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The United States and Arab Allies Sanction Five Entities and 16 Hezbollah Officials

The United States and the member states of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) have imposed a new round of sanctions against the financial network of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Iranian regime’s principal proxy group in the country. In this joint action, five entities and 16 senior executives and officials associated with Hezbollah’s financial structure were placed under sanctions. The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced on Tuesday, June 30, that the sanctions were imposed to weaken Hezbollah’s financial infrastructure, deny the group access to funding, and restrict its operational capabilities in Lebanon and across the region. According to the statement, Hezbollah’s two principal financial institutions, “Al-Qardh Al-Hassan” and “Bayt al-Mal,” along with several of their senior executives and officials, have been designated under the sanctions.

Iranian Regime-Backed Hezbollah Under Heavy Pressure

The joint statement issued by the member states of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center emphasized that financial networks linked to proxy groups backed by the Iranian regime threaten regional stability, international security, shared interests, and global trade. The U.S. Department of the Treasury also stated that targeting Hezbollah’s financial resources is part of international efforts to protect the global financial system, support the people of Lebanon, and prevent the activities of terrorist networks affiliated with the Iranian regime. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, although Al-Qard Al-Hassan is officially registered as a non-governmental organization in Lebanon, it effectively operates as Hezbollah’s unofficial bank and provides extensive financial services beyond its legal authority. U.S. officials say Hezbollah has used the institution to transfer funds, finance its military activities, and evade international sanctions. According to the Treasury, over the past decade, the network has moved more than $500 million through Lebanon’s banking system by using intermediary and front accounts. Among those sanctioned are several senior members of Hezbollah’s financial network, including Ahmad Mohammad Yazbek, Chief Financial Officer of Al-Qard Al-Hassan; Abbas Hassan Gharib, the institution’s Information Technology Director; Ibrahim Ali Zaher, head of Hezbollah’s Central Finance Unit; Adel Mohammad Mansour, Executive Director of Al-Qard Al-Hassan; as well as Samer Hassan Fawaz, Ali Mohammad Karneeb, and Imad Mohammad Baz. The U.S. Department of the Treasury also identified Bayt al-Mal as Hezbollah’s unofficial financial treasury, responsible for holding the group’s assets, managing its investments, and overseeing its financial resources while acting as an intermediary between Hezbollah and Lebanon’s formal banking sector. In addition, the companies “Al-Khubaraa for Accounting, Auditing and Studies” and “Tasheelat” have also been sanctioned for assisting in the management and transfer of Hezbollah’s financial resources. Hezbollah, which has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and a number of Western and Arab countries, has served as the Iranian regime’s primary proxy in Lebanon for the past four decades and has received a substantial portion of its financial, military, and logistical support from Tehran. U.S. officials and their Arab allies have emphasized that the objective of this latest round of sanctions is to disrupt Hezbollah’s funding channels and limit the group’s ability to continue its military and regional activities.

