The Rising Cost of Food in Iran; Hidden Pressure on Large FamiliesAt the same time as food prices have risen, the foreign exchange rate has also experienced an unprecedented jump. The price of the U.S. dollar on the open market, which stood at around 820,000 rials before the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025, has now reached approximately 1.9 million rials. As a result, the value of the dollar has increased by more than 120% over roughly 10 months, and the collapse of the national currency has imposed a new wave of price hikes on consumer and food markets. When implementing the plan to remove subsidized currency rates, the Iranian regime had promised that the resources generated from the measure would be directly returned to the public through electronic coupons and that the value of the credit would increase in line with inflation. Ahmad Meydari, head of the Planning and Budget Organization, had also promised that the coupon credit would be reviewed every three months based on the inflation rate. However, no increase has so far been applied to the amount of this subsidy. On May 6, Fatemeh Mohajerani, spokesperson for the government of Iranian regime president Masoud Pezeshkian, referring to the government’s financial limitations, said that the government wanting to increase the coupon amount and actually having the ability to do so are two different matters. Meanwhile, official reports and data published in domestic media indicate the continued upward trend in food inflation. Some estimates show that inflation in food items has surpassed 70%. A recent assessment also shows that in April 2026, the cost of a household food basket was equivalent to 85% of the minimum income of a married worker with two children, highlighting the severe decline in purchasing power and the deepening livelihood crisis in Iran.
Iranians Struggle to Afford Basic Food Basket as Prices Surge
While only about five months have passed since the implementation of the plan to remove subsidized foreign currency rates for some essential goods, the latest economic reports show that the cost of the basket of goods covered by the electronic coupon program has risen sharply and far exceeded the amount of government support being paid.
According to statistics published by economic media outlets affiliated with Iran’s regime, the total price of items included in the electronic coupon basket, which was around 21.8 million rials before the removal of subsidized currency rates, has now reached approximately 37.8 million rials. Meanwhile, the amount of support paid to eligible households has remained fixed at 10 million rials with no increase. It is worth noting that the U.S. dollar exchange rate has surged in recent months to an unprecedented 1.9 million rials per dollar, while a worker’s salary is approximately $126.
Iran’s Inflation Crisis: A Monster Nurtured by the Power Structure
Iran’s inflation crisis is no longer a temporary phenomenon but has become a chronic and structural condition. Contrary to official narratives, this crisis is not merely the result of war or reduced supply of goods, but the direct outcome of economic and political mechanisms that have taken shape over many years. It is a structure in which unproductive and rent-seeking costs are continuously imposed on society.
Structural Roots of Iran’s Inflation Crisis
In the past, even under unstable conditions, there was a possibility of relatively returning to lower inflation levels. But now, this possibility has almost disappeared. The reason for this change lies in the accumulation of deep economic imbalances. One of the most important factors is the uncontrolled expansion of spending orders within the power structure. In this framework, economic resources are allocated not based on productivity, but according to the interests of groups close to power. This process has caused public expenditures to rise continuously without any growth in the economy’s productive capacity.Behind the Internet Shutdown: The Iranian Regime’s Black MarketUnder such conditions, the gap between supply and demand expands artificially. The economy lacks the capacity to produce sufficient goods and services, yet demand is increased through liquidity injections and populist policies. The result of this situation is nothing other than the intensification of Iran’s inflation crisis. Contrary to official claims, historical evidence shows that war alone is not the determining factor behind inflation. The experiences of various countries, from post-World War Europe to contemporary economies, demonstrate that severe inflation has mainly been caused by unstable fiscal policies. Even within Iran itself, there have been periods without war that experienced extremely high inflation.
