Triple-Digit Inflation Pushes Iran’s Lower and Middle Classes to Breaking Point

The state-run Economy24 website, citing the latest inflation data from the Statistical Center of Iran for July 2026, wrote: “The nearly 25% increase in the cost of the household livelihood basket during just the first four months of the Iranian year (beginning March 22), together with soaring inflation in essential food items, shows that economic pressure on the lower and middle-income groups has reached a critical breaking point.”
Rising Inflation in Iran and Uncertainty Over Workers’ Livelihoods
Economy24 added, citing analytical data: “Among 53 selected food items, 41 recorded price increases higher than the urban point-to-point inflation rate of 85.2%. A review of annual price trends shows that products such as solid and liquid cooking oil, mayonnaise, imported rice, chicken, and eggs have experienced record-breaking price surges.” According to the report, the average prices of Iranian rice, lamb, beef, and various nuts have reached levels that have effectively turned them into luxury goods or unattainable items for a large segment of society. The website said that the Iranian regime’s economy is burdened not only by monetary factors and structural imbalances in the banking system, but also by “the heavy shadow of geopolitical uncertainty and the country’s prolonged and exhausting state of neither war nor peace.” The state-run Rouydad24 website, citing the latest data from the Statistical Center of Iran, reported that point-to-point inflation reached triple digits in eight provinces during the Iranian month of Tir (June 22–July 22, 2026). The report said that while Iran’s nationwide point-to-point inflation rate was reported at 87.9%, it reached 112.4% in Ilam Province and stood at 73.9% in Tehran Province—”a gap of 38.5 percentage points that shows households across different provinces have not experienced price increases equally.” Rouydad24 also noted that disparities in annual inflation are significant, with Ilam Province recording the highest rate at 80.6%, while Tehran Province recorded the lowest at 55.2%. The report added that the most severe inflationary pressures are evident in the food category. Rouydad24 reported that point-to-point inflation for food, beverages, and tobacco reached triple digits in all 31 provinces, climbing as high as 149.9% in West Azerbaijan Province. According to the report, even provinces where overall inflation remains below 100% have experienced food basket price increases of more than double compared with the previous year.

How Iran’s Clerical Regime Divided, Conquered, and Kept Breathing

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The clerical regime in Iran is politically, economically, and morally bankrupt. It commands no social capital. Its legitimacy, to the extent it ever had any, was liquidated long ago — in the torture chambers of Evin, in the mass graves of the 1988 massacre, in the blood of teenage protesters shot on rooftops during the 2019 uprising. What it has, instead of a mandate, is a rotating gallery of mirages designed to keep Iranians chasing shadows. For two decades, the regime’s most profitable illusion was “reform.” Khatami, Rouhani, the promise that the theocracy could soften from within — millions of Iranians were told to wait, to vote, to trust the process. The 2017 uprising in Mashhad, Shiraz, and a hundred other cities incinerated that myth. “Reformist, hardliner — the game is over,” the crowds Enter the monarchy fantasy — the notion that a son of the deposed Shah, living comfortably in a Maryland suburb on wealth stolen under his father’s rule, might somehow constitute a credible alternative. For the regime, Reza Pahlavi has been a political gift: a figure who absorbs opposition energy, fragments it, and returns nothing. His record is not one of leadership but of serial contradiction.
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On the IRGC: in 2017, he publicly rejected designating the Guard as a terrorist organization. In November 2018, he boasted on television of “two-way contacts with the Army, the IRGC, and the Basij.” By December 2018, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he claimed “direct communication” with military and paramilitary forces. In 2020: “My support will come from these very IRGC members.” Then, on July 14, 2026 — one day after Britain designated the IRGC — he reversed everything in a Reuters interview, denying he had ever communicated with senior Guard commanders and recasting years of boasts as anonymous social media messages. The Washington Examiner noted the technical impossibility: his X account restricts direct messaging to 66 approved contacts. On foreign intervention: for years, he insisted the regime would fall from within, telling POLITICO throughout 2025 he “didn’t want the United States or Israel to get involved directly.” By February 2026, he told ABC News that U.S. military strikes were “critical.” By July, he called the U.S.-led war “a necessary step.” On organizations: the Iran Future Association (2007, stalled). The National Council of Iran for Free Elections (Paris, 2013; by 2017, the Congressional Research Service noted “defections” and “minimal” activity). The Phoenix Project (2019, vanished). The Alliance for Democracy and Freedom in Iran (Georgetown, 2023) — torpedoed by his own tweet on April 4, 2023, demanding hand-picked additions, until coalition partners walked out citing his “undemocratic methods.” The Atlantic Council documented how his online supporters drove actress Nazanin Boniadi off Twitter entirely. None of this is incidental. Every peaceful protest in Iran —every worker who struck, every student who marched — has been met by the regime with bullets, torture, and mass arrests. In that context, Pahlavi’s four decades of pacifist rhetoric did not protect a single protester. It disillusioned dissent by promising a transition that never materialized, and it divided dissent by fracturing the opposition. His overnight pivot on January 10, 2026 — suddenly calling on Iranians to “seize city centres and hold them” — only confirmed what his own would-be patrons already knew. Rudy Giuliani called him “a fraud” who “never risked his life.” Here, then, is the blunt truth. Foreign military intervention has not altered the regime’s behavior. Sanctions have not. Appeasement — the nuclear deals, the frozen-asset swaps, the diplomatic handshakes — has not. The mirage of reform has not. And the illusion of a monarchist restoration has not. Every one of these paths has been tried, and every one has delivered the same result: the regime still stands, and Iranians still die. The only path to freedom in Iran, to peace in the Middle East, and to stability beyond it is regime change — achieved not by foreign saviours or exiled pretenders, but by recognizing the Iranian people’s sovereign right to overthrow this regime by whatever means they deem necessary. That right is not granted by Washington, London, or Brussels. It exists because forty-seven years of tyranny have left no other option.