Drug Crisis: Chemotherapy Costs in Iran Have Increased Tenfold

A new wave of drug price increases in Iran has catastrophically raised the cost of medical treatment. In one example alone, the cost of each chemotherapy cycle has risen from about 70 million rials two years ago to nearly 700 million rials. The increases affect everything from widely used generic medications to specialized drugs for patients with rare and chronic illnesses. Insurance providers have not increased their coverage in line with rising prices, forcing patients to pay the difference out of pocket. Inflation in the healthcare sector has been significantly higher than overall inflation, reaching 15.6% in April, 23.1% in May, and 8.6% in June. In addition, the foreign currency allocation for medicines and medical equipment has been reduced from $3.5 billion to $3 billion.
Iranian Citizens Face Drug Shortages and Health Crisis
Other factors behind rising healthcare costs include severe liquidity shortages, government-imposed price controls, delays in insurance reimbursements, fragile supply chains, and the forced shift in transporting medicines and raw materials from sea routes to land routes due to regional tensions resulting from the Iranian regime’s foreign policies, which has sharply increased transportation costs. Months ago, pharmaceutical industry representatives warned that production could not continue without structural reforms, but the Iranian regime has taken no effective action. The main burden of soaring prices has fallen directly on patients. The Iranian regime’s destructive foreign policies, which have resulted in extensive sanctions, proxy wars, and international isolation, have reduced foreign currency allocations and made transportation routes more expensive and less secure. At the same time, systemic corruption, economic mismanagement, government-imposed price controls, and the failure to allocate resources properly have pushed the pharmaceutical industry to the brink of collapse. As a result, cancer patients and people suffering from serious chronic illnesses now face an extremely critical situation. Many are abandoning treatment altogether, while others are selling their assets and taking on overwhelming debt, destroying their own lives and those of their families. This humanitarian disaster is unfolding while a large share of the country’s oil revenues and national resources is being spent on war, regional adventurism, domestic repression, and looting by regime institutions instead of being invested in public healthcare. By continuing these failed policies, the Iranian regime is effectively condemning patients to death or extreme poverty and has plunged Iranian society into a deep healthcare crisis.

Iran’s Negative Economic Growth: From Statistical Manipulation to the Collapse of Investment

When the gap between official figures and reality becomes too wide, the economic crisis is no longer confined to production and investment—it also consumes public trust. Iran’s negative economic growth during 2025 reflects the collapse of investment, declining household consumption, and the role of the governance structure, international sanctions, and the erosion of social capital in shrinking the country’s economy.

Why Did Iran’s Economy Shrink in 2025?

Official data released for 2025 show that Iran’s economy has entered a new phase of structural stagnation. Although some official institutions have reported slightly positive economic growth, excluding oil revenues presents a completely different picture. Negative economic growth indicates that the core problem is not a temporary shock but the gradual erosion of the foundations of production, investment, and social trust.
Inflation in Iran and the Limits of What an Agreement with the United States Can Achieve

Oil Growth: A Cover for the Reality of the Domestic Economy

Statistics from the Central Bank of Iran and the Statistical Center of Iran show that economic growth in 2025, including oil, ranged between -0.7% and 0.2%. However, excluding oil, the country’s economy entered negative territory and gross domestic product contracted. This reality once again highlights Iran’s historical dependence on oil revenues. Negative economic growth demonstrates that the existing economic structure has failed to transform oil resources into a driver of industrial development and higher productivity. As a result, whenever oil revenues decline or their growth potential becomes limited, the weaknesses of other sectors become apparent. Negative growth in agriculture, declining industrial output, and a sharp slowdown in the services sector all indicate that the main engines of the economy are in a state of deterioration. Limited growth in the oil sector has only prevented an even larger economic decline.

The Collapse of Investment: A Warning Sign for the Future

One of the most significant aspects of negative economic growth is the sharp decline in investment. Gross fixed capital formation fell substantially in 2025, and investment in machinery also entered negative territory. Investment is the most important indicator of economic actors’ confidence in the future. When investors lack confidence in legal stability, economic security, and the political outlook, they do not commit their resources to productive sectors. Under such conditions, the economy shifts toward speculation, capital flight, and unproductive activities. In Iran’s current system, the dominance of regime institutions over the economy, widespread organized corruption, international sanctions, and the lack of transparency have created an unfavorable environment for investment. Negative economic growth shows that the investment crisis is not merely an economic issue but the direct result of the governing system and the concentration of political power.

Declining Household Consumption and the Erosion of Public Welfare

The slowdown in private consumption is another key sign of economic stagnation. In recent years, Iranian households have faced chronic inflation, the depreciation of the national currency, and rising living costs. Declining household consumption means a smaller domestic market and reduced incentives for producers to expand economic activity. This vicious cycle intensifies stagnation and reduces employment opportunities. Social studies also show that a large portion of the population has lost hope in the country’s economic future. The decline in social capital and the growing sense of discrimination have themselves become factors deepening the economic crisis. Negative economic growth reflects precisely this connection between economic crisis and the erosion of political legitimacy.