Rent-Seeking Economy and the Reproduction of Inequality
One of the main features of Iran’s inflation crisis is its connection to the rent-seeking structure of the economy. In this structure, resources are placed in the hands of specific networks instead of being distributed fairly. These networks benefit from exclusive privileges and are effectively shielded from inflationary pressures. In contrast, the costs of inflation fall disproportionately on low-income groups. Rising prices of essential goods, declining purchasing power, and economic instability have all caused class divisions to increase at an unprecedented level. This is the very process that can be described as the transfer of wealth from the lower classes to the upper classes. Policies such as distributing electronic coupons or increasing nominal wages not only fail to solve the problem, but in many cases contribute to worsening Iran’s inflation crisis. This is because such measures, without productive backing, merely increase liquidity and place greater pressure on prices. On the other hand, the expansion of parallel and unaccountable institutions has imposed a heavy financial burden on the economy. These institutions consume a significant share of resources without playing any role in increasing production. Such a structure effectively makes any form of economic balance impossible.Social and Political Consequences of Inflation
Iran’s inflation crisis is not merely an economic issue, but one with profound social and political consequences. The continuous decline in purchasing power has eroded public trust. People who see their dining tables shrinking day by day gradually lose confidence in the future. This situation has laid the groundwork for widespread social unrest. The experience of recent years has shown that rising prices have been one of the main factors behind protests. When daily life is disrupted, dissatisfaction becomes a natural reaction. Moreover, chronic inflation also damages the production structure. Price instability deprives economic actors of the ability to plan and reduces investment. As a result, the economy enters a vicious cycle in which inflation and recession reinforce one another simultaneously. Iran’s inflation crisis cannot be explained solely by external factors. This crisis is the direct product of a structure in which economic decisions are made in service of political and factional interests. As long as this structure remains unchanged, any effort to control inflation will be doomed to failure. The reality is that Iran’s economy is facing a fundamental imbalance: limited resources but endless expenditures. This imbalance is not a temporary error, but the result of a flawed decision-making system — a system that, instead of accountability, is focused on reproducing and preserving itself.Increasing Pressure on Female Political Prisoners in Iran’s Evin Prison
Reports indicate increasing pressure and restrictions against female political prisoners in Iran, particularly women arrested for supporting the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK). According to these reports, the process of imposing new restrictions, opening new judicial cases, and issuing additional sentences against these prisoners has intensified in recent weeks.
In this context, Shiva Esmaeili and Elaheh Fouladi, two political prisoners held in Tehran’s Evin Prison, faced a new case after protesting the death of Somayeh Rashidi and were each sentenced to an additional six months in prison on charges of insulting the supreme leader. Somayeh Rashidi, 42, had previously died in October 2025 in Qarchak Prison in Varamin due to lack of medical treatment, an incident that at the time sparked reactions among political prisoners.
Iran Intensifies Pressure on Families of PMOI Prisoners Amid Expanding CrackdownIt has also been reported that seven female political prisoners — including Zahra Safaei, Forough Taghipour, Marzieh Farsi, Elaheh Foladi, Arghavan Fallahi, Shiva Esmaeili, and Golrokh Iraee — have been denied family visitation rights due to participating in protest activities inside prison and taking part in the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign, including singing songs and chanting slogans against executions. In Yazd Prison, another political prisoner and supporter of the PMOI/MEK, Parisa Kamali, is reportedly under severe pressure. According to informed sources, prison authorities, citing special conditions, have refused to provide her with necessary medication and transfer her to medical centers, raising concerns about her health condition. Reports also indicate that she is facing an order to be transferred to Khash Prison in Iran’s southeastern Baluchestan region. In response to these developments, several human rights organizations and advocacy groups have called for greater international attention to the situation of political prisoners in Iran, especially women, and emphasized the need for an independent investigation into prison conditions.
Behind the Internet Shutdown: The Iranian Regime’s Black Market
Severe communication restrictions in recent months, imposed under the pretext of war and security concerns, have fundamentally altered the economic and social structure of access to cyberspace. Transforming internet access from a public right into a class-based privilege has led to corruption, rent-seeking, and the destruction of the country’s digital economy.