Iran’s Regime Uses War to Legitimize the Gallows

As the world’s attention remains fixed on the drums of war echoing across the Middle East, the Iranian regime has found, in the shadow of war and escalating external conflicts, a strategic opportunity and a key pillar for its survival to reinforce its weakened and fragile domestic front. Under the cover of escalating regional tensions, Iran’s prisons have become open arenas for systematic purges and organized intimidation aimed at deterring a protesting society. This continues as urgent warnings from international human rights organizations, along with increasingly alarmed calls—even from state-run newspapers—for a temporary halt to executions out of fear of an imminent social explosion, continue to grow.
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Pezeshkian’s deception and state media’s admission of structural failure

While the regime’s primary domestic security priority is expanding the use of the gallows and deepening the atmosphere of fear, Iranian regime president Masoud Pezeshkian has been tasked with implementing a policy of deception and deflecting responsibility in an effort to contain society. On July 20, 2026, the state-run Mehr News Agency published remarks by Pezeshkian in which he claimed: “The most important battlefield today is the economy and people’s livelihoods!” However, what Iranian citizens are experiencing in practice is entirely contrary to these slogans, as the regime has completely ignored labor and professional protests while expanding the wave of executions through the use of the gallows. As part of this effort to mislead public opinion, the state-run newspaper Donya-e-Eqtesad published an article on July 20 titled “Why Doesn’t Change Happen?” Without naming individuals directly, it pointed blame toward the regime’s supreme leader and the heads of the three branches of government, acknowledging the deadlock of structural reforms. It stated: “Beliefs that have taken shape over the years in the form of security and ideological priorities have now become a major obstacle to any reform… The path that has been followed has not been the right one, and a fundamental change in approaches and objectives is unavoidable.” Iran’s prisons are witnessing the widespread transfer of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience to solitary confinement; a step widely regarded as a precursor to execution by hanging. Within this context, human rights reports have documented the following major developments in July 2026: Execution of political prisoner Mehdi Khanaki: In the early hours of Wednesday, July 22, the Iranian regime’s judiciary executed 26-year-old political prisoner Mehdi Khanaki, a law graduate, by hanging in Karaj. Khanaki had been wanted since the January 2026 uprising and was arrested on February 10. He was subjected to severe torture during detention, a matter that had been reported to the UN Special Rapporteur and international organizations.
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Fourteen prisoners were suddenly transferred to solitary confinement in Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan, with 12 facing the imminent risk of execution within hours. So far, four of them have been executed. Under the cover of war, the regime is using the gallows in an attempt to contain the country’s deepening and explosive social crisis.