War, Sanctions, and the Governance Structure

The wars of 2025 and early 2026 caused extensive economic damage and intensified existing uncertainty. However, attributing all of the country’s problems solely to war or sanctions would be an incomplete analysis. International sanctions have undoubtedly imposed heavy costs on the economy, but a significant portion of the current crisis is rooted in domestic policies and the structure of political power. A rent-based economy, extensive government intervention, weak independent institutions, and prioritizing ideological goals over economic development have created the primary conditions for negative economic growth. Negative economic growth shows that even during periods when oil sales increased, Iran’s economic growth was not sustainable. The reason is that oil revenues have been used to reinforce the political structure and expand the rent-based economy rather than to develop productive infrastructure.

Structural Deadlock and the Need for Fundamental Change

The experience of various countries shows that sustainable economic development is not possible without fundamental political and institutional reforms. In Chile after the end of Augusto Pinochet’s rule, in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, and in many developing countries, the transition to accountable and democratic systems created the conditions for long-term economic growth. In Iran as well, negative economic growth indicates that the current crisis goes beyond management failures or short-term policies. The current governance structure has itself become an obstacle to the development of a competitive economy, the attraction of investment, and higher productivity.

Iraq Sets September 30 as Deadline for Disarmament of Iranian Regime-Backed Militia Groups

Iraqi government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi announced on Monday, June 29, that the government has given Shiite armed groups backed by the Iranian regime until September 30 this year to surrender their weapons. The announced deadline coincides with the end of the U.S.-led international coalition’s mission against ISIS in Iraq. The announcement comes ahead of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s visit to the United States, as Washington has been pressuring Baghdad to ensure the disarmament of these groups. The deadline for the Iran-backed groups was announced one day after Iranian regime Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Baghdad. Haider al-Aboudi, the Iraqi government spokesperson, said during his weekly press conference, “A specific date has been announced to all armed groups for resolving this issue (disarmament)… That date is September 30, which also coincides with the end of the international coalition’s presence.” He added that after that date, any weapons outside the authority of the state would be subject to legal prosecution. At the same time as Araghchi’s visit to Iraq, Iraqi security forces, backed by the army, raided Baghdad’s Green Zone early Sunday to arrest several senior officials. According to the Iraqi News Agency (INA), 47 people, including government officials and several members of parliament, were arrested as part of an anti-corruption campaign. Some reports indicate that a number of those arrested are figures backed by Tehran. Iraq hosts dozens of powerful armed groups backed by Iran, many of which are part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), also known as Hashd al-Shaabi. Many of these groups were formed following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and expanded their power and influence after 2014 during the campaign against the Islamic State (ISIS). In recent months, under intense U.S. pressure, Iraqi officials have announced plans to fully integrate all Popular Mobilization Forces factions into the state’s security forces so that the government holds the exclusive authority to bear arms. The Baghdad government also intends to incorporate brigades currently operating outside the PMF’s official structure into this integration process. The move comes after some PMF factions launched attacks against U.S. interests in Iraq following the outbreak of the U.S. and Israeli war with Iran in March 2026. In response, Washington carried out strikes against these groups and subsequently suspended the transfer of Iraq’s oil revenues under an arrangement established after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. During the 40-day war and the subsequent ceasefire, reports also emerged of attacks by these groups against other countries. In May 2026, the United Arab Emirates announced that drones launched toward one of its nuclear power plants had originated from Iraq. The Iraqi Shiite groups were not the Iranian regime’s only proxy force involved in the war. Hezbollah in Lebanon also began launching rocket attacks into northern Israel shortly after the conflict started, prompting extensive Israeli air and ground operations across Lebanon. Iraqi officials had been working to fully integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces into the state’s security forces well before the Iran war began. However, some of these groups have argued that the continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq justifies delaying the disarmament process. In early June, Iraqi officials announced that they had received information on the weapons held by Kataib Imam Ali, an Iranian regime-backed armed group, a move regarded as the first step in the plan to integrate these groups into the state security forces. Shortly before that, two groups aligned with the Iranian regime—Kataib Imam Ali and Asaib Ahl al-Haq—announced that they would transfer control of their brigades within the Popular Mobilization Forces to the Iraqi government.