The Emergence of Digital Apartheid and the Concept of “Internet Pro”
More than 69 days after the blocking of the vital arteries of communication, a phenomenon known as “Internet Pro” has emerged in society. Instead of solving infrastructure problems, this new structure has effectively entrenched a form of digital apartheid across the country. This is no longer merely about simple filtering. Internet access, which should serve as a tool for development, is now traded on the black market at exorbitant prices. This trend reflects the transformation of public services into exclusive privileges for wealthy and influential groups. The rent-based distribution of bandwidth has left academics and intellectuals struggling behind the regime’s extensive filtering barriers.If restricting access is rooted in security concerns, then class-based access effectively means selling security to select applicants. This raises the question of how paying 600 million rials (about 315 dollars) can supposedly eliminate security risks for a wealthy individual, while internet access for a student or journalist is still considered a security threat and remains blocked. This comes as the monthly salary of an ordinary worker barely reaches 130 dollars. The divide created by this discrimination could itself become the greatest threat to the stability and long-term security of society.🛠️ It's now the 69th day of #Iran's internet blackout after 1632 hours largely cut off from international networks. The shutdown continues to drive job losses with a disproportionate impact on independent workers, effectively redistributing wealth to regime-aligned groups. pic.twitter.com/6AAWwsGThu
— NetBlocks (@netblocks) May 7, 2026
Underground Economy and Crisis in the Technology Market
Alongside this prolonged shutdown, a corrupt underground economy has emerged that directly targets people’s livelihoods and finances. Tools used to bypass restrictions, which were previously inexpensive, are now sold in some packages for 100 million to 120 million rials (approximately 53 to 63 dollars). According to reports, some citizens spend up to 600 million rials per month to purchase these tools.Iran’s Economy Under Pressure from War and Internet ShutdownsThe lack of oversight in this market has paved the way for greater exploitation of users. Conditions in the hardware and mobile phone market have reached catastrophic levels, with field reports describing the situation as outright looting. The current distribution system has fully enabled abuse by intermediaries who have access to unrestricted networks. The Iranian regime speaks of providing support to businesses, yet it has completely ignored a basic economic principle. Even if the seller has access to the network, no online transaction can take place when the customer remains trapped behind filtering barriers. According to official statistics, around 2,000 digital companies can survive under these conditions for only another one to two months. The severe 40% to 70% drop in platform sales has sent silent shockwaves through the country’s already fragile digital economy, with potentially irreversible consequences.
Institutional Denial of Responsibility and the Uncertain Future of the Internet
Reza Olfat Nasab, head of the Union of Virtual Businesses, stated on May 3 that no specific authority is accountable for the internet in Iran. He emphasized that it remains unclear which institution economic actors should negotiate with to resolve their problems. According to him, many businesses have suffered sales declines of 40% to 50%, while some have completely halted operations. Workforce reductions of up to 60% in these companies demonstrate the depth of the unemployment crisis among skilled sectors of society. Dissatisfaction with discriminatory policies has reached its peak among all participants in this field. Ehsan Chitsaz, deputy communications minister of the Iranian regime, announced on May 2 that decisions regarding this network are made outside the ministry. Meanwhile, Mohammad Hafez Hokmi, an adviser to the minister, reported widespread violations in the implementation of the so-called special access program. He believes mismanagement and misconduct have occurred during the process, leading to the creation of a black market for selling access quotas. These remarks came after revelations that organizational internet access had been illegally sold to ordinary individuals. The Communications Ministry claims it neither designed these restrictions nor authorized selective access programs. According to officials, the original permits were issued solely to maintain the stability of company services during crisis conditions and prevent disruptions. However, reports by technology websites indicate that the scheme has turned into a black market for the sale of organizational internet quotas.Iranian Regime Judiciary Confiscates Assets 40 More Individuals
The Iranian regime’s judiciary says that by judicial order, the assets of 40 individuals accused by the regime of acting against the country’s security and stability have been confiscated. The judiciary claimed that these assets were seized in line with protecting public rights for the benefit of the people and would be used for the “reconstruction of damaged locations.”
The judiciary has not disclosed the names of these 40 individuals. The Justice Department of Hamedan province had also announced on Thursday, April 9, the confiscation and seizure of the assets of 25 individuals.
Head of the Iranian Regime’s Judiciary Emphasizes Accelerating ExecutionsThe details of the legal proceedings leading to the confiscation of these individuals’ assets remain unclear. However, in recent weeks, the judiciary has on several occasions published lists of individuals—mostly residing outside Iran—accusing them of supporting war efforts. As the confiscation of assets intensifies against individuals from a wide range of social backgrounds—including journalists, former actors, political activists, and artists—the Iranian regime’s judiciary has also begun taking measures to prevent the transfer of assets. Previously, Iran’s State Organization for Registration of Deeds and Properties issued a directive to notary offices requiring that any transfer of property based on powers of attorney issued by the Iranian regime’s consulates since February 28 must first receive approval from the Office of the Attorney General. Less than a month ago, the attorney general of the Iranian regime announced that a judicial order had been issued to the Foreign Ministry to suspend, until further notice, the processing of powers of attorney for the transfer of assets belonging to Iranians living abroad through an online system.