State-run newspaper’s alarmed appeal: “Temporarily halt the executions!”

The extent of the regime’s fear of widespread public anger became evident in the unusual and unexpected position adopted by the state-run Ettelaat newspaper in its July 20 edition. The newspaper issued a direct and alarmed appeal to the head of the judiciary under the headline: “Temporarily halt the executions!” Part of the appeal, reflecting deep concern within the regime’s decision-making circles over the possibility of a domestic uprising, stated: “There will be time to carry out corporal punishments and executions, but the rapid increase in reports of executions and their growing number cannot be regarded as a positive sign or evidence of the government’s strength and control.” These admissions show that despite media attention being dominated by external conflict, the Iranian regime’s greatest concern remains its fear of the majority of the population seeking its overthrow. The judiciary is attempting to intimidate them through the expansion of executions under the cover of escalating regional military tensions.

The failure of appeasement strategies and the need for a democratic alternative

Strategic assessments following recent developments indicate that international policies toward Tehran have failed, and this failure can be summarized in two key areas:

First: The failure of appeasement and military strikes

Experience has shown that neither negotiations and international policies based on appeasement nor foreign military strikes are capable of producing a lasting political solution or containing the regime because they ignore the principal driver of change.

Second: The need for a domestic democratic alternative

The fundamental flaw in international policies lies in ignoring the capacity of the Iranian people and the potential of a domestic democratic alternative—the only force capable of dismantling the system of Velayat-e Faqih from its roots, ending the destruction of Iran’s resources and wealth, and establishing lasting stability and freedom. Current realities show that the external conflict fueled by the Iranian regime serves as nothing more than a tool to legitimize the gallows at home and to conceal the structural failure of the country’s economy. No matter how much regional tensions escalate or how extensively the regime exploits them for propaganda purposes, they will never eliminate the fundamental realities confronting the overwhelming majority of Iranians: economic collapse, the growing number of executions, and the people’s determination to overthrow the system of Velayat-e Faqih and replace it with a national and democratic alternative.

Rising Inflation in Iran and Uncertainty Over Workers’ Livelihoods

The livelihoods of workers and retirees have faced unprecedented challenges in recent months. Point-to-point inflation has reached 96%, and it is projected to approach three digits for the first time in the country’s history. In this environment, implementing a wage increase for workers during the second half of the Iranian year faces serious obstacles. At the same time, employers are struggling with what is described as an economic war, including damage to production units and workforce reductions, while delays by the Social Security Organization in paying retirees’ pensions have added to the pressure. The value of the 10 million-rial government shopping voucher has also fallen to one-third of its original purchasing power because of runaway inflation, and its proposed increase has not yet been implemented. Meanwhile, the latest estimate of the workers’ minimum livelihood basket stands at 429 million rials (approximately $227), while the base monthly wage for a worker with two children is around 250 million rials (approximately $132).
Iran’s Statistical Center: Point-To-Point Inflation in July Reached Nearly 88%
Hamid Haj Esmaili, a labor market expert, told the state-run Jahan-e Sanat newspaper that implementing the wage increase for workers during the second half of the Iranian year (September 23, 2026, to March 22, 2027) would be a very difficult and complex issue. Although the measure had been approved by the Supreme Labor Council at the end of the previous Iranian year, he said that the implementation of wage increases at the end of the year on March 21, 2026, had already encountered numerous problems. On one hand, employers had been affected by the war, with some production units damaged and others forced to lay off workers. Therefore, in order to prevent further layoffs, employers were permitted to implement wage increases only through mutual agreement between workers and employers. He added: “On the other hand, the Social Security Organization delayed pension payments to retirees. Under such circumstances, implementing wage increases during the second half of the year will face many challenges, and it may not be feasible under the current conditions.”

Three-Digit Inflation Is Approaching

Responding to a question about inflation over the past four months and its impact on workers’ living standards, the labor market expert said: “Inflation is approaching three digits, and this will have negative consequences for workers and retirees. By the end of the previous Iranian year on March 22, 2026, inflation had reached 60%. It has now risen to 96% on a point-to-point basis and is approaching three digits.” It is noteworthy that, according to the Statistical Center of Iran, the Iranian regime’s official statistics agency, inflation in rural areas reached 100% in July.