Escalating Iran-US Conflict Cuts Strait of Hormuz Traffic, Lifts Oil Prices

Oil Prices Rise and Ship Traffic Through the Strait of Hormuz Declines Following Tensions Between Iran and the United States. New shipping data show that vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz declined again on Saturday and Sunday of the current week following a new round of reciprocal attacks between Iran and the United States in the strategic waterway. At the same time, the attacks and the resulting tensions caused oil prices, which had eased following the signing of the Islamabad memorandum of understanding, to resume an upward trend.
Iran’s Regime Nearing Oil Export Deadlock
According to data released on Monday, June 29, by the maritime analytics company Kpler, a total of only 29 cargo vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Saturday, while 12 vessels transited the strait on Sunday. Before the outbreak of the war involving the United States and Israel against Iran, which led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), at least 130 vessels, including oil tankers and container ships, passed through the waterway each day. According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Sunday’s figures show a sharp decline compared with the previous week, when the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington on June 15 pushed traffic through the strait to its highest level since the start of the 40-day war. According to Kpler, the number of transits reached 70 last Wednesday. Despite Iran’s warning against using unauthorized shipping routes, vessels continued to use several different routes to transit the waterway over the weekend. After a ship was struck while transiting the strait on Saturday morning, vessels continued using the southern corridor in Omani waters for several hours. However, according to Kpler data, traffic declined afterward. On Saturday and Sunday, the number of ships entering the Persian Gulf also exceeded the number leaving it, reversing the trend seen the previous week. During the previous week, the main focus had been on evacuating seafarers stranded in the Persian Gulf. The United Nations-led operation to evacuate 11,000 seafarers was suspended on Thursday after a ship was attacked in the Gulf of Oman. Following Iran’s attacks on these vessels, the U.S. military carried out strikes in southern Iran early Saturday and Sunday. In response, Iran launched an attack on Bahrain. According to a post published on X by HFI Research, four oil tankers and one container ship entered the Persian Gulf through the southern corridor in Omani waters on Sunday under escort by U.S. Navy warships. However, according to Kpler data, no vessels used the same route to leave the Persian Gulf on Sunday.

Oil Prices Rise Again

Amid renewed tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices rose again after falling sharply last week and approaching their pre-war levels. According to Reuters, oil prices increased on Monday, June 29, after several days of attacks by the United States and Iran once again slowed energy shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. According to reports, Brent crude from the North Sea rose to about $72.57 per barrel on Monday morning, while U.S. crude reached $70.11 per barrel. This compares with last Friday, when Brent crude fell by more than 4% to $71.99 per barrel, while U.S. crude declined to $69.23 per barrel.

The ‘No To Executions Tuesdays’ campaign has entered its 127th week

The campaign “No to Executions Tuesdays,” a prisoner-led protest against executions held across multiple prisons in Iran, entered its 127th week on Tuesday, June 30. In this way, the longest-running protest and hunger strike by prisoners in Iran has entered a critical phase. On this occasion, prisoners participating in the campaign issued a statement, and while reviewing the most prominent crimes committed in Iran over the past week, they called for a global response to these executions.