Aftermath of the War: Iranian Workers’ Lives in Grip of a Livelihood Crisis
Following the US and Israeli war against Iran’s regime, the impact of the attacks has not been limited to infrastructure damage; the labor market has also entered a period of widespread instability. A wave of layoffs, the shutdown of internet-based businesses, runaway inflation, soaring rents, and a sharp decline in purchasing power are now putting immense pressure on working-class families and large segments of Iranian society.
Iran’s economy, already suffering from structurally high inflation, is now bending further under the crushing pressure of rising prices. Reports indicate that the US dollar exchange rate has surged to an unprecedented 1.9 million rials. At the same time, according to Iran’s regime Central Bank, point-to-point inflation has reached around 70% and living costs have crossed critical thresholds. Official data also show that food inflation has exceeded 60%, rents have once again increased in many cities, and working-class household incomes have fallen to around $200 per month. This is while, under a government decree, the minimum wage for a worker with one child stands at approximately $127, an amount that continues to decline daily due to the rising dollar exchange rate.
How Did Inflation in Iran Become the Most Chronic Structural Crisis?
How the War Destabilized Iran’s Labor Market
Military attacks and disruptions to industrial and communications infrastructure pushed Iran’s already fragile and unstable economy into another phase: production lines halted, supply chains were disrupted, factory capacity declined, internet businesses shut down, and a tsunami of layoffs followed. The war’s biggest blow to workers, combined with the denial of labor rights, is estimated to have affected up to 2 million people. On one hand, war caused inflation to surge, especially in food, housing rents, and medicine, while on the other hand wages have either been suspended or reduced for many workers. Employees at damaged factories are being sent on forced unpaid leave, benefits such as annual bonuses, housing allowances, and insurance contributions are often not paid, and layoffs have become an everyday phenomenon. As inflation rises rapidly, people’s purchasing power is sharply declining, while a 50% to 60% increase in construction material prices signals a new wave of housing price surges. Even before the war, women’s share of employment was no more than around 20%, and conditions are now far worse for them than for men. According to regime officials, only 147,000 people have been deemed eligible for unemployment benefits, of whom only one-third are women. Most of these individuals are also stuck in lengthy queues for processing unemployment claims. Due to the strained conditions of the fund and various restrictions, unemployment payments are often equivalent to only half of previous wages, which is not even enough to cover rent. Half of all workers, whether male or female, work in places not covered by labor law protections.Internet-Dependent Livelihoods and Network Blackouts
One of the differences between this war and previous crises was the direct blow to the digital economy. Widespread internet shutdowns caused a large portion of online businesses to cease operations. Internet outages in Iran are not merely communication restrictions; for many women and households engaged in home-based and online work, they effectively mean complete exclusion from the labor market. More than one million large and small internet-based jobs have been severely damaged due to prolonged internet disruptions, along with many home-based businesses, most of which are run by women.Rents Are Consuming Wages
The state-run Ham-Mihan newspaper reported that many households have been forced to leave the capital due to high living costs, reflecting the structural pressure of the housing market on the urban working class. In the official narrative of Iran’s regime institutions, measures such as food coupons and unemployment insurance are presented as supportive policies, but in an economy where purchasing power has declined by at least 50% in one year, these forms of support play only a minimal role in easing livelihood pressures.Greater Suppression of Labor Protests in a Wartime Atmosphere
The prevention of union activities, the effective suspension of labor law, and the security atmosphere created by the war have reduced the possibility of addressing the pressures faced by workers, while any form of labor protest is met with repression. The pressure currently affecting workers’ mental health is not merely the result of war or recent crises, but rather the outcome of years of accumulated economic crises, privatization, the spread of temporary contracts, job insecurity, and declining purchasing power of wages. In recent years, these pressures have intensified due to the war, its economic consequences, and the suppression of social protests, affecting not only workers themselves but also their families. The consequence of this situation is a severe decline in purchasing power and the relocation of part of the middle class to cheaper urban areas, a trend showing that the shrinking middle class and expansion of lower-income groups have become structural issues in society. The behavior of the private sector under current conditions cannot be separated from the policies adopted by the government and institutions responsible for labor affairs. In the current structure, the government and the Labor Ministry are effectively more inclined toward protecting the interests of major employers and economic enterprises than defending workers’ rights.The Outlook for the Working-Class Economy in the Post-War Situation
Under such conditions, one can speak of a kind of outlook of economic and social misery, although historical experience shows that these same pressures can also create the conditions for new forms of solidarity and public uprising.The Voice They Could Not Silence: Vahid Bani Amerian’s Final Testament
The executions carried out in Ghezel Hesar Prison between March 30 and April 4, 2026, marked another chapter in the Iranian regime’s long confrontation with organized political opposition. Among those executed were six imprisoned members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK): Vahid Bani Amerian, Mohammad Taghavi, Babak Alipour, Pouya Ghabadi, Akbar Daneshvarkar, and Abolhassan Montazer.