Calculated Livelihood Basket Reaches 429 Million Rials

According to the state-run ILNA news agency, Mohsen Bagheri, a workers’ representative on the Supreme Labor Council and head of the Wage Committee of the High Council of Islamic Labor Councils, discussed the latest calculation of the workers’ livelihood basket. Bagheri said that preliminary estimates indicate that food and beverage costs within the livelihood basket have increased significantly compared to the past and may have risen by approximately two to three times. However, he said that precise calculations will be completed after the Statistical Center of Iran publishes its official data. He added that if the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor and Social Welfare establishes the Wage Committee, the livelihood basket calculations will be reviewed and finalized through tripartite negotiations involving representatives of the government, workers, and employers. He emphasized that if the Labor Ministry does not hold these meetings, the workers’ group will independently calculate the livelihood basket based on the official statistics of the Statistical Center of Iran and announce its findings. Regarding the latest estimated value of the livelihood basket, Bagheri said that the workers’ group’s most recent estimate, based on January 2026 inflation, stood at 429 million rials. He further referred to discussions about the impact of exchange rate changes on living costs and said that during wage negotiations, the workers’ representatives believed the effects of the currency’s depreciation would gradually appear in consumer expenses. For that reason, they proposed postponing the final review of the livelihood basket until those effects became clear so that additional wage benefits could also be increased. Bagheri added that the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance had argued that its exchange rate policies would reduce inflation beginning in February. However, according to him, that prediction did not materialize, and by the end of June the effects of the exchange rate increase had become fully visible in the market, pushing inflation for food and beverages to around 140%. Regarding a new estimate for the livelihood basket, Bagheri said that no precise calculations have yet been completed. He added that although a significant increase in food costs is expected, announcing any exact figure without expert calculations would not be accurate. The Statistical Center of Iran announced that point-to-point inflation reached 87.9% in July 2026, while annual inflation stood at 66%. The annual inflation rate also indicates that the average prices of goods and services during the 12 months ending in July 2026 were 66% higher than during the corresponding previous period. In July 2026, rural households experienced the highest inflationary pressure compared with the national average. Point-to-point inflation in rural areas reached 106.9%, while monthly inflation was recorded at 3.4%.

Reuters Exposes $4 Billion Iran-Linked Gambling Network  

A Reuters special investigation shows that one of the world’s largest illegal gambling networks has become part of the Iranian regime’s multi-billion-dollar sanctions evasion operation through an unlicensed cryptocurrency exchange in Dubai. The exchange, called “Shelbit,” has processed at least $4 billion in cryptocurrency since May 2024. According to blockchain data analysis, it has been linked to the Central Bank of Iran, sanctioned entities, and cryptocurrency wallets attributed to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Shelbit’s official address is an office on the upper floor of a budget hotel in Dubai’s Deira district. The exchange is run by Siavash Keyvanpour, an Iranian living abroad, but Shelbit has no active website or clear means of providing services to the public.
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Employees whom the Reuters reporter found at the address claimed they had never heard of Shelbit or Keyvanpour. The office was registered under the name of a watch sales company, and inside there were only a few worn watches, a cash-counting machine, and a desk. One of Shelbit’s main clients is a Persian-language network comprising more than 2,000 gambling websites. The network’s two main promotional figures are Iranian influencers Sasha Sobhani and Pouyan Mokhtari, who showcase their lavish lifestyles on social media, including multi-million-dollar cars, luxury villas, private jets, and yacht parties. Reuters identified more than 60 Iranian influencers promoting these gambling websites, with about half of them having more than one million followers. A technical analysis by cybersecurity company Infoblox found that websites registered under seemingly different names and brands use common software and technical features, indicating they are part of a single network. One of these websites alone has processed more than $130 million through Shelbit since May 2024. Gambling is prohibited under the Iranian regime and is punishable by imprisonment and flogging. However, this network has access to Iran’s electronic payment system, which is subject to strict government oversight. Former regime officials and individuals with ties to the IRGC told Reuters that the IRGC took control of the largest online gambling networks about a decade ago, as online gambling expanded. Blockchain data show that Shelbit has processed at least $125 million for the Central Bank of Iran. The exchange has also received at least $20 million from an operation that experts identify as a cryptocurrency mining network in Iran. Cryptocurrency mining, which the Iranian regime legalized in 2019, has become an important tool for circumventing sanctions. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies mined in Iran can be sold on international markets without relying on the global banking system. Since May 2024, at least $676 million has been transferred from addresses linked to Shelbit to Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange. Sobhani, Mokhtari, and Keyvanpour were prosecuted in Iran in connection with the abt90 and Hazarat gambling websites. In 2023, Sobhani and Mokhtari were each sentenced in absentia to two years in prison, while Keyvanpour received a three-month prison sentence. Iran’s regime issued Interpol Red Notices for Sobhani and Mokhtari, and both were arrested in Spain. However, the notices were later withdrawn, and the Spanish case was closed. Sobhani denied any involvement in money laundering, sanctions evasion, terrorism financing, or transferring funds on behalf of the Iranian regime, the Central Bank of Iran, or the IRGC. He said he had only been paid to advertise certain gambling websites and was neither their owner nor manager. Mokhtari also said he is not a member of the IRGC or any military group affiliated with the Iranian regime and rejected the allegations made by Dubai authorities. Both men said they do not know Shelbit or Keyvanpour and have no knowledge of any possible connection between their activities and the Iranian regime. Mokhtari was arrested in Dubai in late March on suspicion of financing Iranian regime groups accused of carrying out attacks against the United Arab Emirates. This case illustrates how the combination of illegal gambling, social media influencers, Iran’s domestic banking infrastructure, cryptocurrency mining, and international cryptocurrency exchanges has helped the Iranian regime circumvent Western financial and banking restrictions.