The continuation of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign in 57 different prisons during its 127th week

The machinery of execution and repression of the ruling authoritarian government continues to operate, and on a daily basis political prisoners and prisoners convicted of ordinary crimes are being executed across the country.
Iran: 304 Executions in One Month, 1,735 In 2025 So Far
The judiciary of the Iranian regime has announced that since the beginning of the recent war, 3,292 people have been arrested on charges of “cooperating with the enemy.” This figure comes amid a new phase of crackdown on protesters following the suppression of nationwide protests in January 2026 by military and security forces, with many detainees now facing death sentences or long prison terms. The prosecutor of Sari, a city in northern Iran, said that 700 cases have been filed against protesters from the January uprising. Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday prayer leader of Mashhad, has also reported thousands of cases against those arrested during the January uprising. The number of executions between May 22 and June 21 has reached approximately 140 people. The record of this regime is full of widespread and blatant human rights violations and the use of executions as a tool of repression and intimidation. Thousands of families in Iran are mourning loved ones who have been victims of the regime’s repressive will through inhumane processes. In this context, the voice of a father asking, “Where is my son’s grave?” rises from the depths of pain and injustice; this is the question of the father of Vahid Bani Amirian, a political prisoner who, along with five other political prisoners, was executed in April at Qezel Hesar prison. Other families who were not even given the bodies of their children express not only a personal demand but the collective cry of many justice-seekers who are deprived of the basic right to know the burial place of their loved ones. This deprivation is a continuation of punishment after death and a clear violation of human dignity, where suffering does not end and mourning is not even permitted. In contrast to this repression and medieval brutality, the voice of prisoners in the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign continues to be raised. Every Tuesday without interruption, they remind that the death penalty must be abolished and that freedom and equality must be established in Iran. Members of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign are on hunger strike on Tuesday, June 30, during the 127th week, in 57 prisons across Iran.

Sixty-two Members of the Iranian Regime’s Assembly of Experts Call for Keeping the Strait of Hormuz Closed

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As signs of divisions and rivalry at the highest levels of the Iranian regime have become increasingly apparent, 62 of the 88 members of the Assembly of Experts, the body responsible for appointing and overseeing the supreme leader, issued an unprecedented statement calling for the continuation of confrontational policies, including keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed and the assassination of U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In the 10-point statement, the signatories described U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as “Mahdur al-Dam” (one whose blood may be shed with immunity) and claimed that killing them “is obligatory for every obligated Muslim who gains access to them.”
European Union Sanctions Against Iran’s Regime and the Strait of Hormuz Crisis
The signatories also referred to Israel’s continuing military operations in Lebanon and the presence of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, claiming that this constitutes a violation of understandings between Iran and the United States. On that basis, they described reopening the Strait of Hormuz as “a strategic mistake,” arguing that doing so would make “the enemy even bolder.” The statement also reaffirmed the positions announced by Mojtaba Khamenei, the new leader of the Iranian regime, regarding negotiations with the United States, calling for Iran’s nuclear program to be excluded from the agenda of any talks with Washington. The signatories further emphasized the need to pursue the “consolidation of control over the Strait of Hormuz,” obtain compensation, secure the release of frozen assets, and bring about the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region. In another section of the statement, officials were warned to refrain from making any remarks or taking any actions that could be interpreted as showing “the country’s weakness or inability.” It also stressed that Mojtaba Khamenei’s positions should be treated as the “final word” and that negotiations with the United States should not be allowed to drag on.

Deepening Divisions at the Top of the Ruling Establishment

Regardless of the statement’s unusually hardline content, its publication can be viewed as a sign of intensifying rivalry and divisions among different power factions within the Iranian regime. The signatories’ repeated insistence that Mojtaba Khamenei’s positions constitute the “final word,” along with their warning to officials not to deviate from them, may, in the view of some political observers, indicate that there is no complete consensus within the ruling structure on how to deal with domestic and foreign crises and that Mojtaba Khamenei’s directives do not command broad acceptance. From this perspective, when dozens of members of the Assembly of Experts feel compelled to issue a public statement emphasizing the need to follow the positions of a particular center of power, it may itself indicate the existence of resistance, hesitation, or disagreement within other parts of the ruling establishment. In addition to reflecting the increasingly hardline positions of part of the regime’s political establishment, the statement may also be interpreted as evidence of intensifying internal struggles at the highest levels of power. The unprecedented emphasis on following Mojtaba Khamenei’s positions is not necessarily a sign of strength but may instead reflect concerns about the extent of his influence and his ability to impose his preferred policies under the current crisis conditions. If these internal disagreements persist, this could come to be viewed as one indication of a weakening of his political position within the regime’s power structure.