The six men were members of the PMOI Resistance Units, networks that Iranian authorities have repeatedly targeted in recent years. Their executions followed legal proceedings that the prisoners themselves described as predetermined and rooted in coercion.
In the days following the executions, one voice emerged with particular force: the final recorded statement of Vahid Bani Amerian, a 32-year-old political prisoner sentenced to death. Delivered from inside prison and intended for public release, his testimony offers a rare look into the mindset of a condemned political prisoner confronting execution while insisting on making his defense visible to the public.
“I want to make my defense public,” Bani Amerian said at the opening of his message.
The statement was not framed as an appeal for clemency. Instead, it functioned as a political declaration and a personal account of why he believed resistance had become unavoidable. Speaking directly to “the people of Iran and the world,” he portrayed his imprisonment and sentence as part of a broader campaign aimed at suppressing dissent and preventing the growth of organized opposition.
Throughout the recording, Bani Amerian repeatedly returned to one theme: the refusal to separate personal life from the suffering he said he witnessed around him.
“May that kind of life be forbidden to me if the price of it is stepping on my conscience and closing my eyes to the pain of my people,” he declared in response to what he said was a question posed during his trial about why he had not returned to a “normal life” after a previous imprisonment.
Iran Intensifies Pressure on Families of PMOI Prisoners Amid Expanding CrackdownRather than speaking in abstract political slogans, Bani Amerian filled his testimony with scenes drawn from daily life in Iran. He described seeing impoverished Baluchi children “wasting away and dying from scorpion stings” during a period of exile in Bashagard. He recalled child street vendors standing on pedestrian bridges near Khajeh Nasir University and wondered aloud what had become of them years later. One of the most emotional passages centered on a memory from outside a hospital in Kermanshah. According to his account, a laborer and his wife stood unable to afford surgery for their sick child. The father asked how he could possibly pay for the operation on a worker’s wage, while the mother cried out repeatedly for justice.
“And now you speak to me of a normal life?” he asked.
The statement also offered his account of the judicial process that led to the death sentences. Bani Amerian described the proceedings as “a court that had nothing in common with a real court” and said that he and the other defendants had been subjected to psychological and physical torture from the moment of arrest. “We were under torture the entire time,” he said, arguing that the outcome of the trial had been determined in advance. He stated that he and the others refused to recognize the legitimacy of the court, saying their answers during proceedings were intentionally brief because they did not believe the process could deliver justice. At several points, Bani Amerian directly addressed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, accusing the regime of using executions to spread fear and halt political opposition. Yet even while speaking under a death sentence, he insisted that repression would fail to extinguish the movement he identified with. “Even if you execute me and people like me, we will multiply,” he said. “Even if you hide our bodies.” Bani Amerian openly identified his support for the PMOI as the central reason behind his sentence and described that affiliation as a source of pride rather than regret. Referring to decades of confrontation between the organization and successive Iranian governments, he praised the group’s history of sacrifice and resistance. He also referred extensively to Maryam Rajavi and her Ten-Point Plan, citing proposals including the abolition of the death penalty and the separation of religion and state. In his remarks, Rajavi was portrayed not simply as a political leader but as a symbol of endurance and commitment. His final defense took on a confrontational tone when he reversed the logic of the courtroom itself. “Am I the one who should defend myself—or are you?” he asked, addressing the judges and authorities responsible for the sentences. In one of the most striking sections of the testimony, Bani Amerian argued that future accountability would eventually reach those currently in power. He spoke of a future “people’s court” in which officials would answer for years of repression, while emphasizing that even such a court, unlike the one he faced, would allow legal representation and public proceedings. Despite the political nature of the message, its emotional center remained fixed on ordinary Iranians. Bani Amerian repeatedly returned to the themes of poverty, repression, imprisonment, and lives lost during protests and crackdowns. He invoked the names of young protesters killed during uprisings, describing them as “the finest children of this land.” Toward the end of the statement, he addressed another question reportedly raised during the proceedings: whether he would repent. His answer was unequivocal. “For the freedom of Iran, not only will I not bargain with you over my life,” he said, adding that he had prepared himself for death long before the sentence was carried out. The recording closed with a pledge that would become one of the defining lines associated with his final message.“I swear by the blood of my comrades: I will stand firm to the end.”