Iran’s Statistical Center: Point-To-Point Inflation in July Reached Nearly 88%

Amid Iran’s deepening economic crisis and mounting pressure on household livelihoods, the Statistical Center of the Iranian regime announced that the point-to-point inflation rate reached 87.9% in July 2026, while annual inflation rose to 66%. Point-to-point inflation measures price changes in a given month compared with the same month of the previous year, while annual inflation compares the average prices over the past 12 months with the average prices during the preceding 12-month period. As a result, Iranian households paid nearly 88% more on average in July 2026 than they did in July 2025 to purchase the same basket of goods and services.
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The annual inflation rate also indicates that the average prices of goods and services during the year ending in July 2026 were 66% higher than during the corresponding previous period. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) reached 676.9 points in July, reflecting a 3.1% increase compared with June. In July 2026, rural households experienced the highest inflationary pressure compared with the national average. Point-to-point inflation in rural areas reached 106.9%, while monthly inflation was recorded at 3.4%. In recent months, accelerating inflation and sharp increases in the prices of essential goods have placed significant economic pressure on households and created serious challenges for the livelihoods of a large segment of society. On July 27, Eghtesad News, an Iranian news website, reported that as the economic crisis has intensified, installment payments have become increasingly common in Iran’s healthcare market, with services such as dental care and even medications now being offered on installment plans, a trend reflecting the further decline in households’ financial capacity.

Rising food and service prices

According to the Statistical Center of Iran, monthly household inflation stood at 3.1% in July 2026. The rate was 2.5% for the “food, beverages, and tobacco” category and 3.6% for the “non-food goods and services” category. A closer look at price changes shows that vegetables and legumes recorded the highest monthly price increase at 8.3%. They were followed by “unclassified food products” at 6.9%, bread and cereals at 5.9%, furniture, household equipment, and routine home maintenance at 5.7%, and tea, coffee, and cocoa at 5.5%. The “unclassified food products” category includes items that do not fall under the main food groups such as meat, dairy, fruit, vegetables, or bread, and mainly consists of spices, sauces, seasonings, and food additives. Monthly inflation also reached 5.3% in healthcare, 5% in transportation and vehicle-related services, 4.8% each in clothing and footwear and in fruit and nuts, 4.6% in recreation and culture, 4.3% in sugar, sweets, and confectionery, and 3.3% in dairy products, cheese, and eggs. By contrast, red and white meat was the only major category to record a price decline in July, posting a monthly inflation rate of negative 4.7%. On July 15, the state-run EcoIran news website reported that more than seven million people in Iran live in informal settlements, writing that rising inflation and the housing crisis have fueled the expansion of marginal settlements across the country.