Workers and Retirees in Iran Once Again Protest Over Living Conditions

Retirees and workers held protest gatherings and marches in several cities across Iran on Sunday, June 28, once again demanding that their labor-related and livelihood grievances be addressed. In the city of Shush, a group of Social Security retirees held a protest march and rally, emphasizing that they would continue pursuing their demands through street protests. Protesters chanted slogans including “Only in the streets will we win our rights” and “The street is our trench; the struggle continues until our demands are achieved,” calling for action to address their living conditions and legal rights.
New Wave of Protests Across Various Iranian Cities
The gathering took place as temperatures in Khuzestan Province exceeded 50 degrees Celsius, but despite the extreme heat, the protesting retirees continued their demonstration. At the same time, in Ahvaz, a group of workers and retirees staged a protest outside the Social Security Organization building in the Farhangshahr district at Kargar (worker) Square. The demonstrators demanded that officials be held accountable and that their labor-related and livelihood demands be addressed. In Isfahan, retirees from the steel and iron industries gathered outside the Governor-General’s Office to protest living conditions and the suspension of health insurance services. Reports indicate that protesters also blocked parts of the roads surrounding the provincial government building during the demonstration.

Retirees Protest in Kermanshah and Dezful

In Kermanshah, Social Security retirees gathered outside the Social Security Organization building as part of the nationwide protests. Speakers at the rally stressed the need for unity and solidarity to confront what was described as “the normalization of poverty, war, and destructive sanctions,” while chanting, “Until we get our rights, we will come every Sunday.” In Dezful, a group of Social Security retirees also gathered outside the organization’s building, demanding that their grievances be addressed. The protest was part of an ongoing series of labor-related demonstrations by retirees in cities across the country. The protests on Sunday took place after months of repeated demonstrations by retirees and workers in cities across Iran over living conditions, health insurance, retirement benefits, and broader economic conditions, with participants calling for their demands to be addressed without delay.

Bread Prices Rise Again in Tehran; Fresh Pressure on Household Budgets

With the implementation of new bread prices in Tehran on Saturday, June 27, a new wave of concern has emerged over increasing economic pressure on low-income households and the working class. As bread is considered the primary staple food for a large segment of society, higher prices could have a direct impact on food security and the livelihoods of millions of Iranian citizens. Hamidreza Rastgar, head of the Tehran Chamber of Guilds, announced the implementation of new bread prices for both subsidized bakeries and those selling bread at market prices, stating that the new rates would take effect on Saturday. However, many citizens say they have experienced higher bread prices at bakeries since late June, despite the absence of any prior official announcement from the government.
Rationing and Sharp Increases in Bread Prices Across Iran
Mohammad Javad Karami, head of the Flour and Bread Working Group, announced last Tuesday that, under a decision by the Tehran Governorate, the price of bread made with government-subsidized flour had increased starting on the evening of June 22. However, field reports indicate that at many bakeries, actual prices are even higher than the officially announced rates, forcing customers to purchase bread at prices above the approved levels. Economic experts believe that, unlike many other goods, rising bread prices have a direct and widespread impact on low-income households because bread remains the primary—and in many cases the cheapest—source of calories for millions of Iranian families. Particular attention has focused on the increase in the price of lavash, the most common and widely accessible bread consumed by workers and low-income families. The price of this type of bread has increased by approximately 440% over the past two years. During the same period, workers’ wages have increased by only slightly more than 100%, a gap that observers say reflects the continued decline in purchasing power and the shrinking ability of working-class households to afford basic necessities. The increase in bread prices comes as many families were already facing serious financial hardship due to rising housing, healthcare, transportation, and food costs. Now, the higher price of a food item that holds a fundamental place in the Iranian diet has further intensified concerns about worsening poverty and food insecurity. When even bread, the most basic consumer staple, is subjected to such significant price increases, the consequences extend far beyond a simple price adjustment. It is a sign of mounting economic pressure on the daily lives of millions of Iranians, many of whom spend a large share of their income on meeting only their most basic living needs.