The execution of Vahid Bani Amerian and the five other PMOI prisoners was intended to bring finality. Yet the circulation of his final statement ensured that his voice would continue beyond the prison walls where it was recorded. In its language, imagery, and defiance, the testimony offered not only the final words of a condemned prisoner, but also a portrait of the convictions that continue to shape organized opposition inside Iran.How Did Inflation in Iran Become the Most Chronic Structural Crisis?
More than 80 years after World War II, signs of collapse in Iran’s economy are reappearing with the same intensity.
Inflation in Iran in 2026 has reached a level that many consider unprecedented in contemporary history. The 73% year-on-year inflation rate in March and April is not merely a statistic, but a sign of a deep crisis within the economic structure of the Iranian regime’s system of absolute clerical rule. This level of inflation, especially in post-war conditions and amid escalating political tensions, recalls periods when the country’s economy simultaneously collapsed under severe external pressure and domestic mismanagement.
The Collapse of Iran’s Economy; How Long Can People Endure?
Inflation in Iran; A Structural Crisis Beyond Governments
Inflation in Iran is not a temporary phenomenon, or one tied to a specific administration. This crisis is fundamentally rooted in the economic structure of the Iranian regime and has been reproduced over decades. Chronic dependence on oil revenues, permanent budget deficits, and an inefficient banking system are the three main pillars of this crisis. In such a structure, every external shock—from war to sanctions—rapidly leads to increased liquidity and rising prices. The recent war and the uncertainty resulting from it have merely acted as catalysts, not the primary cause. In fact, inflation in Iran had already stabilized above 30% before this and has now simply entered a new phase of intensification. One of the dangerous features of this period is the chronic nature of high inflation. Unlike the World War II era, when inflation was severe but short-lived, Iran’s economy today has experienced more than seven years of persistently high inflation. This continuity reflects the complete inability of the regime’s decision-making structure to control the crisis. On the other hand, the policies announced by economic institutions under the regime’s control have not only failed to curb inflation, but in many cases have contributed to concealing reality. One example is the heavy weighting of the housing sector in the inflation index, which due to temporary price stagnation moderates the overall inflation picture. However, this statistical adjustment has no effect on the reality of people’s lives.Smaller Dining Tables; The Social Consequences of Inflation in Iran
Inflation in Iran is most visible at people’s dining tables. The sharp increase in food prices has caused inflationary pressure on lower-income groups to be far greater than on other segments of society. This situation has not only intensified inequality but has also led to the gradual collapse of the middle class. A 73% increase in the cost of a specific basket of goods and services has occurred under conditions where even a 60% rise in wages has failed to preserve purchasing power. This gap between income and expenses means a real decline in living standards. In sectors such as healthcare and medical treatment, the situation is even more critical. Rising prices for medicine and medical services, especially after the war, have placed additional pressure on households. Unlike other consumer goods, these expenses cannot be postponed and are directly linked to health and survival. The housing market is also on the verge of a new inflationary surge. Although relative price stagnation is currently visible, the doubling and tripling of construction costs indicates that this stagnation will not last. Passing these costs on to consumers will create a new wave of inflation in the near future. Meanwhile, the role of the political structure in intensifying the crisis is undeniable. By prioritizing political and military objectives over the economic needs of society, the system of clerical rule has allocated the country’s limited resources in a way that has resulted in worsening inequality and poverty. Ultimately, inflation in Iran is not merely an economic phenomenon, but also a social and political crisis. This crisis has eroded public trust and darkened the outlook for the future. If inflation in the 1940s was the result of foreign occupation and world war, today this phenomenon is largely the product of the internal power structure. The main difference is that today’s crisis is not temporary, but persistent and self-reproducing. This continuity shows that the problem lies not in policy tools, but in the structure itself—a structure that is not only incapable of solving the crisis but is itself the source of producing it.Repression and Human Rights Violations in Iran – April 2026
What distinguishes the pages of Iran’s history at the beginning of 2026 more than ever is the emergence of the January uprising, which reflects public anger toward a tyrannical and anti-human rights ruling establishment.