Inflation gap between income deciles widens

The Statistical Center of Iran said annual inflation varied across income deciles, ranging from 63.9% for the tenth decile (the highest-income households) to 73.5% for the second decile. As a result, the inflation gap between income deciles reached 9.6 percentage points in July, an increase of 1.2 percentage points from 8.4 percentage points in the previous month. This disparity indicates that low-income households continue to bear a heavier burden from rising living costs than higher-income groups, and that the inflation gap between income groups is widening. In recent weeks, amid escalating regional tensions and growing uncertainty over the future of negotiations between Tehran and Washington, Iran’s foreign exchange market has moved upward. Sharp exchange rate fluctuations undermine economic stability and deprive businesses and households of the ability to plan and predict future conditions. This uncertainty can reduce investment and production and, by increasing inflationary pressures, further raise the cost of living and affect the livelihoods of citizens.

Serious Drug Shortage in Iran as Officials Assure Supplies for Arbaeen Pilgrims

Salman Eshaqi, spokesperson for the Health and Treatment Commission of the Iranian regime’s Majlis (parliament), described the country’s drug shortage as a “serious and critical” issue. At the same time, Jafar Miadfar, head of the Iranian regime’s Emergency Medical Services Organization, said there is no concern about supplying intravenous fluids and medicines needed for Arbaeen pilgrims. On Monday, July 27, Eshaqi cited “unjust sanctions” and the “war” as the main factors worsening the drug crisis and said difficulties in securing imported raw materials have also driven up medicine prices. He stressed that domestic production capacity and pharmaceutical technology development centers should be strengthened to reduce the sector’s vulnerability.
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The regime lawmaker added: “Damaged infrastructure can be rebuilt, but there is one vital infrastructure whose neglect can cause irreparable damage and even result in patients’ deaths, and that is the sustainable supply of medicines and the public’s easy access to them.” On July 24, Homayoun Sameh Najafabadi, a member of the Health Commission of the Iranian regime’s Majlis, cited the “naval blockade and transportation disruptions” as factors increasing costs and complicating the shipment of medicines. He said delays in allocating foreign currency, combined with liquidity shortages, have created further obstacles to drug imports. These remarks come as Khabar Online, an Iranian news website, reported on July 26, citing Rasoul Nazari-Fard, founder of a pharmacy specializing in patients with rare diseases, that many patients must visit several pharmacies to find certain medications, while those same drugs are readily available on the black market, through intermediary networks, and on social media. Nazari-Fard stressed that part of the pharmaceutical market’s problems stem not from production but from the distribution system and weak oversight of medicine supplies. He continued: “The access of numerous individuals to certain systems, along with insufficient oversight, can facilitate the issuance of fake or fraudulent prescriptions, which ultimately result in medicines being obtained through the official distribution network and then sold on the black market.”

Iranian regime officials emphasize medicine supplies for the Arbaeen Ceremony

Amid warnings about medicine shortages in Iran, the head of the Emergency Medical Services Organization announced on July 27 that the necessary measures have been taken to supply medicines and intravenous fluids needed for Arbaeen pilgrims. Miadfar said: “During the recent funeral ceremony [of Ali Khamenei], we had no problems supplying intravenous fluids, and we are also fully prepared for the Arbaeen period.” He announced that the Health Ministry has introduced special measures to prevent heatstroke among participants in the Arbaeen pilgrimage, which marks the 40th day after the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the third Imam of Shia Muslims. He added that necessary medicine stocks have been positioned at Iran’s six border crossings and that about 300,000 units of intravenous fluids have been allocated for the event. Earlier, on July 19, Pirhossein Kolivand, head of the Iranian Red Crescent Society, announced that sufficient medicines and medical equipment had been supplied and dispatched for the Arbaeen ceremonies, and that five hospitals in Iraq along the route from Najaf to Karbala have been made available to Iranian medical teams to provide healthcare services.