Economics and Ethics in Iran; From Poverty to the Commodification of the Human Body

The economy affects more than people’s income, employment, or purchasing power; it can also penetrate the deepest layers of social and ethical life. When economic pressures drive people toward choices they would never have accepted under normal circumstances, economics and ethics can no longer be treated as separate domains. Economists such as Alvin Roth have, in recent years, sought to explain the concept of “repugnant transactions”—transactions that both parties voluntarily accept but that society views with moral disgust or ethical concern. Markets for human organs, prostitution, and certain forms of assisted death fall into this category. Iran’s experience has become one of the frequently discussed cases in the global literature on the ethics of markets.
Inflation in Iran and the Limits of What an Agreement with the United States Can Achieve
The expansion of unconventional markets, the sale of human organs, the growth of transactions driven by economic desperation, and the decline in social capital demonstrate that the economic crisis is not merely a financial issue but one that has also affected the ethical foundations of society.

The Political Economy of Iran’s Ethical Crisis

The relationship between economics and ethics in Iran cannot be analyzed separately from the country’s ruling political structure. Widespread poverty, chronic inflation, and declining economic opportunities are not the result of temporary policy decisions. Rather, they are the outcome of decades of concentrated political power, lack of accountability, and prioritizing political interests over public welfare. In democratic systems, civil society organizations and independent media can debate the ethical boundaries of markets and establish shared norms. In authoritarian systems, however, decisions about public ethics also become political tools. As a result, the government claims to defend moral values while simultaneously creating the economic conditions that undermine those very values. Iran’s kidney market is a clear example of this contradiction. A large proportion of sellers are individuals who have made this decision under severe financial hardship and economic pressure. Under such circumstances, speaking of “free choice” without considering the underlying economic conditions presents an incomplete picture of reality. Michael Sandel and Debra Satz also emphasize this point. They argue that poverty can severely restrict freedom of choice and transform certain transactions into forms of economic exploitation. Therefore, the ethics of markets cannot be judged solely by the consent of the two parties involved; the broader structure of power and the distribution of opportunities must also be considered.

Unusual Markets; A Product of a Dysfunctional Economy

In recent years, the relationship between economics and ethics in Iran has been marked by the emergence of markets that either do not exist or remain marginal in many other countries. From the sale of human organs to various unconventional contractual arrangements, these markets reflect society’s adaptation to severe economic pressures. Such adaptation is not necessarily a sign of success. Societies under pressure develop survival strategies that often carry significant ethical costs. When people are forced to sell parts of their own bodies to pay for medical treatment, rent, or outstanding debts, the issue cannot be reduced to a simple economic transaction. Economic authoritarianism has further intensified this trend. Widespread monopolies, institutionalized corruption, and the absence of equal opportunity have restricted social mobility. As a result, segments of society are pushed into markets that were once confined to the margins. An important point is that outright prohibition does not necessarily eliminate these markets. Global experience shows that simple suppression often leads to the expansion of underground markets. This reality, however, does not imply acceptance of the status quo. The central issue remains the economic and political conditions that give rise to such markets.

Rebuilding Public Ethics Is Impossible Without Structural Change

The relationship between economics and ethics in Iran ultimately leads to a fundamental question: Can public ethics be rebuilt when the political structure itself produces poverty, corruption, and inequality? Many political economy analysts answer this question in the negative. Social ethics do not develop in a vacuum. Public trust, social solidarity, and civic responsibility require accountable institutions and transparent governance. In the absence of these elements, society is forced to make painful compromises between survival and ethical values. What is unfolding in Iran today is not merely an economic crisis but also a crisis of the moral legitimacy of the ruling power structure. A system that cannot provide economic security and equal opportunity inadvertently pushes its citizens toward choices that they themselves do not view as ethically acceptable.