Images of the piled-up bodies of those killed in the uprising in warehouses and morgues overflowing with human remains have recorded a bitter yet telling image in Iran’s history. Now the same perpetrators who gunned down youths during the uprising are trying to prevent another movement through the daily executions of uprising participants and rebellious youths.
Details of the Execution of six PMOI Members
The state of repression and human rights violations in Iran in April 2026
Executions:
During this month, at least 25 people were executed in various prisons. Among those executed were one Baluch prisoner and four Kurdish prisoners.The breakdown of the statistics is as follows:
Women prisoners: one person Male prisoners: 12 people Political prisoners: 12 peopleExecution of women:
Hanifeh Avandi: She was executed on April 19 on murder charges in Tabriz Central Prison.Execution of political prisoners:
Amirhossein Hatami: He was 18 years old and was executed on April 2, 2026, on charges of moharebeh (“enmity against God”) in Ghezel Hesar Prison. Vahid Bani Amerian: He was 33 years old and was executed on April 4, 2026, on charges of baghi (“armed rebellion”) and membership in the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) in Ghezel Hesar Prison. Abolhassan Montazer: He was 67 years old and was executed on April 4, 2026, on charges of baghi and membership in the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) in Ghezel Hesar Prison. Mohammadamin Biglari: He was 19 years old and was executed on April 5, 2026, on charges of moharebeh in Ghezel Hesar Prison. Shahin Vahedparast Kalur: He was 30 years old and was executed on April 5, 2026, on charges of moharebeh in Ghezel Hesar Prison. Ali (Arian) Fahim: He was 23 years old and was executed on April 5, 2026, on charges of moharebeh in Ghezel Hesar Prison. Hamed Validi: He was 46 years old and was executed on April 20, 2026, on charges of moharebeh and ties to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) in Karaj Central Prison. Mohammad Masoum Shahi: He was 39 years old and was executed on April 20, 2026, on charges of moharebeh and ties to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) in Karaj Central Prison. Amirali Mirjafari: He was executed on April 21, 2026, on charges of moharebeh in Ghezel Hesar Prison. Erfan Kiani: He was executed on April 25, 2026, on charges of moharebeh in Isfahan Central Prison. Amer Ramesh: He was executed on April 26, 2026, on charges of moharebeh in Zahedan Central Prison. Sasan Azadvar Jounqani: He was 22 years old and was executed on April 30, 2026, on charges of moharebeh in Isfahan Central Prison.Arrests:
During this month, at least 1,595 people were arrested, categorized as follows: Political arrests: During this month, at least 1,587 people who had participated in the January uprising were arrested in connection with the war, for the enforcement of prison sentences, or without any specified reason. Religious arrests: During this month, at least eight Baha’is were arrested either to enforce prison sentences or without any specific reason.Extrajudicial killings:
There are no available statistics on extrajudicial killings during the war involving Iran’s regime, the United States, and Israel. According to published figures, two people died under torture and seven others were killed by gunfire from regime agents in cities and on roads.The 119th week of the ‘No to Execution Tuesdays’ campaign in 56 prisons
In the 119th week of the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign, political prisoners in 56 prisons across Iran once again launched a hunger strike on Tuesday, May 5, despite security pressure and extensive restrictions. This protest action took place while prison authorities in recent weeks have attempted to prevent prisoners from participating in the campaign through threats, pressure, and additional restrictions.
According to published reports, prison authorities have used measures such as threats of transfer to solitary confinement, cutting phone calls, denying visitation rights, and intensifying prison restrictions in an attempt to stop the hunger strike. Nevertheless, political prisoners, despite ongoing pressure, have emphasized continuing their protest the death penalty and repressive prison policies.
Iran: Three Young Protesters Executed by the Iranian RegimePolitical prisoners participating in the campaign also issued a statement this week regarding the hunger strike. The full statement of the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign is as follows: The increase in executions is the result of the judiciary surrendering to the Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGC Intelligence Organization, and the country’s Intelligence Coordination Council.