Iran: Growing Demand for Installment Payment Plans for Medical Services

Amid rising prices and the deepening cost-of-living crisis in Iran, Eghtesad News website reported that installment payments are becoming increasingly common in the country’s healthcare market, with services such as dental care and even medications now being offered through installment plans. The trend reflects the further deterioration of households’ financial capacity. On Monday, July 27, Eghtesad News reported that some patients, due to financial hardship, negotiate with doctors for discounts on consultation fees and, in some cases, receive treatment through installment payments.
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According to the report, dental services are currently the “most prominent showcase” of installment-based healthcare, with many clinics and platforms offering services such as implants, orthodontics, root canal treatment, and dental veneers through installment payments, loans, or multi-month repayment plans. The outlet added: “A toothache does not wait until next month’s paycheck. Someone with an infected tooth or in need of a root canal cannot always postpone treatment. Therefore, installment payments are both an opportunity and a warning; an opportunity because they make treatment possible, and a warning because an essential living expense has been shifted into debt for future months.” In recent months, accelerating inflation and sharp increases in the prices of essential goods have placed significant economic pressure on households and created serious challenges for the livelihoods of a large segment of society. According to the latest report from the Statistical Center of Iran, point-to-point inflation in rural areas surpassed 100%, reaching 108.1%.

Buying medications through installment plans

Eghtesad News further reported that installment payments are no longer limited to dental services, as some online pharmacies and credit service providers now offer installment plans for medications, dietary supplements, and health-related products. The report stated: “When even medication is sold on installment, it means the pressure of rising costs has extended beyond consumer goods to the most essential aspects of life.” According to the report, healthcare apps and websites also use discount codes and promotional offers for online consultations with physicians, psychologists, and psychiatrists. Eghtesad News added that the question now is whether this trend has improved access to healthcare or instead pushed patients toward choosing the cheapest option rather than receiving complete treatment.

Economic pressure and incomplete treatments

Eghtesad News continued: “Some doctors say they see patients who attend the initial consultation but postpone laboratory tests, imaging, medication, or follow-up appointments. In ongoing treatments, such delays are more dangerous; patients abandon physiotherapy halfway through, stop therapy after two sessions, or take only half of their prescribed medication so it lasts longer.” According to the report, economic pressures are even more evident in psychotherapy, with some patients requesting delayed payment for sessions or reducing the number of appointments. The report stated: “Psychotherapy is supposed to be a place to talk about anxiety, burnout, and the pressures of life, but sometimes the cost of the session itself becomes one of those anxieties.” Eghtesad News concluded by warning that the growing prevalence of installment-based healthcare reflects weaknesses in the financing of Iran’s healthcare system and the high share of out-of-pocket spending by patients for treatment, medications, and other medical services.

US Sanctions Global Network Supporting Mahan Air and IRGC

The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced on Thursday, July 30, that its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had imposed sanctions on six companies and individuals in China, India, Russia, and Iran for cooperating with Mahan Air and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which the United States has designated as a terrorist organization. According to the Treasury Department, these individuals and companies were part of Mahan Air’s international support network. Washington says the airline has for years played a role in transporting personnel of the IRGC Quds Force, as well as moving military equipment, drones, and weapons.
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Those sanctioned include Shanghai Wings and Shanghai Elite International Travel in China, Skiez Travels and Logistics in India, Air Cargo Pro in Russia, and DadeNegar Startup Studio in Iran. Tang Xin, the CEO of Shanghai Wings, was also sanctioned separately. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized that any individual or entity providing financial, commercial, or logistical services to the IRGC or Mahan Air is contributing to the continuation of a network that Washington considers terrorist and will face the risk of sanctions. Under this decision, the assets of the sanctioned individuals and companies within U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen, and foreign institutions that conduct business with them may also be subject to U.S. secondary sanctions.

