argued that political change should emerge from organized movements inside Iran rather than through external intervention or a return to the monarchy.
The conference concluded with remarks from former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Bloomfield, former Members of the European Parliament Struan Stevenson and Paulo Casaca, and representatives of younger generations of Iranian activists.
Speaking on behalf of Iranian youth attending the summit, jurist and commentator Mahan Taraj reflected on growing up in exile and her decision to support the NCRI after independently studying Iran’s political history. She linked the current generation of activists to those who participated in the June 1981 demonstrations and to contemporary Resistance Units operating inside Iran.
As the second day of the summit came to a close, participants repeatedly returned to a common theme: the future of Iran should be determined by its citizens. While speakers differed in emphasis—focusing variously on human rights, regional security, accountability, or democratic governance—the proceedings centered on support for an organized opposition movement and rejection of both the current theocratic system and any restoration of hereditary rule.
Free Iran 2026 Summit in Paris Draws International Support for Democratic Change in Iran
PARIS, June 20, 2026 — Political leaders, former government officials, parliamentarians, and human rights advocates from Europe and North America gathered in Paris on Saturday for the Free Iran 2026 World Summit, an event focused on Iran’s political future and support for democratic change.
The conference took place amid controversy surrounding a last-minute administrative decision that prevented a planned public demonstration in Paris. According to organizers, the rally was expected to draw tens of thousands of participants from across Europe, North America, and Australia. Speakers at the summit repeatedly referred to the cancellation of the gathering, arguing that it reflected broader tensions surrounding international policy toward Tehran.
The event was organized around support for the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), with participants presenting the coalition and its President-elect, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, as a democratic alternative to the current ruling establishment in Iran.
Opening the summit, Mrs. Rajavi marked 45 years of organized resistance against the Iranian regime. She highlighted the activities of Resistance Units inside Iran and argued that domestic opposition remains a decisive factor in shaping the country’s future.
“Iran’s future, and peace and freedom in Iran, lie in the establishment of a democratic republic,” Mrs. Rajavi told the gathering. She pointed to the NCRI’s Ten-Point Plan, which calls for a secular republic, free elections, gender equality, judicial independence, and a non-nuclear Iran.
A recurring theme throughout the conference was criticism of what speakers described as Western “appeasement” of Tehran. Participants from a range of political backgrounds argued that diplomatic engagement had failed to moderate the Iranian government’s behavior and called for stronger measures, including increased pressure on Iranian authorities and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization.
Former European Council President and former Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel argued that policies aimed at accommodating authoritarian governments had historically failed to produce meaningful change. Referring to Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan, Michel described it as a framework for a future democratic Iran and emphasized that lasting transformation must emerge from within Iranian society.
Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson also addressed the conference, criticizing the French authorities’ decision to block the planned demonstration. Drawing comparisons with historical democratic movements in Eastern Europe and South Africa, Johnson argued that political change ultimately depends on organized domestic resistance rather than outside intervention. He expressed support for principles outlined in the NCRI platform, including free speech, gender equality, and an independent judiciary.
Several speakers drew on their own experiences with political transitions. Former Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman recalled the downfall of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s dictatorship in 1989 and suggested that authoritarian systems can appear stable until sudden political shifts occur. He described Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan as a structured roadmap that provides a vision for democratic governance after political change.
Former Speaker of the UK House of Commons John Bercow used his remarks to criticize both the Iranian government and efforts to revive monarchical rule. He praised the NCRI as a secular and pluralist movement while arguing that democratic aspirations in Iran should not be linked to a return to the political system that existed before 1979.
Ukraine’s former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba connected developments in Iran to broader international security concerns. He noted Tehran’s military cooperation with Russia and described the experience of Ukraine’s own democratic movement as evidence that popular mobilization can overcome entrenched systems of repression.