Retirees Keep the Flame of Civil Protest Alive in Iran

Retirees in Iran are now forced to take to the streets in the scorching heat of summer and the freezing cold of winter. They stand in front of Social Security offices and government buildings, risking insults, beatings, arrest, and fabricated legal cases—not for special privileges, but for their most basic rights: a dignified livelihood, accessible healthcare, and the respect earned through a lifetime of work. For weeks, Sundays have become the day of retirees’ protests in cities across Iran. The significance of these protests extends beyond their economic demands or the number of participants each week. The “Protest Sundays” have become a recurring public gathering, gradually taking on a meaning that goes beyond a labor-related protest. What gives these protests political and social weight is their persistence. Through their repeated presence, retirees prevent government promises, waves of repression, or new crises from pushing their demands aside.
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A group denied the right to form independent and free organizations has, in this way, created an informal institution—one without offices, budgets, or official platforms, but sustained through continuity, local networks, and shared experience. A significant part of the protests focuses on enforcing existing laws. Retirees are demanding pensions that reflect the real cost of living, full implementation of pension equalization, payment of overdue benefits, enforcement of Article 96 of Iran’s Social Security Law, and access to free or affordable healthcare.

Why do retirees’ protests matter?

Retirees are among the groups that the Iranian regime has traditionally viewed as low-risk, conservative, and dependent on official institutions. The prevailing assumption is that old age, illness, reliance on healthcare, and dependence on pensions would keep them off the streets. Yet in recent years, this very group has become one of the country’s most persistent forces for labor and civil protest. The retirees’ movement emerged from economic demands, but at some demonstrations its slogans have expanded to broader social issues. Protests against war, executions, the arrest of labor activists, and the imprisonment of teachers and workers show that parts of the movement have drawn a connection between economic injustice and political repression. Slogans such as “Enough warmongering, our tables are empty” and “Inflation, high prices, no to war and destruction” show that retirees do not see war and economic hardship as separate issues. Slogans opposing executions and supporting workers, teachers, and imprisoned activists also expand the boundaries of what would otherwise be a purely labor-related protest. When retirees demand the release of political prisoners and imprisoned labor activists, the issue of pensions becomes linked to the rights to protest and freedom of expression.

Small Protests and Moments of Social Upheaval

Iran’s experience over the past decade shows that large-scale protests rarely emerge in a vacuum. Before public anger erupts across dozens or hundreds of cities, society often passes through a period of smaller demonstrations, strikes, and scattered protests. These protests may appear to focus on different issues: wages, water shortages, electricity, unemployment, compulsory hijab, corruption, the collapse of financial institutions, the arrest of an activist, or the death of a citizen in custody. Yet the repetition of these scattered protests creates a shared experience. Different segments of society come to realize that, despite their different grievances, they share common underlying causes: poor governance, systemic corruption, lack of accountability, and the suppression of the right to protest. In the months leading up to the January 2018 nationwide protests, demonstrations by victims of failed financial institutions were among the clearest signs of economic discontent. Those gatherings were not the sole cause of the uprising, but they helped create an environment in which limited economic demands quickly evolved into broader protests against the political system. Before the nationwide protests of 2022, Iran had already witnessed successive waves of demonstrations by workers, teachers, retirees, farmers, women, and families seeking justice. The killing of Mahsa Jina Amini was the decisive trigger, but public anger was not born that day. Her death connected years of accumulated humiliation, violence, discrimination, and unanswered protests. The same pattern can also be seen in the January 2026 protests. Before the unrest spread, signs of public dissatisfaction were already visible in strikes, labor demonstrations, and protests over inflation and economic conditions. In all three cases, a specific event or demand grew into a broader protest only after society had already experienced sustained grievances, demonstrations, and repression. Social movements cannot be predicted with precision, and every major wave of protest requires a combination of conditions, a triggering event, and the ability to connect different social groups. But smaller protests can provide the invisible foundation for such moments by reducing fear, creating a shared language, building experience with public demonstrations, and expanding solidarity. These movements may not, by themselves, lead to nationwide protests, but they can play the same role that smaller demonstrations played in earlier periods: preserving the memory of protest and keeping networks prepared to connect when an unpredictable moment arrives.

The Broad Geography of a Shared Demand

One of the defining features of the retirees’ movement is that it is not confined to Tehran. The continued presence of retirees in Ahvaz, Shush, Kermanshah, Rasht, and many other cities shows that the crises of livelihoods and healthcare are nationwide. At first glance, the Sunday protests may appear to be small and scattered gatherings, but the history of protests in Iran has repeatedly shown that major waves of unrest are often built from the convergence of such local circles. No one can say with certainty when or how the retirees’ Sunday protests or the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign will connect to broader social movements. But it can be said that these movements prevent both the streets and the prisons from becoming places of absolute silence.