Former Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird similarly rejected the notion that Iran’s future lies in a choice between the current ruling establishment and the restoration of the monarchy. He argued that organized opposition movements inside and outside Iran have developed an alternative political vision centered on democratic institutions and civil liberties. Support for the NCRI’s platform was echoed by several European lawmakers and political figures. Former Vice President of the European Parliament Alejo Vidal-Quadras described the organization’s political program as a blueprint for a secular republic based on democratic principles and equal rights. Baroness Nuala O’Loan of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords focused on growing calls within British politics to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization. She also criticized the restrictions placed on the planned Paris demonstration, describing them as inconsistent with democratic principles and freedom of expression. German Bundestag member Carsten Müller argued that the Iranian government’s reliance on executions, censorship, and repression reflected underlying vulnerabilities rather than strength. He called on European democracies to support democratic movements advocating political change in Iran. French Deputy Christine Arrighi addressed the controversy surrounding the cancellation of the public rally, expressing concern about the decision and its implications for freedom of assembly. Speaking on behalf of parliamentary groups supporting a democratic Iran, she described the NCRI as an organized political movement with a clear vision for the country’s future. Italian parliamentarian Naike Gruppioni highlighted the role of women in Iran’s protest movements and praised what she described as the resilience of Iranian civil society. She pledged to raise human rights concerns through Italian and European institutions. Canadian Member of Parliament Judy Sgro pointed to demonstrations held by Iranian communities abroad, including large gatherings in Toronto, as evidence of continued international engagement with developments inside Iran. She argued that support for democratic change remains strong among members of the Iranian diaspora. The summit concluded with remarks from Dominique Attias, former President of the European Lawyers Association, who framed the event in terms of legal rights and democratic freedoms. Attias criticized restrictions on peaceful assembly and argued that international attention should remain focused on human rights concerns in Iran. Throughout the day, speakers repeatedly returned to several common themes: support for democratic change, opposition to both the current theocratic system and any restoration of monarchy, criticism of Western engagement policies toward Tehran, and endorsement of the NCRI’s Ten-Point Plan as a political framework for a future republic. The gathering also included participation from residents of Ashraf 3 in Albania through a live video link, underscoring the international character of the event and the continued involvement of Iranian opposition supporters from multiple countries. As the conference came to a close, participants presented a unified message that Iran’s future should be determined by its people through democratic institutions, free elections, and respect for fundamental rights.I salute all my fellow Iranians and supporters of the Resistance who traveled long distances to take part in the grand Free Iran rally.
— Maryam Rajavi (@Maryam_Rajavi) June 20, 2026
A thousand salutes to the perseverance of every one of you who echo the voice of the people of Iran and the voice of prisoners who face the… pic.twitter.com/EfTQ6JLCiR
Iran’s Water Crisis: Women on the Front Lines of a Silent Disaster
Iran’s water crisis is no longer merely an environmental or economic challenge; it has become one of the country’s most serious social and humanitarian threats. Experts have warned for years about the consequences of mismanagement of water resources, excessive extraction from groundwater reserves, climate change, and ineffective policies. Today, however, the effects of this crisis are more visible than ever in people’s daily lives, especially among women.
Iran is now among the countries experiencing severe water stress. According to the World Resources Institute, Iran is one of the 25 countries facing the highest levels of water stress in the world. This means that a large share of the country’s renewable water resources is consumed each year, a trend that seriously threatens the sustainability of its water supplies.
According to official statistics, Iran’s rainfall has declined significantly over recent decades. At the same time, excessive extraction of groundwater has caused many of the country’s plains to experience land subsidence, a phenomenon experts consider irreversible.
Number of Water Wells in Iran 2.5 Times Greater Than All Middle Eastern Countries CombinedThe state-run Shargh newspaper warned in a report that dozens of Iran’s plains have reached a critical stage and that a large portion of the country’s groundwater resources has been lost. The state-run Mehr News Agency also quoted water officials as saying that many of Iran’s dams are facing significant declines in water reserves and that some cities are on the verge of severe water shortages.
